The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

- EDITORIAL
- COMMENTS
- BORDERLESS DEBATE
- FEDERALIST ACTION
- BOOK REVIEWS

Contents

A New World Will Spring from the Ashes of the Pandemic

Lucio Levi

The affirmation of the multilateral option in 2019 European elections and in 2020 American Presidential elections, marks a significant retreat of sovereignism, populism and nationalism.

A new political cycle has begun, triggered by the peril caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The lesson governments have drawn from the pandemic is that global issues need global solutions and that there is no exit from the emergency without a genuine common action. The immense task they have to address is to vaccinate the world. There is no alternative. "Where the danger is, also grows the saving power," famously asserted Friedrich Hölderlin. The turning point started in 2020 with Next Generation EU, the European recovery Plan. It represents a true paradigm change. The heads of state and government, having opposed for thirty years the increase of the EU budget beyond the ceiling of 1% of GDP, have suddenly been convinced by the pandemic to substantially increase the budget resources to an amount that can reach the figure of EUR 2400 billion and to finance it through a common debt to be refunded through European taxes.

Another extraordinary novelty is that the US, in tune with the EU, has decided an even stronger rescue plan, unprecedented in size and quality, with a budget of 1900 billion dollars intended to reduce inequalities and a "Build Back Better" plan with a budget of 4000 billion dollars, still to be approved by the Congress, to be spent in infrastructure and welfare provisions from paid leave to community college grants. This plan is clearly inspired by Keynes' idea that public investment is the key driver of growth and job creation. Its goal is the improvement of the quality of life: large scale use of renewable energy would boost transport electrification and residential heating and reduce pollution; the universal access to broadband would accelerate the transition to knowledge society, improve the quality of education, increase the role of telemedicine and eHealth technologies. Of course, the environmental and digital transition is underway all over the world, but is particularly advanced in the northern hemisphere. A brilliant economist, Mariana Mazzucato, has compared this ambitious project to the Apollo Program which paved the way for the conquest of the moon and space exploration. I venture the hypothesis that the era of neoliberal globalization is passing. On the other hand, the bad management of the pandemic has shown the weakness of political leaders like Trump, Bolsonaro and Modi and the limits of the idea that national borders provide a protection against the impact of globalization. Biden has substantially changed the traditional approach to development funding following the recommendation of a UN high level panel, which suggested to adopt a global minimum corporate tax on foreign earnings of multinational companies, in order to significantly reduce tax elusion. To convince the majority of the OECD countries, the G7 summit reduced the level of the proposed tax to 15%. It is an interim step towards a global agreement. The goal of the tax is to shift the competition between states from the amount of the corporate tax aimed to attract foreign investment to the quality of the investment in education systems, healthcare, social security and social services.

The lesson learnt by the COVID-19 pandemic

is that it is impossible to address global issues with national policies and structures. Taxation of multinational activities represents a big step forward in the direction of governing globalization. The global institutions should be strengthened, in order that they can correct global markets distortions and failures, and be democratized in order to let citizens participate in decision-making at the international level.

At the same time, it is worth quoting the opinion of Raghuram Rajan who suggested that the way towards the revival of democracy is strengthening the power of local communities through the articulation of public institutions at local level. Therefore, in order to overcome the limits of national democracy, it is necessary to transfer decision making powers not only at international (regional and global) level, but also at local level according to the multilevel federal model of government.

It is not meaningless that the promoters of the above-mentioned turning point are democracies. The North Atlantic area is not only the pivot for Biden's initiative to summon a summit of democracies and create a larger alliance of democracies, it is also the area where the barriers to free movement of goods and capital have been removed and is therefore the framework where an area of monetary stability, similar to the European Monetary System, with fixed but adjustable exchange rates, can be established, which is necessary to avoid monetary wars. In order to pursue this objective, the dollar as a world reserve currency should be replaced by the special drawing rights (SDR), i.e. a multicurrency system. The retreat of the American power in the world also involves the strategic and military sphere. Therefore, the US should rebalance its relationship with the EU in the direction of the strategic autonomy of the EU and a US-EU equal partnership.

Lastly, the EU's relations with Russia and Africa are to be considered.

Russia
The EU is in a position to improve mutual understanding with Russia and revive Gorbachev's grand design of the European Common Home. It should remove sanctions, start negotiations aimed at the enlargement of NATO to Russia and the adoption of a common security system in the perspective of stretching it to China and the rest of the Asian continent, including stabilization of the relations with Turkey and Iran, and ultimately transforming it into the armed wing of the UN. The OSCE and the Council of Europe can give a crucial contribution to this design, as they associate several countries belonging to different world regions and cooperating in the areas of security, economy and human rights, which are the three baskets of the Helsinki process. It is to be considered that economic cooperation presupposes security and political stability and that the transition to democracy requires political stability and economic development. The EU can help Russia modernize and diversify its economy away from oil and gas and accompany it on the path of ecological and digital transition.

Africa
A development plan comparable with the Marshall Plan to address the root causes of Africa's economic backwardness is the highway to solve the problems posed by the imposing migratory flows which are heading towards Europe. At the same time, the Sahara desert is the potential source of solar energy, whose exploitation would require technological innovation and a huge amount of investment. The joint efforts of diplomacy are oriented in this direction. President Macron has recently summoned an emergency summit on the financing of African economies and pleaded for the funding of at least 100 billion dollars through the allocation of SDRs issued by the IMF to revive the continent's economy, heavily impacted by the COVID-19 epidemic. An African monetary fund would enable the African countries to pool their financial resources in order that they can face the payment crisis they are confronted with.

Why European Strategic Autonomy Matters

Josep Borrell

The debate on "European strategic autonomy" has recently given rise to quite a lot of controversies. Let's welcome this debate because we need to clarify the issue, clear up ambiguities and make some concrete proposals on how we can move forward.

Some see in strategic autonomy an illusion that is best abandoned, especially after Joe Biden's victory. Others see in it a political imperative to be pursued more than ever. In between, yet others suggest that we need to avoid old theological disputes and give practical content to these words. I agree with them.

When dealing with the issue I cannot resist the temptation of paraphrasing a great French author, Montesquieu, and his famous satirical text entitled How to be a Persian? *"Oh! To be strategically autonomous, it should be a very extraordinary thing! How can we be strategically autonomous?"* That is the question.

A brief history of an agreed concept

The concept is not new. In fact, strategic autonomy is part of the agreed language of the EU since quite a long time ago. It was born in the field of defence industry and, for a long time, it was reduced to issues of defence and security. And that is part of the problem.

For quite a while, the debate was limited to a clash between those for whom strategic autonomy was a means of regaining political space vis-à-vis the United States, and others, most of the European states, for whom it had to be avoided precisely for fear of accelerating American disengagement.

Since then, strategic autonomy has been widened to new subjects of an economic and technological nature, as revealed by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, the security dimension remains predominant and sensitive. Every time I mention "European strategic autonomy" someone raises a finger and asks, "And what about NATO"?, showing that both continue being seen as opposed. So, let us then recall some basic facts.

The Council already used the concept in November 2013 in relation to defence industry, to strengthen the EU's ability of becoming a better partner through the development of CSDP. In May 2015, the Foreign Affairs Council used the same terminology. It was further elaborated in the 2016 EU Global Strategy, with a clear reference to "an appropriate level of strategic autonomy".

The closest we have come to a definition is in the November 2016 Council conclusions. From there comes the expression, "capacity to act autonomously when and where necessary and with partners wherever possible". And the concept of strategic autonomy has been reiterated again by the Council in 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 and lately, even by the European Council in October 2020 in its wider sense. PESCO and the European Defence Fund Regulation have adopted it too.

Then, one could ask: Why should it be contested now? Well, the problem is that, in spite of being agreed language, not all the Member States understand it in the same way when used in different fields. This is why, for example, the definition of the conditions for third States participation in PESCO projects was so sensitive and difficult to agree.

Why is strategic autonomy salient more than ever?

Because the world has changed. It is difficult to claim to be a "political union" able to act as a "global player" and as a "geopolitical Commission" without being "autonomous". What are then the factors that make this concept more relevant than ever?

The first is that the weight of Europe in the world is shrinking. Thirty years ago, we represented a quarter of the world's wealth. It is foreseen that in 20 years we will not represent more than 11% of world GNP, far behind China, which will represent double it, below 14% for the United States and at par with India.

The next two decades are going to be crucial because China will use them to become the first global power, before becoming itself confronted with new demographic constraints, which will slow its rise. The relay could then probably be taken over by India.

The conclusion is straightforward. If we do not act together now, we will become irrelevant as many have argued cogently. Strategic autonomy is, in this perspective, a process of political survival. In such a context, our traditional alliances remain essential. However, they will not be enough. Since power gaps are shrinking, the world will become more transactional and all powers, including Europe, will tend to be more transactional too. This is an unescapable truth.

The second factor has to do with the transformation of economic interdependence in which we, as Europeans, have invested a great deal, particularly through the defence of multilateralism. Today we are in a situation where economic interdependence is becoming politically very conflictual. And what was traditionally called soft power is becoming an instrument of hard power.

The Covid-19 crisis has revealed the fundamentally asymmetrical nature of interdependence, and the vulnerability of Europe. Science, technology, trade, data, investments are becoming sources and instruments of force in international politics.

This is a very important change, which should lead us to strengthen all the instruments beyond security and defence, in particular those competences and instruments of the Commission that we have at our disposal, to defend our interests.

Another important reason is the shift in the world's focus towards Asia, particularly in US policy. This trend did not start with the Trump administration. The Obama administration initially decided to withdraw the last US tank in 2013. However, following the crisis in Ukraine it decided to bring back, on a rotational basis, an armoured brigade. Still, the wider point stands, as also the German defence minister said recently: "Only if we take our own security seriously, will America do the same." I cannot agree more.

Additionally, Europe is today confronted on its periphery with a certain number of conflicts or tensions in the Sahel, in Libya and in the Eastern Mediterranean. In these three cases Europe must act even more, and alone, because these problems do not primarily concern the United States.

As one Polish scholar wrote, "the US will no longer be engaged in large-scale military operations in Africa and the Middle East and will leave to Europe crises and conflict resolution in the European neighbourhood".

Therefore, we need to close many capability gaps and loop-holes and to be present and active in areas where our interests are at stake. In conflicts like Nagorno-Karabakh, Libya as well as Syria, we are witnessing a form of "Astanisation" of regional conflicts (in reference to the Astana format on Syria) which leads to the exclusion of Europe from the settlement of regional conflicts in favour of Russia and Turkey.

Why is this? How can this be remedied? Should it be accommodated? These real

questions must be asked within the framework of strategic autonomy. On these issues, the exclusive reference to NATO is no longer enough.

Europeans still have differentiated risk perceptions

Now, in spite of a broad agreement, things become more complicated when it comes to defining the concrete implications of this orientation and the level of strategic autonomy it entails. You can be more or less autonomous, depending on what issues and with respect to which actors.

In addition, I am well placed to know that not all European states see the problems through the same lenses, because they share neither the same history nor the same geography. And as result they do not have the same strategic perceptions.

Even if EU member states generally agree that they face the same risks, the perception of those risks is necessarily differentiated. In the east, in the south or in the southeast, the perception of threats and dangers is not the same. From this point of view, the Strategic Compass that is currently under development will be very important because it aims precisely at harmonizing the perception of threats and risks. However, the framework we need to define cannot be the expression of the preferences of the most powerful states. Because no state in Europe is entitled to lecture others when it comes to defining the threats and the interests of Europe.

This definition is not an easy task, but not an impossible one if we deal with the problem in concrete and not in abstract terms. For example, there are now French forces stationed in Estonia. Just as there are Estonian Special Forces engaged alongside France in Mali. I am not sure that without Europe we would have Baltic countries present in Africa.

In addition, Nordic and Baltic States who were at the forefront of cyber and hybrid threats

have been able to count on the support and cooperation of all other European states and the EU, which has developed a large toolbox. This shows that there is not only cooperation but also solidarity to help each other to address the whole spectrum of threats.

Strategic autonomy and the transatlantic link

When talking about threats, a major issue concerns the relationship of the Union with NATO and especially with the United States. It is a quite sensitive one. However, positions are not as far apart as we may think. I believe the time has passed when the need for a common foreign policy and security was denied, or not taken seriously.

At the same time, no one disputes the vital character of the transatlantic relationship and no one advocates the development of a fully autonomous European force outside NATO, which remains the only viable framework to ensure the territorial defence of Europe.

Since the Warsaw and Brussels Declarations of July 2016 and July 2018, cooperation between the EU and NATO has reached an "unprecedented level" as acknowledged in the London Declaration of Allied Leaders in December 2019. The election of Joe Biden will certainly make the transatlantic dialogue more fruitful.

From the pandemic response to trade, security and climate, or big power games, Europeans and Americans will be working closely together. Only a more capable, and thus more autonomous Europe, can meaningfully work with Joe Biden's administration, to make multilateralism great again.

That is why the consolidation of the European pillar in defence and security is more necessary. And the pace at which it will develop will be at the heart of the debate on strategic autonomy. Some want to go further than others, because they see it as a political objective that implies a much stronger mobilisation.

In addition, about the Atlantic Alliance, it can only truly work if it behaves as an evolving relationship between consenting and equal partners. That is why I believe that European strategic autonomy is fully compatible with a stronger transatlantic bond and is even a precondition for it.

If the relationship between its members is static or unbalanced, it will end up generating recriminations on both sides. On the American side, there are complaints that the Europeans do not make sufficient efforts to defend themselves. Therefore, American citizens wonder why they should help countries that do not want to spend on their own defence. Who could blame them for that?

On the European side, some may fear that the price paid for this guarantee may be too strong in terms of diplomatic and military autonomy. They may argue that in exchange for the military protection they offer to Europe, the United States demands, for example, that American military equipment is acquired. In doing so, the creation of a military industrial base in Europe will be weakened.

Nevertheless, we Europeans are managing to make pragmatic progress on that front. We have, for example, just adopted a new regulation governing third-party access to PESCO projects. In addition, we are about to adopt the European Defence Fund with equivalent provisions.

The EDF and PESCO are very good illustration of pragmatic strategic autonomy. Europe is creating mechanisms for cooperation and contributing to the financing of a European program designed to strengthen Europe's industrial base without undermining Atlantic solidarity. On the contrary, capabilities developed jointly by Member States under those schemes respond also to priorities identified within NATO.

What applies to these projects also applies to major intergovernmental industrial projects such as the Aircraft of the Future (SCAF) project, in which France, Germany and Spain are participating. These projects are likely to strengthen Europe without harming the transatlantic relationship. Therefore, they need to succeed. This is why the current industrial misunderstandings between partners need to be overcome.

The work on strategic autonomy begins first with us in Europe. If we want to remain somewhat credible in the world, if we want to develop our industrial base, we must necessarily develop a European defence industry that is a component of the European industrial base. We also need to work on reducing our substantial operational gaps.

Strategic autonomy is not limited to security and defence

If I have approached the issue of strategic autonomy at some length under the political-military prism, it is because this is, as I recognised from the beginning, the most sensitive dimension of the problem.

However, it is not the only one because the stakes of strategic autonomy are not limited to security and defence. They apply to a wide range of issues including trade, finance and investments. Whereas in trade, the EU is already strategically autonomous, when it comes to finance and investment work remains to be done.

We need to develop the international role of the euro, to avoid being forced to break our own laws under the weight of secondary sanctions and to ensure a much better level-playing field with China when it comes to investment standards. That is why a transatlantic dialogue on China is very useful.

On all those issues, we have started reassessing our tools to make them more effective. This is a big change in international politics. We now have a foreign investment screening mechanism, reinforced trade instruments, a useful toolbox for 5G and in the next year a better screening of subsidized investments. All

those instruments help with the construction of our political autonomy.

This movement has been accelerated by the Covid-19 crisis, because it showed how an issue like health could become a geopolitical issue. As such, neither masks, nor reagents, nor antibiotics are strategic products. However, when produced by a very small number of countries which turn out to be potential strategic rivals, they become strategic products. And what applies to health products applies also to rare metals of which certain states control the production or the transformation. Europe therefore needs to diversify the sources of its supplies and provide incentives for companies who want to relocate.

The very recent launching of the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA) is a concrete contribution to European strategic autonomy after Covid-19. The partnership of companies, business associations and governments will secure access to 30 critical inputs by increasing domestic production, recycling, and looking abroad for friendly suppliers.

The list of sensitive materials has more than doubled over the past decade, including rare earth elements joined by lithium, titanium and bauxite. The alliance will focus on the most pressing needs: EU resilience in the rare earth magnet and motor value chain. They are vital to key EU industrial ecosystems, such as automotive, renewable energy, defence and aerospace.

The alliance will address other critical and strategic raw materials needs, including those related to materials for energy storage and conversion. In this regard, the creation in 2017 of the European Battery Alliance of batteries is already producing significant results. By 2025, the EU will be able to produce enough battery cells to meet the needs of the European automotive industry – and even to build our export capacity. This is also strategic autonomy! Another issue where strategic autonomy is at stake is data. We have achieved a lot through GDPR. But the challenge will be industrial data, and business-to-business data for which there are no satisfactory international regulations. Indeed, in a world where data will be the oil of the 21st century, Europe cannot have its data left solely to market players or to have it confiscated by states whose protection of liberties is not an absolute priority. There is a true European model in an area that must prevail. A European voice must make itself heard.

Conclusion

Strategic autonomy is not a magic wand but a process, a long-term one, intended to ensure that Europeans increasingly take charge of themselves. To defend our interests and values in an increasingly harsh world, a world that obliges us to rely on ourselves to guarantee our future.

Towards a Multi-Currency International Monetary and Financial System

Alfonso Iozzo and Antonio Mosconi

Long before the US financial crisis of 2007-2008, which involved large and small investors in the EU, and backfired on the real economy, we thought that there was an urgent need to create a safety net for a possible dollar crisis. The safety net we identified was a basket of currencies represented by the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) on the International Monetary Fund, and as such not a euro-like single currency, but a common ECU-like currency[1].

