



The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

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Editorial Note

Due to the rapid unfolding of events in Ukraine, we could not produce our usual long term editorial from a European federalist point of view. We realize that confining ourselves to condemnation of war is not enough. We perceive that a new world order

will spring from the ashes of war, but we are unable, for the time being, to draw up its contour lines. We apologize with our readers if we cannot offer a well-pondered text. We will return to the subject in the next issue.

The Empty Chair for Alexei Navalnyj

David Sassoli

David Sassoli, President of the European Parliament, passed away on 11 January 2022. We publish one of the last messages he left us. We remember him as a convinced federalist and a champion of European democracy. [Editor's Note]

There is an empty chair in the European Parliament. Sometimes it hosts a photo, sometimes a flag. Only a few times does it manage to welcome the person it is intended for. That chair often remains empty because in some parts of the world the heroines and heroes advocating democratic values are forced into physical isolation, imprisonment, segregation. That chair is the chair of the Sakharov Prize, which annually celebrates those who defend human rights and fundamental freedoms with extraordinary determination and action. Today the award goes to Alexei Navalnyj, a member of the Russian opposition and anti-corruption activist.

The Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought was awarded for the first time in 1988 to Nelson Mandela (in that year the award also went, posthumously, to the Russian dissident Anatoly Marchenko). On that occasion, Mandela was unable to receive it because he was imprisoned for his resistance to the South African segregationist regime. This year, also Navalnyj, who is a political prisoner, will not be in a position to attend the ceremony. In his place there will be his daughter Daria Navalnaya, to whom I will deliver the prize. Alexei Navalny is an example of exceptional courage. His persistent campaign against the corruption of Vladimir Putin's regime testifies to a strenuous defense of democratic values. Through his social media accounts and political campaigns, he has contributed to denouncing the abuses within the system, managing to

activate millions of people throughout Russia. The forces resisting Putin's regime have mobilized around him.

In August 2020, Navalny was poisoned and collapsed aboard a plane that departed from Siberia and headed for Moscow. He spent several months convalescing in Berlin only to be arrested upon his return to Moscow in January 2021. He is currently serving a three-and-a-half-year prison sentence at a high-security penal colony. Navalny started a long hunger strike at the end of March 2021 to protest the lack of access to medical care. In June 2021, a Russian court classified Alexei Navalny's regional offices and his Anti-Corruption Foundation as extremist and illegal. On behalf of the European Parliament, I call for his immediate and unconditional release.

Last year the Sakharov Prize was awarded to the Belarusian opposition for its defense of pluralism and the rule of law in the country, demonstrating the closeness to the demands of freedom of that people. Given the situation we are currently experiencing, Sakharov Prize's assignment to Navalny has an additional symbolic value. Amid the tensions with Russia and the migratory crisis on the border between Poland and Belarus, the European Parliament expresses its attention and concern towards that geographical area, so close to our borders and yet tormented by the violation of democratic values. Values in which we believe and to which we want to commit ourselves.

Certain principles, which are universal, remain a priority for us. Indeed, it should be remembered that human rights are integrated into the EU

treaties and the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as well as into the EU's external relations policies, including the Action Plan for Human Rights and Democracy 2020-2024. In its relations with third countries, the Union's objective is to promote democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law.

Indeed, the Prize represents for us a flagship initiative within the framework of our commitment to human rights, rights which are at the heart of our common values. It becomes an instrument of exchange and support given that the Prize network itself allows the winners to get in touch and establish relationships with each other, because the battle for the respect of human rights must be a universal battle.

Let me also say a word for this year's finalists, the Afghan women, represented by eleven

human rights activists, who received a special mention. The European Parliament does not forget them and does not forget their very difficult situation and their struggle for not losing the achievements strenuously attained in the last twenty years.

Finally, I want to remind that several Sakharov Prize winners, including Nelson Mandela, Malala Yousafzai, Denis Mukwege and Nadia Murad, were subsequently also awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.

The winners, but also the finalists, of the Sakharov Prize represent high examples of political and civic struggle. They are and have been a constant source of inspiration, not just for their communities. This occasion must serve to highlight Navalny's situation and his unjust detention. And it must continue to remind us that rights and freedoms must always be kept alive in the practice of democratic life. To give dignity to their universality and, therefore, to every citizen.

Federalism, a Decisive Challenge for Europeans.

2. Making Europe Charming Again Through Reason and Heart *

Michel Dévoluy

Indifference, doubts and blockings: for which reasons?

Three quarters of a century ago, Europe's Founding Fathers conceived a method of integration calibrated to come up to a European federation. However, this last stage seems to be hardly completed for now. There are multiple reasons: we could trace back the main ones, without intending to rank them. All of them shed light on the indifferences, the doubts and even the objections of citizens and Member States. Knowing these obstacles is a first step for moving forward. The construction of a federal Europe will not be achieved by denying or bypassing the political, economic, social, cultural, doctrinal and emotional realities.

The successive enlargements have slowed down the federal dynamic by increasing States' heterogeneity. Today, the 27 Members are not expecting the same things from Europe. How to find, then, a common ground for a federal Europe? Moreover – and that is an uncomfortable question – would the founding countries have already attained the federal step without these enlargements?

The new Member States from the former socialist bloc, freed from the USSR crushing guardianship, became part of the EU in 2004 to benefit from freedom and from a common

market, that bring economic progress. Their priority was not to strive for the construction of a federal State. For them to feel fully committed for a political Europe will require time. We should accept history and its shifts.

A multi-speed Europe would facilitate the formation of a federation comprising a few States. This possibility of a “vanguard” is even more legitimate given the Eurozone's peculiar statute. But the treaties are built on the idea that all members should move at the same pace. Waiting for all the members to cross the finishing line, Europe is clipping its wings and scaling back its ambitions. However, the treaties offer two types of derogations. “Enhanced cooperation” allows at least 9 States to cooperate in order to accelerate the achievement of one of EU objectives, while of course strictly respecting the treaties. On the other hand, the “exceptional status” acknowledges that a State can benefit from a peculiar and less restrictive status with regard to EU law. For example, the non-members of the Eurozone have an exceptional status. The fact is that the main rule remains uniformity; hence the difficulties in moving forward.

Europe is not a credible and internationally recognized power yet. It has no army, and no common foreign policy. NATO's role as the ultimate protection of the integrity of many

EU Member States is a tangible evidence. Creating a political union while giving up on autonomous defence is contradictory.

Another dividing line is human rights. For many citizens, Europe is too accommodating in its mission to impose respect for human rights. For others, it is too invasive and without regard for national peculiarities. Compromise, a key method of EU functioning, is of little help to address this issue. Over recent years, the presence of illiberal democracies within the EU is undermining some citizens' desire to build a federal Europe that would neglect Europe's founding values.

The notion of Welfare State is still linked to that of Nation State. This is hardly surprising, since the treaties do not give real social competencies to the EU; everything hinges so far on States' will. The latter is a crucial point, as redistribution and support mechanisms of personal and collective risks are at the core of the sense of belonging to a political community. A federal state plays a dual role in these matters. It intervenes directly in the financial mechanisms that constitute the welfare state. It initiates, facilitates and controls the process of homogenizing the social systems of the Member States. The EU is not in this situation yet. Moreover, Europeans are fully aware of the incantatory words according to which people anticipate the creation of a federation without implementing the convergence of its social systems.

The national political spaces are more understandable than the European political space. Transnational parties are absent and the perception of the major issues remains national. The EU remains distant and complex to many citizens.

To Europeans' view, the EU is hindered by complex, heavy and undemocratic decision-making mechanisms. Conversely, national

spaces are reassuring, and seem more efficient and transparent. The benefits provided by Europe appear to be messy and unrecognizable. Europe is perceived as being more concerned about the common market's good functioning than the citizens' well-being. National narratives are crushing European narratives. European identity is still blurry.

The absence of a "European people" is recurrently evoked. But in a democracy, people are formed by sharing common interests within a political space recognised by all.

The veto procedure, according to which a single Member State can block a decision, undermines the perception of a solidarity-minded Europe.

A federation is built on rights and duties. Solidarity between Member States should not be a one-way process. The debate around the "frugal States" or the "Club-Med States" does not give much desire to create a political Europe.

The question of a common language is recurrent too. But several federations are multilingual!

The issue of egos should not be overlooked either. Indeed, the transition to a federal state implies a federal government, which would automatically downgrade national politicians in the hierarchy of powers. Are the latter ready for this sacrifice? As the proverb says, it would be a "turkeys voting for Christmas" situation. All the above-mentioned arguments explain the citizens' and governments' lukewarm willingness to move forward to a federal Europe. Not to mention those – citizens and governments – who are resolutely hostile to any transfer of sovereignty to Europe, and wish, on the contrary, to unravel the EU. Or to leave the EU altogether.

Finally, it seems necessary to me to consider apart a cause less immediately identifiable. It is both diffuse and decisive.

Europe's economic and social doctrine has been totally permeated by the so-called neo-liberal revolution that began in the 1970s. The market was to solve all problems. Deregulated competition became the undisputed driving force for growth and well-being. The trickle-down theory would ensure a higher standard of living for the poorest. Interventionism became a dirty word and industrial policies were regarded as outdated. In short, politics was to withdraw as much as possible from public affairs, be they economic, social or monetary. But that is not all. The European economies' convergence was also to be achieved through the use of efficient markets and competition. States, regions and employees were to compete with each other and thus benefit from the advantages of globalization. Instead of talking about solidarity, Europe promoted the "every man for himself" attitude and individualism.

This neo-liberal world has had deleterious effects on the construction of a political Europe. This lack of ambition came from several political sides. "All for the market" advocates were satisfied with the status quo. The EU had "done the job": a single market, a single currency, well-regulated public finances, good rules of free and fair competition. Why go further and build a federation? The Europe of markets is enough.

On the other hand, many Europeans were not prepared to consider the cult of financial-market efficiency and the virtues of labour-market flexibility as convincing arguments for aspiring to a federal Europe. The single market and the euro, as defined by the treaties and experienced by these Europeans, appear above all to be technical issues unrelated to a societal project.

In their view, the neoliberal and technocratic Europe did not have the necessary scope to be the driving force for a political Europe. The Europe of treaties did not make one think of more integration, on the contrary.

In short, either this Europe was sufficient, or it was disappointing. A dismal context in which to aspire to a political Europe!

One must be motivated by reason and by the heart to work towards a federal Europe. To become a reality, this Europe will have to convince people of its usefulness, demonstrate that it is strong and protective and, dare we say, make them dream of a better world. A vast programme. One is entitled to be surprised, in a text written by a convinced federalist, at the insistence on flushing out the obstacles to the establishment of European federalism. But in order to move forward, one must show both realism and determination. Two well-known quotes sum up this perspective excellently. According to Albert Camus, "to name things wrongly is to add to the misfortune of the world". While Antonio Gramsci urges us to "have the pessimism of the intellect and the optimism of will".

The need for Europe in the face of contemporary issues and challenges

Contemporary issues and challenges are causing a kind of alignment of the planets that pleads for a federal Europe. The arguments are gathered around several themes: the aspirations to a more inclusive, qualitative and appeased society; the new situations for what regards sovereignty and strategic autonomy; the indispensable mutualization of environmental, climatic and health problems.

The evolution of the economic and social doctrine has already been mentioned. Several elements contribute to put into question neoliberalism as an unsurpassable system. The destruction of the environment and the growth of income and wealth inequalities are

increasingly associated with the functioning of the ultra-liberal economy. The financial crisis of 2008 and the current health crisis are also leading to a questioning of the neoliberal vision. Many citizens now aspire to a return of the social state and to forms of interventionism. More than ever, the EU Member States would benefit from uniting politically to guide citizens and states towards the construction of a more cohesive and peaceful society. The time for competition between states is over; the time for cohesion and unity is called for. Making Europe an exemplary economic and social area that promotes qualitative well-being, knowledge and humanist values should win over many Europeans.

The federal Europe is capable of carrying out a generous and innovative project for society. On the other hand, such an ambition would be much more difficult to achieve if it had to be led by isolated Member States, without the support and boldness of the whole federation. Let's face it, in a world governed by the balance of power and the weight of very large countries, no European state, taken individually, would have any choice but to follow political, economic and societal norms imposed by others. You cannot remake the world on your own. A powerful and credible collective dynamic is needed to change the course of things. Europe could be proud of itself should it revise the economic and social trajectory it has followed for four decades. And the Europeans would be proud to build a common narrative together.

For a state, sovereignty means being able to freely choose its values, its political system, its major strategic choices and its destiny. Sovereignty also means being able to defend its territorial integrity, to control its borders, to assert its interests in the world and to enter into alliances with other countries independently. Here again a small country - in relative terms - does not have this autonomy. It is subject to the power and aims of big states, but also to

the strategies of large multinational companies (industrial, commercial and financial). Although it is formally sovereign, a small or medium-sized state is not sovereign in reality. In today's - and tomorrow's - world, no European state, even the largest, will be able to fully exercise its sovereignty. Its weight in geopolitics and in the dynamics of globalization will be weak, even derisory. On the other hand, Europe is fully capable of choosing and assuming its own fate thanks to its strategic autonomy.

Expressions of power now go beyond the number of guns and nuclear warheads. Soft power is also at work. In other words, global geopolitics is governed by the economic weight of states, their cultural and ideological influences, investments and shareholdings in foreign economies and their ability to destabilize other countries. In addition to military arsenals, power today depends on the possession of raw materials and rare products, the control of value chains, the control of trade routes and financial circuits, and the ability to discipline information circuits and virtual data storage. Countering and controlling soft power is beyond the reach of an isolated European state. In this new world, only a continental state has sufficient weight to weigh and count on the international scene. Make no mistake: small countries, more or less the vaults of the world's immense fortunes, may seem to be safe; but this is because they are useful and pose no danger to the larger ones. On the contrary, they are at their disposal.

Another crucial and vital aspect, in the truest sense, is food sovereignty. Agricultural independence in order to supply the population with sufficient quantities is also an element of strategic autonomy. Because of its geographical and climatic diversity and the extent of its fertile land and fisheries resources, Europe is still in a position to ensure its sovereignty here.

Finally, the thorny issue of immigration is also central to European sovereignty. Europe,

an aging continent, must open up in order to remain a prosperous economy. However, the essence of the migration issue stems from three immense challenges: demographic pressures, particularly from Africa; the reception of refugees fleeing totalitarianism; and the castaways of climate change. Here again, the solution lies in Europe. Sharing an economic area, with a single external border, without a single migration policy is technically and politically unbearable. Migration tragedies are tearing the conscience of Europeans and fueling pernicious rivalries between Member States. Faced with these tensions, a federal Europe would be more effective and would help to bind Europeans together. Deciding to provide asylum together, within the framework of a shared policy, is both a vector of collective identity and the manifestation of a self-confident power.

Ideally, environmental, climate and health problems should be dealt with at a global level. Even if meetings such as the Conferences of the parties (COP) or organizations such as the World Health Organization (WHO) act on behalf of the international community, we are still in an intergovernmental logic in which each party defends its own interests. There are two sets of reasons why these issues should be dealt with by a federal Europe. Firstly, the dimension of the European geographical area is such that decisions taken at its level will have significant impacts in the treatment of these problems. All Europeans will benefit directly. A state can of course act alone, but these issues are global or at least continental. Secondly, by speaking with one voice, Europe has a much better chance of influencing international negotiations. It could then rely on its exemplary behavior to assert in the international community standards and ambitions that would benefit the entire world community.

We will conclude these reflections on Europe and federalism with a complex problem and an intriguing theme.

The complex problem, but one that needs to be resolved quickly, is that of a multi-speed or multi-circle Europe. With 27 Member States and in the current state of affairs, it is illusory to want to switch all together to a federation. There are still too many differences and too many divergent ambitions. Hence the blockages. We must have the political courage to loosen this constraint by allowing those states that wish to do so to go ahead more quickly. Without of course closing the door behind them.

The intriguing theme points out the gap between reasonableness and concrete achievements. Why, although there are so many rational arguments in favour of a significant move towards a federal Europe, is history moving so slowly? Or, put differently, why is it that many citizens proclaim themselves to be pro-European and in favour of a greater political integration, and yet their words seem to have become commonplace, without palpable effects, without real passions? Leaving aside the convinced nationalists and purveyors of illiberal ideologies - a small minority -, the lack of enthusiasm of Europeans for a federal Europe probably has as much to do with emotions, feelings and sentiments as with pure rationality. In fact, we are confronted here with economic, social and political issues, but also with the complexity of the human beings, with the capacity to free ourselves from preconceived ideas and with the meanders of collective history. Let's face it. To move forward, it is not enough to convince through reason, we must also desire Europe and adhere to the construction of a common narrative.

* This article is the second part of a paper whose first part was published in the last issue of *The Federal Debate*.

From G20 to COP26: the Role of the European Union

Alberto Majocchi

An assessment of the results of the G20 in Rome highlights, on the one hand, the doubts some of the observers raised about the lack of a precise deadline to achieve carbon neutrality and, on the other, Mario Draghi's conclusions, widely shared by the American President, Joe Biden, who consider the G20 in Rome a great success. In reality, it was difficult to expect more consistent results from this meeting where, *inter alia*, the leaders of two of the greatest world powers, Russia and China, were absent. In fact, the most important result, namely the introduction of a global minimum corporation tax, had already been mentioned on 8 October in the OECD, with a global agreement¹ signed by 136 out of the 140 member countries, including all those of the EU and the G20. However, while the new elements that emerged in Rome should not be underestimated, the attention of the political class and of public opinion should focus on the strategy that Europe should implement in the COP26 underway in Glasgow² to lay the groundwork so that the COP27 (in Egypt) can take the strategic decisions necessary to achieve the goal of substantial emission reduction in 2030 and carbon neutrality in 2050.

