



The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

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American Democracy has Narrowly Revived

Joseph Preston Baratta

The new president has been inaugurated, but the former one has assembled political forces that still threaten the republic. The nation has been in turmoil since the elections in November.

Before the national elections, the Tyrant claimed he could not lose. He threatened to send militant thugs to intimidate citizens at their voting places. He appointed a new postmaster general who promptly began removing post boxes and restricting voting by mail. He urged state officials to throw out late ballots and guard against fraud and theft. When the results were tentatively announced the day after the election by the Associated Press, he refused to graciously concede to his opponent, and in fact has not conceded to this day. Weeks went by without an official count of the popular vote. When it was announced – 81,293,495 for the Democrat, 74,223,755 for the Republican – the Tyrant claimed he had still won the election, which he charged was stolen. He then initiated some 60 legal suits in state and federal courts, every one of which found no fraud. His attorney general, William Barr, Republican, stated officially that the Justice Department had uncovered “no voting fraud on a scale that could have effected a different outcome in the election.” When the Electoral College found the count as 306 to 232 (270 being necessary to determine the presidency), he pressed electors to reverse the popular vote. He made a phone call to the secretary of state of Georgia to “find 11,780 votes,” and threatened legal action against him if he did not – an action which later became one of the articles of impeachment.

It happened that Georgia scheduled runoff elections for its two senators on January 5th. The people elected two Democrats, which had enormous significance for the future, since the Senate would then be equally divided, 50–50, leaving the vice-president, who presides over the Senate, to break the tie. That led to the extraordinary events of the next day, January 6, when the Senate was to formally open the certified votes of the Electoral College and declare the winner. The Tyrant whipped up a great crowd (10,000) of his supporters, who marched on the Capitol, where the vice-president was presiding over the official count. They overcame the weak police security, marched into the historic building with their banners flying (including one of the Civil War Confederacy), and ransacked the Capitol. Their goal was to break up the count and enable the current president to claim he had been re-elected. “Hang Mike Pence” was a call heard among the mob. “Put a bullet in the noggen of Nancy Pelosi” was an ambition of one of the rioters written on social media before the event. A mock scaffold with a noose was even erected on the expected inauguration platform. Although the mob left within hours – with only one death of a policeman and one of a protester – what the president would have done, if his protestors had *succeeded*, can be imagined. The press called the event an “insurrection.” But it was plainly an attempted *coup d’état*, by a president who was about to end American democracy.

What are the deeper causes of this crisis? The country is deeply divided. The elections were actually very close. Only eight Republicans in

the Senate and a handful in the House have broken from the former president. Although, in response to the insurrection or attempted coup, articles of impeachment have been sent to the Senate for trial (even after he has left the capital), conviction seems unlikely. Almost half the country refuses to accept that things can go on as usual. Injustices are too deep, going back decades to divisions during the Vietnam War, stagflation, abandonment of the IMF gold standard, Milton Friedman-style liberal economics, reductions of progressive taxation, increasing national debt, and globalization benefiting principally the rich. The outgoing president mobilized a “base” of mostly white workers whose jobs have gone abroad. They have deep grievances against “elites” in Washington who have made the working class pay for financial liberalization. Jobs, unions, homes, family life, religious values – all seem threatened. Workers support the Tyrant because he “hears them” and promises to “drain the swamp.” He would “make America great again,” if that could be done by isolationism and protectionism. Americans want globalization to slow down.

It does not yet appear, as I predicted on these pages four years ago, that the Republicans will split into a fascist party following the lead of the Tyrant and a traditional Robert Taft conservative party, nor the Democrats into a traditional liberal party on the model of Roosevelt’s economic bill of rights and a “left” progressive party led by Bernie Sanders, Elizabeth Warren, and many others. The two-party tradition is very strong in the U.S.A. lest we slip into the frustration of European multi-parties. Two parties, broadly liberal and conservative, may be necessary to the sustained success of democracy.