This view was underpinned by China's tremendous support, at the time, of the stability of the international monetary and financial system;[2] by Obama's promise to include the renminbi in the SDR basket (2009), and the fulfillment of this promise – albeit only at the end of his second term (2015) due to long parliamentary opposition; and by China and the World Bank's first bonds issued in SDR. The proposal for a "new Bretton Woods" was also consistent with this framework and remains a forward-looking goal. This proposal sought to replace the dollar, issued according to the *raison d'état* of a single power, with the SDR basket in preparation for a world currency independent of individual national currencies. In our experience, this is similar to the transition from single European currencies to the ECU and then to the euro. Indeed, both the ECU-euro and the SDR originated from the line of thought that began with John Maynard Keynes's bancor, completed by Robert Triffin.[3]

In the first amendment to the IMF's Articles of Agreement (1969), Triffin managed to have the objective set of using only the SDR as an international currency. Despite having signed the commitment, the US prevented it from being achieved: however, the value of that long-term view has gone down on record.[4]

In the decade between the financial and health crises, enthusiasm for the SDR once again waned, like in the 1970s, and the creation of a multi-currency international monetary system started. Recalling Triffin's conversion to the euro in the 1970s, when the US blocked the affirmation of the SDR, we too must recognize that another phase should be completed before we get to a world currency. On the other hand, Bretton Woods was only actually possible because the US's overwhelming military and financial superiority at the end of the Second World War allowed it to impose the dollar, and not the bancor, as the world currency. This was a confirmation of reality. The next Bretton Woods must mark the end of hegemonies, and the beginning of cooperation. Therefore, it will involve far more complexity than an imposition. Parties to it will not be individual nation states, but large currency areas, and we need to focus our attention on creating them. A short-term view needs to be taken, while not getting distracted from the long-term one, remaining well aware of how the multi-currency system, that emerged between the two wars, ended. This new multi-currency system certainly will not be stable either; we federalists will have to fight for solutions that can preserve our greatest value: peace. Therefore, once again, it is a question

of reasoning in terms of realpolitik to make the transitionary arrangements' inadequacy clear with respect to the new scientific and technological "mode of production", which has made it possible the globalization of productive forces. We should observe what is happening to the dollar, the euro, the renminbi, the yen and other currency areas made up of countries that are interdependent but without plans for a monetary union. We will not mention the pound sterling, whose weight is now insignificant as the UK completes its post-imperial suicide with Brexit. Fortunately, the victory of democratic political forces over nationalist ones, both at the 2019 European Parliament elections and the 2020 US presidential elections, makes it possible to resume trans-Atlantic talks about the revival of multilateralism and international organizations. However, it will take time to remedy the damage caused by the Trump presidency. Biden himself aims to create a summit of democracies, thus excluding many peoples from participating in world decision-making, and giving the US the ability to decide which countries are democratic and which are not.

The dollar is burdened by a mountain of debt that is unprecedented in human history. The "paper pyramid" (Guido Carli), in comparison, seems modest today, while "deficits without tears" (Rueff-De Gaulle) and the "exorbitant privilege" (Giscard d'Estaing) remain in place. One may wonder why the dollar is still accepted as a reserve and financing currency, ranking first among currencies, despite Russia and China's massive sale of dollars in favor of gold and the euro. At the same time, one has to consider why the euro is about to overtake the dollar as an international means of payment. The financial supremacy of the dollar contrasts with that of the euro in the real economy. The weakness of the euro in the financial sector reflects the two areas of integration that have yet to be completed: the banking union (there is still no agreement on a common deposit insurance) and the European capital market. Moreover, there is always the question of path dependence: the US banking system was developed in a large unified market to match imperial ambitions, while the European banking system has suffered for a good part of its life because of the continent's division into nation-states that were at war with each other. The dollar retains this strength, a legacy of history, because after the declaration of the dollar's inconvertibility to gold (Nixon, 1971), and during the first oil crisis (OPEC, 1973), the US managed to ensure that the world oil price be quoted in dollars, bending the will of producing countries, which wanted the quoted prices to be in SDR. Energy was quoted in dollars because the US provided military protection along the supply routes and made it possible to recycle the vast amounts of dollars that were accumulating in oil-producing countries by investing in the US itself.

Thus, the myth of the world "policeman and banker" arose. The policeman has been discredited by uninterrupted series of wars lost or "not won", while the serious financial crises of Southeast Asia, Russia, large American companies and finally Wall Street itself have shown the rest of the world that de-dollarization and the accumulation of diversified reserves are a strategic priority. From the outset, it was evident that the formula "oil-for-dollar investments" would result in a cumulative US current account deficit offset by capital movements (which are nothing but external debt). The US authorities responded to this objection with "The debt is ours, but the problem is yours." Europe united and created the euro. In addition, the previous US Administration has weakened the role of the dollar as convertible currency, let alone the one as world currency, because large countries are subject to US diktats (sanctions) extended to the rest of the world with the threat of being excluded from the US financial market, the

payment system (SWIFT), etc. The case of Iran best illustrates the situation that has arisen.[5]

The European Commission's stated intention to foster the international use of the euro, seems to run counter to our conviction that the "Triffin dilemma"[6] applies not only to the dollar, but also to the euro and any other regional currency which has been given a global role. In reality, the Union does not aspire to a global role for the euro but intends to address situations that fall within its sphere of regional responsibility (its "backyard") and risk running out of control. Let's think first of the East. The situation in Ukraine has yet to be resolved, and will not be unless there is overall peace between the European Union and the Russian Federation. This result can be achieved on the basis of the economic interdependence between the two groups of countries,[7] but may also be hindered by the US, which will therefore have to get back into the game. In the meantime, during the financial crisis caused by the coronavirus, the Fed has enabled the usual swap agreements for all countries short of dollars except China and Russia, in the latter case the Fed being promptly replaced by the ECB. For us Europeans, achieving peace with Russia is absolutely essential. The EU has two foreign policy instruments: membership and association. The latter formula, which has been developed in various forms (as in the case of Norway, Switzerland and even Brexit) can also be adapted to the Russian Federation. Hitherto neglected institutions such as the Council of Europe and the OSCE will be able to provide the political framework for the "Common Home" to which Gorbachev aspired.[8]

The other part of the "backyard", i.e. our regional responsibilities, are Africa, for which the EU has launched the "Development Plan for Africa", and the Middle East. These two areas must be addressed together, not only because of the common problems of fostering peace between Shiite and Sunni Muslims, and the control of terrorist fundamentalism, but also because here, more than elsewhere, the currency choice is of decisive global political importance. In this case the free trade areas currently being created[9] will choose the currency in which the price of oil and many raw materials will be fixed. In practice, this means replacing the dollar. In our opinion, the SDR (e.g. the Afro-SDR, etc.) and not the euro should be proposed, initially as a unit of account, and then following the same path that led from the European Payments Union to the European Economic and Monetary Union. Why not the euro? For the same reason that the dollar or the renminbi cannot be used: A common currency must be used that neither evokes past colonialism nor threatens forms of future domination. To this end, it is crucial that the European Union has the African Union as its main interlocutor and partner. Finally, also with regard to the US, the adoption of a basket where the dollar still weighs more than 40%, even if it is to be gradually reduced according to IMF rules, will make the transition less painful. As mentioned, China has chosen the path of internationalizing the renminbi with respect to its definition in terms of SDR. However, a new major event has changed the scene: the creation of a large free trade area that includes China, Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand and ASEAN countries,[10] from which the US has excluded itself due to Donald Trump's isolationism. When the time is ripe to choose a common currency for this gigantic Asian market, it is unthinkable that the countries that escaped the supremacy of the dollar would want to be subject to the supremacy of the renminbi (and, least of all, the yen, whose population is a tenth of the Chinese one). At that point, one option will be to peg currencies to the SDR. And this is the one to fight for.

Let's also take a long-term look at Latin America. The various attempts at regional unity have always resulted in conflicts between right

and left "democratures". From a monetary point of view, pegging the various currencies to the SDR would bring a strong element of peace, but this alone is not enough. A basis for understanding must be established. So far only Pope Francis has understood what is at stake (peace) and, despite his age, he went to Congo and will go to Iraq and China. However, how can we ask the Pope to go to the opposite democratures of Venezuela and Brazil as well? Finally, a look at the future international monetary system must include digital currencies, alongside the dollar, the euro and the SDR. The question is whether these can exist independently. Our answer is no. The experience of bitcoin, characterized by enormous fluctuations in value, has ruled out it performing the functions of a currency (unit of account, medium of exchange and store of value). The big names in Silicon Valley have noted this deficiency and have felt the need to peg their lybra to a basket of currencies, obviously different from the SDR. This project is also struggling to take a final shape. From the point of view of power, these projects echo the ideas of the Mont Pelerin Society, established by von Hayek: The value of everything must be established by the market, and even currencies must compete with each other, without a public monopoly. Fortunately, not even the great neo-liberal and neo-con wave, which began with Reagan and continued until Trump's failed coup, was able to succeed on this point. While citizens may be gullible about grand political "visions", when it comes to their savings they understand that they need rules and guarantees: Central banks with their reserves and their powers of control are better. However, an international monetary system with digital currencies replicating the real ones will not ensure greater efficiency, unless there is a single digital currency pegged to the SDR, because what the world needs is a world currency.

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[1] Alfonso Iozzo and Antonio Mosconi, *The Foundation of a Cooperative Global Financial System. A New Bretton Woods to confront the crisis of the international role of the US dollar*, in The Federalist Debate, 2/2006.

[2] Xiao-Chuang Zhou, *Reform the International Monetary System*, in BIS Review, 41/2009.

[3] Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *The Ghost of Bancor: the Economic Crisis and Global Monetary Disorder*, lecture at the University of Louvain-la-Neuve, 25 February 2010, included in the collection of his essays *The Ghost of Bancor*, 2016.

[4] Elena Flor, *SDR: from Bretton Woods to a World Currency*, Peter Lang, 2019.

[5] Miriam L. Campanella, *Far-Reaching Consequences of US Financial Sanctions. The Dollar Shortage and the "Triffin Moment"*, RTI June 2019.

[6] In 1960 Robert Triffin, during a hearing in front of the US Congress, stated that an international monetary system based on a currency issued from a single state – such as the dollar – could not function in the medium-long term. In order to ensure the necessary liquidity to the world economic system, the issuing country needed to have a deficit in the payment balance but if the deficit was too much the trust in the currency would erode: the "dilemma". In the Bretton Woods system, the dollar was convertible into gold at the price of $ 35 an ounce. Triffin had predicted that it would be impossible to keep the promise and that the dollar was therefore not convertible, as President Nixon then announced in his famous statement of August 15th, 1971.

[7] Elena Flor, *Russia in the Triffin Dilemma, from De-Dollarization to new Commercial Perspectives*, RTI Paper N.14, December 2020.

[8] J.P. Baratta, D. Moro and G. Montani, *A New Atlantic Pact. A Peaceful Cooperation Area from Vancouver to Vladivostok*, The Ventotene Lighthouse, 7 October 2020.

[9] Elena Flor, "Monetary Aspects of the African Continental Free Trade Area", in Alberto Majocchi (ed.), *Africa and Europe a Shared Future*, Peter Lang, 2020.

[10] Indonesia, Brunei, Cambodia, the Philippines, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.

In Search for a European Identity*

Alessandro Cavalli

The sense of belonging to the European Union and, more generally, the feelings of European identity are phenomena in the making that can evolve, strengthen or weaken, according to the developments of the integration/unification process. It is not a question of building the myth of Europe, as the nation states have built the myth of the nation. Europe could never become a nation, but only a union of peoples, a post-national construction, a unity in diversity. But even so it will still need to develop a kind of European identity. This identity will, hopefully, not be as strong and exclusive as national identities have been in the past. A fundamental task in the formation of a European identity will certainly have to be carried out by schools, taking care however not to slip into an excess of Eurocentrism and/or European chauvinism. The European identity cannot be based on a common language. English will be the common language since it is the language of international exchanges, the language of everyone and of no one and, after Brexit, it is not the official language of any of the 27 countries of the Union, not even of Ireland, where Gaelic is the official spoken language. In order to have access to the culture of other peoples, English will not be enough; every European, in addition to his or her mother tongue and English, will have to be able to speak, read and write in at least one other of the 24 official languages of the EU. Trilingualism will have to be the mark of the European citizen.

If not the language, maybe religion can be the focus of a common European identity. A few years ago, at the time of the Convention charged with the drafting of a European Constitutional treaty, a lively debate arose about the proposal to include a reference to the "Christian roots" of European identity: the secular and the religious tradition confronted each other. No doubt that European culture is unconceivable without the tradition of Christian religion, as well as without the tradition of classical Greece or Roman law. However, to this tradition belong also centuries of religious wars against peoples of different faiths, outside and inside Christianity, fighting bitterly each other and spreading desolation and death all over Europe. Not to mention the facts that also antisemitism has a long tradition in Europe, and that the spread of the Christian faith all over the world was accompanied, anticipated or followed, by wars of colonial expansion.

There is no doubt that secularization has spread all over the continent. However, secularization can hardly be understood as an identity trait, but a secular view based on religious tolerance can indeed become a positive message that Europe offers to the rest of the world, based on its tragic experience of religious wars.

The common history will be the history of the "civil wars" that the European states fought among themselves in Europe, in the world and with the rest of the world, a history in which all the particular histories of its thousand cities and its hundred regions can be framed. It will be the history of the great cultural currents and their local and national variations: every country has had its Renaissance, its Enlightenment, its Baroque, its Romanticism and its science, which never had any nationality. The same is true for music and all the figurative arts, but also for all those forms that require linguistic

mediation, and therefore express a particular variant of a single cultural heritage. Voltaire, Hume or Kant, Shakespeare, Goethe, Tolstoy or Pirandello, Galilei or Newton (to name just the names that come to my mind first) would be impoverished if their works were circumscribed to the cultural heritage of the country in which they were born or found themselves living. It is certainly a good thing that Dante and Manzoni are read in Italian schools, but neither can we ignore Goethe's *Faust*, Cervantes' *Don Quixote* or Tolstoy's *War and Peace*.

Of course, the common European historical memory will also include the tragedies and iniquities of which the European states have been guilty in the course of history, from the Crusades to colonial dominations, anti-Semitism and the Shoah. Regarding the Shoah, of which last January the 27th was the day of remembrance, and many schools visited the Auschwitz camp museum, it will be important not to forget that Nazism represented the last extreme act of a long history of persecution of the Jews, that involved the whole of Europe from Spain in the West to Russia in the East. In addition to Auschwitz, however, it would be useful to organize school visits to the many military cemeteries that sadly dot the landscape of many European regions, so that we do not forget that the experience of war has marked the lives of entire generations of Europeans.

It may be that in time the symbols of belonging (the blue flag with the 12 golden stars and the hymn to joy from the finale of Beethoven's 9th symphony) will gain in importance, adding to and not replacing the national symbols. On the other hand, it is unlikely that an official EU team could be set up to participate in the Soccer World Cup, while it is possible that the national championships would lose some importance compared to the European Cup competitions. It is possible, although not probable, that May 9th will become a popular holiday like July 14th is in France; I don't know

if today 10% of the population of the EU knows that May 9th is Europe's Day, in memory of the speech in which Robert Schumann in 1950 proposed the pooling of coal and steel resources in order to avoid the possibility of future inter-European wars. It could perhaps become the day celebrating the memory of all the fallen of all the wars that Europeans fought against other Europeans. There will not be, instead, we hope for a long time to come, a military parade in front of the EU headquarters in Brussels, unless the EU is forced to defend itself from some external enemy.

The commemoration of the victims of infra-European wars will also concern the frequent case of border territories between two nations that historically have been the object of encounters, clashes, occupations, deportations, partitions, genocides and forced or voluntary migrations. Starting from the extreme West and going towards the East, apart from the events of the partition of the Iberian Peninsula between the kingdoms of Portugal and Spain, we have the case of the Basques, a population settled in ancient times between the northern part of the Pyrenees and the Atlantic Ocean, speaking a language not belonging to the Indo-European family and divided to this day between Spain and France. Then we find all the areas and the populations on the eastern border of France, the French-speaking part of Belgium and Luxembourg, the populations of the Rhine area, of Alsace and Lorraine historically disputed between France and Germany and often bilingual. Going down further south, we have the border areas between France and Italy, Nice, Brig and Tende, Valle d'Aosta and, going up further north, apart from Switzerland with its four linguistic communities, a true multicultural nation, Friesland, historically disputed and now divided between Holland and Germany, the Danish minority in the North of Germany and the German minority in the South of

Denmark, not to mention the German (and Russian) minorities in the Baltic countries, and the Swedish minority in Finland. Then there is the whole vast area of contact, often of clash, sometimes of exchange, between Germanic and Slavic populations (from East Prussia, now Russian, to the territories of Silesia, disputed between Germans, Poles, Slovaks), the areas of Hungarian minorities in Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania, and then again the Alto-Adige/South-Tyrol, the Slovenian minorities in Italy and Italian minorities in Slovenia and Croatia, the Greek and Albanian minorities in Italy, the chaos of the Balkan area, the division of Cyprus between Greece and Turkey, and who knows how many others.

Almost all these areas, that have been historically disputed, sometimes peacefully and often with unprecedented violence and suffering, are now within the borders of the European Union and there is no member country that has not had problems with its neighbors in the past. Memories are often divided, but history cannot be erased, and removals risk being more cumbersome than memories. One of the tasks of civic/civil education in the EU and its member countries is to be willing and able to address the wounds left by history based on the idea that every memory is legitimate and that historical truth cannot be reconciled or removed, but only approached through the understanding of the narrative of the other. Therefore, it is not a matter of adopting a surface irenicism, but of recognizing and overcoming historically determined fractures.