In the Final Declaration approved by the G20³ in Rome, an important paragraph concerns the support that G20 members undertake to provide for vulnerable countries: "We welcome the new general allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), implemented by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) on 23 August 2021, which has made available the equivalent of USD 650 billion in additional

reserves globally. We are working on actionable options for members with strong external positions to significantly magnify its impact through the voluntary channeling of part of the allocated SDRs to help vulnerable countries, according to national laws and regulations." On this point, the European Union could lead the way by allocating its share of SDRs to the countries of the African Union to facilitate the financing of increased trade volume in the framework of the internal market, recently launched at the continental level, and of a policy that promotes effective and socially just ecological transition.

The second important point is the reiteration of the goal "to hold the global average increase well below 2°C and to pursue efforts to limit it to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels", as strongly recommended by the scientific community, even if the date for achieving this is still rather vague ("by or around mid-century"). However, the decisive point concerns the tools that must be put in place to achieve this goal. The concrete commitment made by the G20 is that its members "[will] put an end to the provision of international public finance for new unabated coal power generation abroad by the end of 2021". Regarding the tools used to achieve the goal set in the Paris agreements, there is an innovative – and extremely important – reference to carbon pricing: "Such policy mix should include [...] a wide range of fiscal, market and regulatory mechanisms to support clean energy transitions, including, if appropriate, the use of carbon pricing mechanisms and incentives, while providing

targeted support for the poorest and the most vulnerable.” It seems no coincidence that the day after the closing of the G20, in the opening ceremony of COP26, Angela Merkel proposed the introduction of global carbon pricing.

If this happens, finance can play a more important role, with the certainty of a defined reference framework for investment decisions. An amount of 100 trillion dollars is generally considered to be the minimum funding needed for the energy transition over the next 30 years. This impressive figure could be achieved by adding to public resources the interventions that will be implemented by international financial institutions and by the private sector.

This point is underlined by Jean Pisani-Ferry⁴ in a recent article in *Le Monde*, where, on the one hand, he highlights the enormous amount of investment required (“The International Energy Agency estimates that the annual energy investment should increase from 2,000 billion dollars/1,720 billion euros in recent years to 5,000 billion in 2030, before gradually decreasing”) and, at the same time, the need to provide a framework of certainties to ensure that public investments are accompanied by a growing flow of private investments for the development of renewable energies. This is the main task of COP26; and, in this perspective, the European Union will have a central role, given that with NextGenerationEU and Fit for 55, it has launched an extremely demanding programme to promote ecological transition. The programme outlines the measures to be

activated to achieve a 55% reduction in CO2 emissions in 2030 and carbon neutrality in 2050.

However, to play a decisive role in COP26, the Union should be able to build a system of strong alliances with the most vulnerable countries, and in particular with Africa. A recent volume edited by the Centro Studi sul Federalismo (CSF) is appropriately entitled: *Europe and Africa: a Shared Future*⁵. Essentially, the ecological transition – and in particular the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energies – is only possible if the Union is able to carry out the technological and financial transfers to ensure the development of new sources of green energy in African countries. On the other hand, this energy production will promote an endogenous process of development in the African continent – within the framework of the process already started for the creation of a common market, which will have to be strengthened by the progressive creation of a Payments Union, similar to the one established in Europe following the Marshall Plan – which will be facilitated by the transfer of the European share of SDRs to African countries that will be distributed by the IMF. The importance of this decision was underlined on 1 October in Addis Ababa by the African Ministers of Finance⁶, who met with the Director of the IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, and, on that occasion, also asked for the introduction of a global carbon price. This is a complex strategy and will require a great deal of political capital from the Union. However, in this area, Europe will finally be able to prove its ability to become a global player.

¹ <https://www.oecd.org/tax/beps/statement-on-a-two-pillar-solution-to-address-the-tax-challenges-arising-from-the-digitalisation-of-the-economy-october-2021.pdf>

² <https://ukcop26.org/>

³ <https://www.governo.it/sites/governo.it/files/G20ROMELEADERSDECLARATION.pdf>

⁴ https://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2021/10/16/jean-pisani-ferry-le-vieux-monde-de-l-energie-se-meurt-le-nouveau-tarde-a-apparaître_6098599_3232.html

⁵ <https://www.peterlang.com/document/1059110>

⁶ <https://www.uneca.org/stories/eca%2C-african-ministers-of-finance-and-imf-discuss-changes-needed-to-global-financial>

COP26: Disappointment and Hopes for a New Multilateralism

Roberto Palea

Are there scientific “truths” in the area of climate change?

The answer to this question is needed to have a yardstick, a touchstone; reliable even if not absolutely certain.

The characteristics of “scientific truth” can all be found in the periodic Reports of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), founded by the UN and made up of 1,400 scientists from 196 countries.

We must acknowledge that, as stated by the Sixth Assessment Report ¹ of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), COP26 in Glasgow failed to limit global warming that “unequivocally”, “without margins of uncertainty” results from CO₂ and other greenhouse gas emissions (including methane) produced by mankind’s combustion of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas).

Forecasts of the International Energy Agency (confirmed in COP26 by the declarations of the participating States) assert that current emissions of CO₂ and other greenhouse gases, estimated at 40 bn tons per year, could increase, in the current post-pandemic economic recovery phase, to 50 bn tons and more per year.

The inference here is that, beyond the known increase of 1.09°C in the average temperature of the planet since the beginning of industrialization, in the most favourable scenario this would exceed 2°C in 2050, and 2.7°C in the “long term” (years 2080 / 2100)

with an upward trend in the subsequent years. Moreover, in the most likely scenario, by 2050 the increase in the average temperature of the planet would reach 2.2°C, and 3.6°C in the “long term”, with a continuing upward trend. Either of the 2 scenarios under consideration would involve an upheaval in all the main environmental balances, engendering high levels of suffering, and harm for mankind, especially for the countries of Africa, the Far East and South America.

The goal of eliminating climate-changing emissions by 2050, and, consequently, of never exceeding the maximal limit, an increase of around 1.5°C (to permit a reduction from then on), stated in the 2015 Paris Climate Treaty, has been disregarded and shown to be unattainable.

However, it would be short sighted to deny that, especially in the G20 in Rome, but also during and after COP26, new developments have provided the grounds for a little hope. To start with, the European Union (EU) has been given a leadership role, thus becoming a driving force for the rest of the world in the transition to a sustainable future based on renewables and hydrogen, as well as electric mobility, the electrification of every sector of human activity, and to a digital economy.

In effect, the EU has not only fulfilled its commitments under the Paris Climate Agreement, but also has cut its emissions from 1990 to 2019 by 24%, whereas the EU economy grew by 60% over the same period.

Furthermore, a propensity for a “new multilateralism” has emerged among all countries in the world which aims at cooperation between sovereign states, at least in certain areas, without demanding extensive integration.

This new multilateralism is based on the awareness that epochal interconnected emergencies have a global dimension, and can only be addressed by all states acting together. This awareness has become a general belief regarding the climate and natural environment, pandemics such as COVID-19 (and others reported in various areas of the world), and economic and social inequalities that have not been reduced but rather increased – between states, but also and especially within them.

This new multilateralism has not only involved the United States and the EU, but also other major powers, including India and China, and should now be extended to Japan, Turkey and Iran (with a participation from China).

The relationship with Putin’s Russia remains essential in order to build that European Common Home proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev, in 1989, to definitively overcome the Cold War and establish a lasting peace order from Brest to Vladivostok.

American foreign policy turns out to be a failure, also with Biden, towards Russia (and beyond), as the threat from the United States and NATO to install missiles with nuclear warheads aimed at Moscow in Ukraine and in other Eastern European countries provoked Putin’s violent reaction. The Russian reaction is aimed at creating difficulties in the supply of natural gas, with a consequent, sudden increase in energy costs, then by increasing pressure from Belarus on the border with Poland; and, again, by resuming military incursions in Ukraine. That reaction can be contained and,

later, overcome through the force of diplomacy, with the mediation of the European Union.

As for its relationship with the African continent, the EU has planned, under its Green Deal, to produce renewable energy and hydrogen in the sun-rich countries of Saharan and sub-Saharan Africa within the framework of an agreement with the African Union² (which now includes 55 states and whose creation was based on the European model); this should provide for the transfer of technologies in the “green” and digital energy sector to African countries. The endogenous development of African countries should be its main objective through the required availability of energy (also used to extract drinking water from the subsoil and to desalinate seawater), and the export of surplus green energy and hydrogen to Europe, through existing pipelines.

Europe’s vocation is to address sustainable healthcare and economic development throughout the African continent in partnership with the African Union, which in 2021 launched the African Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The African Union aims to adopt a common currency, possibly linked to Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), and to strengthen the existing African Central Bank.

The EU would thus ensure that CO₂ and other greenhouse gas emissions from Africa are limited, while helping curb migration flows to Europe through new jobs created by sustainable economic development.

A second factor pushing towards this new multilateralism is the existence of copious public and private financial resources – during the G20 Mario Draghi spoke of \$130 tn – which could be used in the most underdeveloped and fragile countries. The EU has taken on the task of spreading vaccines around the world, guaranteeing global vaccination coverage of 40% in 2021 and 70% in 2022.

The EU's global commitment should be medium-term, ambitious and tackle a number of fronts.

It should:

1. promote a new World Energy and Environment Organisation (WEEO), under UN control, to tackle climate change (and allocate the \$100 bn pledged during the G20), managed by a High Authority (based on the European model of the ECSC);
2. revitalise the World Trade Organization (WTO) to negotiate a fair carbon price for all countries (which could in part finance the WEEO) and support a global tax on multinational enterprises' activities, which was already decided by the OECD;
3. push the World Bank to issue SDR-denominated Green Bonds in agreement with the International Monetary Fund (which has already done its part with the allocation of \$650 bn, denominated in Special Drawing Rights in favour of disadvantaged states);
4. task the I.M.F. and the World Bank to:
 1. utilise the large amounts of financial resources available in public and private investments, denominated in Special Drawing Rights, having as their object sustainable development in Africa and the Middle East;
 2. recapitalise local investment banks

in Africa, Latin America and India (if possible by meeting the requests of the second-industrialization countries, such as India, to be compensated for the environmental and climatic damage caused by the industrialization of the West from 1850 to today, the advantages of which they have not had the possibility to profit from).

The US-China Joint Declaration³ at COP26, on a common plan to cut polluting emissions, followed by meetings between Joe Biden and Xi Jinping and between John Kerry and the leaders of the Chinese climate diplomatic mission, are a step in the right direction. Likewise, in recent days the open attitude of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a good sign for the future when faced with the pandemic deaths, and the air pollution in Indian cities caused by coal factories.

Humanity would obtain much greater benefits, and incur much lower costs, if it acted immediately to reduce climate-altering emissions and swiftly addressed the very high investments required, rather than bearing mitigation and restorative costs afterwards (even without taking into account the deaths and the suffering of the people). However, cooperation between sovereign states, as Jean Monnet has taught us, needs common institutions: this is also an inescapable problem, when attempting to launch the "new multilateralism" the world needs.

¹ <https://www.ipcc.ch/assessment-report/ar6/>

² <https://au.int/>

³ <https://www.state.gov/u-s-china-joint-glasgow-declaration-on-enhancing-climate-action-in-the-2020s/>

The “Traffic Light” Coalition in favour of a Federal Union in Europe: a Critical Assessment of the Coalition Agreement

Junius

The new coalition agreement in Germany between Social Democrats, Greens and Liberals (the ‘Traffic Light’ coalition) calls for the establishment of a Federal Union in Europe. What does it mean politically, for Germans and their fellow Europeans? After the 16 years of Merkel’s solid grip on German European policy, the narrative from Berlin has now fundamentally changed, turning the previous prudent and conditional support to political union into a new sense of dynamic progress towards European federalism.

Merkel’s rule of prudence was generated by an abrupt development which proved again that EU integration is not a linear process: the rejection by the French and Dutch electorates of the European Constitution in two referenda back in 2005. Ultimately, Merkel feared her fellow citizens would behave alike, and reject any deepening of the European Union, after having unwillingly given up the *Deutschemark* for the euro. After 2005, German policy has been guided for three decades by a rigid definition - in principle - of the ultimate limits beyond which Europe should not dare to venture: no transfer union. However, many important exceptions to those self-imposed boundaries were admitted, all forced by unexpected circumstances: the banking union after the great financial crisis, the European Stability Mechanism after the sovereign crisis, and, last but not least, Next Generation EU after the pandemic. Merkel’s rule has, in fact, permitted Europe to overcome a few highly

severe crises through institution building. However, reflecting its uneasiness with a creeping Europeanization of national policies, the CDU soon decoupled its contingent and qualified support for specific EU crisis response packages and its ultimate rejection of a federal state among the Europeans. Reflecting this, a majority of Germans remained attached to the idea of European Union, but under the condition that it would not develop further into a self-fulfilling “ever closer union”. This attitude was also confirmed by the Constitutional Court, which imposed that new EU tools in response of the crises of the last fifteen years would be subject to conditionality and rigid limits, to permit the Bundestag to exercise its sovereign rights of democratic control.

The Traffic Light coalition opted for a bolder and more positive European agenda. One could object that this was the consequence of a much-needed window-dressing for a red-green-yellow coalition which was untested and did not have a common line on European issues. The new emphasis on federalism would dissimulate a lack of agreement on topical concrete issues (reform of the Stability and Growth Pact, establishment of a European fiscal instrument, consistent policies versus Russia).

I understand these considerations, but I do not necessarily agree with them. Instead, I would call three deeper political motivations for the German turnaround on the federalization of Europe.

(1) *A revival of Joschka Fischer's speech at the Humboldt University (2000)*, which launched discussions about the 'finality' of European integration and triggered the first attempt to establish a European Constitution. When Greens went back to government a few weeks ago, they could count on a long and unabated support of their voters for bold initiatives going beyond the preservation of current institutional structures in the EU (also note that since a few weeks the Spinelli Group at the European Parliament is chaired by the German Green Daniel Freund). Also the Social Democrats had run in 2017 an electoral campaign under the flag of European Federalism with their candidate Martin Schulz, but his political and personal defeat rather confirmed on that occasion that the German electorate, while remaining pro-EU, seemingly did not want a bigger leap forward.

(2) *A positive response to Emmanuel Macron's Sorbonne speech (2017)*, only a few months ahead of the upcoming French Presidential elections in April 2022. Here the Traffic Light coalition indirectly expressed a support to Macron's programme, also fearing the extreme right would be able to establish itself in France's government (Marine Le Pen and Éric Zemmour). It was today's French President to launch, five years ago, a new language, calling for a sovereign, democratic and united Europe at the beginning of his term. The past German Great Coalition always studiously avoided to adhere to his choice of words. The CDU chair Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer even objected to Macron's views openly in 2019, rejecting his call for more independent European security policies. The idea of European sovereignty is now central in the new government agreement.

(3) A relaunch of democratic multilateralism at a time of unprecedented tensions worldwide. The German government has emerged in an age when democracy discovered itself at risk (even in the United States), illiberalism gained ground even in the European Union (Hungary and

Poland), new-imperialism got ground globally (China, Russia, Turkey) and democratically elected governments were reversed (recently, in Burma, Hong Kong and Tunisia). For the new coalition, federalising the European Union is a project, first of all, to preserve the primacy of human rights and democracy within Europe itself, and secondly to commit a large and global player like Europe to fight more vigorously for those goals within multilateral institutions. I see here a deeper cultural imprint from Jürgen Habermas' doctrine behind these policies: the idea that international policy must be treated as *Weltinnenpolitik*, a world domestic policy, as the planet forms a unity. Habermas has deeply impacted on German views in our times. It is not a case that so many NGOs acting in the Mediterranean are animated by German youngsters, in a sort of a voluntary civil service in the interest of global mankind.

Summing up, it cannot be considered as a pure formality that the highest domestic policy agreement among political parties forming the German coalition considers the federalization of Europe as an integral part of the national interest. Also outside Germany, the publication of the coalition agreement has created a new state of affairs, with German majority political forces proclaiming their readiness to play the role of 'federator' of Europe. This is not business as usual. As a rule, European politics in Member States focuses at best on which public goods they can extract from Europe and, in the worst case, on what European competences political forces wish to take back under their control. Often, Europe is simply ignored, and the building up of European institutions is seen with suspicion. The recently published coalition pact in the Netherlands, for instance, between the four parties making the Rutte IV government, does not include any similar reasoning.

What a Federal Europe?

It is with this background in mind that one should read the *Koalitionsvertrag*, i.e. the coalition agreement.