But politics must come to grips with modern problems. There has not been an increase in real incomes of ordinary Americans since the Carter presidency (1980). The richest 10 percent increased their share of total pretax income

from about 33 percent in the late 1970s to 50 percent by 2012. The top one percent alone now capture more than 20 percent of total income, double their share they received before Reagan. Between 2009 and 2012, the top one percent have captured 95 percent of all gains from economic growth (Emanuel Saez). Between 1973 and 2011, productivity increased 80 percent, but median hourly compensation rose only 11 percent (Lawrence Mishel). The average pay for the 25 highest-paid hedge fund managers climbed from \$134 million in 2002 to an astonishing \$537 million in 2012 (Steven Kaplan and Joshua Rauh). Meanwhile the highest income tax bracket has fallen from 70 percent in the Nixon period to 35 percent (Reagan) to 23 percent today – less than what the middle classes pay (Saez and Zucman). Reenacting a progressive tax code will be the key to justice, including racial justice, in the country.

The real heroes in this crisis of American democracy were the middle-ranked state officials and lower-ranked election commissioners and poll workers – often Republican – who patiently obeyed the law, did their duty, and insured a fair vote. One of the best was the secretary of state of Georgia, Brad Raffensperger, a conservative Republican, who stood up to the president and insisted that Mr. Biden had won fair and square in Georgia. Many judges, often appointees of the recent president, maintained the rule of law. Generals and common soldiers firmly faced what they would do if given unlawful orders to intervene in civilian politics or to launch a war in the usual way of tyrants. Near the end, the former president discussed with his latest secretary of defense and General Mike Milley about launching missiles on the nuclear facilities in Iran. We were reminded of how fragile is nuclear deterrence, dependent on “rational” leaders of sovereign states.

The winner of the election, now that the inauguration has properly been completed, is President Joseph (“Joe”) R. Biden Jr., 78, and

Vice-President Kamala Harris, 56. Mr. Biden was an old senator from Delaware until he joined the Obama administration as vice-president. He has long experience in American government and is known for compassion and collaboration across party lines, unlike the Tyrant. Ms. Harris was twice elected attorney general and once senator of California. She is the daughter of immigrants from India and Jamaica. Technically Black (as Americans divide the human race), she is vividly aware of the plight of minorities. She is a tough prosecutor, rather “left,” and is already being mentioned for the presidency in 2024. Also, the whole House of Representatives (435 seats) and one third of the Senate (35 seats) were elected. The Democrats still have a majority in the House, though they lost some seats. In the Senate, Republicans now are tied with Democrats. There is prospect for long overdue action.

So begins the government of the United States for the next four years. Mr. Biden has begun to form his administration, which will not be confirmed by the Senate until after January 20. Named so far are Antony Blinken, 58, secretary of state, Jake Sullivan, 43, national security advisor, and Linda Thomas-Greenfield, 68, UN ambassador. These three are most significant from a foreign policy point of view. Blinken has been deputy secretary and advisor, Sullivan aide to such officials, and Thomas-Greenfield a career diplomat. Other appointees, like Janet Yellen, a Keynesian economist and past chairperson of the Federal Reserve, to Treasury, and John Kerry as “envoy” on climate change, are very suggestive of future policy.

The Biden administration intends to return to American leadership abroad, but friends and allies must bear in mind that America must put its domestic house in order. The elections were not a mandate for a Democratic party legislative and executive revolution as in the New Deal of 1933. The fears of the Tyrant’s supporters for the old core of America before globalization will

have to be addressed. Progressive change – as in ending the coronavirus pandemic, returning to W.H.O., restoring the economy, raising the minimum wage, passing a uniform voting rights and democracy law, protecting Obamacare, passing an infrastructure bill, enacting a progressive tax code, getting it right this time on racial justice, restraining the police, protecting labor in an age of artificial intelligence, protecting the schools from assault weapons, moderating immigration as befits a nation of immigrants, cooperating with other nations on green energy, and returning to international leadership among allies and adversaries – will have to be moderate. Americans must reunite the sweet land of liberty.