Beyond the symbols of identity, it is possible that silent, inconspicuous, and in a certain sense banal forms of acquiring a European identity may emerge, which have to do with the slow and almost unconscious accumulation of relational experiences in daily life that go beyond national borders. There are

several factors that contribute to the formation of this "banal" form of identity. On the one hand, there is the thickening of commercial exchanges, in the course of which partners get to know each other and establish relationships of mutual trust over time. Trade needs credit, and credit needs trust. On the other hand, there is international mass tourism, which has undergone an extraordinary expansion in recent decades and which, even at a superficial level, makes it possible to grasp similarities and differences and to become more familiar with different cultures, especially if language barriers are lowered.

Another factor concerns internal migration movements within EU countries. For example, the Registry of Italian citizens residing abroad tells us that they are about 5 millions, of whom slightly less than a half reside in a European country, and the figure is certainly larger since many migrants are thought to be temporary and do not officially transfer their residence. On the whole, almost 22 million EU citizens live in a EU country other than the one in which they were born, and it is very likely that this minority has a more precise awareness of its European identity than people that never left their homeland. However, migration is not only, nor even primarily, an intra-European phenomenon. Europe, from which tens of millions of people migrated to other continents over the centuries, has increasingly become an area of immigration since the end of colonialism, and European countries are becoming, not without problems and difficulties, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural societies. Migrants to Europe are often willing to become as soon as possible European citizens, in order to improve their geographic and social mobility.

In addition, a further factor, perhaps the most important in view of the formation of a ruling class with a European spirit, is student

exchanges between schools, universities and other institutions of higher learning. Since 1987, the Erasmus program has been active, involving over time at least 5 million young people and in recent years a share of 8.5% of all students in tertiary education. Personal relationships of friendship and possible future professional collaboration are also bound up with these experiences, and the increase in the formation of mixed couples of partners of different nationalities is not surprising either. Finally, a further factor refers to the consumption of mass cultural products (from cinema to pop music to video games). In this area, the share of production and consumption that can be labeled as "national" is now very small, and the phenomenon has global dimensions that are clearly not limited to the area of Europe.

Identity, however, does not only concern the images of the past and the present. There is no identity without images of the future. Europeans have another task to accomplish not only for their own benefit but also for that of the rest of the world: they have to show that it is possible to overcome the national dimension of statehood and build supranational institutions endowed with limited but effective powers. It is in this perspective that the idea of "constitutional patriotism" assumes political significance in the debate over a European identity, opened toward a cosmopolitan dimension. Should French and Dutch citizens in 2005 have approved the Constitutional Treaty proposed by the Convention chaired by Giscard d'Estaing, the European peoples would probably by now have acquired a stronger identity based on "constitutional patriotism". What was not accomplished then remains a task for the future.

Pan-Africanism, Federalism and Decolonization in Sub-Saharan Africa and the West Indies

Jean-Francis Billion

In his book, *Africa Unite! A History of Pan-Africanism*[1], historian Amzat Boukhari-Yabara writes in his introduction that "Pan-Africanism is a historical enigma. It can be defined as 'a *philosophical concept* born with the emancipatory and abolitionist movements of the second half of the nineteenth century', 'a *socio-political movement* built and developed by African-Americans and West Indians between the end of the nineteenth century and the end of the Second World War', or 'a *doctrine of political unity* formulated by African nationalists within the framework of anti-colonial and independence struggles'"[2]. He also writes that "in its essence, Pan-Africanism is above all an idea and a movement of history, which takes multiple paths to reach a final destination, Africa"; that "its birth marks the great return of Africans in the intellectual and political history of international relations" and, with good reason, that there can be no universal history today, between the Americas, Europe and Africa, without a history of Pan-Africanism. I hope that the author, who also cited one of my papers on Senghor in the notes, will not mind the above quotations, which have spared me a longer presentation[3].

The first Pan-African Conference in London in 1900 adopted an *Address to the Nations of the World* written by the African-American William E. Burghardt du Bois, considered one of the Fathers of Pan-Africanism. Despite the decision to organize new conferences in the United States (1902) and in Haiti (1904),

there were no others until the Paris Congress (1919), organized by du Bois in conjunction with the black deputy from Senegal (at the time a French Colony), Blaise Diagne, which submitted a request to the League of Nations for the German colonies to be managed internationally. The next Congress was held in London in 1921 and published a new declaration drafted by du Bois, the *Declaration to the World* insisting on racial equality, and a *Manifesto* on the need to correct the unequal distribution of wealth between the metropolises and the colonies, before a second session in Brussels and a third in Paris, where there was disagreement between conservatives (Diagne) and "reformists" (du Bois). The third Congress took place in London and then in Lisbon (1923) with a representation of the Portuguese colonies but the absence of the French-speaking ones. The fourth was held in New York (1927) with more than 200 delegates from thirteen countries or territories and an audience of thousands. According to Philippe Decraene[4], a French historian, "the Pan-African doctrine began to take shape "as participants proclaimed the right of blacks to African land and resources, to justice adapted to local conditions and including African judges, but also to world disarmament and the suppression of war. Some West Indians were also involved in the Pan-Africanist circles, from the 1930s in London: George Padmore[5], a communist in New York, responsible for the Comintern in Moscow until his break with communism (1935), founded the International Africa Service

Bureau and is, with du Bois, considered one of the fathers of Pan-Africanism; his close friend Cyril Lionel Robert James, a former Trotskyite, and Eric E. Williams, the future President of Trinidad...

The crisis of 1929 postponed the holding of the fifth Congress, which met in Manchester only in March 1945, organized and led from top to bottom by two men, Padmore, "a little-known but key figure in Pan-Africanism", and the future President of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah[6]. The preparation of the congress allowed English-speaking people to renew contacts with French-speaking people, thanks to contacts made by Nkrumah in France, and new leaders were revealed while the territorial divisions resulting from colonization, economic exploitation and the brakes on industrialization, the appropriation of cultivable land by Europeans, illiteracy and malnutrition were denounced... and calls were made for the independence from France of Algeria, Morocco and Tunisia in the North of the Sahara.

From the 1930s onwards, certain black intellectuals raised the problem of the balkanization of Africa which, after 1945, aspired more and more strongly to regain its independence; many of them considered the question of African unity as a condition for the independence and the future of Africa. However, "only" the future Heads of State Nkrumah (Ghana)[7], Julius K. Nyerere (Tanzania)[8] and the Senegalese well-known academic Cheikh Anta Diop[9] will really raise the question of a continental and federal African State. It is also worth recalling the differences and misunderstandings between English-speaking pan-Africanists (Afro-Americans, West Indians or Africans) and French-speaking people (such as Senghor or Aimé Césaire), who were the driving force behind the *négritude* movement, affirming the values of the black man.

According to our friend, Senegalese Federalist and World Citizen, Fall Cheikh Bamba[10], it is in great ideological confusion that African leaders led the anti-colonial struggle. They frequently wanted unity at the same time as, or before, independence, but none of them really asked himself the question of the need for a continental Federalist Movement, specifically African and strictly autonomous from the political classes (European or African) as an indispensable vehicle for African Unity. The attempts made at the 5th Pan-African Congress in Manchester at the end of 1945, and the last Pan-African Federation event in 1944, did not create a solid organization. Nkrumah's trip to Paris in 1947 to meet Senghor and French-speaking black intellectuals did not lead either to anything concrete. Senghor's later attempt to create the African Federalist Party, involving Senegal and some of its neighbors, also ended in failure. In the absence of a single, coordinated African program, demands were made in disunity, and remained confined to the territorial limits (often those of the current African States) imposed by colonialism during the arbitrary divisions of the Congress of Berlin at the end of the 19th century.

As far as French-speaking Africa (« French Equatorial Africa » and « French West Africa » being considered two *colonial federations*) is concerned, federalist or confederalist projects are numerous and there is not enough space here to analyze them in detail. Decraene draws up an inventory of the regional groupings envisaged by African leaders (1958 and 1959). Union between English-speaking Ghana and Guinea under Sékou Touré, joined for a time by Mali under Modibo Keita (after the failure of its union with Senegal); Sahel-Benin Union (Ivory Coast of Houphouet-Boigny, Upper Volta, Dahomey of Sourou Migan Apithy, a deputy close to Senghor at one time, and Niger), aimed at thwarting the Federation of Mali project; Customs Union of

Equatorial Africa (Central African Republic, Gabon, Chad and Congo Brazzaville); United States of *Latin Africa* promoted with a pan-Africanist aim by the deputy-mayor of Banghi Barthélémy Boganda (Middle Congo, Gabon, future Central African Republic, Chad and if possible the Belgian Congo, Portuguese colonies, Cameroon and Ruanda-Urundi); United States of Central Africa aiming at perpetuating the AEF; Union of Benin (Togo, Niger and Dahomey)...! None of these projects, whether or not they were linked to a federal or confederal *French Union* supposed to be a "French-style Commonwealth", could be completed.

On the other hand, in a context of nationalist exaltation, projects for Euro-African federations between certain colonial powers and their colonies were often seen as final attempts by European States to maintain their domination. The failure of Senghor's 1958 federation project (Senegal, Sudan, Upper Volta and Dahomey) and his more limited attempt at The Federation of Mali (Senegal, Sudan), or the lack of follow-up to Nkrumah's efforts after the convening of the 1958 Pan-African Conference in Accra: all of this, according to Bamba, is still attributable to the organizational vacuum that prevailed in the period preceding African independence. Only the union of Tanganika and Zanzibar, present Tanzania, succeeded for a time thanks to Nyerere.

Senghor did not limit his Federalism to Africa. He worked closely with European Federalists before independence, particularly as Vice-Chairman of the Federalist Intergroup in the French Parliament during the debates for the European Defence Community (EDC, 1954) and later in the Council of Europe. He was also in contact with World Federalists and remained until his death Vice President of the World Movement for World Federalist Government, to which he was linked by his advisor at the

Presidency of Senegal, Jean Rous[11], former Secretary General of the Peoples' Congress Against Imperialism founded, with Gandhi's approval, by him and the British Ronald G. MacKay MP, a member of the British Federal Union since the late 1930s[12].

In 1963, in Addis Ababa, despite Nkrumah's desperate efforts, the African Heads of State adopted the Charter of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), which would define the political principles and legal rules of African unity for decades. It proclaimed as the basis of the new Africa the principles of "respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State" and "the inviolability of African borders inherited from colonialism". The constitution of the OAU thus sealed an important stage in the history of Africa, by signifying the affirmation of new African state-entities built on the European model of the Nation-State and absolute national sovereignty. As Bamba wrote, the OAU thus opened "a brand new period in the struggle of African Federalists. The 'state nationalism' that has plagued Africa since then regularly brings the question of federalism to the forefront with particular acuity».

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In the Americas, the Spanish Colonies gained independence long before the 20th century and we do not discuss them. As for the French West Indies and French Guiana, the debates on the constitution of the Fourth Republic focused on the idea of departmentalization and an acceptable level of autonomy. Césaire, a Communist MP in 1951 for Martinique, was one of the actors; he left the Communist Party in 1956, joined the parliamentary group of the *Rassemblement africain et des fédéralistes* and created the left wing and local *Parti progressiste martiniquais[13]*. At its founding Congress, he revisited departmentalization, which had not produced the hoped-for results. He cited Proudhon's federal principle

and asserted that only the federal idea would allow for a true synthesis between assimilation and autonomy, envisaging that one day "Martinique, Guadeloupe and French Guiana together would form a State in a federal French Republic[14].

The debate in the British colonies was earlier and more ambitious. As early as 1932, Great Britain organized a conference and in 1938 a Labour Congress drew up a federal scheme emanating from civil society. In 1942, an Anglo-American Commission for the Caribbean was created, expanded to include French and Dutch territories; it was consultative and had limited powers, along with a non-governmental West Indies Conference. Many politicians, intellectuals and trade unionists took a stand. Eric Eustace Williams, the Labour Prime Minister of Trinidad, saw the West Indian federation in a globalist perspective[15]. At the St. Thomas Conference in 1946, one of the French representatives, Rémy Nainsouta, a Guadeloupean French MP and "independent communist," called for the future birth of a multinational "West Indian Community", without fearing that it could go as far as a Federation... he was accused of separatism. In 1947, a second Labour Congress called for a Federation of all the West Indies without distinction of nationality, and at the Montego Bay Conference, delegates from seven British colonies, meeting at the initiative of Great Britain, approved the principles of a federation with increased autonomy for the territories. The debate spread to the American continent where Richard Benjamin Moore, a Barbadian, was a member of the Socialist Party and then the Communist Workers Party, from which he was expelled in the early 1940s[16]. From the 1920s to the 1960s, he defended his theses at the Brussels Congress against Imperialism (1927), the Pan-Africanist Congresses, and

the Havana (1940) and San Francisco (1945) Conferences, where the United Nations was created. He led various committees: the West Indian National Emergency Committee (1940) and the American Committee for West Indian Federation, which sent a memorandum to the Labour Congress in 1947. Another conference was held in 1955, in Trinidad, under British presidency[17]. Norman Manley, Prime Minister of Jamaica, saw a confederation of all the West Indies taking shape, but Césaire remained doubtful, even though he could not rule out a confederal West Indian community in the indefinite and distant future[18]. The West Indian Federation, founded in 1958 (Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, Leewards Islands and Windwards Islands) broke up in 1961, paying for its heterogeneous character, the oppositions between Barbados and Jamaica, or between the large and small territories. Nor did the Federation attract the British mainland colonies (Guyana and Belize) despite its efforts and a conference in Georgetown (1959, Guyana) of C. L. R. James, General Secretary of the very important West Indian Federal Labour Party[19].

Padmore and James, natives of Trinidad who emigrated to the United States in the early 1920s, activists of the black cause, the former involved in the Communist International and the latter with Trotsky[20], continued their pan-Africanist work with Nkrumah, whom James had discovered in New York and put in contact with Padmore in London. Another companion of Nkrumah, Komla Agbeli Gbedemah, Ghanaian Minister of Finance, presided over the WMWFG for four years[21]. Senghor, who was close to Rous, concluded his message to the 1961 Vienna Congress of the WMWFG as follows: "After your congress, we propose to create a section of the Universal Movement for a World Federation in Dakar"[22]...

[1] A. Boukary-Yabara, *Africa Unite! Une histoire du panafricanisme*, Paris, La Découverte, 2014.

[2] The italics are mine.

[3] The book being organized in three parts, I used here parts 1, « Back to Africa! » (late 18th century to the 1930's) and 2, «Africa for the Africans! » (1930's to 1960's).

[4] P. Decreane, *Le Panafricanisme*, coll. Que sais-je ?, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1959.

[5] G. Padmore, *Panafricanism or Communism*. The coming Strugle for Africa, foreword by Richard Wright, London, Dennis Bobson, 1956.

[6] Elikia M'Bokolo, *George Padmore, Kwame Nkrumah, Cyril L. James et l'idéologie de la lutte panafricaniste*, Accra, Codesia, 2003.

[7] K. Nkrumah, see « Continental Government for Africa », in *ibid.*, *Africa must unite*, New York, International Publishers Company Co. Inc., 1970.

[8] J. Nyerere, cf. *Freedom and Unity*, London – Oxford, University Press, 1967, more specifically pp. 334-450.

[9] C. A. Diop, « Unité politique et fédéralisme », in *Les fondements économiques et sociaux d'un État fédéral d'Afrique noire*, 1974, and « foreword » in *Nations nègres et culture*, Vol. I, 1954, Paris, Présence africaine.

[10] C. Bamba Fall, « African Federalism », in *The Federalist*, Pavia, Vol. XXIX, n° 2, 1987, and « Le fédéralisme est-il un modèle pour l'Afrique », in Guido Montani, Tetevi Godwin Tete Adjalogo (eds.), *L'Afrique, l'Europe et la démocratie internationale*, coll. Textes fédéralistes, Lyon, Fédérop, and Ventotene, Altiero Spinelli Institute for Federalist Studies, 1990.

[11] J.-F. Billion and Jean-Luc Prevel, « Jean Rous and Federalism », in *The Federalist*, Pavia, Vol. XXVIII, n° 2-3, 1986.

[12] J.-F. Billion, *World Federalism, European Federalism and International Democracy. A New History of Supranational Federalist Movements*, foreword by Lucio Levi, New York, WFM-Institute for Global Policy, and, Ventotene, Altiero Spineli Institute for Federalist Studies, 1997.

[13] Daniel Guérin, *Les Antilles décolonisées*, Paris, Présence africaine, 1956.

[14] A. Césaire, *Pour la transformation de la Martinique en « région » dans le cadre d'une Union Française Fédérée*, Fort-de-France, PPM, 1856.

[15] E. E. Williams, *The Negro in the Caribbean*, London, Panaf Service Inc., 1945; *Federalism. Two Public Lectures*, Port of Spain, People's National Movement, 1956; *E. E. Williams Speaks, - Essays on Colonialism and Independance*, introd. Selwin R. Cudjoe, Welesley (Mass.), Calaloux Piblications, 1993.

[16] W. Burghardt Turner and Joyce Moore Turner (eds.), *Richard B. Moore, Caribbean Militant in Harlem – Collected Writtings 1920-1972*, Bloomington and Indianapolis (Ind.), Indiana University Press, and, London, Pluto Press, coll. Blacks in the Diaspora, 1988.

[17] D. Guérin, *op. cit.*

[18] A. Césaire, introd. to D. Guérin, *op. cit.*

[19] C.L.R. James, *Lectures on Federation (1958-59)*, CLR James Archives.

[20] CLR James, « Georges Padmore: Black Marxist Revolutionary – A Memoir », 1976, in *At the Rendez-vous of Victory – Selected Writings*, London, Allison & Busby, 1984.

[21] Re-elected in 1959 for a second term at WMWFG's 10th Congress, he opposed Nkrumah in 1960 and had to leave Ghana on exile.