Pleading for a federal Europe, the Traffic Light coalition adopted a new terminology (in political sciences, the use of words is never neutral) with a reference to the new denomination *föderaler europäischer Bundesstaat*. To be noted, the three words contain – intentionally – a recurrent concept: a Federative (*föderaler*) European Federal State (*Bundesstaat*). However, what seems linguistically clumsy is politically significant. The focus is on federalizing the European Union along the two principles of subsidiarity and proportionality, specifically mentioned in the agreement as core concepts: it implies that transfers of powers should be limited to what is strictly indispensable and objectively justified (subsidiarity) and, also in those cases, not go beyond what is subject to a rule of reason (proportionality). A Federative European Federal State shall therefore remain very far from any centralization, and it might be even less centralized than the European Union, at least in some respects. In some respects, the model is the *Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, the Federal Republic of Germany, as it developed in the postwar decades. I see here the cultural impact of leading scholars of political science in Germany, like Ulrike Guérot, and of her European Democracy Lab. Equally interesting from a political science perspective, the Traffic Light coalition set the European Charter of Fundamental Rights at the core of the federalization project, to mark the centrality of human rights. Often forgotten by the pro-EU camp because it did not establish any new power or task for the European Union, the charter became the *bête noire* of the Brexiters during the referendum campaign and has continued to be rejected by all those who – across Europe – refute the EU policies in support of the rule of law. At times, EU opposers may see things clearer than supporters!

The process towards federalisation

The coalition agreement also suggests how to trigger Europe's federalizing process. It should

start with the results of the Conference on the Future of Europe (against any expectation, it could eventually reach a consensus in favour of a strong pro-Federal stance) and achieve further progress with an intermediate constitutional convention to reform the EU Treaties. In the meantime, Europe's democracy would be reinforced with a common electoral law, including transnational lists and a binding system of *Spitzenkandidate*, to enhance the legitimacy of the next Parliamentary elections in 2024. On the other hand, the Traffic Light coalition understood well how finding unanimous support for ambitious treaty changes and ratifying them in all 27 Member States might be far from simple in the current situation. Therefore, they put the focus on how to make the institutional framework more flexible and differentiated already before any treaty change. A few examples: in all areas where it is institutionally possible, qualified majority voting in the Council should "*be used at best and broadened*"; in order to provide the power of legal initiative to the European Parliament, the first best would be to amend treaties, but an intra-institutional agreement might be sufficient; the 'community method' should remain the preferred option, but where necessary States should reach progress through intergovernmental agreements or other decentralized solutions, for instance on key policies like security, energy and asylum.

Achieving European sovereignty

The Traffic Light coalition adhered to Emmanuel Macron's language as from 2017 with several and unambiguous statements. "*We want to increase European sovereignty. This means, first of all, that Europe should build up its own capacity of action in a global context and be less dependent and vulnerable in important strategic sectors, like energy supply, health, import of raw materials and digital technology. Europe should however not be isolated.*" "*Our objective is a sovereign EU as a strong player in a world characterized by insecurity and competition among*

systems. We are committed to a truly European foreign, security and common defence policy. We need the transition to a qualified majority (with a correcting mechanism to take account of smaller countries)."

Turning to specific tools, the coalition agreement listed *"full support to the strategic compact", "reinforced cooperation between European armies of those countries which want to integrate training, capacity, missions and equipment", "set-up of joint command structures and a common civilian-military headquarters. All of this should be interoperable and complementary to NATO structures", and "a general political approach to civilian and military EU missions, encompassing the reasons of conflict, exit strategies and parliamentary control (assigning co-decision and control powers to the European Parliament)."*

These views mark a stark opening compared with the traditionally cautious German approach (I already mentioned Kramp-Karrenbauer's vehement rejection of the French views on setting-up an autonomous defence capacity for the EU). Still, the focus is more on voluntary cooperation, even if reinforced with joint structures and common strategies, than on federal institution building. The coalition parties fell short of agreeing on the creation of a European army, nor did they discuss any of the many options which have been pencilled in several academic or policy blueprints to advance in that direction (there is no reference, for instance, to a past SPD plan to establish a 28th army, nor to proposals to integrate today's Eurocorps in the EU framework).

Multilateralism and strategic solidarity with democracies across the world

Building up a sovereign Federal Union may be seen as 'simply' providing to Europe the capacity of being a new geopolitical actor in an age of global competition or, going much beyond it, setting a further pillar for a more democratic, global multilateralism in order

to pursue global coexistence in peace. For the Traffic Light coalition, there was no doubt that pursuing the first option only is insufficient: *"A sovereign European Union shall remain bound to a multilateral and rule-based international system". "The foreign policy engagement of the EU shall be bound to the pursuit of peace, international human rights and conflict avoidance".*

In order to establish a link between European sovereignty and global governance, the coalition agreement set the objective of *"strategic solidarity"* of the Federal Union *"with our democratic partners"*, so that they can pursue aligned policies within multilateral institutions. This is aligned with recent German foreign policies, as inaugurated by the joint German and French initiative to set up a global *Alliance for Multilateralism*, dating back to 2019.

The coalition agreement saw three further objectives for democratic peers:

- At global level, they should align their views to reinforce (politically, financially and in terms of human resources) the United Nations, with a reform of the Security Council where all world regions need to be represented. To be noted, coalition parties did not reiterate the traditional German call for getting a permanent seat at the UN Security Council, another important innovation compared to the last decades; however, they neither called for a joint EU seat (which France is still fiercely opposing).
- At transatlantic level, democracies should develop a new strategic concept within NATO based on the fair redistribution of tasks among the EU and NATO itself. This should happen recognizing the concerns of Central and Eastern European partners.
- At regional level, they should strengthen the independence and autonomous capacity to act of the OSCE and the Council of Europe, also against their authoritarian members (the implicit reference is to Russia and Turkey) which have tried to hollow them out.

From a domestic budgetary angle, these policies should be supported by a fiscal expenditure objective of 3 per cent of domestic GDP per year, to be jointly dedicated to international activities (diplomacy, development, NATO obligations). In budgetary terms, this goes well beyond the 2% objectives of pure military expenditure set by NATO, which was even not mentioned in the Traffic Light agreement.

Innovative policies: The Green Hydrogen Union and the International Climate Club

Confronted with such a large set of principles, one could ask which new streams of work could be pursued already in the immediate future.

The Traffic Light coalition identified at least two of them:

- Establishing a EU-wide *Green Hydrogen Union*, in order to develop a public infrastructure for the green hydrogen infrastructure, enhancing the ambition of an already existing Integrated Project of Common European Interest (IPCEI). A Green Hydrogen Union would serve the objective of making Germany and Europe the world leaders in the technology of green hydrogen by 2030.
- Setting up an *International Climate Club*, a proposal which Olaf Scholz already tabled as Minister of Finance of the previous government in 2021. The International Club, open to all States (with an emphasis on neighbouring regions, but potentially reaching up to China) would be established by the European Union in cooperation with other international institutions, in order to fix a minimum common price for CO² and create a common Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism.

Obviously, Germany cannot do all of it alone

The obvious should not be forgotten. This a contractual agreement for the pursuit of a

national government coalition. Even if various Eurosceptic leaders immediately pointed to the coalition agreement as a further prove of Germany's attempts to establish a further dominance over Europe (often repeating the stupid slogan of a German attempt to establish a 'Fourth Reich'), the Social Democrats, the Greens and the Liberals of Germany do not have any power (and do not want) to create unilaterally a Federal Union. Still, Germany can strive in that direction with the cooperation of a strong core of peer European political forces aligned behind the same design for an entire political cycle. This must become the main purpose of a new generation of European leaders. How to ensure sufficient cohesive support behind Germany's new proposals?

When Macron launched its plaidoyer for a Federal Europe in 2017, Germany remained silent (in my view, it was the worst mistake of Merkel's 16 years). Today, the situation may be different, and there is more hope for a positive European response, but it is also important to identify potential shortcomings:

- Mario Draghi and Emmanuel Macron have recently sponsored the signature of the Quirinale Treaty and presented joint ideas in favour of a renewal of budgetary solidarity and fiscal rules in the EU. Unfortunately, the latter is exactly the area where the overlap between the Traffic Light coalition and the views of Draghi and Macron on how to develop Europe might be the thinnest.
- France and Italy have been hit more severely and from much worse starting conditions than Germany by the Covid pandemic, and see Europe – both historically and in the current juncture – as a tool to achieve further protection. Germany sees now Europe as an instrument to ensure the most radical modernization of its own productive system since one hundred years, in order to ensure that our continent remains the leading industrial region in a much greener

world. Much simplifying, France and Italy have a defensive, Germany a pro-active EU stance. For a part of the French and Italian electorate, it might be difficult to support Europe's federalization without obtaining visible guarantees they would not be the losers of modernization; for a part of the German electorate, it might be difficult to agree transferring anew fiscal resources to fellow Europeans, if they see the core challenges and expenditure needs for their future at the global level due to global competition. Germany's government agreement called for spending 3 per cent of GDP each year for domestic policies having a projection outside the European Union, not within it.

- The needs of all players may be made compatible, as all of them have lost - without a broader regional and global system of stable governance of globalization - the size and the resources to achieve alone protection (France and Italy) and modernization (Germany). Ultimately, achieving the objectives in parallel can increase European cohesion without the risks of important trade-offs: all Europeans need protection and modernization. There is however an urgent need to align priorities among the leaders.
- Time is of the essence. A turbulent international arena might expose all players to the sudden risk of abandoning the focus on the federalizing process, much before alignment is found among a majority of EU stakeholders. To be reminded: the external shock of the Iraq war in 2003 weakened the pro-EU camp, dividing Tony Blair from Jacques Chirac and Gerard Schröder,

and turning their attention from selling harmoniously the EU to their citizens to justifying Europe's split on the war. Only weeks before the attack against Iraq, discussions in the UK included how and when to bring the country into the euro area, a prospect which would be soon forgotten. People had to vote on the constitution after the EU had proven its incapacity to stay united on war and peace. Today, the degree of instability around Europe (think about tensions among Russia and Ukraine, immigration and potentially a risk of Trump returning to power in the US) exceeds any capacity of Europeans to mitigate threats, achieve more control of their foreign policies and contemporaneously stabilize their neighbours in the short term. It makes a difference to achieve EU sovereignty in a time of acute, abrupt and potentially disruptive crises, or as the result of an orderly, global and consensual reappraisal of policies.

At the time this article will be published, in a few weeks from now, the readers of the *Federalist Debate* will have already made their first judgement on whether European leaders are willing to run the first steps in the direction of a Franco-German-Italian federalist pillar within the EU, or whether they will run in separate directions. Germany has revealed its cards in favour of a bold federalization of Europe. The leaders of France and Italy have relaunched on the need to rebuild the EU fiscal governance. A bridge between the two approaches is urgently needed. Federalists should identify opportunities without ignoring the risks, encouraging all players to play a fair game, and helping creating coalitions to foster the federal perspective.

Germany's Most Pro-European Government Ever? *

Manuel Müller

Germany's new federal government assumed office on 8 December 2021. After the Merkel era, this is a turning point not only for Germany, but the European Union too. Brussels is expecting new impulses from its largest member state. The new government brings together the three parties that had most strongly argued for the further development of the EU in their election manifestos. The SPD, for example, wants to 'make the EU the world's most modern democracy' and create a 'sovereign Europe in the world'. The liberal FDP advocates a 'constitutional convention' that would lay 'the foundation for a federal and decentralized European federal state'. And the Greens have declared a 'Federal European Republic with a European constitution' to be their 'guiding star'.

Consequently, there is no shortage of ambitious formulations on European policy in the three parties' coalition agreement. The most conspicuous one is undoubtedly the demand that the Conference on the Future of Europe¹, which will run until May 2022, should 'result in a constitutional convention and lead to the further development [of the EU] into a federal European state'. After many years during which the German government largely avoided European visions, this clear statement is a refreshing change that was met with great enthusiasm, especially among federalists. Some reactions were also sceptical, however. After all, the last grand coalition in 2018 had also spoken quite prominently of a 'new departure for Europe' and even placed it at the very beginning of the coalition agreement – but then followed up with few actions, at

least until the historic decision of the recovery fund in summer 2020. Can we really believe that the "traffic light" coalition will succeed in transforming the EU into a federal state within four years? Well, paper doesn't blush.

Reactions abroad

At any rate, the strong words in the coalition agreement amount to a symbolic fanfare, which was also heard in other EU member states. Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán immediately wrote an essay throwing down the gauntlet to the new federal government, while his Polish counterpart Mateusz Morawiecki described a federal Europe as dangerous "bureaucratic centralism".

By contrast, Guy Verhofstadt, former Belgian Prime Minister and liberal group leader in the European Parliament, welcomed Germany's return to a leading role in Europe. And in France, according to one survey, 58 per cent of the population consider the new coalition's stance on Europe to be a 'good thing' – with high approval in all camps except for the extreme right.

In any case, the expectations of the new federal government are high. Even if the European federal state will not materialize anytime soon, with this slogan it has set a benchmark by which it will have to measure its practical European policy. But what exactly does the coalition agreement foresee?

Reform details

In matters of institutional reform, the traffic light coalition is completely on a federalist

course. Among other things, it is aiming for a stronger European Parliament, a uniform European electoral law with transnational lists and lead candidates, and an expansion of majority voting in the Council. Moreover, many lines in the coalition agreement are devoted to defending the rule of law – which is probably the main reason for the harsh reactions from Budapest and Warsaw.

The plans for economic, fiscal, and social policy sound less ambitious, but here too, the new coalition is ready for reform and open to deeper integration. A new edition of the recovery fund in future crises is not promised, but not expressly excluded either. In terms of freedom of movement, the coalition wants to restore the ‘integrity of the Schengen area’ and make a ‘more restrictive’ use of derogations (which allow the temporary reintroduction of border controls). In terms of asylum policy, there should be a ‘fair distribution’ when taking in refugees and a ‘European-led sea rescue in the Mediterranean’.

Common foreign and security policy also plays a major role in the coalition agreement. There is repeated talk of ‘strategic sovereignty of the EU’ – a catchphrase that French President Emmanuel Macron uses time and again and which the coalition agreement defines as ‘our own ability to act in a global context’, along with a reduced dependency in areas such as ‘energy supply, health, raw material imports and digital technology’. To this end, foreign policy decisions in the Council should in future be made by a qualified majority, the European External Action Service is to be strengthened, and the High Representative should act as a genuine “EU Foreign Minister” – whatever the latter may mean.

As is the case with European politics, the traffic light coalition will not be able to achieve most of these goals alone, but only through

compromises with other member states. This raises the question of how much political capital it is willing to invest in which project. Only practice will tell the answer to this, and it is quite possible that not all parties in the coalition will always set the same priorities here.

The personnel

Not least for this reason, the question of which people are to assume responsibility for the German European policy of the next years is also significant. Unsurprisingly, all coalition parties have secured relevant cabinet portfolios. While the SPD controls the Chancellery with Olaf Scholz, the ministries responsible for European coordination – the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Economic Affairs – are in the hands of the Greens Annalena Baerbock and Robert Habeck. In turn, the FDP’s Christian Lindner got hold of the equally influential Ministry of Finance.

But the second row is also interesting for the government’s profile. With Jörg Kukies as European policy advisor in the Chancellery, State Secretary for European Policy Carsten Pillath in the Finance Ministry, and his counterpart Sven Giegold in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, the Federal Government has gathered strong financial policy expertise. Another State Secretary in the Ministry of Economic Affairs will be Franziska Brantner, the previous spokeswoman for European policy for the Greens. The new Minister of State for Europe in the Foreign Office, Anna Lührmann, has a background in the field of democracy promotion – a sign of the importance that the rule of law should play for German European policy in future.

The chairmanship of the European Affairs Committee of the Bundestag also goes to the Greens and will be taken over by their former parliamentary group leader Anton Hofreiter. And finally, according to the coalition agreement, the Greens are also to propose the

next German member of the Commission, at least ‘unless Germany provides the Commission President’. The latter could happen if Ursula von der Leyen secures a second term in office as the lead candidate of the European People’s Party in the 2024 European elections. The new German government would obviously not stand in the way of that.

It remains to be seen how harmoniously the traffic-light team will work together over the next four years. There has never been a three-colour coalition at the federal level in Germany;

and when, shortly before the new government took office, the SPD parliamentary group leader Rolf Mützenich declared that German foreign policy would be ‘steered in particular in the Chancellery’, this did not go down too well with the Greens.

But more European policy debate – including public debate – does not have to be harmful. In any case, the start of the new government gives reason to be confident that both Germany’s presence in European politics and European politics’ presence in Germany stand to increase in the coming years.

* This article was originally published by the *Internationale Politik Gesellschaft Journal*

¹ https://brussels.fes.de/fileadmin/public/editorfiles/events/2021/Q1/210315_CoFoE_Paper_final_online.pdf

We Have to Decide Which European Democracy We Really Want *

Roberta De Monticelli

Last 19 October, the Polish Prime Minister made an address to the European Parliament which triggered the indignation of the European Commission President, Ursula von der Leyen.

“The European Union is a great achievement of the European countries,” said Mateusz Morawiecki, “and it is a strong economic, political and social alliance, and the strongest and best developed organization in History. However, the European Union is not a state, but the member states of the EU are. The states are those that remain sovereign over the treaties”.