[22] See *Monde Uni*, Paris, n° 54, August 1961.

Climate Change and the Role of Cities

Alberto Majocchi

Many of the changes aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions by using new European resources are connected to city management. These concerns are primarily about the use of air-conditioning, energy efficiency of the existing housing stock and the development of buildings that rely exclusively on renewable sources of energy. Towards these ends, public authorities would have to offer some subsidy to mobilise private investment in energy efficiency. However, in many cities, one of the biggest problems that needs to be solved is to reduce the use of fossil fuels linked to private cars.

Lewis Mumford noted[1] that the development of the modern city is based on the idea of people commuting by private cars. This type of development generates traffic congestion, increases pollution and ultimately reduces the quality of life of citizens. It is thus clear that the use of fossil fuel-powered cars is not compatible with the goal of carbon neutrality. In another essay[2], Mumford observed that "if the problem of urban transportation is ever to be solved, it will be on the basis of bringing a larger number of institutions and facilities within walking distance of the home; since the efficiency of even the private motor cars varies inversely with the density of population and the amount of wheeled traffic it generates" (p. 264). This seemingly simple observation should be a starting point for rethinking an urban structure which guarantees accessibility by phasing out transport that uses fossil fuels. Mumford's second observation relates to the spill-over that generally occurs as cities develop, with all the most important functions concentrated in the historic centre, leaving the suburbs without essential services. Mumford

argued instead that an ideal model would be based on the pattern of a medieval city: "The medieval city was composed on the neighbourhood principle, with the Church serving as community centre and the market place adjacent to it as shopping centre, both within easy walking distance of all the inhabitants" (p. 257). He added: "The creation of a neighbourhood involves something on a different pattern than that which has hitherto characterised the undifferentiated big city; for it also demands the orderly provision and relationships in both space and time of a group of neighbourhood institutions, such as schools, meeting halls, shops, pubs, restaurants, and local theatres. This calls for the continued activity of a public authority" (p. 266).

Finally, Mumford proposed that urban planning should follow a neighbourhood-based structure because neighbourhoods are based on principles of solidarity and should be considered as the foundation of community life. This approach had existed in the past, but was jeopardised by a style of urban development that encouraged car traffic and the spill-over expansion of the urban structure. Mumford also observed that "In a rudimentary form neighbourhoods exist, as a fact of nature, whether or not we recognise them or provide for their particular functions. For neighbours are simply people who live near one another. To share the same place is perhaps the most primitive of social bonds, and to be within view of one's neighbours is the simplest form of association. Neighbourhoods are composed of people who enter by the very fact of birth or chosen residence into a common life. Neighbours are people united primarily not

by common origins or common purposes but by the proximity of their dwellings in space" (p. 257). Therefore, the strengthening of community would facilitate a new welfare structure where public intervention and individual behaviour guided by a spirit of solidarity would play important roles.

A similar approach can be found in an important essay by Raghuram Rajan[3] on the "third pillar", that is, the community where we live. Economists often limit themselves to analysing the relationship between the state and markets, and leave it to others to deal with significant social issues. Rajan argues that this is not only short-sighted, but also dangerous. The whole economy is actually interwoven by social relations, as markets are embedded within a network of human relationships, values and norms. As markets grow, the state adapts to this larger scale, concentrating economic and political power in rich central poles, allowing the periphery to disintegrate and degrade.

Rajan offers a way to rethink the relationship between the market and civil society. He advocates a return to strengthening and empowering local communities as an antidote to the growing despair and disorder of life in urban centres[4]. These proposals imply a federal institutional structure, which allows all levels of government to participate in the decision-making that affects the whole community or parts of it. Additional steps involve reassessing fiscal federalism mechanisms to make autonomous fiscal resources available for each level of government, as well as creating an institutional structure where the lower levels of government participate in the decision-making mechanisms of the higher levels in a second chamber.

Restructuring the City based on Neighbourhoods
Restructuring the city based on neighbourhoods will require considerable investment to create essential services for each neighbourhood and to ensure that these can be accessed through eco-compatible modes of transport (walking or cycling), thus phasing out cars and other fossil fuel-powered transport. Each neighbourhood should have a local school – that can be reached without driving a car and can be used as a social and cultural centre during non-teaching hours – as well as commercial activities that are essential to daily life. There should also be essential health services, equipped with facilities to provide basic treatments and emergency care. Complex health services would be distributed in different neighbourhoods to avoid a one-way flow from the suburbs towards the centre.

Public transport should be used to travel between neighbourhoods or, if this is not available, an electric car powered by renewable energy could be used. *Ad hoc* routes should be established to allow cars to leave the urban structure. Large green spaces within neighbourhoods should be created, especially for children to play in and for senior citizens to enjoy a natural environment. These green spaces would be located between neighbourhoods and would function as carbon sinks. The road structure should be revolutionised to ensure separate routes for public transport, bicycles and pedestrians.

The issue of restructuring cities based on neighbourhoods is on the agenda in many European cities. A candidate for the office of mayor of Paris, Anne Hidalgo, is running on a platform that envisages Parisians having all essential services within 15 minutes of their homes[5]. Towards this end, she has proposed a simple idea to reorganise the city: that the services citizens need are no more than 15 minutes away and can be accessed either on foot or by bicycle from anywhere in the city. This project includes building wider sidewalks, greenways and cycle paths that are away from

motorised traffic, and having local operators to coordinate street cleaning and maintenance. To improve the proximity of services, Anne Hidalgo has also proposed making places multi-purpose. For instance, she wants to open schools on weekends and turn playgrounds into gardens where children can meet and play freely. Some buildings meant to be car parks could also house bicycle garages.

According to Carlos Moreno[6], the urban planner coordinating this project for Mayor Anne Hidalgo, "The aim is to transform the urban space, which is still highly mono-functional, with the central city and its various specialisations, and go towards a polycentric city, driven by 4 major components: proximity, diversity, density, ubiquity. The objective is to offer this quality of life within short distances, a quality of life comprised of the six essential urban social functions that are: living, working, supplying, caring, learning and enjoying. It is the fifteen-minute city, in a compact zone (or the half territory in a semi-dense or sparsely populated zone), of hyper-proximity, where everything is accessible to everyone at any time."[7]

In France, discussions on these projects are well underway, with studies conducted in eleven large cities (with 200,000 inhabitants or more) to see what work still needs to be done to achieve these goals. The analysis shows that the inhabitants of these cities are an average of 4.5 minutes away from a store and 17.5 minutes from a swimming pool. However, the main problem is work, as only 10% of the inhabitants of these cities walk to work. Hence to address this issue, the urban revolution would be facilitated by extending the growing trend of remote working that became necessary following the pandemic. This would significantly reduce commuting traffic.

However, this hypothesis applies to cities besides Paris. Mayors of the C40 network of global cities (including Milan, Los Angeles, Melbourne, New Orleans, Rotterdam, Seattle, Freetown, Hong Kong, Lisbon, Medellín and Seoul) have come together to launch the Global Mayors COVID-19 Recovery Task Force[8] to rebuild their cities and their economic structures to improve public health, reduce inequality and tackle the climate crisis. In their meetings, the proposals to revive cities include "the 15-minute city". Ultimately, it may be said that Mumford's ideas about revolutionising the urban structure by organising cities into neighbourhoods are beginning to take shape.

[1] Mumford, L. *The City in History: Its Origins, Its Transformations, and Its Prospects*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961.
[2] Mumford, L. *The Neighborhood and the Neighborhood Unit*, in The Town Planning Review, January 1954, Vol. 24, No. 4, p. 264.
[3] Rajan, R. *The Third Pillar. How Markets and the State Leave the Community Behind*, Penguin Press, 2019.
[4] "Democracy does not require perfect equality, but it does require that citizens share in a common life. What matters is that people of different backgrounds and social positions encounter one another, and bump up against one another, in the course of everyday life. For this is how we learn to negotiate and abide our differences, and how we come to care for the common good" (Sandel, M. *What Money Can't Buy. The Moral Limits of Markets*, Allen Lane, London, 2012, p. 203).
[5] Girard, M. "La ville du quart d'heure, une utopie ?", *La Presse*, 26 September 2020.
[6] Moreno, C. *Droit de cité, de la "ville-monde" à la "ville du quart d'heure"*, Éditions de l'Observatoire, 2020.
[7] Moreno, C. Preface to the White Paper *Paris Northgates Project*, ETI Chair, IAE Paris Sorbonne Business School, 2019
http://chaire-eti.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/White-Paper-2019.pdf
[8] https://www.c40.org/other/covid-task-force

The Rule of Law in Europe. The case of Hungary

Eszter Nagy

"Money makes the world go 'round", the famous song from the musical Cabaret is more valid than ever before. It is true for the EU's authoritarian leaders in two aspects; on the one hand, they receive unconditional financial support from the EU, and on the other hand they use financial means to punish local opposition, to eradicate independent media, and to suppress critical voices in general.

Within the EU there is the recurring narrative of the toolbox of the Commission. Tools they could make use of to assure the safeguard of the treaties. So, what is there in the toolbox?

There is a brand new, so far unused shiny new tool for this purpose, the rule of law mechanism that was finally adopted after long and difficult negotiations. Its purpose should be to fill in the shortcomings of the so far existing set of tools to guarantee the EU-wide respect of the basic democratic values.

However, there is also EU-wide skepticism about the implementation of the rule of law conditionality. Earlier this year the European Parliament even threatened the Commission with legal action should the Commission delay the application of the budget's rule-of-law mechanism any further.[1] Obviously the Commission's wait-and-see approach comes handy to those enjoying the chaotic status quo, the lack of accountability on EU level.

Hungary and Poland threatened to veto the whole budget framework and the recovery fund until the very last moment. And then, there was a compromise allowing these two member states to soften it, to turn to the European Court for review. The Hungarian and the Polish governments waited until the very last moment – as it was also expected – to file their complaint at the European Court of Justice about the EU budget.[2] What was and is really at stake? Hungary will hold general elections in 2022, and Poland in 2023. The Polish and the Hungarian "chicken game" with the veto revealed their intentions, leaving no doubt regarding the motivations of these two governments. They need the money for their political purposes. Their success will only depend on the approval of their national plans, and the capability of the Commission for action, as nobody can tell how fast the European Court can finish the review process; but nobody expects it to be very fast, either.

There is another famous tool that used to be called the "nuclear option", the Article 7 procedure. Not surprisingly, the two ongoing procedures are also against Hungary and Poland, and still ongoing with little hope they could bring a tangible result any time soon. The founding fathers of the EU would have never thought that this procedure would once need to be applied against two member states that could easily support each other in blocking their final conviction. So, this tool seems to be quite unfit for the purpose. We can only hope that the Commission will search some other tools to mend democratic backsliding within the Union, or some different kind of repairing methods.

In Hungary, "Money makes the world go 'round" works also for politics, as for other related fields of life. Entering power in 2010, Orbán has been the first prime minister ever to be favored by EU-funds, and never reluctant to use them for his political purposes.

He has his own toolset, somewhat more efficient, but also more ferocious than the one of the European Commission. By it, the originally noble purposes of EU funds have been converted into providing the ruling party with a devastating political advantage. Instead of serving the general interests of the country, the EU-funds contributed to the strengthening of Fidesz-close oligarchs, the most famous of which being Lőrinc Mészáros, originally a gas-repairman and a childhood friend of Viktor Orbán.

A gas-repairman comes handy in the toolbox of Orbán: Mészáros has accomplished a miraculous career becoming the richest Hungarian in the past 10 years.[3] Mészáros, who likes to compare his talents to those of Zuckerberg, cannot even follow any more the number of companies he owns, or the sectors where his companies are present, ranging from hotel chains, media holdings, building industry, financial sector, real estate sector, thermal baths, tourism, agriculture, wineries, insurance companies, etc.[4]

An important example for the price we Hungarians are paying for the rise of Mészáros is the ever-shrinking space for media freedom. In 2016, Opimus Press – an offshore-owned company over which Mészáros exercises influence – purchased Mediaworks Hungary from Vienna Capital Partners. Mediaworks Hungary owns 14 of the 19 regional dailies, as well as the rights to the daily national newspaper *Népszabadság* that it stopped publishing on October 8, 2016. Hungary lost its biggest daily, a high-quality newspaper that provided government-critical information. We could add to this chain of events the take-over of *index.hu*, *Klubrádió* deprived of its frequency, etc.

Money is also in the toolbox of the Orbán-regime. The best pretext to use it is the pandemic situation, but the main purpose is not fighting the plague, but the municipalities with opposition leaderships. The municipal elections in 2019 resulted in the take-over by the opposition of Budapest and quite a few major cities in the countryside. The government suspended parking fees the first time in April 2020, and the second time in the beginning of November 2020, and the suspension has only been ended in the end of May 2021. They were hitting two flies with one hit; Budapest residents suffered from increased traffic, air pollution, and the aggravated chaotic parking situation, while the opposition-led municipalities also lost an important part of their regular income. You should have known better whom to vote for at the municipal elections…

And knowing just a bit of Orbán's tactics, you can be sure that it does not stop there. A recent legislative proposal was initiated by a Fidesz member of Parliament, that would oblige the municipalities to sell the municipal rental flats for a fraction of their value – between 15-30% of the market value – to the tenants, if they wish to buy the apartment.[5] The new law will for sure pass the voting, bringing a step further the loss of municipal property.

A latest new tool for Orbán is his "magical" concept of "foundationalization", meaning the reorganization of state universities into private foundations, promising them a better financial situation. But the state universities are being forced into foundations by a Fidesz-close curators board, whose members are nominated by Orbán. The result: even after a change of government next year at the general elections, it will be impossible, or at least very hard to reverse this process, for the state to get back ownership of the universities and give back their autonomy.

So, what about the toolset for democracy, the checks and balances on the local level? Every country has a Parliament, a prosecutor, police forces, judicial system, State Audit Office.

In Hungary, these institutions have been converted into retaliation tools ready to punish anyone expressing government-critical views, in the form of financial penalty. If an opposition member of Parliament shows to

be a critical voice in Parliament, László Kövér, the speaker of the Parliament, himself also a founding member of Fidesz, punishes him or her with a huge fine to discourage any further similar action. The public prosecutor, Péter Polt, himself again a founding member of Fidesz, makes sure to disregard or at minimum to play down cases of suspected corruption. But when it comes to lighting a flare at an opposition demonstration or writing 'free Navalny' with chalk on the pavement in front of the Foreign Ministry, then he strikes with the full rigor of the law to deter.

Currently Ákos Hadházy, an independent member of Parliament, is spending his sentence of public work for organizing a peaceful car demonstration last year near the prime minister's office, even respecting the pandemic restrictions. He refused to pay the imposed fine and wanted to draw the attention to the fact that apparently the government is afraid of even such peaceful demonstrations.

The State Audit Office is also quite ingenious in finding the right targets, fining opposition parties just before the elections. In 2017, the state subsidy to the 'Jobbik' party was reduced by a sum of around 1,8 million euros for irregular party financing.[6] In Hungary there is no legal remedy against the decisions of the State Audit Office. Anyhow, Jobbik turned to the Constitutional Court with the issue, but their complaint – not so surprisingly – was rejected by the Court, whose members have been appointed by the Fidesz majority.

The EU recovery fund is an unprecedented and much needed financial package that meant a big step ahead in the federalist direction. Nevertheless, this amount of money can be seen as a double-edged sword in the hands of authoritarian leaders. Their first and foremost priority is not the betterment of the country, but their biased list of preferences. In Hungary, we see that Orbán is most interested in strengthening his grip on the country. The Hungarian government forgot to consult the stakeholders about the recovery plan, be they the municipalities or social partners, not to speak of the other political parties.

On the one hand, when it comes to money Orbán has no mercy. His first and foremost endeavor is that everybody should depend on his favors within the country. On the other hand, on the European level, he plays the heavyweight vetoer claiming a blank check and hindering all attempts at increased accountability and transparency.

Giving financial subventions to a member state is part of the toolbox of the EU, intended to serve noble purposes, namely economic convergence, modernization and the catching up of under-privileged EU member states. There is a good reason to introduce conditionality mechanisms if these purposes are endangered.

With the Hungarian federalists, we have participated in January in the UEF project with a telling title "Democracy is Europe". The EU institutions, especially the European Commission, must live up to the expectations of the European citizens, and be inexorable with those governments who abuse the system when it comes to the basic democratic values; that title shall become a reality.

If you give somebody a hammer, you should make sure that the person will not use it for breaking the window with it.

1 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20210322IPR00523/meps-ready-to-take-commission-to-court-for-failing-to-protect-eu-budget
2 https://apnews.com/article/europe-viktor-orban-poland-national-elections-elections-3430a708a118fc222dbea01ce9121d22
3 https://theorangefiles.hu/lorinc-meszaros/
4 http://valasz.hu/data/cikk/12/6925/cikk_126925/Meszaros.pdf
5 https://telex.hu/gazdasag/2021/05/12/berlakasaik-eladasara-kotelezne-az-onkormanyzatokat-a-kormany
6 https://merce.hu/2020/06/22/hiaba-vitte-strasbourig-a-jobbik-az-asz-birsag-ugyet/

Civilizing Globalization. Beyond Institutions, Human Education

Giampiero Bordino

Civilizing globalization, that is, making it coherent and compatible, to put it briefly, with the values of humanity and dignity of the people, is an ethical and political objective of an extraordinary commitment, from which no theoretical reflection and no political movement can legitimately escape. But, first of all, what can be understood, in this perspective and for these purposes, by "civilization"?

Among the many and different attempts at an answer historically elaborated over time, and in particular among the most recent ones, it may be useful to assume, at least to open and synthetically articulate the question, the concept of "hexagon of civilization", elaborated and proposed by the German political and social scientist Dieter Senghaas. A metaphor that identifies and defines six great transformations which are at the base of the civilization process as it is configured in the internal life of States. The first is the "de-privatization of violence", which is taken away from the hands of individuals and is entrusted to a legitimate public authority. The second is the control of the monopoly of de-privatized violence by the "rule of law" or the "constitutional State". The third is the "control of passions", in other words a cultural and anthropological transformation. The fourth is "democratic participation", essentially the participation of everybody in the deliberative and decision-making processes relating to common issues. The fifth is "social justice", in short, equality in life opportunities. The sixth, finally, is a "constructive culture of conflict", oriented towards mediation and tolerance.

We could usefully add to this "hexagon" a further "transformation" (it would thus become a "heptagon", in a new geometric metaphor), which is just starting: the "environmental" one, which consists in a different relationship with nature and with the surrounding world by men, who have finally become aware to think and take care of the complex and intertwined "totality" of the multiple aspects of life (not only human, also animal, vegetal, etc.). As is increasingly evident (even the current pandemic is teaching that), this is a decisive existential challenge for the very survival of the human species.

In this context, the *institutional* dimension of the problems to be faced, the one that historically has been at the basis of the federalist reflection since the time of Kant and Hamilton, is obviously indubitable, and, as we have seen, it is also a fundamental aspect of the "hexagon" proposed by Dieter Senghaas. But the necessary and decisive institutional road to civilization is not, nor has it ever been, sufficient. The institutions themselves, as is well known, are born and develop only in coherent and adequate human and cultural contexts, without which either they are not born at all or they wither and die over time. Beyond institutions, there is the equally decisive dimension of human education, which constitutes the finest and most pervasive "fabric" capable of binding men together and of determining, at least partially, their thoughts and behaviors. In the era of globalization, in which technologies make available to all new and extraordinary tools for building that "fabric", the theme of

human education runs increasingly across all institutional and social processes in progress. Human training, it must be remembered, is not only the formal and institutional one that takes place in "designated places" (schools, universities, associative centers, etc.), but it is more generally that which in fact takes place every time an individual interacts, by any means and in any place (therefore also online and through the network), with others. In this sense, it should be noted that in no other epoch of human history has the process of education, that is to say in substance, of mutual teaching and learning even in informal and unintentional ways, been, for better or worse, so extensive (worldwide, global), dense and pervasive.

In this perspective, a specific reflection on what can and should be understood today, in the era of globalization, by "human education" for the purposes of the civilization process, appears necessary and appropriate.
Paraphrasing Dieter Senghaas' geometric metaphor mentioned earlier, I believe we can speak of a "triangle of education". In summary, education (first of all, but not only, the one provided in the "designated places"), in order to be effective and appropriate to the times in which we live, must be interdisciplinary, intercultural, permanent.

First of all, interdisciplinary, that is, characterized by its relationship and intertwining between different disciplines and different knowledge, by a plurality of "gazes" on the world, without which reality cannot really be understood in its entirety and complexity. In its absence, the "disjunctive and reductive thought" of which Edgar Morin has often spoken triumphs, and consequently science and culture, disconnected and shattered, lose their human dimension. They outline and describe a human figure too disconnected and shattered, essentially false.
Secondly, intercultural, that is, capable of recognizing and letting the different cultures present in the world, and the different "symbolic universes" that characterize the different human communities, communicate with each other. In the globalized world, where the flows of people, goods, values, images, etc., run across all territories and places, recognizing "otherness" and being able to have a dialogue with it has become essential for human coexistence. Ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts are everywhere just "around the corner", not only if institutions aimed at peace are missing, but also if a shared ethics of global dimensions is not adequately elaborated and promoted. Therefore, a dialogic and plural educational process is necessary.

What is it, and how is a shared ethics configured? This question is answered in a synthetic and at the same time articulated way, among many others who have written about it, by the Spanish philosopher and writer Raimon Panikkar (of a Catalan and Catholic mother and an Indian and Hindu father, therefore an exemplary figure of the contemporary reality). Panikkar writes: "The only form of ethics that has any force today must be an intercultural ethics. This imperative is pragmatic, because it is not based on an "a priori", but simply on the fact that if there were no alternative ethics for the current world, there would be the mutual destruction of humanity, the extermination of men and ecological disasters ". To this end, Panikkar outlines and proposes a "decalogue of the ethics of dialogue": the other exists "for" each of us; the other exists as a subject and not only as an object (not only men, but even trees, animals, etc.); the other is not an object of conquest, conversion, etc.; the other has his own rights, like me, in a mutual relationship; even if I think the other is wrong, I must get in touch with him; being willing to dialogue is the supreme ethical principle; dialogue must be open and total; ethics is linked to politics, it is placed in a cultural context, and all this makes

it relative, but concrete and effective; ethics and religious dialogue are closely connected; ethics is not to be promulgated, it is discovered together in dialogue.

Finally, thirdly, education must be permanent, continuous and recurrent from the beginning to the end of life. Continuous education, its reasons, the possible and necessary policies to promote it, entered the international public debate especially starting from the 1970s, with the UNESCO "Faure Report" of 1972 entitled *Learning to Be*, the documents of the UNESCO Conference held in Paris in 1985, and the 1996 UNESCO Report produced by an international Commission chaired by Jacques Delors. Subsequently, various documents of the European Union are published, such as in particular the "Memorandum on lifelong learning", drawn up by the European Commission in October 2000, in which not only the cultural, but the civil and political dimension of this type of education emerges to the foreground, as necessary to make the active participation of all citizens in public life possible, i. e., in essence, "to learn to live together". The concept of lifelong learning proposed in the document is articulated and developed through six "key messages": new basic skills for everyone to be able to participate actively in social life; greater investment in human resources; innovations in learning and teaching to ensure lifelong learning; assessment of learning results; revision and development of the orientation processes; promotion of continuous education paths as close as possible to people and their living places.

The Carbon Tax Is Frightening Beijing

Andrea Bonanni

After much talk, many promises and endless controversies, the environmental question begins to bite into the reality of global geopolitics. Yesterday China was the protagonist of a double game. In Shanghai, former Secretary of State John Kerry, President Biden's special envoy for climate, met with his Chinese counterpart to discuss, among other things, President Xi Jinping's participation in the conference call on environmental protection that Biden organized for 22 and 23 April, with the participation of about forty world leaders. In a phase of worsening of relations between the United States and China, the participation of the Chinese President would be a sign of relaxation at least on one front, the environmental one, in which the dialogue between the two major polluters of the planet could be beneficial to both. The participation of Xi Jinping, at the moment, has not yet been officially confirmed.

Simultaneously with the meeting in Shanghai, Xi himself participated in a teleconference in Beijing with Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron, again on the issue of environmental protection. The fact that the Chinese President has chosen the leaders of the two major EU countries as his interlocutors confirms the reluctance of the authoritarian powers to dialogue with the European institutions, but it is also an indication of a certain realism on which are the real decision-making centers of the strategies that later the EU will make its own. That Merkel and Macron are willing to play that game, on the other hand, is so obvious that it is not even newsworthy.

But why did Xi Jinping suddenly feel the need to confront Europe on environmental issues?

Because the EU is preparing to translate its world leadership in the ecological field from words to deeds. And it will do so with a measure, the carbon tax, which already scares the great polluters of the planet. According to the decisions of the summit of last July, which gave way to the NextGenEu plan for post-Covid financing, the carbon tax will be one of the European taxes thanks to which the Commission will be able to repay the bonds issued to create the Recovery Fund and other financial anti-epidemic instruments. The European Parliament has already approved the principle, and the Commission is preparing to present a detailed proposal for the levy to go into operation in 2023.

The idea behind the carbon tax is simple. As Europe has given itself stricter rules and more ambitious targets than those of the rest of the world in terms of reducing emissions, European industry will have to bear additional costs to meet the new environmental parameters. In order to avoid unfair competition, and a possible relocation of its industries, the EU will protect itself by imposing a duty on incoming goods produced with methods that do not respect Community parameters. In this way, the competitive advantage of countries that allow highly polluting production methods, such as China, India or Brazil, but also, in certain sectors, the United States, should be offset, at least in part.

Of course, Xi Jinping doesn't like all of this. "The response to climate change is a common cause of humanity. This is why it must not become a geopolitical question, or a pretext for building trade barriers",

the Chinese President told Merkel and Macron, solemnly making the commitment to achieve carbon neutrality by 2060 (ten years after the EU), and hinting that China is ready for greater openings for a "fair, just and non-discriminatory" trading climate. In other words, Xi tells Europeans, forget about the carbon tax and we will offer you easier access to our market.

The question, as can be understood, is crucial. And, certainly, it will be discussed in the next world conferences on the topic: the Cop15 on biodiversity, which will be held in China in October, and above all the Cop26 on climate, which will open in Scotland in November, and where Italy will play an essential role as president of the G7. On the other hand, without a carbon tax that defends European industry from competition from polluting countries, the EU could hardly pursue its emissions reduction objectives and maintain world leadership in a sector that is at the same time of great economic importance and of enormous political significance.

The Conference on the Future of Europe Is Being Launched

Junius

The recent launch, on 19th April 2021, of the electronic platform supporting the Conference on the Future of Europe (https://futureu.europa.eu/) has marked the start of an event – the Conference itself – which has, on purpose, an open-ended result. On the one hand, it will organize a discussion among European citizens on the direction Europe should take in the next years and decades. On the other hand, its results will much depend upon two factors: the equilibrium between pro and anti-integrationist forces within European and national institutions, and the bottom-up input of the citizens. The Conference will occur under the joint patronage of the three leading European institutions and is expected to last one year: to this aim, Parliament, Council and Commission have signed a joint declaration on "*Engaging with citizens for democracy – Building a more resilient Europe*" on 10th March.

Certainly, achieving a substantial progress while preserving the consensus between the three EU institutions will be a considerable challenge, but one which cannot be evaded.

The openness of the Conference's results implies that it is a duty of the European federalists (and I will say, also of those beyond Europe) to intervene actively in the discussion. This will help the pro-integrationist camp (composed of the core of European MEPs and a part of national parliaments and governments) and permit the emergence of a more European-minded public opinion. Action is already ongoing as from the same 10th March, when the Union of European Federalists has called for "*Our federal Europe: sovereign and democratic*". The federalist-minded Spinelli Group has announced on 20 April: "We have taken the first step in the creation of the federalist caucus of national and European parliamentarians who share the view that the Conference on the Future of Europe is an opportunity to transform the EU". The Conference will be formally opened on 9th May, but the simple publication of the Joint Declaration of 10th March has already impacted EU policies. Intentionally, the Declaration left open the question whether the Conference might eventually lead to Treaty changes or not. On this point, two 'non-papers' were released, marking the division between defenders of the status quo on the one hand and pro-integrationist (and even federalist) champions on the other one. The first 'non-paper' was issued by 12 countries (Austria, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Slovakia, and Sweden) and the second by Italy. The 12 countries were opposed to any legal obligations deriving from the Conference, while Italy was open to Treaty changes. But things may be moving, also under the pressure of new electoral results. For instance, after the success of the federalist party D66 in national elections, the Dutch have signed with Spain a non-paper on strategic autonomy, also in March, while Belgium and Spain have presented a non-paper on the social objectives of the EU in April. And most recently Chancellor Merkel stated the need to establish a Health Union, thereby opening the way to Treaty changes.

Paradoxically, emerging divisions among governments might be a positive sign, as they point to the inevitable exchange of views between those starting from opposite angles. On the other hand, every new polity is created by a constitutional synthesis of diverse standpoints, and in particular federal arrangements are always achieved with a view to coordinate levels of powers with potentially contrasting interests, while keeping each institution in charge in its own area of competence. To find the equilibrium between contrasting views, bringing together institutions and citizens will be crucial.

Europeans are invited to the above-mentioned platform (https://futureu.europa.eu/) to express ideas on ten veritable public goods: (1) climate change and the environment; (2) health; (3) a stronger economy, social justice and jobs; (4) EU in the world; (5) values and rights, rule of law, security; (6) digital transformation; (7) European democracy; (8) migration; (9) education, culture, youth and sport, and (10) other ideas. Citizens may also want to organise events, bringing together citizens. In the first week, more than 5,000 citizens have taken the floor, and 200 events have been announced. The platform is accessible worldwide, and all those world citizens for whom the success of Europe is a key step towards establishing international democracy, are invited to support us.

Can Europe in Space still Catch Up?

Alain Malégarie

Due to a lack of budgetary resources and a lack of consensus among European leaders, Europe is lagging behind the other giants of the world, notably the United States and China.

However, its ambitions remain intact, with the declared aim of building a European "NASA". The EU has an asset: high-quality engineers and researchers. Josef Aschbacher, who will take over as Director General of the European Space Agency (ESA) next spring, wants to make it a modern, flexible and fully-fledged EU agency.

It must be said that its international competitors, Space X and New Space, are formidable. Thierry Breton, European Commissioner for the Internal Market, who is also in charge of space, did not mince his words at the beginning of January: "we must do space differently". That says it all. To put it plainly, for him, it is absolutely necessary to break the taboos, change the method and unite the 22 ESA member countries around competitive projects stemming from the common space policy: this implies stopping spreading ourselves too thinly, and going beyond national interests for the benefit of the Community interest and its citizens and companies.

He sees a necessary redefinition of the roles of each of the players: for the European Union, it is necessary to define the space strategy and policy; and it will be up to the European Space Agency to implement them, and the industrialists will have to align themselves to meet the EU's needs. Clear and unambiguous, on paper at least.

The ambition is legitimate, but the funding must follow. Because the reality is crueller. The Americans and the Chinese occupy space, the Chinese are the challengers, and the Russians and the EU have dropped out. Not to say that they have been 'downgraded'.

The figures speak for themselves. In 2020, the United States carried out 44 manned spaceflight launches, more than half of which were for the Space X spacecraft designed by the firm founded by American billionaire Elon Musk, the new hero of space conquest. The Chinese have carried out 41 launches. Russia launched 12 rockets and Europe 10.

The United States remains by far the biggest investor in space, with a budget in 2020 of 48 billion dollars (39 billion euros), representing 58% of the global budget (no comment!). China comes second, with 9 billion dollars.

The rest (33 billion) is divided between other countries: Russia, 7 billion; EU, 6 billion; India, 3.5 billion, etc.

But China is more ambitious and is planning a second wave of manned flights to the moon, in preparation for the conquest of Mars.

In this geostrategic confrontation, the EU finds itself isolated and weakened. But in this area as in others, Donald Trump's humiliating and aggressive attitude towards the EU over the past four years has made Europeans aware of the risk of finding themselves alone. André-Hubert Roussel, Executive Chairman of Ariane Group, the company that builds the European rocket and whose subsidiary Ariane Espace ensures the launches, mobilised and alerted on the imperative need to work together, between States, in total cooperation to be effective. He recalled that the priority for the EU is to

guarantee access to space if Europe wants to keep its sovereignty.

It was to be hoped that European leaders would listen to him and that more funds could be allocated, not to "catch up"with the United States, but to keep at least one foot in space.

Even with the best organisation in the world, the sinews of war remains the budget. Is the European taxpayer prepared to pay the price? Unlike the USA, the EU relies too much on public funding and not enough on private funding (foundations, donations, patrons). We do not have the same customs! There are embryonic public/private partnerships, but

they are still largely insufficient. This is what is needed, however, for the EU to take its full place in Space.

Without substantial financial resources, we must be realistic, the EU will be left behind. As will Russia, for that matter. And Star Wars will only have one winner, and it will be America. This will be a great waste for Europe, which nevertheless has a high-flying technical capability (no pun intended!). The United States has billionaires who are useful to their country's research. Where are our European billionaires? Where is our European "Elon Musk"? They would be welcome. Space is very expensive... But the geopolitical gain is strong.

Perspectives and Challenges for the "New" ACP-EU Partnership

Andrea Cofelice

The future of relations between the European Union (EU) and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group of countries is finally taking shape. After more than two years of close negotiations, last December the negotiators of the two sides reached a political agreement on a new partnership agreement which, once it enters into force, will replace the Cotonou Treaty, adopted in the distant 2000. With the approach of the legal expiry date of the Treaty (initially scheduled for February 2020 and subsequently postponed to November 2021), the need was ever more felt, at the political level, to rethink and relaunch the ACP-EU partnership, to adapt it to the changes in the international system and the new interests and legitimate aspirations of the two blocs of countries.

The ACP-EU partnership has often been described as a "unique" agreement, due to the concomitance of various factors: its legally binding nature; its wide-ranging scope, both geographical (four continents involved and about 1.5 billion people represented) and thematic (a "three-pillar" structure: political dialogue, economic and trade cooperation, development aid); a management method and a joint institutional infrastructure; a constant and predictable flow of resources from the EU, mainly channeled through the European Development Fund (intergovernmental: it was the most consistent development-aid instrument compared to any other EU external instrument) and the European investments. However, the changes in the international system that have taken place in the last twenty years (the emergence of new "competing" geopolitical realities; the development of regionalization processes, especially in Africa and the Caribbean; the consequences of the EU enlargement, leading to the fact that today most member states have no significant historical ties to ACP countries) have had a profound impact on its very nature.

First, they have contributed to a gradual marginalization of the privileged relationship between the ACP and the EU, in favor of other regional organizations (above all, the African Union - AU). As a result, the Cotonou Treaty has been gradually joined by parallel continental strategies (such as the Global Strategy with Africa) and by a growing number of regional and bilateral strategic partnerships, which pose important coordination and coherence challenges.

Secondly, they caused the erosion of the three-pillar structure. The provisions relating to political dialogue (including the conditionalities in Articles 8 and 96-97 of the Cotonou Treaty) have always found a difficult implementation, due to unbalanced power relations, operational inconsistencies and a general disagreement on values and objectives at the basis of the partnership (consider, for example, the tensions over the participation of civil society, the management of migration, the role of the International Criminal Court). In the face of these difficulties, the political dialogue was de facto "regionalised" (for example, regarding the AU) or took place bilaterally, with limited influence from the ACP

group. Similarly, the preferential trade system that should have supported the partnership has evolved, especially due to European desire, into a series of autonomous international agreements negotiated on a regional basis, known as the Economic Partnership Agreements, the negotiation methods of which have put a considerable strain on the ACP-EU relations. Consequently, as the trade and political dialogue components have been pushed beyond the ACP-EU framework, the partnership has been transformed in recent years into a privileged instrument of cooperation for development, the area in which the most significant results have been achieved (especially in terms of poverty reduction).