On 7 October, the Polish Constitutional Court had issued a ruling which contested the primacy of EU law over that of the states, and ruled, in particular, the incompatibility with the Polish Constitution of certain EU provisions on human rights and the respect for minorities (in particular LGBT minorities). Nevertheless, the tensions between the EU and the Polish government led by the conservative right-wing Law and Justice Party (PiS) are due to, beyond minorities’ rights, the liberty to inform and the reform of the Polish judiciary system in a context of sharp reduction of the magistracy’s autonomy.

What the European Union is

The European Union’s reaction has been instantaneous. The same day, in a document that can easily be found in the magnificent directory of European law on the website *eur-lex.europa.eu*, the Commission reiterated

that: “The EU law prevails over national law, including constitutional provisions; the EU Court of Justice’s rulings are binding for all authorities of the member states, including national courts”.

The statement of the Polish Prime Minister should have provoked a real debate on the principle that the sovereignist leader enunciated with determination: “The EU is not a state, but the member states of the EU are”. It should have and it still should, because that is the crux of the matter, even more so than a debate on the individual rights of minorities (we in Italy saw what happened to the Zan law proposal on Homophobia) and on the irrepressible pressures of national governments upon the autonomy of the judiciary system (here again, in Italy we had some experience of this issue).

In other words: what kind of political entity is the European Union? What do we want it to become? It is up to us, the European citizens. We elect a Parliament, which implicates an executive body (the Commission), we can appeal to a Court of Justice even against judgments by national courts, and we witness, too often, the impotence of the other body which, together with the Parliament, “exercises legislative and budgetary functions” (Lisbon Treaty, Title III, Art. 9B): the Council (of Heads of State and Government).

We also know something about this: think of the Dublin Treaty, which puts the burden of the management of migrants onto the countries

of first reception, instead of regulating their examination and distribution among the different EU countries at the EU level.

Parliament has been pushing for a fair and rational solution, and the Council has been blocking it. The same applies to the construction of a true European international presence on the world stage, a presence already ideally outlined in the Lisbon Treaty in terms that echo Kant's words on perpetual peace. Think also of the establishment of a common defence, which would respond to these principles rather than to the logic of geopolitical anarchy; it is identically subject to the blocking rule of unanimity in the Council (a veto by one and the decision is not taken). This impotence is rooted in the inevitable prevalence (unless changes are made to the unanimity rule) of national sovereignty over the EU's interests.

Altiero Spinelli unceasingly denounced it as the cause of the failures of all the great supranational political entities, from ancient Greece onwards. Until the Federation of the United States of Europe, outlined by the Draft Treaty establishing the European Union – otherwise known as the Spinelli project – approved by an overwhelming majority of the European Parliament in 1984, which served as model for the actual realisation of the institutional set-up of the current Union, when the international situation made it possible.

Ideals

Gianfranco Pasquino wrote on 2 November in the *Domani* newspaper that without ideologies, populism triumphs, and that the EU's strength is based on its ability to foster a "democratic ideology".

How I would like to see a debate that goes beyond this ambiguous word, 'ideology', and face the crucial matter: do we want a supranational democracy, therefore, to all intents and purposes, the United States of Europe, or do we believe – with the Polish sovereignists – that the concepts of democratic sovereignty and nation are indivisible?

The latter is an opinion that has long prevailed even within left-wing parties. Pasquino rightly quotes Spinelli's famous thesis that European parties will no longer be distinguished into left and right, but into those for and against the political unification of Europe.

Not because the progressive ("left-wing") character of the Federalist project is unclear. But because this project creates normative obligations to counter the nations' sovereign arbitrary power. These obligations are based on values universally accessible to the reason, sensitivity, and goodwill of anyone, and not brought up by the "forces" of History.

This project is made of ideals to fight for: not of "ideologies".

* Article published in the *Domani* newspaper on November 7th, 2021

The Spectre of War Hovers over Bosnia Once Again

Faruk Šehić

Never since its creation in 1995 has Bosnia-Herzegovina been so close to break-up, following the recent threat of secession by the head of the rotating presidency, Serbian nationalist Milorad Dodik. A strategy aimed at achieving the goals of Serb nationalists during the Bosnian war, warns Bosnian writer Faruk Šehić from Sarajevo.

The current situation in Bosnia is reminiscent of the events of the early 1990s, just before the war. The parallels with that era of political unrest, pseudo-politics, fears and collective hopes are fully justified.

The Berlin Wall has been torn down, but its bricks have fallen on our shoulders. Yugoslavia has disappeared in a bloody dismantling. What is causing chaos today are threats of secession by a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina called the Bosnian Serb Republic or Republika Srpska (RS). This entity, formally created by the 1995 Dayton Agreement, was at the time the ethnically cleansed territory under the control of Serb forces.

Radovan Karadžić, the leader of this insurgent entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the war, had built his policy on Islamophobia, and on the myth of the threat that Muslim Bosnians would pose to the Serbian people. The Serbs were as threatened by the Muslims as the Germans were by the Jews in the 1930s. The present Serb-Bosnian leader is doing just the same, putting in practice Karadžić's war objectives through political means. Icing on the cake: his Islamophobia lets him enjoy the important support of the anti-liberal leaders and parties.

Since the official end of the war (because the war has only been interrupted, it is not over), there has never been such a psychosis as there is today, such a fear that a new war will start. Indeed, few pay attention to Milorad Dodik's daily invectives and the blatant lies with which he fills the media. Some analysts try to justify this political crisis with the cliché that politicians use war rhetoric for electoral purposes, in order to divert attention from their own misdeeds. But war propaganda is what it is, it has no hidden meaning.

Milorad Dodik really means what he says. His words are explosive and his speeches have long crossed the red line; people are used to his ultranationalist panegyrics. And that is exactly what Dodik wants. He wants the citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the pro-Bosnian parties to tire of this sham and begin to reluctantly accept a new reality. In this new reality, Republika Srpska is integrated into Serbia, something Milorad Dodik knows cannot be achieved by peaceful means.

The boiled frog

Therefore, he adopts the tactic of the boiling frog. The fable tells that if you plunge a frog in cold water and bring the temperature to the boil very gradually, the frog ends up boiled without realising it. We, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina itself, are in the cauldron.

If the National Assembly of the Bosnian Serb Republic votes the withdrawal of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or the State

Investigation and Protection Agency, or the Tax Authority, this would formally mean the end of the rule of law in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the resulting anarchy, the Bosnian Serb Republic would become an unrecognised political entity, like Transnistria or Abkhazia (an entity that would only be recognised by the anti-liberal EU countries). For Bosnia and Herzegovina as such, it would be a real catastrophe: demographic, economic, cultural and moral.

Then armed conflict would break out. No one can predict how intense this new war would be, but its consequences would be devastating for everyone in this country, for the simple reason that we have not yet recovered from the trauma of the last war, and we really do not need another conflict. Not to mention all the dead, all the wounded, all the displaced and missing. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, 7,500 people are still missing from the last war.

The secessionist policy of Milorad Dodik and his party dates back to 2006 and has not changed course since. US sanctions have not affected him much, nor has the EU's lukewarm attitude. A political bully like him will only stop with the use of force.

Dodik and Serbian nationalists began to block the country's common institutions, when the High Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (a figure provided for by the Dayton Agreement) Valentin Inzko, at the very end of his term of office [in August 2021], introduced a "Law on the prohibition of denying genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes attested by irrevocable judgments of local and foreign courts". Political chaos ensued in which all Serbian politicians, including the more moderate ones, condemned the law in unison, because it is almost normal, even prestigious, for Serbian

politicians to deny the genocide in Srebrenica in July 1995.

Imagine for a moment that someone in Germany denies the Shoah, while at the same time holding the office of President...

Just imagine for a moment that someone in Germany denies the Shoah, while at the same time holding the office of President. This is what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, because Milorad Dodik is a member of the rotating tripartite presidency, which means that he happens to hold the office of the president of the presidency of this state, that he so abhors.

The escalation of this separatist policy is part of a broader geopolitical strategy, conducted in collaboration with Serbia and, behind the scenes, with Russia in the role of big brother. It is not Inzko's law that is at the root of the current crisis, but the Bosnian Serb leader's desire for Bosnia and Herzegovina to disappear as a state, so that all Serbs can live in one country.

As I said before, since the official end of the war (because the war has only been interrupted, it is not over), there has never been such a psychosis, such a fear that a new war will start. People have already had this useless experience and do not want to repeat it. I don't believe in empty formulas that assure us there will be no more wars. I hope, of course, that it will not happen, because it would be a destructive spiral, which could lead to the total disintegration of several Balkan states. I am thinking of 'fragile states', i.e. multi-ethnic states. The redefinition of borders in the Balkans will probably lead to more widespread chaos.

Once you open Pandora's box, it is impossible to control what comes out. This is exactly what many militants and leaders of the extreme right in Europe are calling for.

The Alluring Growth of Illiberal Democracies in Eastern Europe

Adriana Castagnoli

Ulrich Beck and Edgard Grande, when reflecting on society and politics in Europe, observed that European integration has, on the one hand, been too uncritically accepted in a certain academic and research milieu; on the other hand, it has been criticised by “wrong detractors with (mostly) wrong arguments”.

Namely, the populists from both left and right, especially the communist parties, who viewed the integration project with scepticism and opposition from the very beginning.

The accession of several former communist countries to the EU between 2004 and 2007 has had conflicting effects: retrospective phenomena such as the re-emergence of regional identities and regionalisms; but also, economic processes of intense catch-up with the average incomes of European partners.

The tough relationship with Brussels

In Poland and Hungary, part of this success can be attributed to unconventional social and economic policies. In Warsaw, the ruling Law and Justice Party (PiS) has been generous with subsidies to the poor and rural families with children that are its core voters.

Budapest, on the other hand, has conducted a policy of general increase in minimum wages, combined with tax cuts on social security and betting on productivity improvement.

But the EU transfers have been so large (about 4% of Polish GDP and about 5% of Hungarian GDP in 2020) that if Brussels decided to suspend them, the effect could hardly be

minimised.

Therefore, the so-called conditionality mechanism aimed to freeze transfers to governments that manifest hostility to the supremacy of European law or violate the rule of law - as in the recent Warsaw-Brussels dispute with current Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki - could have serious political consequences for some national leaders, whose support from citizens also depends on economic performance.

Conflicts over values

Although the EU membership has served Warsaw well with an economic boom since the national-conservative party of Jaroslaw Kaczynski got back into power in 2015, many Poles have perceived the EU's liberal values as a threat to their conservative social traditions.

In their important publication *Cultural Backlash* (2019), political scientists Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart have shown that conflicts over values in recent years appear crucial in explaining popular support for right-wing populist parties. Cultural factors such as the behaviour towards immigrants, the mistrust of national and global governance, and the support for authoritarian values, have proved to be crucial in determining political choices.

The mix of economics, politics and technology

According to Agnieszka Graff and Eidbieta Korolczuk, who analysed in particular the Polish situation and the restriction of women's rights, the factors that have contributed most to this regressive devolutionary process of the

populist right are both socio-economic, like the global financial crisis of 2008, which led to the dismantling of the welfare state in many countries, thereby increasing precarity and the crisis of the healthcare systems; and political factors, such as the crisis of the left, linked to so-called 'refugee crisis' of 2015 and to Islam, seen as a potential threat to Europe; as well as to technological factors, such as social media and online petitions, that have enabled an unprecedented collaboration between ultra-conservative groups and networks at the international level.

In the 1970s and 1980s, the European conservative parties supported free enterprise and economic orthodoxy. Conversely, post-communist populism, rejecting both socialism and neo-liberalism, combines social policies with a jarring form of neo-nationalism.

See, for instance, Hungary, which, after rejecting Soviet communism, has also repudiated Western democracy. Viktor Orbán, founder of Fidesz and prime minister from 1998 to 2002, and back in office since 2010, has moved towards an authoritarian regime, the 'illiberal democracy', supported by a crony capitalism.

Fundamentalist Catholicism

The Polish PiS government also displays a similar distinctive feature: a regime that invokes the values of the most fundamentalist Catholicism, and of an anti-globalisation, anti-immigration, anti-abortion and anti-LGBT ethnic nationalism.

But this regime offers attractive social policies that support families with children and therefore has many supporters in the small towns and the eastern countryside of the country.

The leader and co-founder of PiS, Jaroslaw Kaczynski, has identified the EU as the main political target for Brussels' insistence on gender equality, women's rights and LGBT rights which are values rejected by the most traditionalist Poles.

The peaceful revolutions of 1989-90 in Eastern Europe were the benign result of grassroots contestation. However, the historian Anton Weiss-Wendt observes that, in weak democracies, populism can accelerate the erosion of self-government by reducing civil rights and representative institutions, eventually emptying democracies from within.

The neo-liberal economic transition has re-structured societies in the East, creating new winners and leaving many vulnerable people behind. Especially women, who had jobs under the socialist regime, and retired elders, with pensions that do not keep pace with inflation. Therefore, many have lost faith in self-government and have turned to illiberal democracy.

The nationalist regimes of Eastern Europe, which have grown out of disenchantment with western democracy, are an example of the dangers or risks caused by the degeneration of populism, dramatised by the insurrectionary demonstration in Washington in January 2021.

The return of the East into Europe, however, has inspired a certain convergence of values across the Continent, as argued by Weiss-Wendt, a readiness for democratic rights, including an impartial justice system, gender equality and freedom of speech. On these issues the leaders who came to power thanks to the wave of anti-elitist anger are facing a growing dissent.

Drought and Covid, the African Emergency Threatens to Explode

Mario Platero

In Maasai villages, the Omicron variant has not arrived. But rivers and tributaries are running dry because of the lack of rain. Millions of people are in danger, animals are dying, social tensions are rising. An exodus of biblical proportions is threatened.

Ornabuli is a small Maasai village, perhaps 200 people, a micro-community in the immense Masai Mara public reserve, 235,000 hectares, dotted with dozens of similar villages of precarious mud huts. Here, no news has yet arrived of the Omicron variant that frightens the world. For two reasons. The first is that in Ornabuli the pandemic has never struck, too isolated, and is heard of as a distant thing. The second is that there is already a matter of life and death: the endless drought that has burnt the pastures, destroyed the trees, brought aridity, and reduced the wild animals to the brink of exhaustion: giraffes, buffaloes, gazelles, zebras and rhinos that move in herds of up to several hundred heads in search of water.

Drought killed a cow this morning. I saw three men from the village skinning it to at least try to salvage something before the vultures and hyenas arrived. It may seem like a distant world, but as we will see from a series of statistical insights, it is a problem that instead concerns us very closely, as Europe and as an international community.

Many of the rivers and tributaries in northern Kenya are dry. The impact on populations is devastating. There are no water systems, and

while in the past you could reach abundant sources within a kilometre, today you often have to travel five kilometres to reach a trickle. I saw small groups of shepherds, very young, with sheep or cows in serious difficulty. They are forced to look for water to water their flocks farther and farther away, in other people's land. Tensions arise, skirmishes without violent impacts, but with consequences for the precarious equilibrium of a demographic nucleus anyhow in difficulty: school work is disturbed, small businesses are interrupted, the few services, including health services, are paralyzed because of interminable disputes. Therefore, in this second year of drought, with rainfall between 20% and 40% for the season between October and December, on 8 September President Kenyatta declared a state of emergency, which is still in force: 2.4 million people are at risk, they will not be able to wait for the long rains expected between March and May.

The statistics give an even more disturbing overview for the 2.4 million people at risk. The Integrated Phase Classification (IPC)-phase 4 counts 368,000 people in emergency and the IPC-phase 3 counts 2 million people in crisis, three times more than the December 2020 figures when the situation already seemed critical. If the trend continues, the risk is that the number of people in crisis will increase geometrically, with devastating consequences for a rural economy that is already very poor in normal times.

There are an estimated 465,000 under-five children and 93,000 lactating women

undernourished. And, as we know, there is nothing worse than abstaining from food during the period of growth. Poor agricultural harvests obviously contribute to the deterioration of the ecosystem. Take corn: the average harvest today is between 61% and 89% below normal. Corn stocks per household are 54% below the average of the last five years. The problem is not only in Kenya but is widespread in other Sub Saharan African nations. And I remember James Wolfensohn's prophetic words in an interview before leaving the World Bank. His biggest concern? "Illegal migrations will be a serious problem. But they will be a catastrophe if they take biblical proportions in case of a crisis: what will happen if there are 20 million people knocking on Europe's doors?". As Italy, as Europe, we have been systematically absent, we have left the field open to China, which has invested thousands of billions, but which, in the event of serious problems, certainly does not run the risk of seeing millions of refugees arriving at its doorstep.

What to do? The truth is that it is not enough to organise aid packages or directives to reduce CO2 emissions to zero by 2050, or to put pressure on the UN Convention. Kenya also has responsibilities, and unfortunately it looks too often the other way. Daniele Sardelli was born in Kenya to an Italian father, but despite his nostalgic Italian name he does not speak a word of our language. I met him much further north, in Lewa, an hour and a half by plane from Masai Mara, a smaller reserve, but still enormous according to our parameters, 65 thousand hectares. If Masai Mara is a public reserve, controlled by the local region, Lewa is a public foundation, but the land is still owned by the Craig family, of English origin but Kenyan for five generations: "The drought problem,

with the danger of serious social repercussions, is very serious," says Sardelli. "Climate change is mainly the fault of the West's excesses, but we must also be realistic and self-critical, and denounce what they are doing in our country. For example, uncontrolled deforestation". Sardelli tells me that in Kenya they produce a lot of coal from wood, because the prices of gas and oil are rising. Coal production is illegal, but tolerated. And deforestation ruins the environment, also because there is no serious reforestation programme and without forests there is not any rain. On top of that, there is corruption to reclaim land in protected areas, which is then used for construction.