Finally, the partnership's "global" political potential has remained largely unexpressed. In theory, the 27 EU member states and the 79 ACP countries could constitute a substantial force in multilateral forums, as they account for more than half of the UN seats. In practice, however, there are few cases in which the two groups have joined forces to lead the processes of change in the context of international negotiations.

The political agreement of last December seeks to address these challenges, introducing important innovations that will characterize the new structure of ACP-EU relations in the post-Cotonou years. First of all, the unique legal nature of the partnership, which establishes priorities and shared values, and the joint institutional framework, were safeguarded. At the same time, on European impulse, a more explicit regional differentiation was promoted, through the adoption of three distinct protocols that set specific objectives, strategies and governance systems for each of the three regions of the ACP group: hence a hybrid formula "3 (partnerships) in 1".

Furthermore, the new agreement identifies six

key thematic areas, substantially coinciding with the proposals formulated by the EU in its recent Global Strategy with Africa. In terms of political dialogue, it is a question of revitalizing some issues already present in the Cotonou regime: human rights, democracy and governance; peace and security; human and social development. On the contrary, trade liberalization, the real pillar of the Lomè Conventions (which between 1975 and 2000 regulated the partnership), seems to have taken a back seat, absorbed by the more general theme of the contribution of trade to inclusive and sustainable economic growth. However, the Economic Partnership Agreements will remain in force, despite the criticalities expressed above all by the African partners. The European footprint is also evident from the emphasis given to two new priorities: environmental sustainability, which includes green transition and the fight against climate change, and migration and mobility, the latter a very sensitive issue on which a meeting point must be sought between the European agenda (which aims at the stipulation of repatriation agreements and the responsibility of the partner countries in the management of irregular migratory flows) and that of the ACP countries, whose priorities are the opening of regular migration channels and the facilitation of remittances. On these issues, the new agreement will seek to promote greater cooperation in international fora and the building of global alliances between the two blocs of countries.

A final new element concerns the issue of the financial resources intended to ensure the implementation of the agreement. The European Development Fund will in fact be absorbed by the new "Instrument for Neighborhood, Development and International Cooperation": in this way, the main development cooperation instrument with the ACP countries will, for the first time,

be removed from the purely intergovernmental framework, and inserted within the multi-annual financial framework of the Union for the period 2021-2027 (with a budget of € 70.8 billion), giving greater decision-making weight to the Community bodies (including the European Parliament).

The new text shall now be ratified by both parties before entering into force in the course of 2021. In the European context, the approval of the Council will be required, on the basis of a Commission proposal, following the approval of the European Parliament, which obtained the maintaining of the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly, having placed it as a non-negotiable condition for its assent.

The implementation process will then begin: a complex challenge that will require, to be successful, huge investments in terms of creativity, openness to dialogue and political capital. Only in this way will it be possible to shape a mutually beneficial partnership, suitable for addressing the priorities of the global-development agenda for the coming decades.

Israel: Appeal of Sixty Teens who Refuse to Serve in the Army

We are a group of Israeli 18-year-olds at a crossroads. The Israeli state is demanding our conscription into the military. Allegedly, a defense force which is supposed to safeguard the existence of the State of Israel. In reality, the goal of the Israeli military is not to defend itself from hostile militaries, but to exercise control over a civilian population. In other words, our conscription to the Israeli military has political context and implications. It has implications, first and foremost, on the lives of the Palestinian people, who have lived under violent occupation for 72 years. Indeed, the Zionist policy of brutal violence towards and expulsion of Palestinians from their homes and lands began in 1948, and has not stopped since. The occupation is also poisoning Israeli society – it is violent, militaristic, oppressive, and chauvinistic. It is our duty to oppose this destructive reality by uniting our struggles and refusing to serve these violent systems – chief among them the military. Our refusal to enlist to the military is not an act of turning our backs on Israeli society. On the contrary, our refusal is an act of taking responsibility over our actions and their repercussions.

The military is not only serving the occupation, the military is the occupation. Pilots, intelligence units, bureaucratic clerks, combat soldiers, all are executing the occupation. One does it with a keyboard and the other with a machine gun at a checkpoint. Despite all of this, we grew up in the shadow of the symbolic ideal of the heroic soldier. We prepared food baskets for him in the high holidays, we visited the tank he fought in, we pretended we were him in the pre-military programs in high school, and we revered his death on Memorial Day. The fact that we are all accustomed to this reality does not make it apolitical. Enlistment, no less than refusal, is a political act.

We are used to hearing that it is legitimate to criticize the occupation only if we took an active part in enforcing it. How does it make sense that in order to protest against systemic violence and racism, we have to first be part of the very system of oppression we are criticizing?

The track upon which we embark at infancy, of an education teaching violence and claims over land, reaches its peak at age 18, with the enlistment in the military. We are ordered to put on the bloodstained military uniform and preserve the legacy of the *Nakba* and of occupation. Israeli society has been built upon these rotten roots, and it is apparent in all facets of life: in the racism, the hateful political discourse, the police brutality, and more.

This military oppression goes hand in hand with economic oppression. While the citizens of the Occupied Palestinian Territories are impoverished, wealthy elites become richer at their expense. Palestinian workers are systematically exploited, and the weapons industry uses the Occupied Palestinian Territories as a testing ground and as a showcase to bolster its sales. When the government chooses to uphold the occupation, it is acting against our interest as citizens – large portions of taxpayer money is funding the "security" industry and the development of settlements instead of welfare, education, and health.

The military is a violent, corrupt, and corrupting institution to the core. But its worst crime is enforcing the destructive policy of the

occupation of Palestine. Young people our age are required to take part in enforcing closures as a means of "collective punishment," arresting and jailing minors, blackmailing to recruit "collaborators" and more – all of these are war crimes which are executed and covered up every day. Violent military rule in the Occupied Palestinian Territories is enforced through policies of apartheid entailing two different legal systems: one for Palestinians and the other for Jews. The Palestinians are constantly faced with undemocratic and violent measures, while Jewish settlers who commit violent crimes – first and foremost against Palestinians, but also against soldiers – are "rewarded" by the Israeli military turning a blind eye and covering up these transgressions. The military has been enforcing a siege on Gaza for over ten years. This siege has created a massive humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip and is one of the main factors which perpetuates the cycle of violence of Israel and Hamas. Because of the siege, there is no drinkable water nor electricity in Gaza for most hours of the day. Unemployment and poverty are pervasive and the healthcare system lacks the most basic means. This reality serves as the foundation on top of which the disaster of COVID-19 has only made things worse in Gaza.

It is important to emphasize that these injustices are not a one-time slippage or straying away from the path. These injustices are not a mistake or a symptom, they are the policy and the disease. The actions of the Israeli military in 2020 are nothing but a continuation and upholding of the legacy of massacre, expulsion of families, and land theft, the legacy which "enabled" the establishment of the State of Israel, as a proper democratic state, for Jews only.

Historically, the military has been seen as a tool which serves the "melting pot" policy, as an institution which crosscuts social class and gender divides in Israeli society. In reality, this could not be farther from the truth. The military is enacting a clear program of 'channeling'; soldiers from upper-middle class are channelled into positions with economic and civilian prospects, while soldiers from lower socioeconomic backgrounds are channelled into positions which have high mental and physical risk and which do not provide the same head start in civil society. Simultaneously, women's representation in violent positions such as pilots, tank commanders, combat soldiers, and intelligence officers, is being marketed as feminist achievement. How does it make sense that the struggle against gender inequality is achieved through the oppression of Palestinian women? These "achievements" sidestep solidarity with the struggle of Palestinian women. The military is cementing these power relations and the oppression of marginalized communities through a cynical co-opting of their struggles.

We are calling for high school seniors (*shministiyot*) our age to ask themselves: What and who are we serving when we enlist in the military? Why do we enlist? What reality do we create by serving in the military of the occupation? We want peace, and real peace requires justice. Justice requires acknowledgment of the historical and present injustices, and of the continuing Nakba. Justice requires reform in the form of the end of the occupation, the end of the siege on Gaza, and recognition of the right of return for Palestinian refugees. Justice demands solidarity, joint struggle, and refusal.

Two Citizenships for Two Peoples

Donatella Di Cesare

The formula «two Peoples, two States», which still recurs here and there, on the lips of some moderate, has never seemed so worn, almost stale, as in recent days. And indeed, it has been so already for some time. In the best case, the user seems to want to express, despite everything, a glimmer of optimism; in the worst case, it uses a safe way out to circumvent a complex issue that is difficult to analyse. And then - you know - we live in an era in which there is no time, nor desire, to get to know the positions of others, and it is easier to hate them. Hence the flourishing of fanatic supporters, on social networks and in the streets, the waving of flags, the absence of dialogue. Everywhere in the world, and in our country too. Not without paradoxes: those on the left blunder to defend Hamas, while the star of David appears behind representatives of the institutional right conniving with neo-fascism.

Little margin now, almost none, for those who try to argue, ending up between two fires. For Israel and Palestine, the hypothesis of the two States has always seemed remote, difficult to implement. A few decades ago it seemed within reach. The Palestinian leadership is to blame for not having seized that opportunity. Would it really have been the solution? Maybe yes, but maybe not. Anyone who knows that context knows that there are two peoples forced to live together. The intertwining is now inextricable. This is why a second State is no longer conceivable today. Thus, what's the point of continuing to talk about it? Undoubtedly it has tragic implications: those that appear in the news these days. The novelty is Lod, or «the third front». The conflict is penetrating into the country, hostility is also rampant in cities such as Haifa, taken as an example of cohabitation, and in the most remote villages. The fronts multiply and the spectre of civil war is materializing. There have always been tensions, but the explosion of violence on the street, perpetrated by both sides, leaves us puzzled. There is no shortage of good fomenters.

Those who believe in peace have more than one reason to despair. Especially if we move forward with the old political categories of the past. First of all that of «State», which perhaps in that context was always a stretch. Those philosophers – from Martin Buber to Hannah Arendt to Emmanuel Levinas – were right to pose the problem very early on. As it is often the case, they went unheard. Certainly, the idea of a bi-national State, as it was hypothesised at the time, is not practicable. And yet, that very path, which they indicated, still remains open despite the tragic scenario. Where the danger is greatest, the possibility of redemption emerges. And this consists in fluidizing the State and above all in thinking of new open forms of citizenship with equal rights. The key word is «citizenship», no longer the State. This also applies, among other things, to different contexts in the world, where cohabitation is forced and State-related categories become only an obstacle. The new political philosophy deals with this. These are not theories for naïve idealists, but, on the contrary, are very concrete and effective ways to solve otherwise unresolved conflicts.

For post-Netanyahu Israel, where the belligerent right will hopefully have less space, the motto must be «citizenship», even beyond «nation»,

«stock», etc. It can't be difficult, just because of the great Jewish tradition of hospitality. And let it be said, by the way: those who today accuse Israel of «apartheid», more or less openly, are the same Europeans whose nation-States still have citizenship laws based on blood and soil. Let us not speak, therefore, of the European guilt for the holocaust; we are talking about today's events, of Italy that does not grant citizenship to the children of immigrants.

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Ethiopia's Tigray, a New Biafra?

Rene Wadlow

On 4 March 2021, at the United Nations, Mark Lowcock, the U.N. Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, warned that a campaign of destruction is taking place in Ethiopia's Tigray province, saying that nearly five million of the six million population of the province needed food assistance. For the first time, a high U.N. official highlighted the role of the Eritrean Defense Forces, fighting alongside the Ethiopian central government's forces, in committing crimes of war. He indicated that as the Tigray fighting enters its fourth month, there are "multiple credible and widely corroborated reports from Tigray of widespread atrocities, involving mass killings, rapes, and the abductions of civilians."

The fighting in Tigray began at the time of the harvest of agricultural production. Much of the harvest has been destroyed as well as farm markets. Thus, there is wide-spread hunger. The question which we must ask is if famine is a consequence of the fighting or a deliberate policy to starve the Tigray resistance - starvation as an arm of war. The famine situation in Tigray today brings to mind the Nigeria-Biafra war of 1967-1970.

During the Biafra war, I was a member of a working group of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva. The armed conflict was the first in Africa in which only an African State was involved, no colonial party used to the European laws of war. The International Committee of the Red Cross faced a new socio-cultural context in which to try for the respect of humanitarian law.

We find many of the same elements in the lead up to the fighting in Tigray: a change in power in the central government, an effort of the new administration to centralize the administration, demands for autonomy or independence based on ethnic criteria, a flow of refugees toward other provinces of the country, the influence of neighboring or other States in the conflict. The Nigeria-Biafra war dragged on for 30 months and at least one million lives were taken.

Blocking food aid to Biafra became a deliberate policy. Starvation became not a consequence of war but an arm of war. The policy of starvation is remembered and still colors politics in Nigeria.[1]

The fighting in Tigray becomes more complex by the day, as Ethiopian Defense Forces, Eritrean Defense Forces, ethnic militias from the Amhara region face Tigrayan forces. There is a buildup of Sudanese government forces on the Ethiopian-Sudan border, and there are growing ethnic conflicts in the Benishangul-Gumuz region, as Tigrayans flee into Sudan. Reporting on the war is very limited. Communications are deliberately cut, and journalists unwelcome and under heavy government pressure. Starvation as a government war policy is denied. One would not expect otherwise. However, we know little of the military planning of the central Ethiopian government. For the moment, all efforts for mediation proposed by the United Nations or the Organization of African Unity have been refused by the Ethiopian central government, and the former officials of the Tigray province have fled. For the moment, we on the outside can only watch. We need to do more to uphold human dignity.

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[1] See Ifi Amadiume and Abdullah An-Na'im (Eds), *The Politics of Memory: Truth, Healing and Social Justice*, Zed Books, London, 2000, 207 pp.

Lessons from Colombia's Insurrection

Raúl Zibechi

A week of general strike with mobilizations that suggest that now the insurrections have cracked the model of domination administered by the far right of Álvaro Uribe. The provisional toll is about 30 deaths due to police repression, 10 sexual violences, 1,400 cases of brutality by officers, with over 200 injured and nearly a thousand arrests. Let's try to reflect on this imposing movement that nourishes hope.

1. The capitalist system is genocidal and criminal, especially at this time of decline and for the countries of Latin America. Its character does not depend on some government administering the model, because it is a structurally genocidal regime as it is based on a mode of accumulation by expropriation and theft that can only work with violence, exclusion and marginalization of majorities.

The brutal repression at the hands of the Mobile Riot Squadron responds to the fact that half of Colombia, but perhaps also half of the continent, is in excess from the point of view of the logic of capital. It must be discarded, or people must be locked up in their neighborhoods / ghettos or even killed if they dare to protest. Summary executions, crimes against young people are not due to errors or deviations by some man in uniform, they are the politics of the State and of the capital.

"If vandalism is assumed to occur, people are supposed to be captured and brought before a judge, but what we have seen is that protesters are *directly executed*," says Colombian researcher Richard Tamayo Nieto. The system no longer aspires to integrate or tame *los de abajo*, those from below, so it is ready to eliminate the demonstrators, those it considers terrorists.

To the extent that the surplus population comprises half of our continent, they have no right to protest, which is considered a risk to the State and "social demonstrations must be addressed militarily," Tamayo notes. Since this is a structural reality, the government that will succeed Iván Duque, in the best-case scenario, could only moderate the repression for a while.

2. Once we know the genocidal character of what is above, we must focus on what is below. Most notably, hundreds of thousands of young people defied police repression, the state of emergency and crime for seven days (at least until May 5). This is the main change, in Colombia and in the entire region.

We are facing a generational change that teaches ways of doing things differently from the previous ones. To fight, resist and rebel against the system, you don't need the avant-gardes, which most frequently become obstacles, as they claim to manage from their offices, without even asking questions or listening to the people who took to the streets. The participants in the mobilizations of these days have learned to take care of each other, because they already belonged to affinity groups, artistic and neighborhood, in which they socialized.

In the front row, with the men, are the young women. They promote forms of protest in which confrontation is not sought, they make themselves heard in order to be able to say what they think and collectively defend themselves from uniformed assassins. This generation

knows what it is facing, but it has lost its fear and a cry that we hear in all the geographies of our south resounds: "Yes, you can".

3. There is no way out of this model without powerful mobilisations from below and to the left. It only comes out with a political crisis, because those who benefit from extractive industry, more or less 30 percent of society, will defend their privileges with generalized violence. What it is about, more than a change of government, is a change in the way of accumulation that destroys societies and the environment. If we do not stop this speculative financial model (mining industry, monocultures, mega-projects and real estate speculation), we will enter a period of barbarism in which we, the two thirds of society, will be subjected to open-air concentration camps, while the remaining third will be watching over us, consuming and voting.

4. We are not moving towards better governments, but towards a period of ungovernability, regardless of who is in charge of the government. Whoever wins the elections will have no rest or respite. We are entering a period of chaos, in which there are no forces capable of imposing an order other than that of cemeteries.

From the global and geopolitical scale to the most remote corner of the planet, disorder has become the norm in everyday life; what the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) calls a "storm", caused by the unstoppable predatory vocation of the capitalist hydra. It is a challenge to our knowledge and forms of action and to the objectives of the anti-systemic movements that aim at seizing power.

5. We, *las and los de abajo*, must learn to live and coexist with uncertainty, systemic violence and permanent attempts to make us disappear. Collectively caring for one another must be placed at the helm of our driving direction, in self-controlled spaces out of the reach of capital-armed males. This is the form that autonomy takes during systemic chaos.

Time for Global Democracy Promotion to be Ramped Up

Andreas Bummel

As democracy is in decline across the world, we need a new club of democracies to reverse this trend.

Democracy is under pressure across the world. According to the latest annual report by Freedom House, a United States-based non-partisan think-tank, the balance is shifting further "in favour of tyranny". In the report's assessment, 2020 was the 15th consecutive year of declining global freedom. This dire picture is confirmed by other studies. In the 2020 edition of its *Democracy Index,* The Economist Intelligence Unit recorded the worst state of global democracy since the index was first published in 2006.

V-Dem, another leading research project, reported that in 2020, autocratisation accelerated and "turned viral" across the world. V-Dem's study points out that "the level of democracy enjoyed by the average global citizen" is down "to the levels around 1990". Last year, its researchers concluded that for the first time since 2001, a majority of states are no longer under democratic rule.

The COVID-19 crisis has been used by authoritarian governments to strengthen their grip on power and to stigmatise democracy as feeble. They not only attempt to crush opposition at home, but increasingly interfere beyond borders.

At the United Nations, representatives of authoritarian regimes sit on the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations to undermine civil society participation, and on the Human Rights Council to prevent criticism of human rights abuses. On the Security Council, China and Russia are misusing their veto power to stop action against governments committing gross human rights violations, Syria being the most infamous example.

Sidestepping the dysfunctional Security Council, Liechtenstein and Qatar successfully led an initiative in the General Assembly to establish a UN investigation that has already collected massive evidence for war crimes and mass atrocities committed in Syria. Likewise, UN investigations of crimes committed in Venezuela and against the Rohingya Muslims in Myanmar were pushed through by groups of states.

Nonetheless, democracy has not been a prominent item on the international agenda for many years. The global trend of democratic backsliding and rising authoritarian influence makes it clear that a counter-strategy is urgent. In theory, democratic countries working together could muster substantial economic and political leverage.

Yet when in 2020, in response to China's increasing influence across the world, then-United States Secretary of State Mike Pompeo entertained the idea of "a new alliance of democracies", it received little attention. The credibility of the Trump administration had already reached a low point.

The presidency of Donald Trump in the US was one of the worst expressions of anti-democratic and nationalist populism across the world. Trump's "America First" ideology, his disregard of democracy, his attraction to autocratic rulers and his effort to overturn the results of the presidential election caused massive damage. The attack on the US Capitol on January 6 made the US system look weak and in considerable demise.

Now a window of opportunity seems to be opening. In his election campaign, President Joe Biden pledged that during his first year in office, the US will host a global "Summit for Democracy" to "renew the spirit and shared purpose of the nations of the free world". An interim national security strategic guidance, published March 3, says that reversing the anti-democratic trend in the world was essential to US national security.

In a similar vein, the European Union's representative on foreign affairs, Josep Borrell, has said that the EU should deepen its cooperation "with fellow democracies to counter the rise of authoritarianism". A new action plan adopted in November puts a high priority on democracy promotion.

The United Kingdom has been pursuing the idea of expanding the membership in the Group of Seven (G7) bloc of states to Australia, India and South Korea, in order to form a so-called D10 "club of democracies". This club, in the UK's view, should help lessen reliance on Chinese technology. Reportedly, the UK as host of this year's G7 summit plans to give full access to these three new partners.

As Biden has noted, renewing democracy at home is a precondition for regaining credibility as a promoter of democracy abroad. This applies to all countries that consider themselves democratic, requiring a reckoning with their shortcomings on both fronts. Surveys indicate that large majorities of people in all world regions continue to believe in democracy. However, there is strong dissatisfaction with how it operates in practice. Governments are perceived to be failing to address major issues such as corruption, inequality, the needs of ordinary people or the threat of global warming.

The attack on the US Capitol prompted German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas to call for a "joint Marshall Plan for democracy". He commented that it was necessary to look into "the roots of the social divisions in our countries".
Indeed, a club of democracies could help identify common challenges and solutions. As many issues have a cross-border dimension, a transnational perspective would be vital. The criteria for membership in such a club is a crucial question. It is not obvious why a club of democracies should be limited to the G7 countries – Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the UK and the US – plus Australia, India and South Korea.

In the new Freedom House assessment, India has slipped into the category of a "partly free" country. France, Italy and the US are rated as "flawed democracies" in the index published by The Economist Intelligence Unit. From the perspective of democratic performance, the club should be open to many dozens of countries rated similarly or better. A red line should be drawn with regard to countries that are clearly authoritarian and not free.

It should not be forgotten that the G7 has drawn massive criticism in the past, not least because of a perceived lack of legitimacy and transparency. The G7 format is not the right starting point. It lacks a permanent secretariat and a formal structure. For a club of democracies, a different approach should be taken.

Instead, what may be considered is ramping up the existing Community of Democracies (CoD), which has been around since 2000. Except for Australia, Germany and France, all "D10" countries are already among the CoD's 29 member states.

In any case, an honest assessment of how to reinvigorate and defend democracy cannot be made by diplomats and political leaders alone. Biden said that civil society representatives standing on the front lines in defence of democracy will be invited to the US-hosted summit. In this spirit, a network of civil society organisations should be connected to the club. In addition, it is of vital importance to involve elected representatives. The club should host a permanent global network of parliamentarians from pro-democratic parties. This could tie in with existing pro-democracy efforts at the inter-parliamentary level and the UN.

The club should also consider convening a transnational citizens' assembly to produce recommendations on how to strengthen democracy. At the national level, there are good examples of this format to draw upon. The club and its member governments should commit to fund these activities and implement proposals that find broad agreement.
The club should not operate in a silo that is detached from foreign relations and multilateral action. Turning outwards, it should be a platform not only for coordinating democracy promotion but also for establishing and coordinating common value-based policies, including joint smart sanctions against gross human rights abusers.

The China-EU Comprehensive Agreement on Investment shows that this is a major challenge. It was concluded last December, despite the fact that China is brutally crushing dissent, waging a genocidal campaign against Muslim Uighurs in Xinjiang, and stepping up its military intimidation of Taiwan. Observers complain that the agreement does not include any human rights obligations and sends the wrong signal.

The club cannot replace or compete with existing mechanisms of global governance. Working with governments rated unfree is necessary to address major global issues. For the time being, it will remain an ongoing challenge to find a balance between promoting democracy and human rights, and an urgent need to collaborate.

A primary purpose of the club should be to pursue common policies in intergovernmental organisations, in particular the UN. The investigations mentioned earlier show that a lot can be done if the political will exists. The group should coordinate a UN democracy caucus to push back authoritarian influence and help the UN step up its democracy assistance.
Finally, as globalisation increases the need for global coordination and decision-making, democracy needs to be expanded to global institutions. Leading proposals include a UN Parliamentary Assembly, the instrument of a UN World Citizens' Initiative, and the creation of a UN Civil Society Envoy. Ultimately, a club of democracies will only be credible if it helps to promote democracy at this level, too.

The State of Democracy in India

James W. Arputharaj

The article titled *The Decay of Indian Democracy* by Milam Vaishnav, published on *Foreign Affairs* (March 2021), depicts the downward trend of the Indian democracy, which is true. For many of us, the shrinking of the democratic space is worrying. Many students, journalists, human rights lawyers are in prison for expressing their opinions, due to draconian laws like the NRC (National Register of Citizens) which aims to target minority communities, and the "Farmer Laws", which ensure the monopoly of multinational corporations in the agriculture sector.

In a democracy, there should be independence of the judiciary, the executive and the media. The media houses are coerced to convey the narrative of the Government. The Central Bureau of Investigation is used to target opposition leaders in the hope they would join the ruling BJP party. In many states, like Madhya Pradesh, Goa, Manipur, Karnataka, the members of the legislative assembly were bought over and they resigned in order to bring down the democratically elected Governments. The Courts are also on the side of the Government, which is the most dangerous situation since Independence. A 83 year old Catholic Father is in prison and the courts are not giving him bail for over 4 months. He was in solidarity with the land rights of the tribal peoples against the Multinational Companies engaging in mining in Bihar and Jharkhand.
I firmly believe that the majority of Hindus are aware of the politics of polarisation and would not support the BJP, as seen in 4 states where elections were held on 6th April; the results announced on 2nd May were a death knell to the BJP and the Sangh Parivar (Hindu religious forum).

Not only in the political sphere, but in the cultural areas too, the BJP has destroyed the system by bringing in a new education policy. Even Vice Chancellors of prestigious universities are appointed from Sangh Parivar members without adequate expertise. The head of the Planning Commission is not even a Commerce or Finance graduate.

Modi is no doubt a towering personality in the Indian politics after Indira Gandhi. His oratorical skills and his providing a narrative suited to the ruling party are his characteristic style. The illiterate masses are attracted to him, though he did not provide the one million jobs that he promised in 2014. By demonetisation (i.e. withdrawal of a particular form of currency from circulation [*Trl. Note*]), the small and medium firms slowed down, and with the introduction of the Goods & Services Tax (GST), they almost died. He declared a lock down with 4 hours notice during the COVID wave, and many people walked hundreds of miles and never reached home. The Government states that there are no data on this.

The Indian democracy is resilient and the people would bounce back, as did after the emergency in 1975. Tribals in India were practicing democracy and gender equality before the word Democracy appeared in the Oxford dictionary..

Under Draghi's Lead, Italy Takes Europe Another Step Away from Populism

Mario Calvo-Platero

In assessing the new Italian government led by former European Central Bank President Mario Draghi, many analysts miss an essential point. The focus, of course, should be Italy – its issues and the crisis Draghi will face, starting with the pandemic. But the chances are high that his leadership will have an impact well beyond Italy, dramatically changing politics and economics across Europe.

It's still early to say, of course, but the stars have aligned domestically in Italy and at the European Union level to make such a wider change possible. Yet, strangely enough, some international media ignore the wider impact that a global personality like Draghi may have. The kindest commentator was The Economist, which compared Italy to South American democracies, with a difference: in the latter, when the going gets rough, the usual solution is a military coup. But Italy routinely reverts to a "technical government" led by prominent non-elected officials – Lamberto Dini, Carlo Azeglio Ciampi and Mario Monti, who all assumed office in equally troublesome times. The Economist was funny without being insulting. The Wall Street Journal's opinion page, in contrast, was insulting without being funny, writing about Draghi: "Only patriotism can explain why he's volunteering for such a thankless and futile job".

The premise of that editorial was wrong. It assumed Draghi was called to lead the country to avoid elections and to postpone the inevitable victory of the populist right. The fact is that, after having been part of government coalitions, Italy's two main populist parties are imploding.

It is not by chance that both the Northern League and the Five Star Movement enthusiastically support the Draghi government. On the right, Matteo Salvini's Trumpian populist leadership of the Northern League has been under siege by centrists in the party like Luca Zaia, the powerful governor of Veneto, the richest regional district in Europe by industrial production and per capita income. Recently Zaia won reelection with a 76.8 percent majority for a simple reason: besides having managed COVID-19 well, he was adamant in recognizing the importance of the euro and the EU for Italy's national and economic interests and for his local industrial constituencies.

On the populist left, the Five Star Movement also stuck with Draghi. Beppe Grillo, the comedian who founded the movement, understood that his party would lose badly in any election without a dramatic change in its position. He needed time and concluded that the leadership of Giuseppe Conte, the departed centrist prime minister close to the movement but not officially in it, will be an asset for the party's future. To be sure, the Five Star's radical wing has already split.

The same is true for the Democratic Party, now in complete turmoil: Nicola Zingaretti has resigned from the party leadership, and former Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, the architect of the recent power struggle that brought Draghi in, may stage some sort of comeback in the party.

The thinking of all these parties is that being part of a winning government, in terms of fighting COVID-19 and relaunching the economy, will help galvanize their respective

bases and allow them to regroup before the 2023 elections.

Italy was the first industrial democracy to witness a thriving populist party about 25 years ago; the Northern League moved from a fringe underdog populist party to the leading party of the right, placing Silvio Berlusconi on the defensive.

But as we have seen, the centrist impact of Draghi's leadership on Italian politics has already occurred – away from the traditional populist themes of the Northern League and the Five Stars. So, is this a first national shift which will be mirrored across Europe?

If the Draghi government succeeds, there is a good possibility that public opinion in other populist-led countries, like Hungary or Poland, will start looking to their centers, too. And Draghi's potential for success is high – not just because of his stature as the former European Central Bank president who already saved the Euro and Europe once, but because the chances are strong for a return to a good growth rate once COVID-19 is tamed.

Some observers point out that Draghi has a huge parliamentary majority, but one that is smaller than that of one of his predecessors, Mario Monti, – and, in the end, Monti failed miserably to produce an expected turnaround. But Monti's situation was dramatically different, dominated by Germany's austerity obsession. After the 2007-2009 crisis, it took Germany until 2012 to consider easing European monetary policy to support growth against the risk of inflation. And it was Draghi, then running the ECB, who did it.

Today, in contrast, even Germany understands that monetary easing is essential and that, after COVID-19, an expansionary fiscal policy is also key to recovery.

Draghi's challenge will be to get, as quickly as possible, the 209 billion euros ($247.8 billion) allocated to Italy by the EU to ignite a strong recovery. He will be investing, not belt-tightening, which is what killed Monti's leadership. And the EU faces a leadership vacuum: Germany's Angela Merkel, Europe's only political giant, retires in September; France's Emmanuel Macron faces a domestic crisis of confidence and Britain is now out of the EU. Within a few months, Draghi may be ready to fill Merkel's shoes and provide a model for other disappointed countries and for the EU itself.

The second impact of Draghi's prime ministership will be at the EU level. During his acceptance speech in Italy's Senate, he declared: *"Supporting my government means agreeing on the irreversibility of the euro and share the perspective of a more and more integrated European Union, which will lead to a common public budget capable of supporting member countries during recessionary periods."* He was talking about the second step towards a European Fiscal Union; the first step was taken when the EU launched a recovery fund to help its members fight COVID's health, social and economic tragedies. In a historical first, 750 billion euros (about $900 billion) were set aside to help.

One thing is certain: Draghi will have both the authority and the credibility to shake up certain EU rigidities. He picked up the phone firmly complaining with EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen for the unacceptable delays in vaccine delivery to individual countries. And in the next year he will move forward towards the key objective of fiscal unification. The foundations were set at the G-20 gathering in 2012. Now, things are happening and Europe will grow stronger.

Italy's former Treasury Minister, Domenico Siniscalco, a friend who is Morgan Stanley's vice chairman for Europe, recently told me that a new European decade is opening in front of us. Very possible. After all, we know that tragedies like COVID-19 bring a dramatic acceleration on the path of history.

Appeal. Our Federal Europe: Sovereign and Democratic

At watershed moments in history, communities, to avoid sliding into an irreversible decline, need to be able to adapt their institutions, equipping them to govern new circumstances. After the end of the Cold War, the European Union, with the creation of the monetary union, took a first, crucial step towards adapting its institutions; but it was unable to agree on a true fiscal and social policy for the euro. Later, with the Lisbon Treaty, it strengthened the legislative role of the European Parliament, but again failed to create a strong economic and political union in order to complete the euro.

As a result, the EU was not equipped to react effectively to the first major challenges and crises of the XXI century: the financial crash of 2008, the migration flows of 2015-2016, the rise of national populism, and the 2016 Brexit referendum. This failure has also resulted in a strengthening of the role of national governments – as shown, for example, by the now excessive concentration of power within the European Council, whose action is blocked by opposing national vetoes –, and in the EU's chronic inability to develop a common foreign policy capable of promoting Europe's common strategic interests.

Now, however, the tune has changed. In the face of an unprecedented public health crisis and the corresponding collapse of its economies, Europe has reacted with unity and resolve, even indicating the way forward for the future of European integration: it has laid the foundations, starting with an unprecedented common vaccination strategy, for a "Europe of Health", and unveiled a recovery plan that will be financed by shared borrowing and repaid with revenue from new EU taxes levied on the digital and financial giants and on polluting industries. This federal plan constitutes a major leap towards the creation of a financial and fiscal Union capable of asserting European sovereignty both domestically and abroad, and as such, it needs to become permanent.

Now, as European citizens, we are eagerly awaiting the start of the Conference on the future of Europe, an event designed to bring together citizens, leading exponents of civil society, NGOs, trade unions, and representatives of national and European institutions, to debate and decide how to go about adapting our institutions in a way that will complete the building of our federal Europe. And their efforts must be underpinned by the clear realisation that the fundamental decisions on common borrowing and taxation cannot remain indefinitely in the hands of national governments alone, but must be taken in an effective, transparent and democratic way.

Today, therefore, we need and want a strong, legitimate and properly financed political Union that can tackle the great transnational challenges of our time, acting decisively in a wide range of policy areas, from climate change, growing social inequalities, health and migration to foreign affairs and defence. Moreover, we call for stronger pan-European democracy – real European political parties and proper campaigns for European elections, based on the creation of a pan-European constituency and transnational electoral lists headed by the candidates for President of the European Commission.

We are striving for a Union that is, at the same time, a community of destiny and values, and a model for the new world now taking shape – an example of how countries can live in

peace together, build cross-border and social solidarity, and protect human rights, the rule of law, and fundamental freedoms.

We firmly believe that our future lies in a Democratic and Sovereign Europe. And the time to build it is now: now or never. Let us not waste this opportunity.

Brussels, 10 March 2021

Initial Signatories

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Esteban GONZÁLEZ PONS, Vice-President of the European People´s Party (EPP) Group in the European Parliament and Member of the European Parliament

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Dimitrios PAPADIMOULIS, Vice-President of the European Parliament and Member of The Left - GUE/NGL in the European Parliament

Time to Restart Multilateralism

In 2020, the UN celebrated its 75th anniversary. To take stock of the UN's accomplishments and challenges for the future, UN Secretary-General Guterres, who is searching re-election this year, organised a yearlong series of consultations. 1.5 million people participated in surveys and dialogues that were summarised in the UN75 report.