Why is there no overall plan? Why did Kenyatta, speaking in Glasgow, denounce an African crisis due to the industrialised world, but did not mention his internal problems? I tried to ask these questions to Chief Morefu, the Ornabuli chief. He is 85 years old, has four or five wives and about thirty children, he is tall, handsome, and has a great deal of dignity, like all the Maasai, who number 1,200,000 in Kenya. Deforestation, Cop26, vaccines are too complex terms for his simple nomadic life. But he knows that the drought has caused the tenfold dropping of the price of cows, from \$400 for an animal in good condition to around \$50. The chief does not know what the pandemic is. But if in these climatic conditions the Omicron variant were to arrive, an increase in the pandemic in industrialised Kenya (the world's third largest producer of mangoes and Macadamia nuts, and perhaps first, ahead of Holland, in the production of roses and flowers) would add to the drought, in a nemesis of biblical proportions indeed, like the exodus that could follow, as anticipated by Wolfensohn in unsuspected times.

The Latin American Criminal Court: an Approach for Regional Integration Against Transnational Organized Crime (Part 2)*

Fernando A. Iglesias

“To the sad record of being the most socially unequal region in the world, Latin America has added that of being the most violent region on the planet” states the founding manifesto of the project, drawn up in 2013. And it continues: *“The terrible situation in northern Mexico, the growth of Central American gangs, and of criminal violence, drug use, arms trafficking, narcotics and people forced into labor and sexual slavery in the rest of the countries, constitute a regional problem with enormous negative repercussions on the life of Latin American citizens. Slowly but inexorably, the proliferation of groups dedicated to transnationally organized crime is becoming the main social problem in the region, a threat to democracy and the main brake on its economic development. Unfortunately, the only ones who seem to have understood the global nature of the world in which we live and managed to structure their organizations with a supranational logic that renders national borders obsolete, are the criminals. International protection networks that hide fugitives from justice in other countries, collaboration systems between criminal organizations that operate globally, global exchange of information, drugs and weapons, interconnected mafias in the region and in the world, are just some of the strategies that leave the national systems for the prosecution of organized crime reduced to impotence”*.

Summarizing the project in a few lines, COPLA would be constituted on the basis of the experience developed in the creation of the International Criminal Court (ICC), with some

modifications regarding its objectives, scope and location. On the one hand, unlike the ICC, the COPLA would not be in charge of prosecuting crimes against humanity, essentially associated with political objectives, but crimes related to the objective of profit, essentially of an economic nature. Consequently, its founding document would not be the Rome Statute, but the Palermo Convention, a multilateral treaty against transnational organized crime sponsored by the United Nations, adopted in 2000, which is under the jurisdiction of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) and consists of a central agreement supplemented by three protocols: the protocol to prevent, suppress and punish human trafficking, the protocol against the smuggling of migrants, and the protocol against the manufacture and illicit trafficking of firearms.

As a regional multidisciplinary agency, the court should monitor and track investigations and transnational organized-crime-related situations across the region; promote the development and the improvement of national criminal law; promote judicial and police cooperation among member states and offer protection to witnesses; and would look for:

- 1) Persecute and judge in a supranational instance the members or members of the highest rank of criminal organizations, usually enjoying impunity and protected by networks of national judicial and political complicity.

2) Recover the assets obtained illegally by those organizations; a measure of extraordinary efficacy in diminishing their power, successfully experienced in Italy, Colombia and other countries. Such recoveries will promote reparation to the victims, both individual and collective.

Its jurisdiction would include the person who runs, manages, organizes or promotes a transnational organized criminal group destined to commit any of the following crimes:

- Illicit trafficking of narcotic drugs or psychotropic substances.
- Manufacture and / or illicit trafficking of firearms, their components, parts and ammunition.
- Human trafficking.
- Smuggling of migrants.
- Trafficking of cultural property
- Money laundering
- Transnational bribery

The COPLA would also differ from the ICC in the framework of its action, which would no longer include - at least, potentially - all the countries of the planet, but only those of Latin America and the Caribbean; as we have mentioned, the region of the world most directly affected by transnational organized crime. In addition, according to the proposal of its promoters, the COPLA would be created in stages, starting with the constitution of a Latin American prosecutor's office that coordinates and strengthens the action of national prosecutors in the way that the *Direzione Nazionale Antimafia* has done in Italy, the creation of which would be succeeded by the constitution of the Court itself through the adhesion of a minimum number of countries with a minimum number of inhabitants, and that includes at least one of the three largest nations in Latin America: Brazil, Mexico and Argentina.

As for the campaign, its objectives are *"the creation of a broad Latin American and world*

coalition of organizations that fight against organized crime and are favorable to the creation of COPLA; the adhesion of the largest possible number of citizens of Latin America and the world; the drafting of a statute for its operation compatible with national constitutions and existing international treaties; the participation of political actors in the process, beginning with the political parties and their parliamentary representations and ending with the governments and regional organizations". Specifically, the campaign for COPLA has been underway for 8 years, during which it has recorded the following achievements:

Four Latin American parliamentary organizations have given their unanimous support to the creation of COPLA: the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies of Argentina, the Chamber of Deputies of Paraguay and the Mercosur Parliament (Parlasur).

The previous Argentine national government, in the persons of its vice president Gabriela Michetti and its president Mauricio Macri, announced in the United Nations General Assembly the support of the Argentine government and its search for consensus throughout Latin America for the creation of COPLA. The Mercosur Ministers of Justice and Homeland Security declared their support for COPLA as a viable alternative for a regional organization to fight transnational organized crime.

More than 3000 Latin American citizens from 40 countries; 117 national parliamentarians from 13 countries, not only Latin American, and three former presidents of the region have also supported COPLA and its creation campaign.

Situation Diagnosis

After enjoying four years of momentum related to the elevation of the campaign for COPLA to state policy by the Argentine government

2015-2019, the campaign for COPLA has entered a situation of indeterminacy. On the one hand, the loss of government by the *Cambiamos* party coalition has implied its orphanhood with respect to the national executive powers: and no national state claims it as part of its political program. On the other hand, the increase in nationalist and populist tendencies in Latin America and throughout the world, both on the Right and the Left, has in itself implied a strong opposition to the development of international and supranational institutions, and caused limitations to the campaign to promote the COPLA, both political and economic. Finally, the COVID-19 pandemic has strongly reduced the possibility of carrying out activities essential

to its development: meetings, assemblies, congresses and outreach activities have been suspended until further notice given the government health bans and the reduction of air traffic in all the world.

Considering these factors, during this period the main challenge of the COPLA campaign seems to be to keep the flame burning by digitally promoting the adhesion of as many signatories as possible, the involvement of civil society associations, the participation of parliamentary sectors, and the legal activity in the process of debating and finalizing the drafting of the statute, carried out by the Jurists group of COPLA.

*This article is the second part of a paper whose first part was published in the last issue of The Federalist Debate

Mexico Proposes a Regional Organization to Replace the OAS

Gaia Marchiori

In the context of the celebration of the Summit of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC), Manuel López Obrador proposed a new geopolitical order for the American continent: the proposal suggested by the President of Mexico consists in replacing the Organization of American States (OAS) with a new body that integrates all the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to resolve conflicts between them respecting their history, realities and identities.

“The proposal is neither more nor less than to build something similar to the European Union, but connected to our history, our reality and our identities. In that spirit, the replacement of the OAS by a truly autonomous body, not a lackey of anyone, but a mediator at the request and acceptance of the parties in conflict in matters of human rights and democracy should not be ruled out¹”.

López Obrador’s call is seen as a breaking down of the geopolitical puzzle of the region, and as a confrontation of the Left-leaning governments in Latin America with the Right-leaning ones and the OAS.

It should also be emphasized that the Mexican president took the occasion of the 238th anniversary of the birth of Simon Bolivar to review the regional history and remember the US interference during the struggle for independence of Latin American countries, proposing a new direction for the geopolitical dynamics of the continent: *“It is now time for a new coexistence among all the countries of America, because the model imposed more than*

two centuries ago is exhausted, it has no future, no way out, it no longer benefits anyone”, he stated. Despite these words, Lopez Obrador stressed the importance of the collaboration with the United States and the growing influence of the new Chinese giant: *“As I mentioned to President Biden (of the United States), we prefer an economic integration with the United States and Canada respecting our sovereign dimension, in order to recover what was lost in production and trade with China, than to continue weakening as a region, and to have in the Pacific a scenario plagued by military tensions. To put it in other words, it is in our interest that the United States is strong economically and not only militarily²”.*

The one raised by Obrador is a voice in the chorus of some Latin American governments mostly critical of the OAS and in solidarity with the regimes of Venezuela, Nicaragua and Cuba, which participated in the CELAC summit.

Bolivian President, Luis Arce, was the first to intervene after Lopez Obrador’s words. He criticized the OAS and demanded an organism that works with democratic practices and that responds to reality by supporting the sovereignty of the countries and without interference. Cuban President Diaz-Canel also supported the words of the first two leaders, criticizing US interventionism .

It is worth remembering that the OAS is at the center of criticism from some of these countries for its denunciations of human rights violations in the Venezuelan and Nicaraguan autocracy and fraud in the 2019 Bolivian elections, where

Evo Morales attempted a fourth consecutive term.

The OAS: Principles and its new challenges

The Mexican President took the opportunity to call for the Latin American region to constitute something similar to the EU. Despite the effectiveness of the OAS and its purposes still in force since its foundation, we notice more and more that in Latin America the multiple initiatives of regional integration are still far from giving results comparable to those of the EU and they are not immune to internal crises either.

Is it possible to replicate the structure of the European Union in such a different region and in another century? Is that really what the Mexican president is aiming for? Since its creation, and according to its Constitution Letter, the principles of the OAS are:

- 1) Strengthen peace and security on the continent;
- 2) Promote and consolidate representative democracy while respecting the principle of non-intervention;
- 3) Prevent possible causes of difficulties and ensure the peaceful resolution of disputes that may arise between the member states,
- 4) Organize their solidarity action in the event of aggression;
- 5) Seek the solution of the political, legal and economic problems that arise between them;
- 6) Promote through cooperative action its economic, social and cultural development;
- 7) Eradicate critical poverty, which constitutes an obstacle to the full democratic development of the peoples of the hemisphere, and
- 8) Achieve an effective limitation of conventional weapons that allows the greatest number of resources to be devoted to the economic and social development of the member states³.

Although these principles are still relevant and applicable in the Americas, it is important to consider that the current scenario is diametrically different from the time when the OAS was established, in the post-war period, as part of the construction of the hegemonic system and with this institution as an instrument of America's soft power. There are currently a number of new challenges and demands for the Organization. First, the cold war era ended, giving way to a period of clear US hegemony both regionally and globally. Second, multilateralism of a more traditional nature has been and is the object of deep questioning. Both the UN and the OAS must face a series of questions about the effectiveness of their actions in relation to the costs involved in their operation. The new multilateralism and summit diplomacy take political weight away from the OAS and it is necessary to rethink and reactivate it. Third, Latin America today shows a scene of fragmentation and dispersion, after a stage in which, in general, there were a series of common elements that favored rapprochement and exchange, fundamentally at the ideological level. Today, roughly speaking, the region is divided into more populist governments that have a more distant relationship with the United States, and center-right governments which have established fairly close relations with the United States. Fourth, from a security perspective, profound transformations have occurred since the creation of the OAS. Latin America is today one of the regions with the lowest level of conflict in the world. There is no imminent risk of a conflict of interstate scope, but new and varied threats of a more internal nature have arisen, which have motivated a reconceptualization of security, in which the Organization of American States has played a central role. These changes in the regional and international scenario have had to be incorporated from different perspectives by the Organization and in a more prominent way in the field of conflict prevention and resolution.

Latin America and Europe: Two different stages of integration

A- Economy and geographical issues

The first difference between the EU and Latin America is the complementarity of their economies. The main trading partners of the Europeans are other countries of the block, while in Latin America trade with the United States and China is usually much more important.

This is reflected in the figures of trade within each block: while on average between 65% and 70% of the foreign trade of EU members is destined for other countries of the same block, in Latin America as a whole intraregional trade amounts on average to around 20%. *“Regional integration fundamentally needs an economic base. It must allow the exchange of goods, services, capital and workers, and it must serve to adopt common economic policies among the member states⁴”*, explains José Antonio Sanahuja.

The fact that many Latin American countries produce and export the same products (basically raw materials) does not favor integration. In other words, Latin American exports compete for the Chinese and US markets, unlike the European ones.

The enormous geographic extension of the region is another obstacle to Latin American integration that directly affects the possibility of increasing trade and people flows. But it is not only a problem of geographical extension, but also a lack of infrastructure such as roads, railways, ports and sufficient airports. In addition, there is a considerable problem of integration between the Atlantic side and the Pacific one.

B- Excess of national sovereignty

The key element allowing for a real integration to exist in Europe is supranationality: the

countries sacrificed part of their sovereignty so that a regional body be above them. The decisions taken in the community institutions (Council of the EU and European Parliament, for example) are mandatory for all Member States. Supranationality, understood as renouncing certain aspects of national sovereignty, has served as a development engine for the integration of Europe and nothing like that happened for the integration of Latin America.

The mechanisms established in the region have been created preserving a very strong notion of national sovereignty, due to the difficulties for countries to allow certain levels of interference or reciprocity in some issues, and in the region efforts have been made to have much more protectionist development models. The reason for that is due to nationalism, which in Latin America is very accentuated both on the left and on the right of the political space. This implies numerous difficulties in achieving a deep integration.

Ideological changes, the major issue

Among the elements directly related to the insufficient institutionalization of integration in Latin America there are, according to the experts, the ideological and orientation changes that the governments of the region have undergone during the last decades, including those who wanted to give a preponderant role to the State, and even those who were betting on deregulation. The ideological changes in the governments of Latin American countries and the discontinuity between different integration policies have prevented the development of a common thought in terms of democracy, human rights, interference in the affairs of other states. Integration in itself was used as a promise to impose one's way of relating to regional comrades and the whole world. Integration systems are made to rest on the ideological affinity of a group of presidents

or governments, as for example happened with the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of America (ALBA) and the Pacific Alliance.

The last question analyzed is the plan on which the leaders of the various South American countries are most confronted with. Uruguayan President Luis Lacalle Pou actually criticized the posture of the Mexican representative, especially for the lack of freedom and democracy in member countries such as Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, ideologically supported by Lopez Obrador. *“We want to be very clear about it. Both national governments and the governments of different agencies are essentially open to criticism, and they are also a matter of change. That is why you can disagree with a leadership, but you cannot distort an organism”*. And he added that *“participating in this forum does not mean being complacent. And with due respect, when one sees that in certain countries there is no full democracy, when the separation of powers is not respected, when the repressive apparatus is used to silence protests, when opponents are imprisoned, when human rights are not respected, we, in a calm but firm voice, must tell with great concern what is happening in Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela”*⁵.

Conclusions

López Obrador’s proposal to draw inspiration from the European Union and reach a Latin American economic community, finally did not get much support. In large part because it is such an old and objectively unattainable idea. The Economic Commission for Latin America has been trying to build it for six decades without making progress. But also because Mexico, economically speaking, has turned its back on Latin America, with which it has trade exchanges for less than 13%, whereas its economy depends on the USA for more than 85%.

The failure of the idea was also seen in the fact that Mexico was unable to get the leaders of the world’s main economic powers to attend the CELAC Summit on the 18th of September: Chile, Colombia, or the Argentine President Alberto Fernández, an ally of López Obrador who was to receive from Mexico the pro tempore presidency of CELAC, which he canceled due to the political crisis he is experiencing, was not there. Neither was Jair Bolsonaro from Brazil, although he was not expected to participate because he left the body last year. Without Brazil, however, any attempt at political unity or economic integration does not have clout or sufficient power to achieve López Obrador’s dreams.