One thing that stands out is that while an overwhelming majority of people (97%) see the work of the UN as indispensable, four out of ten also reported that they felt that the UN was remote from their lives. This is a clear sign that the citizens of the world believe in the UN's mission, but need it to be more transparent, accountable and participatory.

In recent years multilateralism has come under attack, diminished funding and an unparalleled backslide into autocratisation around the world is threatening the system of global cooperation and partnership that was built in the aftermath of the second World War, we have to act now and set a clear signal that this cynical retreat into self-interest does not serve citizens around the globe. The only way forward is to work together.

At the 2020 UN General Assembly, the Member States tasked UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres to compile a report with proposals for UN reform. He will present his report at the General Assembly this year in September, under the header "Our Common Agenda".

On this day of International Multilateralism, in the midst of a global pandemic, it is all the more clear that good global governance is more important than ever. The highest global governing body, the UN, must therefore adopt the aims that would make the UN more democratic, more inclusive, and more closely representative to the regular people.

Towards the Conference and Beyond: Young European Federalists for the Future of Europe

Diletta Alese

The Conference on the Future of Europe, the ongoing discussion on the approval of European own resources to finance the new Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027, the historical Next Generation EU recovery plan, and the path towards COP26 are some of the main highlights of the action of JEF Europe for the next months, right after the closing of the 15th edition of the pan-European campaign Democracy Under Pressure on the protection of rule of law.

The Conference on the Future of Europe
The arduous negotiations towards the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE, officially launched on 9 May 2021) and on its rules of procedure have shown that some national governments are determined to block any attempt at European renewal. Together with other civil society organisations, JEF Europe will be mobilising around the Conference to ensure it's not rendered meaningless or hijacked by nationalists. Through our political advocacy, we call for the opening of a new constituent phase, while ensuring that the building blocks of a European Federation, such as a Fiscal Union, a European Health Union and a stronger European Parliament, are part of the public debate. As life is gradually coming back to our COVID-stricken continent, with all the consequences of these years of crises, we will keep fighting for a united Europe.

Main actions
• The day after the launch of the CoFoE online platform (*futureu.europa.eu*), on 19 April, JEF Europe, through the profile of its President Leonie Martin, published ten proposals on the basis of its resolutions and political platform. In the section of democracy, three of the most popular demands are now from JEF.

• Through the "Next Chapter Europe" project, JEF Europe, together with AEGEE-Europe, JEF sections and AEGEE local groups, team up to make sure the CoFoE will be a place for each and everyone to be heard, especially young people. The project is funded by the European Parliament and will be implemented from January 2021 to March 2022.

• In the next months, JEF Europe will keep participating in and coordinating civil society alliances, such as the Civil Society Convention on the Future of Europe, to assure a real impact on the process of the Conference and to fulfil citizens' expectations.

• JEF Europe is preparing a big mobilization not only in view of the assemblies of the Conference, but also for the conclusions of the work during the French semester, planning to further engage the organized networks.

Y-Fed Project
The project "*Y-FED: Europe is what we make of it*" aims to bring the EU closer to its young citizens by developing a proposal for an improved institutional framework of the Union in line with the European Youth Goals. The initiative,

supported by an Erasmus+ "European Youth Together" grant, will be implemented between January 2020 and October 2021 through a series of capacity-building training courses, public policy *hackathons*, a large-scale simulation of a reformed EU and advocacy actions. The project partners comprise 18 civil society organisations as well as 2 networks of European and regional decision-makers. The project's main highlight, the Youth simulation of a federal Europe, will take place in Strasbourg (France) in June 2021, and will give young people the opportunity to test the developed model following a series of preparatory webinars. Young people will become advocates for the implementation of the reformed EU institutional model based on the outcomes of the simulation.

Europe@home

This year has been disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic, which has affected many areas of people's lives and moved many professional and civic activities to the online sphere. Building on the *Europe@School* programme, the 18-months project "*Europe@Home: European Civic Education through the mobile*" aims to examine and further develop the practices of digital education that have been put in place in the wake of the pandemic, with a particular focus on European Civic Education.

Green actions

JEF Europe will promote a Green Campaign during the European Green Week, starting 31 May, with weekly tweets to highlight the importance of the discussion on the future of democracy and global institutions to answer to climate challenges, making federalism more accessible to climate activists. JEF will also organise an official side event to the European Green Week.

Federalist Academy

The Federalist Academy will be an intensive seminar where 40 participants from different sections within the network come together to study, analyse and explore the federalist history and theories – including a comparative study between different existing federalist structures. Another key focus will be the study of the organisational history of JEF, UEF and WFM, with the goal of defining and elaborating on – through an ongoing definition process – what it means to be a federalist today. The Federalist Academy will be accompanied by a series of online and offline tools, resources, and events, the former of which will be disseminated to the network with the aim of building and strengthening the capacity of different sections (whether national, regional or local) and promote a shared message in the network.

On Federalist Theory

O.J.

This work offers both a history of federalism, using the Philadelphia Convention and the drafting of the American Constitution of 1787 as a starting point, and a passionate analysis of the theoretical evolution of the federal concept since the 18th century.

Lucio Levi stresses right from the introduction that the processes that have more or less been completed both at the level of the European Union and at the level of a number of its member states (Germany, Belgium, Austria, etc.) "*represent a response to the death throes of the national state and are the expression of the tendency to create new forms of state of a federative nature going, upwards, beyond the model of the national state, and downwards, thereby creating new levels of government above and within nations*" (our translation throughout).

The author recalls that, in 1795, Immanuel Kant argued in his project for perpetual peace that only federalism can establish peace. Throughout the entire 19th century, many criticisms of the nation state as a factor in conflicts were voiced. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and Constantin Frantz argued that the "*national principle and the unitary state are not factors in the development of democracy, but of new forms of oppression (…). They are not factors in peace, but sources of antagonism and unprecedented violence between states*". Proudhon distinguishes between "*a spontaneous nationality, which is the result of natural connections between local communities, their territory and their culture, and an organized nationality, which is the result of connections between the State and the individuals living on its territory and which is the expression of the need for a social and cultural uniformity and an exclusive loyalty towards the bureaucratic and centralized State*". "*The current French nation is made up of at least 20 separate nations, the nature of which, as observed in the people and peasants, is highly distinctive (…). The Frenchman is a conventional being, he does not exist (…). Such a large nation can hold together only by means of force. This is the principal purpose of the standing army. Remove that support from the central administration and police service and France will fall into federalism. Local attractions will win the day*", Proudhon argues in an accurate description of France in his days. In France, the 19th century was that of the subjugation and homogenization of the people, by force if necessary; mobilization and the trenches of the First World War completed the destruction of local identities to the benefit of a national myth. National fictions are always a source of oppression. "*In the social pact, agreed upon in the manner of Rousseau and the Jacobins, the citizen resigns his citizenship and his commune and, above it, his department and province, absorbed into the central authority, they are henceforth nothing but outposts under the immediate management of the ministry. The consequences of this will not be long in making themselves felt: the citizen and the commune lose all dignity, the shamelessness of the State increases and the charges on the taxpayer rise proportionately. This is no longer government made for the people, it is the people made for the government. Its power takes over everything, seizes everything, claims everything, forever*", Proudhon goes on, unwittingly describing the France of today with the new super-regions,

but all under the same yoke of the state. With a few tweaks, the description also applies to other centralized states, such as Spain.

In the same spirit, the Italian Carlo Cattaneo (1801-1869) stated that "*each people* (meaning peoples in the cultural sense, separate from the nation) *can have many interests in common with other peoples, but there are interests that it alone can deal with, because it is the only one that feels them, because it is the only one that understands them. Furthermore, there is also in each people the awareness of its own being, and also the pride in its own name, and the jealousy of the land of its ancestors. Hence the federal law, in other words the law of the peoples, which must have its own place alongside the law of the nation, alongside the law of humanity*". Making the case in 1871 for the "*United States of Europe*", the British historian John Robert Seeley considered that the European federation should not be "*merely an arrangement between governments, but a real union of peoples*". He went on to state that "*it can never be attained by mere diplomatic methods, or by the mere action of governments, but only by a universal popular movement (...) large enough in the end to impose the measure upon governments that would in many cases be from instinctive interest bitterly hostile to it*". What is there to disagree with?

As one would expect, the author does not omit to refer to the work of Altiero Spinelli, from the Ventotene Manifesto to the draft Treaty of the European Union approved by the European Parliament in 1984. Levi considers that the form of words "*federation of nation states*" proposed by Jacques Delors in 1995 represents a "*significant attempt to define the nature of the federal institutions in the post-national era*". "*It is not about erasing the nations (…), it is more about reshaping them by transforming them into one of the levels of government that should be conserved with its autonomy within a multi-level federal system*", he writes, adding that there are "*problems – principally health and well-being*

policies – that should remain within the remit of the national level".

If there are "problems", these should be identified on the basis of efficacy and that has never seemed to me to be the case with health and well-being, which can be best managed at local or regional level, in other words as close as possible to the needs of each population. Any higher level will always deal with the matter not on the basis of local needs, but on the basis of a system of planned economy aiming to achieve the best overall efficiency. Bureaucratic shortcomings and the shortages experienced during the current pandemic are a perfect illustration of this. Health is an area which, in my view, should be shared between the European level (marketing approvals for drugs and single European negotiators to set prices; epidemiological monitoring and recommendations as to stocks and sanitary measures; coverage of citizens when traveling out of their regions of residence, amongst other things); and the infrastructure-management level, healthcare staff and equipment and sickness insurance, which should be regional.

Finally, in a Europe surrounded by crises and war, Levi allows himself a touch of great naïveté: "*to become independent in security and defence matters, all it will take is for the EU to adopt a small professional army suitable to manage security crises, not just to organise peacekeeping missions, but also economic assistance and political stabilisation (state building)*".

France and European Resistance. A Contribution to a Common Legacy

Giampiero Bordino

> **Robert Belot**
> *Résistance et conscience européenne.*
> *Henri Frenay, de Gaulle et les communistes*
> *(1940-1947)*
> Presse Fédéraliste, Lyon, 2021

The European dimension of the anti-fascist and anti-Nazi resistance in the various countries of the continent is one of the great historical legacies that nourish the construction of Europe's political unity in the post-war period and until today. Two fundamental values, essential everywhere to the civilization process, have their roots precisely in those events: peace between states (the Kantian peace guaranteed by institutions and law, not a simple truce based on goodwill), and democracy (liberal democracy, which puts political rights and civil liberties together). Peace and democracy, declined in its various aspects, including the social ones represented by justice and equality, are the cornerstones of the model that identifies Europe in the world. A legacy that must be preserved and developed today, if Europe does not want to "lose" (in globalization and the ongoing world competition) and at the same time "lose

itself" (that is, lose its identity and its soul). A significant contribution to outline and narrate this legacy is given by the recent book by the French historian Robert Belot, author also in 2003 of the biography of Henri Frenay (*Henri Frenay. De la Résistance à l'Europe*, Editions du Seuil), one of the protagonists of the French Resistance, founder of *Combat*, one of the main anti-Nazi political-military movements in France, and in the postwar period among the leaders, for more than a decade, of the Union of European Federalists (UEF).

In France, in the years of the Nazi occupation and Pétain's collaborationism, the European dimension of the Resistance originated and developed with difficulty, "restrained", so to speak, between the Gaullist neo-nationalism and the pro-Soviet communism, which, albeit quite different from one another, were united, however, in a sort of common "sovereignist front". As Belot's essay analytically documents, only with time, and in an anyhow difficult and conflicting dialectic, the "desire of Europe" (which had also to include a new Germany, no longer Nazi) emerged and affirmed itself in the armed struggle and in the political debate. In October 1943, in *Combat*, the clandestine newspaper of the homonymous political movement, Frenay wrote significantly: "Without doubt, this war, even more than the previous one, is a political war ... it opposes two conceptions of life ... freedom vs. slavery, equality vs. inequality, justice vs. injustice". Its watchword is "liberate France and liberate Europe", and in this context also includes Germany and Russia. On Germany, in a wholly European and anti-nationalist perspective, and with great truth and great courage, it is written: "We do not forget that the German Resistance was the first, the first to be martyred; we do not forget Dachau and the many socialist, catholic and communist militants who disappeared without trace".
The war in progress is therefore not so much

a war between different and opposing nation states (France and Germany in particular), but between different and opposing political regimes, different and opposing views of life, different and opposing systems of values that go across the different national societies. In this perspective, comes to mind what wrote in the years of the anti-Nazi struggle the philosopher Albert Camus, one of the great intellectuals of contemporary Europe, director of *Combat*. In his *Letters to a German friend* of 1943, Camus expresses his cosmopolitan and European sentiment with great intensity: "Sometimes it happens to me, on a street corner, in those short pauses left by the long hours of the common struggle, to think at all those places in Europe that I know well ... My memory has merged those superimposed images up to the point of forming a single image, which is that of my greater homeland".

The "desire of Europe", of which we spoke earlier, took shape and political consistency in May 1944, with the *International Federalist Declaration of the Resistance Movements*, drawn up in Geneva through a series of meetings held between March and May of that year. In this declaration was decisive the contribution of the Italians Ernesto Rossi and Altiero Spinelli, already authors in 1941, in collaboration with Eugenio Colorni, of the famous and prophetic (in that year Nazism and Fascism were still dominating Europe) *Ventotene Manifesto,* and later founders in August 1943, in their hiding in Milan, of the European Federalist Movement.

A significant and relevant "thread", therefore, links together, over the years, the various Resistance movements in Europe. In the *Federalist Declaration* of 1944, to give another example, it is the Frenchman Jean-Marie Soutou who contributed significantly to the drafting of the text (specifically the points 1 and 6 of the Declaration) together with Rossi and Spinelli. And it is another Frenchman, Jacques Strohl, who wrote and presented in April 1944,

during the same meetings in Geneva, a *Projet d'unification européenne*.

Frenay, Rossi, Spinelli, Camus, and many others, more or less known, built during the Resistance and in the post-war period an idea of Europe which is today one of the vital roots of the European Union, and which goes far beyond the ideas of "Europe-currency" and "Europe-market", often prevalent today in people's minds.

Forgetting or abandoning this idea and this experience would mean, for Europe and for Europeans, as has already been said, "losing" challenges, and at the same time "losing themselves". In short, an announced suicide.

The History of World Citizens' Movements

Rene Wadlow

Michel Auvray
Histoire des Citoyens du Monde
Imago, Paris, 2020, 342 pp.

Michel Auvray has written a lively and detailed account of what I think of as "the second wave of world citizen action." He deals briefly in a prologue with the first wave, 1937 to 1940, when organizations for the first time used world citizen in the title: Hugh Shonfield and the Commonwealth of World Citizens, largely in England, and the World Citizens Association, in both England and the USA. Both movements drew on people who had been involved in the efforts of the League of

Nations and were concerned with the rise of dictatorial and expansionist governments in Germany, Italy, Spain, and Japan. One can say that the first wave ended in 1940 as the Second World War began, although many of the same people continued efforts after 1945.

The second wave of World Citizen action, 1947 to mid-1950 and focused in France, is the heart of Auvray's extensive research in archives and newspapers of the time. This second wave is symbolized by the efforts of Garry Davis and Robert Sarrazac, at birth Robert Soulage. As some others, he kept his name used during the French resistance period. The same was true of l'Abbé Pierre, born Henri Groues, also very active in the second wave.

Sarrazac, a professional army officer before the war, drew on his contacts within the Resistance movements as well as in intellectual Catholic circles to create *Le Front Humain des Citoyens du Monde.* Garry Davis is a more colorful character and became the symbol of the second wave often highlighted in the press. Garry Davis was the son of a well-known dance band leader in the East Coast of the USA. Garry had started as a song-and-dance man on Broadway, prior to the start of the US entry into the war. He became a bomber pilot, active in bombing German cities. He was motivated in part to revenge his brother, also in the military, killed in Italy.

The war ended and back in New York City, Garry reflected that the people he had killed with his bombs in Germany were also people like himself, part of a wider humanity. It was not Germans who were the enemy, but war itself. Thus he volunteered to work in the New York headquarters of the United World Federalists, a leading movement for peace through a strengthened United Nations.

However, he felt that something more dramatic than brochures and seminars was needed – something that would catch the eye of a wider public. By 1947, the tensions that would become the Cold War were already being felt.

The 1948 session, starting in September, of the United Nations General Assembly was to be held in Paris. Davis went to Paris, renounced his US citizenship and camped in a tent on the UN grounds as "World Citizen N° 1". This start of the second wave of world citizen action is the heart of Auvray's book.

One of the high points of the 1948 wave is the World Citizen Pact. "*We call all men to new and heroic acts, acts of refusal, courage and hope, on which our common future now depends. We call on all men everywhere to mobilize for peace so as not to be mobilized tomorrow by their Governments for war.*"

However, in June 1950 the war in Korea started, and society was mobilized for war. As a US federalist wrote in September 1950, "*If before Korea, federalists were battling against a tide of inertia and provincialism, today we seem but a toy boat on a surging sea. In fact our problem seems not how we can change the sea, but rather can we survive the waves and the undertow.*" The start of the Korean War ended the second wave of world citizen action. During the 1950-1990 Cold War, world citizens focused on preventing a war between the USA and the USSR, and proposed measures for disarmament and arms control.

It is with the breakup of the USSR and Yugoslavia that we can date the start of the "Third Wave of World Citizen Action", devoted to the resolution of armed conflicts through negotiations in good faith. The breakup of the Soviet Union led to fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, Georgia, Chechnya, as well as the Yugoslav conflicts, in which world citizens proposed avenues of compromise. These conflicts have been followed by conflicts in the Middle East and Africa. The third wave is building an ideological framework based on the world as a human community of individuals, each with dignity as expressed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, proclaimed at the 1948 Paris General Assembly.

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