¹ <https://elpais.com/mexico/2021-07-24/lopez-obrador-pide-la-sustitucion-de-la-oea-por-un-organismo-que-no-sea-lacayo-de-nadie.html>

² *ibid.*

³ <http://www.oas.org/es/acerca/proposito.asp>

⁴ <https://www.bbc.com/mundo/noticias-america-latina-43916189>

⁵ <https://www.infobae.com/america/mexico/2021/09/21/como-la-union-europea-munoz-ledo-felicito-a-amlo-por-cumbre-de-la-celac/>

The 6th EU-AU Summit: Some Reflections

Gabriele Casano

Postponed due to the pandemic, the 6th EU-AU Summit finally took place on 17-18 February 2022 in Brussels, while France holds the presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) and Senegal the chairmanship of the African Union (AU). The event was attended by 70 diplomatic delegations from both continents. The summit falls in the wake of what was outlined in the document *Towards a Comprehensive Strategy with Africa* of February 2020 drafted by the Von der Leyen Commission. This document already outlined some of the fundamental principles and objectives reaffirmed during this last meeting. On the one hand, the strategic priority of a strengthened partnership between the EU and Africa in both the economic and geopolitical spheres was highlighted, as well as the need to establish a real relationship between equals based on common values and interests that will make it possible to respond concretely to the challenges of the coming decades (e.g., climate change, migration, security, etc.). Special attention was dedicated to vaccinations and overcoming the pandemic, an area in which the EU is committed to strengthening cooperation with the African continent. In the long term, the perspective of both parties is to work towards «*the progressive and mutually beneficial integration of the respective continental markets*», also thanks to the development of the *African Continental Free Trade Area*. This last statement underlines, once again, the importance and the potential opportunities of a stronger partnership between the EU and the AU. Although there was general satisfaction among the parties involved, doubts remain about how the most important proposal, *The Global Gateway Africa - Europe Investment Package*,

will be implemented. This ambitious financing plan for development, worth 150 billion euros, aims to support Africa mainly through the acceleration of green and digital transitions, the expansion of sustainable growth combined with the creation of decent jobs, which will strengthen health and transportation systems, and improve education and training. These priorities mirror what was already identified in the AU's *Agenda 2063*, but now they are put on paper in a mutually agreed fashion in the *Joint Vision 2030*, shortly presented in the *Final Declaration* of the Summit. The main challenge of the *Investment Package* appears to be the definition and realisation of adequate tools for its implementation that will be able to mobilise, manage and monitor such great amount of resources and this ambitious development plan. The final statements do not clearly illustrate what tools and resources will be introduced to ensure the success of the development plan. In this regard, it could be conceivable, for example, to have recourse - immediately and in a coordinated and unified manner at the EU level - to resources from the recent *General Allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs)* of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), through the creation of an ad hoc instrument that would allow for their rechanneling from the EU to Africa. At present, the EU supports financing through SDRs only those channels defined by the IMF, but these are not able to guarantee the preferential relationship that Europe intends to establish with Africa, and, above all, they follow rules and principles that are far from the desire of the EU and AU to establish a relationship between equals based on common values and needs that go beyond the donor-recipients logic.

A Strategic Compass to Make Europe a Security Provider

Josep Borrell

Why do we need a Strategic Compass?

Europe is in danger: we need to operate in an increasingly competitive strategic environment. The purpose of the Strategic Compass is to draw an assessment of the threats and challenges we face and propose operational guidelines to enable the European Union to become a security provider for its citizens, protecting its values and interests.

The Strategic Compass is a political proposal to prevent the major risk the EU is facing: that of 'strategic shrinkage', or the risk of being always principled but seldom relevant. That is why it defines a high ambition and presents concrete means to make this ambition a reality.

Recently, the debate about European security and defence has switched gear. In her State of the Union speech, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen called for the EU to take its work on defence to the next level, moving from a 'defence eco-system' to a genuine 'European Defence Union'. Shortly afterwards, the President of the European Council, Charles Michel, declared that '2022 will be the year of European defence', adding that a stronger EU role on security and defence would also strengthen the Atlantic Alliance. That same month, President Biden, in a joint statement with President Macron, welcomed 'a stronger and more capable European defence, that contributes positively to transatlantic and global security and is complementary to NATO'. Then, in October, EU leaders discussed the impact of major geopolitical events and decisions which had put into question Europe's ability to defend its interests and vision. They agreed that Europe

cannot afford to be a bystander in a hyper-competitive world.

European citizens are also aware of this new context. According to many opinion polls, they want the EU to contribute in a more active way to their security and that of the world. They want the EU to protect them from the dangerous world we live in. They understand that we must connect the defence efforts of the Member States, avoiding duplications and gaps in our critical capabilities, to be more efficient in providing this protection. And they know that our security starts far from our borders. So we need to project our presence in the world, promoting security in our neighbourhood and with our partners.

So far, so good.

However, in practical terms major questions remain: how to act exactly? To face which threats and challenges? With which means? And with which implications for the EU? Answering these questions is the rationale for the Strategic Compass that EU leaders tasked me as High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy to prepare.

During the drafting of the Strategic Compass I have become ever more convinced that, because of history and geography, we Europeans don't see the world in the same way. And that is why we don't yet share a common strategic culture. We have to realise that there will always come a time when each Member State needs the EU, just as the EU needs each of its Member States to respond collectively to threats of a changing nature. So, a necessary first step was to come

up with a shared threat assessment, which we did in November 2020 and we used as the basis for this Strategic Compass.

A new world of threats

The starting point of the Strategic Compass is to recognise that Europe is in danger. It faces new threats that are not just military or territorial. We are seeing the return of power politics and zero sum conflicts, with competition between states intensifying. At the same time, interdependence is becoming increasingly conflictual and soft power is weaponised.

In recent years, the classic distinction between war and peace has been diminishing. The world is full of hybrid situations where we face intermediate dynamics of competition, intimidation and coercion. Indeed, the tools of power are not only soldiers, tanks and planes, but also disinformation, cyber-attacks, the instrumentalisation of migrants, the privatisation of armies and the political control of sensitive technologies or rare earths. We have to be aware that the defence of Europe will require a new, comprehensive concept of security, and that emerging technologies will have a profound impact on future warfare and European defence.

The geopolitical stage is also becoming more complex. More and more states are behaving as partners on certain issues and competitors or rivals on others. International relations are increasingly organised on a transactional basis. For the EU, which remains the world's most open space and which borders many areas of conflict, this is a real challenge. Even more so because there are also worrying dynamics such as the collapse of states, the retreat of democratic freedoms, violations of international and humanitarian law, plus the attacks on the 'global commons': cyber space, the high seas and outer-space.

Europeans will continue to favour dialogue over confrontation; diplomacy over force; multilateralism over unilateralism. But it is clear that if you want dialogue, diplomacy and

multilateralism to succeed, you need to put power behind it. That's the point of 'learning the language of power'.

The case for ambition and results

In drafting this Strategic Compass, I have been guided by the conviction that we must be ambitious, because the fast-worsening strategic environment is compelling us to act. But equally, we should be result-oriented and avoid our usual European tendency to go for conceptual or institutional discussions, thus side-stepping the harder task of enhancing our capacity to act. It is often easier to talk - and disagree - in abstract terms, than it is to act and agree on how to do things in concrete terms.

This attitude we cannot afford. To prevent the risk of 'strategic shrinking', the Strategic Compass proposes ways and means for the EU to handle the challenges it faces. This will require political will, without which nothing is possible, and operational efficiency, without which everything is pointless. Taken together, these two ingredients will enhance our credibility, without which our ambitions will come up against reality.

The EU must use the full range of policies and instruments, looking at the same time for legitimacy, flexibility and willingness to participate, in line with the Treaty provisions. The EU needs to be able to conduct operations in all circumstances, including those involving the use of force, as foreseen by the Treaties. To secure European interests, we need to do this in a pragmatic and flexible way, depending on the context of the crisis, the urgency, the willingness and the capacity of Member States to act.

In all this we have to understand that in today's world, as in tomorrow's, purely military responses will remain insufficient or inadequate. Recent events, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, have shown the clear limits to the utility of force and the absolute requirement of locally owned political settlements.

The policy answer

We don't start from zero. Let me recall that in recent years, the EU has equipped itself with a number of instruments to introduce more coherence into the field of security and defence. In 2017, it launched the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD) to rationalise military spending across the EU, and the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) to increase the capabilities and interoperability of European armed forces. Building on earlier efforts, it established the European Defence Fund (EDF) in January 2021, to promote defence industrial collaboration. These efforts strengthen our operational capacity. The EU currently has 18 civilian and military missions and operations deployed around the world. With the Civilian CSDP Compact agreed in 2018, we committed to strengthen our civilian missions - and we are well on our way.

The Strategic Compass exercise builds on this wider process. It is neither a crystal ball for predicting the future, nor a 'silver bullet' that will magically enable Europe to develop a common defence policy overnight. It is, however, a guide for preparation, decision and action. Based on the guidance of EU leaders, the Strategic Compass is proposing concrete ideas in the following four work strands so that we:

- **Act** more quickly and decisively when facing crises;
- **Secure** our citizens against fast-changing threats;
- **Invest** in the capabilities and technologies we need; and
- **Partner** with others to achieve common goals.

Why now?

This is, of course, not the first time that the EU describes its strategic environment and how it intends to respond. Indeed, the history of European integration is full of plans and

initiatives to strengthen security and defence ties among us and our ability to act together. Most have come and gone. And while we have made progress in recent years, we should acknowledge that not all our stated intentions have been realised. The difference this time lies in the speed at which the geo-political context is changing. This makes the case for action more urgent and indeed compelling. All the threats we face are intensifying and the capacity of individual Member States to cope is insufficient and declining.

Already in 2017 Angela Merkel said that 'we Europeans should take our fate into our own hands'. In my opinion, everything that has happened since has only strengthened that conclusion: we Europeans must invest in our capacity to think, decide and act in strategic terms – together with our partners and on our own when needed. In drafting this Strategic Compass, my job has been to sketch out a path, to specify the why, the what and the how. This is what the Strategic Compass does, offering a range of proposals, small and large, covering the full spectrum.

As ever, results depend not on strategy papers but on actions. These belong to the Member States: they hold the competences, the prerogatives and the assets. Although the EU is not a military alliance, it should work towards a common defence, as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon.

The decisions of Member States will determine whether the geo-political shifts of recent months and the renewed debate on European defence that has erupted, are yet another wake-up call that goes unheeded. Or whether 2022 is a new start, when we, finally, decide to face our security responsibilities, in front of our citizens and the rest of the world. I am convinced that we cannot afford to treat our security as 'business as usual', repeating the same slogans and sticking to the same mindset. The cost of passivity and inaction are real and the moment for decisive steps is now.

Requirements for a European Defense

Antonio Padoa-Schioppa

History shows that a political community incapable of ensuring its own defense and security on the ground is in danger, sooner or later, of also losing its freedom.

The crucial issue is simple, yet it is anything but a foregone conclusion. It is a matter of ensuring that Europe can finally adopt a set of military and technological tools capable of endowing the Union with the ability to defend itself independently against potential threats to its security, while its alliance with the United States remains in force.

It is obvious that such a goal can only be achieved by the Union as a whole, rather than by member states individually, if we consider the power structure holding sway in the world today. Only the European Union is large enough to face the challenges to the international order that are already having a serious impact on peace in the Mediterranean and that have sparked dangerous tension on the Union's eastern border. Only the European Union has sufficient resources to be able to sustain the cost of its security and defense by adopting an adequate military, technological and IT structure capable of constant and rapid evolution. Only the European Union, following the demise of the United States' role as the hegemonic power, can influence the major choices facing us at the global level in a multipolar world. Only the European Union can adopt a far-sighted investment policy in Africa assuring development, green energy and security in synergy with the African Union. To achieve this, however, it is essential that the strong commercial, economic and monetary role that Europe plays on the international

stage by virtue of its advanced integration be corroborated by equal credibility in the sphere of the legitimate use of force.

The facts are indisputable. Comprehensive public spending on defense by all 27 EU member states is over three times higher than Russia's, and less than half that of the United States, yet its efficiency, gauged professionally on more than one occasion, is a fraction of both. The EU depends on the United States even for minor military operations in the Mediterranean, for handling drones, for artificial intelligence and for satellite surveillance, notwithstanding the European venture Galileo being already operational. Even the defense of the European territory with conventional weapons would be a risky business in the event of a military attack. The economies of scale to be made by synergizing its defense industries would be enormous, and indeed they too have been calculated.

The prospect of endowing the European Union with its own independent intervention force has been aired on more than one occasion at the European level, but it has been taken to a higher level of political determination only in recent years for reasons with which we are all familiar, especially under the Trump presidency, and quite recently with the Afghanistan issue. So, the upgrading of the CSDP (Common Security and Defense Policy) has begun, but the far more ambitious ideas aired at the European Council meeting in Helsinki in 1999 (proposing the establishment of a European force some 60,000 men strong) have largely remained a dead letter, even though a considerable number of European civilian and military very valuable peacekeeping missions, including those under

the UN flag, are currently operating in various parts of the world.

Numerous voices have in fact been raised in favor of a European defense mechanism in recent weeks. One has but to consider those of Italian President Sergio Mattarella, French President Emmanuel Macron, Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, German candidates for the post of chancellor Olaf Scholz and Armin Laschet, EU High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell, and many others. It is significant that these voices are coming from the world of politics, taking up a stance alongside those of the European Parliament and of the European Commission, that have been aligned in favor of the project of a common defense for years. It is equally significant that leading figures in member States' military hierarchies also have repeatedly come out in favor of European defense, for instance General Claudio Graziano who chairs the European Union Military Committee, General Vincenzo Camporini and others, or British General Richard Barrons, a former C-in-C of the British Joint Force Command.

What these people propose is not the abolition of national armies, but the establishment of an initially small yet genuinely European, thus supranational, core military force directly associated with the European institutions, i.e. the Commission, the European Council and the European Parliament. We should remember that the United States could count on the legitimate presence of both a federal army and the armies of individual States until the Militia Act was passed in 1916. This Dual Army structure (as Kenneth Wheare has dubbed it) would, among other things, allow for the flexibility required to address the kind of challenges that are at present

unfortunately starting to proliferate, several of them in regions very close to Europe.

Standardization, which is necessary if we are to achieve economies of scale, should also apply for armies that would continue to be national armies, in the medium term at least, but this necessitates intergovernmental agreements, which are always a sensitive, if essential, issue. Adopting new technologies and new advanced defense instruments is neither a simple nor a rapid operation. For example, it currently takes over a decade to research and manufacture advanced chips and semiconductors (over which Taiwan has a virtual monopoly today) or to put a totally new military airplane or tank in the field.

One thing must be clear. A common European force, even if it is very small to begin with (like the force proposed by Olaf Scholz and symbolically christened the 28th European army), must have a correct relationship with the Union's institutions and thus, ultimately, with the sovereignty of the people and the separation of powers. The Commission, the two Councils and the European Parliament must also play the roles in the field of common defense that are their prerogative in the democratic constitutional system on which the construction of Europe rests.

While the basic thrust can only come from the world of politics, prompted by the current crises as has almost always been the case in the history of European integration, the broad institutional framework that can make concrete progress possible is already there in the Treaties, in Titles IV and V in the Treaty on European Union (TEU). The measures governing strengthened cooperations allow a project to be developed on condition that at least nine member States subscribe to it (TEU Art. 20.2). The TEU also countenances the possibility of deliberating by qualified majority

for certain kinds of decisions (TEU Art. 32.2; TEU Art. 43. 2). A more binding commitment is allowed to States establishing a permanent structured cooperation in defence policy without fixing a minimum of participants (TEU Art. 42. 6). In connection with the military sphere, it is however not permitted to apply the so-called “*passerelle*” clause (TEU Art. 48.7) that would make it possible to regularly adopt a majority vote if such a concept were to get the initial green light from a unanimous vote. Yet unanimity is considered achieved even if one or more states abstain (TEU Art. 238), on the condition (as we understand it) that those in favor represent a dual majority of 55% of the member states involved and of 65% of their populations. In concrete terms, the most likely prospect today is that of initial political support for a first European defense corps comprising primarily the governments of France, Germany, Italy and Spain, which would no doubt be joined by other member States. It would be necessary to incorporate into a EU framework (including by modifying the Treaties if necessary) the Eurocorps force, which currently lies outside the structure of the EU. With that in mind, it would be important for Italy to join the Eurocorps, of which it is not currently a member.

When we talk about European defense using the formula of shared sovereignty, we should realize that the term must be understood in two ways – both of them valid and both of them necessary – in relation to the Dual Army model mentioned earlier: on the one hand, in terms of shared coordination among the member States (or more probably a group of those States) in the field of armaments and in the conduct of common security and defense policies, including within NATO, but primarily within the UN; and on the other hand, in terms of the establishment of a supranational defense corps; and both of them built into the Union’s institutional framework, albeit

in different ways. The task of organizing this dual geometry certainly is not easy; it is going to demand an in-depth study at the technical level of the military, logistical, operational and institutional planning and organization involved. But having said that, it is the only path to pursue if we wish to achieve the goal.

Where the nuclear umbrella is concerned, the desirable prospect is that in due course and in the appropriate manner, France’s *force de frappe* will protect not only France but Europe as a whole, and will be financed by common funds. The “European sovereignty” of which Macron speaks can mean only that, in the same way as Germany deliberately yielded to European sovereignty by giving up their own “monetary sovereignty”. The process took over two decades to be achieved, and it will inevitably take a long time also where common defense is concerned. But we need to set off down that path in concrete terms today.

In the longer term, the creation of a European defense capability will clearly lead to a downsizing of national forces while, in parallel, gradually fueling the common defense budget with new own resources. The burden for the taxpayer will quite presumably not increase, and efficiency would soar dramatically in the space of a few years. A suggestion worth considering carefully is that at least some member States governments – why should the Italian government and parliament not start the ball rolling in a far-sighted perspective? – might declare their amenability for the future to earmark a small part of their national defense budgets (say 10% to start with?) for a common EU defense budget. The Union, on the basis of its own procedures, would then allocate the additional resources to specific defense goals in accordance with the national governments. This could take place gradually, including using at the national level at least a part of the economies of scale that would come

from the standardization of armaments within the Union.

In conclusion, only if Europe acquires its strategic and military independence – that is compatible with its alliances, first and foremost with the Atlantic alliance, with a view to forging step by step an “equal partnership” with the US, but also its autonomous intervention powers – will it be able to become an active player in the world stage; that is, supporting a policy of shared monitoring and of gradual containment of armaments worldwide, of a controlled nuclear disarmament process and of a strengthening of the UN’s powers as enshrined in the Charter since 1945. On this crucial terrain, as in the spheres of the environment and of the climate, Europe is already in the forefront. It is common

knowledge that huge resources, a small part of which would be sufficient to protect the environment and to eliminate health and social inequality worldwide, are currently spent on armaments. Young people are especially sensitive to this topic. The Conference on the Future of Europe was set up with the intention of listening carefully to what young people, indeed the next generation, have to say.

We should not forget that the European integration process first saw the light of day in Ventotene as a political blueprint designed to guarantee not only intra-European peace but also, in the longer term, international order and world peace. That is its original goal, and it has never been superseded despite setbacks and postponements.

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Scenarios for Global Governance and the EU Open Strategic Autonomy: a Window of Opportunity for a ‘Spinellian Moment’

Mario Telò

Introduction: is Open Strategic Autonomy a priority for the Conference?

Open Strategic Autonomy is an extremely relevant and ambitious concept relating to the EU’s future: it has to do with our liberty and welfare within the complex and dangerous world we currently inhabit. However, it is quite a vague notion: the task of making it more concrete should be a priority both for the EU institutions and for the Conference. Research may contribute by deepening its conditions and consequences – notably, what is and is not feasible in the global context of the twenty-first century. While for 70 years European unity was mainly concerned with internal conflict prevention and stability (after two World Wars), the main issue at stake in the decades ahead will be the coherent link between the internal multilateralism and the capacity of shaping, as autonomous actor, the globalization and the world order.

The EU represents only 5 percent of the global population but is comparable with the United States and China in terms of GDP (15,4 percent in 2019) and trade power (15 percent), is still a monetary power (the euro is the world’s second reserve currency), remains a major actor when it comes to aid to developing countries and humanitarian aid, and is still the world’s number one in creating arrangements and agreements with international partners

both near and far. How can it, through a deeper cooperation and integration process, not only survive, but also better influence the multipolar, non-European world and its governance according to its own interests and values? It must, first of all, proactively promote multilateral convergences for common goods: peace by conflict-prevention, public health, sustainable development, environment and fair regulation of the globalized economy and trade.

If the EU misses this opportunity, a tragic backwards step is possible. We might find ourselves retreating from the constructive years between the 2001 *Laeken Declaration*, the European Convention and the Lisbon Treaty, when ambitious objectives were strictly linked to new institutional modes of governance.

Alternative scenarios: analytical findings

Will the current global multipolar context allow new actors like the EU to emerge? Research suggests¹ that there are four alternative scenarios for the EU’s potential role.

a) An asymmetrical multipolarity characterized by the US military primacy

Since 1989-91, the global context has evolved towards an unprecedented multipolarity, both asymmetric and bifurcating, combined with a multilayered, multilateral network

of cooperation, which is to some extent very fragile but in some ways resilient and dynamic.

Why asymmetric? Contrary to the eurocentric order of the nineteenth century, the new multipolarity is asymmetric in terms of geographic extension, demography, economic power, and the soft power of the main poles. The main asymmetry, though, is that related to military capacities and defence budgets. The United States remains by far the biggest superpower. The rhetoric about China strengthening its military competitiveness does not stand up to scrutiny, with data showing that China's defence budget (US\$ 209 billion in 2020) is still a quarter of that of the United States (even if it is increasing).

The consequence for European nuclear and non-nuclear security, notably in a context of global rearmament (SIPRI 2019), is that the EU still needs to combine its own open strategic autonomy with a new transatlantic deal - for the coming 20 years at least (and benefit of the NATO Art. 5 for its security). This does not mean "NATO first", and reviving transatlantic cooperation will not be easy. What is new is that the global changes and the experiences of the last few decades have made European leaders (Merkel, Macron, Borrell) aware that the EU can no longer solely rely on the United States for its security. The United States' declining role and the transatlantic rift over strategic interests and models for society are long-term achievements of scientific research, even if only extremists would neglect the relevance of shared values and the liberal model. The Eurobarometer surveys have shown how EU citizens no longer rely on the United States, as they did previously, and they are worried about the growing relevance of American domestic politics, provoking oscillations of the US will (and capacity) to lead global cooperation.

This means that the EU cannot return to its obsolete role of a junior partner in the alliance. After Trump's defeat, bringing the United States back in the multilateral game is in the EU's interest and in the general interest of all players. That said, after a few months into Joe Biden's presidency, it is already evident that he will often be obliged to choose between internal consensus and leading global change in a multilateral way. George W. Bush' unipolar dream is gone, but the steps taken towards a revived US global hegemony risk taking the form of an uncertain compromise between national US interest and a defensive/exclusive concept of internationalism - far from the 1944-45 grand multilateral commitment, from Roosevelt and Kennedy, and even from the Obama approach.

b) A status quo multipolarity? The emergence of China as an unprecedented historical challenge

The second evidence is the dramatic global economic power shift within the process of consolidation of a multipolar world. Since 2007 the rest of the world has overtaken the West with respect to the share of global GDP. China is already the world's largest global economy in purchasing power parity terms, and it will also be so in nominal terms within a decade. China is the number one import and export power: the largest trading partner for 100 countries, as well as for the EU. Having an authoritarian regime (with a poor human rights record and an alternative understanding of fundamental principles) while being the world's dominant economy - a highly internationalized, interdependent and technologically advanced country - is unprecedented in history, and it demands innovative thought.

Furthermore, while China is authoritarian, it is a well-functioning one: never in history has such a growth in benefits and welfare been provided to so many people in such a short

time. In the USSR, for instance, maintaining its superpower military status came at the cost of people's welfare. And finally, China, unlike the USSR, is much more integrated in the multilateral system – something that provides multiple opportunities for cooperation over common goods.

c) The strong trend towards a bifurcation

The multipolar global order is increasingly bifurcating between the United States and China: trade tariffs are being introduced, technological digital competition is rife, there are increasing splits in supply chains, mutual threats have been upgraded and political rhetoric is heightened. A second Cold War is not an abstract scenario, but a matter of everyday decisions. In fact, it is openly considered as inevitable by relevant scholars on both sides. In the aftermath of the Anchorage US-China hard confrontation in March 2021 and the following series of reciprocal sanctions, a two-part question arises:

- Is a serious reduction of global production chains and complex interdependence possible, or is it too late to contain China's economy in an effective way? See, for example, Ericsson's support of Huawei's competitive presence in the West, in the hope that China will support Ericsson's business in China.
- How can we cope with the risk of an endless multiplying of ineffective reciprocal sanctions, good only for bolstering Xi's regime?

The EU is interested in averting two risks: either passively adjusting to a hard global bifurcation, or sticking to the status quo, which may end up in dramatically weakening the EU and multilateral organizations, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO), the World Health Organisation (WHO) and the UN, but also the G20, as well as their various binding agendas. Antonio Guterres' UN reform agenda would be at risk; the revision of WHO governance would

be frozen; and the commitment of the new WTO Director General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala for subsidies reform, investment facilitation, domestic services regulation and Appellate body revival would be harmed.

How, then, should we deal with China - the country that benefitted most from globalization and multipolarity? Trump tried to combine his defensive and inward-looking program priority - "America first" - with a tough outward stance: trade wars and political confrontation, with the aim of bringing about an internal collapse of the People's Republic of China regime. It became quickly evident not only that his tactics would fail, but that economic containment is not a feasible option. Two alternative avenues are possible: either we strive for a realist plural multilateralism that is a mirror of a consolidated multipolarity, making room for China and other non-Western actors, their economies and also their different background cultures; or we search for innovative combinations of realism and transformation.

Of course, the EU must put human rights and the promotion of democracy at the top of its agenda: EU sanctions are justified on the basis of a neutral investigation of human rights violation, and if there are retaliations against European Parliament members, researchers and research centres, China's actions must be firmly rejected. However, are sanctions – if they are dished out as mainly a means of external pressure - the best way to defend human rights and promote democracy? Is the revival of an anti-reformist and fundamentalist political culture ("if we don't obtain all we ask for, then we obtain nothing") a good way for European global influence, or is it the route to dangerous self-isolation?

d) A EU alternative: combining realism with dialogue and transformation towards a new multilateralism

UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has mentioned the "Helsinki process" (also

known as the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)) several times in relation to authoritarian regimes. When the CSCE was established in 1976 as the outcome of the famous Helsinki conference of 1975, the idea of its promoters - from Helmut Schmidt to Olof Palme, and many others - was to profoundly change the authoritarian Eastern European regimes through dialogue and functional cooperation in three areas: security, economy, and culture and human rights. Brandt's *Ost-Politik* inspired this innovating approach, in spite of the "Gulag Archipelago".

Combining a defence of our values with increasingly sophisticated negotiations of our interests - by using our market power, e.g. by including a level playing field and the chapter on "sustainable development" in the EU-China Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) - is the EU way, and it is consistent with the aim of open strategic autonomy. This approach is realistic and ambitious at the same time. It is realistic because it is a simple fact that, through the recent Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, all the Asia-Pacific states, including the region's most important democratic entities (Japan, Korea, Australia, New Zealand) have recently signed an agreement - the "Phase One deal" (January 2020) - with China, and so too has the United States. But it is also ambitious because the EU seems to be aware that if realism is not combined with strong demands for China to respect human rights, the upgrading of treaty contents and the revival of the WTO, the objective risk is a de facto shift to a conservative and status quo multipolarity, framed by a weak and fragile multilateralism. At the same time, the EU's future as a multilateral entity is directly linked to reform of the multilateral network, and the future of multilateralism is, to a large extent, dependent on the EU as a key driver of multiple coalition building.

Contrary to some comments, strategic autonomy

is the opposite of "going it alone". With good reason, the Franco-German Declaration of 20 November 2020 asserted the European alternative to Cold War - that is, the perspective of a new "Alliance for multilateralism" -, whereas the Cold War scenario would divide the current and potential multilateral coalitions for common goods and weaken multilateral regimes and organisations. The main role of the EU is that of bridge-building, and of forming coalitions at the global, regional and interregional levels, thereby leading the process of multi-lateralizing multipolarity and every bilateral agreement. Since "the status quo is not an option", defending multilateralism is only possible if one is reforming it. That is why the EU is politically obliged to promote various functional coalitions.

With reason has Josep Borrell argued that the EU must use the language of power with authoritarian regimes. I would go further: we must use *distinctive* languages of power: market power, trade power and the euro are the most effective levers of international influence available to the EU.

Conclusion: a "Spinellian moment"?

In 2021, we celebrated the 80th anniversary of the "Ventotene Manifesto". This was the founding statement of the European construction, drafted by Altiero Spinelli and his colleagues during their fascist detention. Would it not be a largely consensual idea to propose to make of 2021-22 a "Spinellian moment" for the EU? Dedicating the Brussels Parliament building to Spinelli was one way of recognizing the main driver of the EU democratization process. However, in a period where the EU needs both more democracy and an enhancement of its role in the world, the bloc's citizens would feel more enthusiasm for a Spinellian moment than for a "Hamiltonian moment" (to quote Wolfgang Schäuble writing in "*The Economist*"). Hamilton's fight was aiming at building the

United States; the EU is not a second United States in the making. Spinelli represents the federalist idea and movement, but also a much larger array of forces and hopes for European unity, rooted in every Member State and political culture - an internationally ambitious European project very timely in the current world. Underlining this solid inspiration would help to avoid two wrong turns: on the one hand, a merely instrumental approach to Europe's unity, whose demise was confirmed by Brexit; and, on the other, an emphasis on the building of a European sovereign state or a

Eurocentric dream of a "European civilisation". Taking a Spinellian inspiration for open strategic autonomy may help upgrade the global EU's distinctive project of European modernity and be a driver of new multilateral cooperation. This project is more actual than ever. Through such a symbolic reference, the Conference of 2021 could make the EU's "Open strategic autonomy" more credible and more able to represent the will of millions of citizens for peace, and an inspiring political and socioeconomic model in an uncertain world.

¹ M. Telò & D. Viviers, *Europe, China, USA. Alternative Visions of a changing world*, Bruxelles, Académie Royale, 2021

Appeal to the Russian Friends

Appeal to the Russian Friends

Dear European neighbours,
Dear citizens of the Russian Federation,
Dear Friends,

Let us dream, yes, let us dream together.

Thirty years after the break-up of the Soviet Union redrew the map of Europe, 32 years after the Central European revolutions, in those times also when your freedoms do not cease to decline, let us dream of the day when your Federation and our Union will find the paths of an understanding and a cooperation which are so necessary for Europe and the world.

Let us dream of the day when there will no longer be any room for mistrust and fear between us, when no longer will there be any wall to replace that of the Cold War, when none of the countries that have emerged from the Soviet orbit will have to fear imperial nostalgia for Russia, when no Russian will be able to believe that the appeal of the European Union would threaten your country by bringing the Atlantic Alliance closer to your borders.

Let us dream of the day when the end of the East-West confrontation will no longer be seen by anyone as a victory or a defeat, but as the possibility of new times, the beginning of a new era of democracy and prosperity on the whole continent, as promising for all of us as the first steps of the Union had been for us. Let us dream of the day when we will be able to combine our intellectual, natural and scientific capital to affirm Europe, its culture and its civilisation, to contribute to the development and to the democracy of all our continent, and thereby of the other shores of

the Mediterranean as well, in order to one day constitute this ensemble: Europe, Africa and the Middle East, which Rome had drawn up and whose outline has never been erased by any of the vicissitudes of history.

Yes, let us dream of the moment when bridges will span the forgotten walls, let us dream of it because there is nothing impossible about it.

From St. Petersburg to Lisbon, from Paris and Moscow to Vilnius, Berlin or Warsaw, our middle classes and young people share the same lifestyles, the same tastes and the same thirst for freedom. All generations and all walks of life are not looking to Asia, but to that part of our common continent which, by uniting it, the European Union has enriched so much.

Europeans we are, all of us, for better or for worse, from the conversion of Vladimir to the Gulag camps and mass terror so scrupulously documented by *Memorial*, from the abomination of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact to the first defeat inflicted to Nazism in the heroic battle of Stalingrad, Russia has always been one of the most decisive European powers.

Europeans we are from Brest to Vladivostok because Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky, Chekhov and Bulgakov, belong to our common heritage, to the pantheon of world literature where they sit alongside Shakespeare, Hugo, Dante, Kafka and Cervantes.

Europeans we are all, because you and we draw our common culture from Greek philosophy, Roman law, the Old and New Testaments, the Enlightenment and the democracy of Athens

and Rome, reinvented by the British and French revolutions.

European, totally European is your history, because the most enlightened of your tsars turned to France, Germany and Italy when they wanted to open Russia to the world, because 1905, February 17, and the liberation that was the *perestroika* drew on the ideals of 1789 and 1848, and because your Empire was defeated in the same century, the 20th century, as the Ottoman, Austrian, French, British, Dutch and Portuguese empires were.

Like all the other former European imperial powers, you were then divided between those who applauded the independence regained by so many different peoples, and those who saw it as a historical setback that they were too hurt to concede.

This heartbreak, too, we shared. In your country as well as in ours, it has weighed on our political chessboards and our political lives. It continues to do so for you, because in Russia this turmoil is only thirty years old, but there are fewer and fewer among you, and very few under forty years of age to think that Ukraine or Georgia should be reconquered.

You too have come to see, as we have, that in trying to deprive others of freedom, you end up depriving yourself of it, and that a community of cultures, a common heritage and the permanence of economic exchange based on historical and no longer constrained complementarities are infinitely preferable to the injustice and fragility of empires.

The evidence is there.

India and Great Britain are not in conflict any more, nor are Austria and Hungary. As France is no more in conflict with the Maghreb or Indochina, and Turkey was better inspired by the ambition of an industrial Commonwealth than by its military incursions into waters and coasts that it will no longer be able to dominate. The state of our present relations saddens us, of course. The tensions between us are numerous and deep, but one day soon, very soon, your new generations will find the way of harmony with your now independent former possessions. That day will come, we are certain of it. And it is with you, with this new self-confident and democratic Russia - serene and free because it is at peace with its closest neighbours - that we will build a continent of trade, freedoms and stability.

We say this to you because we can feel freedom trembling in your hearts, because you will resume your interrupted march towards democracy, because that day will see the birth of a new Europe, free, strong and exemplary, a Europe which we will be proud to leave to our children, because it is our common aspiration and our common destiny to which, together, we will give substance for the good of us all.

It is this message of friendship, certainty and common ambition that we address to you today, in the hope that it will contribute to our much-needed rapprochement, and precipitate it.

Long live Europe! Long live peace! Long live liberty.

*Members of European Parliament:
Bernard Guetta, France, Renew Europe
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UEF Celebrates Its 75th Anniversary

UEF-President Sandro Gozi said: "We must show the same courage and the same determination of our founders and push for a new European democratic transformation."

These days, the Union of European Federalists (UEF) celebrates its 75th anniversary! It marks 75 years of bringing together generations of passionate European federalists who, since the end of World War II, have been campaigning for a united and federal Europe.

The organisation was founded in Paris on 15 and 16 December 1946, based on the conviction that peace for future generations could only be secured by the formation of a European federation. The driving idea "unity in diversity" was the basis on which European federalists thought the division of the European continent, that had caused the suffering and destruction of two World Wars, could be overcome.

The European federalists are still convinced today that only a common effort made by citizens working towards this goal could and can create a peaceful and democratic Europe that guarantees freedom and human rights. At the Congress of Europe in The Hague in 1948, the federalists had an opportunity to reshape the Europe of their time. Back then, federalists fought to put over their vision on the future of Europe, and important federalist elements were also agreed - such as the decision to draw up a binding Charter of Fundamental Human Rights and to establish a supranational Human Rights Court.

The UEF became a leading voice in the European unification process and from the outset advocated the strengthening of the European Communities, later the European Union. The main goals of the European federalists included the abolition of borders

between European States, the introduction of a European currency, direct elections as well as the institutional strengthening of the European Parliament, the introduction of majority decisions in the Council of Ministers, the adoption of European fundamental and human rights and the reinforcement of European foreign and security policy. All these goals have been at least partially achieved in recent years.

On top of the ideas mentioned above, the realisation of a constitution that would lead to a European federal state is the European federalists' key call. However, this has not been still achieved. The process of constitutionalising the European Union was essentially set in motion by Altiero Spinelli in 1984 with the so-called "Spinelli Treaty". This led to a revision of the Treaties and served as a basis for the European Community and the Constitutional Treaty later on.

Today, the UEF's work for a further deepening of the European Union and its transformation into a true European federation continues through the Conference on the Future of Europe (CoFoE). The Conference provides all citizens, and especially the younger generations, with the unique opportunity to make their voice heard and to advocate the Europe they want by shaping it with their ideas. As European federalists, we must be the leading voice calling for a united and federal Europe.

The CoFoE is particularly special for the UEF. For the first time in its 75 years of existence,

the UEF has taken a seat at the conference table and can directly feed the political decision-making process with its positions. UEF is part of the delegation of the European Movement International (EMI) in the organised civil society group. It is represented by its Secretary General Anna Echterhoff. With the President and MEP Sandro Gozi, the Vice-President and MEP Domènec Ruiz Devesa in the group of MEPs, the UEF is represented with three voices in total.

“Federalism means respect of national and regional identities, promotion of political pluralism, efficiency of the public action, transnational politics, and it is a multiplier of rights and opportunities for all. 75 years after, we must show the same courage and the same determination of our founders,

and push for a new European democratic transformation: we will never give up on this”, underlines President and MEP Sandro Gozi.

Thus, the UEF has the historic opportunity to lead the debate on the reform of the Union towards a democratic, federal entity that is close to citizens and can ensure the protection and promotion of our values. Recent developments show that a stronger pro-European sentiment is emerging in several Member States, which politically strengthens the work of the Conference itself. The UEF will continue to be the driving force for change by communicating its ideas and proposals and fueling the discussions with solutions to strengthen the European Union. For 75 years, UEF has put itself to the service of the European unification, and it will continue to do so.

Daniel Freund takes over the Presidency of the Spinelli Group in the European Parliament

As of 1 November, MEP Daniel Freund (Greens/EFA) will take over the presidency of the Spinelli Group from MEP Brando Benifei (Social-Democrats (S&D)). The Spinelli Group is a network of 72 federalist-minded Members of the European Parliament aiming to reinvigorate the endeavour for strengthening and democratizing the European Union.

Daniel Freund, new President of the Spinelli Group, comments:

“I would like to thank Brando Benifei for his great work as president, pushing for a more federal Europe. As Spinelli Group, we want to use the Conference on the Future of Europe to inoculate our continental democracy with strong reforms against overstretching in next crises. We want strong reforms for truly European elections, EU investments in a digital and climate-friendly future, a Europe that speaks with one voice in the world. We invite all to join our campaign to make Europe stronger by making it more democratic!

The EU is being held back by antiquated decision-making processes. We need to get rid of unanimity in the EU Council and we have to push for own initiative rights for the European Parliament. With a European second vote for transnational lists, we could make sure citizens have a stronger say on which lead candidate is the next Commission President in 2024. We have to make clear that more democracy is the answer to the current crises rocking the European Union.”

The Congress of World Federalists Has Elected a New Leadership

Lucio Levi

The Congress of the World Federalist Movement (WFM), held online in July and October last, was called to face a very serious political, organizational and financial crisis of the Movement. The crisis exploded immediately after the 2018 Congress, which had reformed the statute with the aim of simplifying the organizational structure of the Movement. First of all, the Council, the representative body of the member and associated organizations of the Movement (MOs and AOs), which was meeting twice a year and defined the political line of the Movement, had been abolished, and, secondly, it was decided to hold the Congress more frequently (every two years instead of every four / six years). If these reforms have simplified, according to expectations, the functioning of the organization, they have, at the same time, produced a concentration of power in the International Secretariat and the Executive Committee, and increased the distance between the center and the periphery.

Immediately after Congress, the WFM was paralyzed by a series of chain resignations starting with that of Bill Pace, who had led the Movement for 25 years and had been the architect of the campaign that led to the establishment of the International Criminal Court – the WFM's largest political achievement in its 75 years of existence - and the leader of a coalition of 2,500 NGOs. Due to deep political disagreements, the heads of key offices resigned also, including Tawanda Hondora, appointed Executive Director in place of Bill Pace. It should be added that, to aggravate this difficult situation, the new

statute does not allow the co-options of new members to the Executive Committee to fill the vacant posts. As a result, the WFM was left practically without guidance.

On the one hand, the exponents of the old leadership continued to pursue traditional objectives (the campaigns for the universal ratification of the Statute of the International Criminal Court, and for the Responsibility to Protect civilian populations against serious violations of human rights, in the event that the States concerned are unable to guarantee such protection), while the international community was beset by ever deeper divisions due to the resurgence of nationalism and the return of power politics. The International Criminal Court is criticized for having brought to trial only the political leaders of African states, and for not having had the strength to indict the leaders of the great powers, who refuse to submit to a higher jurisdiction. As a result, some states (Burundi and South Africa) have withdrawn from the Court, which is accused of applying a double standard, and other states are threatening to follow their example.

Faced with this change in the international political situation and following the withdrawal of Bill Pace, the leader of the NGO-coalition campaigning for the International Criminal Court and for the Responsibility to Protect, the WFM has lost its leading role of the two coalitions and with it its main financing sources. At the same time, the activity of the national organizations of the WFM has gradually come to a halt, and the number of members has

decreased. At this point, a change of direction was required, and the opening of a debate on the WFM strategy and the choice of new priorities for action, first of all the issue of climate change, but also that of the UN Parliamentary Assembly, as insistently requested by a part of the Movement. This debate has long been postponed with the consequence of causing the collapse of the organization, the closure of its offices in New York and The Hague and the dismissal of its officials. Those who participated in the Congress found themselves faced with a document of over 50 pages, called "Strategic Plan". The plan unquestionably has some positive aspects: for the first time it is stated that the choice of strategic priorities must be linked to the analysis of the trends in world politics - which can favor or hinder the path towards a world federation -, and the strategy defined towards the world federation is inspired by the idea of constitutional gradualism, in other words it relegates to the archives the idea of a qualitative leap from a world divided into sovereign states to the world federation. However, the Strategic Plan does have a flaw that affects its entire framework: it does not even attempt to formulate a diagnosis of the causes of the organization's crisis. The significance of this omission is clear. The outgoing leadership limited itself to proposing that the WFM continue in the direction traced by the old strategic choices. The only innovative choice,

which has the meaning of making a virtue out of necessity, was to found the continuity of the organization on the free and voluntary work of its militants.

It was therefore inevitable that the Congress decided to entrust the future of WFM to a new, younger and more dynamic managerial class and to change the composition of the newly-elected Executive Committee, assigning a seat to each MO and AO, in order to allow all root organizations to meet at least twice a year and thus participate in leading the Movement. The Congress elected two co-Presidents: Inozuka Tadashi (Japan) and Fernando Iglesias (Argentine), who, for the first time in the history of the Movement, are neither of Anglo-Saxon origin nor are they Protestants. The Englishman John Vlasto, who represents the *Democracy without borders* movement, was elected President of the Executive Committee. The posts of Executive Director (Sandra Coyle) and Treasurer (Bente Nielsen) have been extended.

It is clear that the reconstruction work of the Movement will be a demanding one, long and difficult. It should be remembered that a group of European federalists has launched an appeal to unite European federalists and World federalists, and more specifically to spread the slogan "united we'll be stronger", and launch a debate on a common strategy of European federalists and World federalists.

For a More Meaningful Indicator of Well-Being than GDP

Giampiero Bordino

J.E. Stiglitz, J.-P. Fitoussi, M. Durand
Beyond GDP. Measuring What Counts for Economic and Social Performance
OECD-Publishing, Paris, 2018
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/economics/beyond-gdp_9789264307292-en

The three authors, two distinguished economists and the head of statistics at the OECD, write in the last chapter of the book: "What we are arguing is that there is no real growth when GDP numbers rise but do not correspond to an improvement in the well-being of most citizens, do not reflect the damage to the environment or the exhaustion of natural resources, make the economy and individuals more insecure, erode trust in institutions and society, and open the way to conflict... We should not be misled by a number that does not capture all these dimensions."

In these considerations, we find the general meaning of the report promoted and published by the OECD and carried out by a committee of high-level experts chaired by Stiglitz, Fitoussi and Durand. Back in 2009, Stiglitz and Fitoussi, together with the Indian economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, had already denounced in an initial report the radical inadequacy of GDP (the total value of goods

and services produced in a country during a given period of time) as a measure of progress and well-being, and the political and social distortions caused by its use by states and the ruling classes, and had given indications for going "beyond GDP" with new and diverse methods of measurement. As Stiglitz observed, it is obvious and self-evident that "what you measure affects what you do".

If the measure is wrong, so are the resulting policies, with serious consequences (social malaise, inequality, conflict, damage to future generations, etc.) for populations and individuals.

In the new report published by the OECD, more than ten years later, it is evident that GDP, despite some changes, continues to be the fundamental indicator used by states and ruling classes. In spite of crises of various kinds (economic, social, environmental, health, etc.) that are increasingly evident and increasingly global, the "quantity" and not the "quality" of development is still essentially measured by GDP. We can observe, and this is true for any other relevant human phenomenon, that at the origin of this continuity over time there is an inextricable mixture of conscious and, so to speak, "cultivated" interests, which are opposed to the collection of new data and, above all, to new consequent policies, and, at the same time, unconscious stupidity (the typical capacity of men to harm themselves without even realising it) present in societies and, in particular, in the ruling classes that guide them. This is one of the reasons why, because of the complexity of the origins, it is so difficult to change.

What then should be measured, besides the sum of the value of goods and services produced, in order to move towards a qualitative and not only quantitative measurement of development? According to the authors, mainly income and wealth

inequality, inequality of opportunity, economic insecurity, sustainability, social capital and trust. For each of these major areas, the authors propose detailed and technically well-argued analyses of the new measurements that would be needed, the data to be collected, the methods to collect and interpret them, and the new policies that would be needed and possible. A great deal of work therefore remains to be done, also on a technical and scientific level, to go “beyond GDP”, but it is evident that the weight of interests, and of the public and private powers that hold and defend them, remains before all else.

This problem of going ‘beyond GDP’ is neither new nor recent but has a long history. This is demonstrated, to give just one significant example, by Robert Kennedy’s famous speech to the students of Kansas University in October 1968, just three months before he was killed during the electoral campaign that would probably have led him to the presidency of the United States. An impassioned speech of extraordinary communicative force.

GDP, the American leader noted, “also includes air pollution and cigarette advertising, and ambulances to clear our highways of weekend bloodshed...it counts special locks on our front doors, and prisons for those who try to break them... it grows with the production of napalm, missiles, and nuclear warheads... It does not consider the health of our families, the quality of their education... It does not consider the justice of our courts, nor the fairness of our relationships with each other. It measures neither our wit nor our courage, neither our wisdom nor our knowledge, neither our compassion nor our devotion to our country. It measures everything, in short, except what makes life truly worth living”.

More than half a century after Kennedy, nothing has substantially changed from this

standpoint, and “measuring what counts” has not even become a relevant topic of political debate. The book by Stiglitz, Fitoussi and Durand may therefore represent a useful and appropriate informative instrument for those who, as politicians or simple citizens, would like to do so.

Translated by Grégoire Kinossian

Our Homeland is the Whole World

Gary K. Shepherd

Lorenzo Marsili

Planetary Politics: A Manifesto

New Polity Press, Steubenville, OH, 2020

There is an old saying, something to the effect that the whole of something is greater than the sum of its parts. This statement describes the concept of the synergy of the constituent parts leading to something that is more than simply the value of the parts individually added together. One would desperately like to make such a claim for *Planetary Politics: A Manifesto* by Lorenzo Marsili, the English translation of *La tua patria è il mondo intero*, because without a doubt the parts of this powerful little book (only 136 pages) are extraordinary. Despite that, the conclusion of the book is, to put it bluntly, rather anticlimatic.

That is a shame, because Marsili is saying some things one seldom encounters elsewhere. His analysis of the problems of the world, their causes, and possible solutions are both

accurate and astute. And he has a very colorful turn of phrase in describing them. Take this jarring quote about climate change, for example: "We seem to inhabit a new negative communism, a community of destiny that manifests itself through the disappearance of a habitable planet, of a just economy or a healthy environment. We have privatized the profits, and socialized the apocalypse."

Marsili also points to what he calls the zoning of the world, in which differences between nations have become less than those within them. He explains that two professionals from London and Johannesburg can have a greater community of interests with one another than they do with the lower classes of their own countries. At the same time, in Chicago, the difference of life expectancy between richer and poorer neighborhoods (an astonishing 30 years) is greater than the gap between the United States as a whole and any third world country.

One very startling concept Marsili discusses is that of the rhizome. Originally, rhizome is a biological term for a type of plant that propagates using an underground root system, giving the impression of separate bushes, whereas they are actually all part of the same living entity. This perfectly describes the current neoliberal economic system, which emerges in different nations but is a transnational construct beyond the control of any national government.

Ironically, it is the very powerlessness of national politics in solving transnational problems, such as climate change, migration and tax evasion, which gives rise to the hyper-nationalism, nativism and authoritarianism one sees in so much of the world today. Marsili quotes philosopher Wendy Brown, who says, "Counterintuitively, it is the weakening of state sovereignty and, more precisely, the

detachment of sovereignty from the nation state that is generating much of the frenzy of the nation states' wall building today." Closed borders represent the death knell of national sovereignty. As Marsili poignantly describes it, "today's nationalist shadow is nothing but the most obvious manifestation of the twilight of the nation state: its small, fearful dog barking."

To deal with this rhizomic threat, Marsili propounds an ancient philosophical concept, the Chinese idea of *Tiartxia*, roughly translated as "all under Heaven". This concept treats the world as a whole as the subject of political actions, and the welfare of the entirety as the yardstick by which to judge those actions. He explains that there are three dimensions to this concept. The first is the territorial dimension; that is, taking the entire world as the point of reference for action and thought. The second is the political dimension; in which the world is considered as a political unit whose functions are totally interlinked, so that governing the nation becomes part of governing the world. The final dimension is the social one; which takes the welfare of the totality of humanity as the point of reference for determining the desirability and legitimacy of any action, even if the action is undertaken by only a part of humanity.

This concept has the potential to overturn the entire existing order, if it is applied thoroughly and consistently. Yet when it comes to exploring the mechanisms to establish and maintain the implementation of *Tiartxia*, the author seems to stumble. His chapter "A Glimpse into a Politics of the Planet" entertains for the most part only tired old ideas. He suggests, for example, the creation of a transnational party, whose membership is open to people independently of their national citizenship. But this is precisely what was tried, for example, by the Second International and the Industrial Workers of the World.

He goes on to speak of a transformation of human society, brought about by the realization of our common concerns about environmental destruction and the spread of pandemics. However, the author himself admits that so far our responses to these universal threats have been far from unified. Finally, he mentions the need to find a common enemy as a unifying factor, and he provides an obvious candidate. This is the global economic elite, that tiny percent of the population whose money (estimated at ten percent of all the wealth of the world) is safely tucked away in tax havens, and who can travel anywhere with impunity: “flapping their wings over any fiscal frontier”. Yet the existence of this global “class enemy” has been acknowledged by pundits across the political spectrum for many years, and to date no consensus has ever been achieved regarding actually doing something about them.

Despite these flaws, in the last few pages of his book Marsili at least partly redeems himself. He

describes the “Tennis Court Oath” taken by the members of the Third Estate at the beginning of the French Revolution. In this Oath, the members abandoned the Estates-General, renamed themselves the National Assembly and pledged not to disperse until a new constitution was established. Thus, says Marsili, the entire dynamic of the Revolution was changed. “The demand would no longer be for better policies and fairer taxation, but for a transformation of the system of government ... The world today needs its own Tennis Court Oath, its own planetary revolution and the birth of its own planetary politics”.

It is this very point, the need for a “planetary revolution”, that the world unity movement has been so timid to acknowledge in the past, and it is refreshing to see someone like Marsili proclaim the need for it so decisively and unambiguously. Even disregarding the other meaty ideas contained within, that statement alone makes this book a worthwhile one for the members of our movement to ponder.

* This book review was originally published in *United World*

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