In foreign affairs, President Biden has already signed executive orders to return to the Paris accords on climate change. He aims to return if possible to the Iran deal, and negotiate START-4 on nuclear weapons. Whether he can revive the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) and Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaties seems impossible. Completing the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB), which eight nations, including the U.S., of 44 actual and potential nuclear powers, are preventing from entering into force, looks for the far future. But a “new EU-US agenda for global change,” as proposed by the EU Commission in December seems possible. There is also some potential for a return to the Partnership for Peace in NATO in order to reach the Common European Home proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev. Several Italians of the European Federalist Movement and I have been reviving this idea.

In President Biden’s inaugural address, he said “Democracy has prevailed.” This is wishful thinking, though courageous. Biden is the right man for the times. But saving American democracy is not enough. There is a world to save. Look at Earth from the perspective of the moon. Or from Saturn on Voyager I, as interpreted by Carl Sagan. Earth is just a pale blue dot, lost in a sunbeam.

Stability in the OSCE Area is a Strategic Priority for the EU *

Josep Borrell

I am very happy that after six months of discussion, tomorrow we are to appoint a new Secretary General and the heads of the three OSCE autonomous institutions. I am confident that with a new highly competent and experienced leadership, the OSCE can focus on the challenges ahead.

Now, the work of the Organization must be taken forward with renewed energy and determination. The European Union supports the intention of the Swedish Chairman-in-Office to focus in 2021 on “the fundamental tasks of the OSCE: to defend the European security order and to uphold the OSCE comprehensive concept of security”. This is unfortunately particularly relevant today, when the OSCE area is facing a number of crises, many of which erupted in 2020.

Let me recall the European Union’s unwavering commitment to multilateralism. Going it alone is not an option – for anyone. The more we work together, the better will the solution be. The global challenges we are facing today – be it the corona pandemic or climate change – recognise no borders and can only be addressed effectively through multilateral cooperation and structures based on respect for human rights and rule of law.

Forty-five years ago, we established the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), during the Cold War. This was a tremendous victory of multilateralism and cooperation over unilateral and antagonistic approaches. Fifteen years later, the Paris Charter stated the end of the Cold War and opened great hopes for the OSCE region. Many of them became reality, but

unfortunately, thirty years later, the atmosphere within the OSCE is more and more one of confrontation. The spirit of Helsinki and Paris seems far away, and we observe more crises erupting than being solved.

Today, the European Union is confident that the OSCE remains the key forum and instrument to address security challenges in the region. I refer here to both specific conflicts in our region and also emerging and transnational threats that impact us all.

What was valid 45 years ago still holds today: the European security architecture can be defended only by respecting international law and OSCE principles and commitments, namely the Helsinki Final Act and the Paris Charter.

In that context, I welcome the recent positive developments in Ukraine. The renewed ceasefire is largely holding since the end of July. It spares lives and this matters greatly to the European Union. Regrettably, Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are still illegally annexed by Russia. The European Union reiterates its unwavering support to Ukraine’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity.

We need a long-term political solution to achieve a lasting peace in the eastern Ukraine. This will require political will by all parties to the conflict. The full implementation of the Minsk agreements is a key condition in this regard.

The work of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission is invaluable. European Union Member States contribute to more than two thirds in personnel and budget. It must enjoy full, safe, unconditional and unhindered access throughout Ukraine, in accordance with

its mandate, and no pretext should limit this. Let me mention also a few words about Belarus. I regret to say that 4 months after the elections the Belarusian authorities still continue to employ violence against peaceful protesters, against ordinary Belarusian citizens. We welcome the report drafted under the framework of the OSCE Moscow Mechanism. We call on Belarusian authorities to fully implement its recommendations.

We also urge Belarus to accept the mediation proposal of the Albanian Chairmanship-in-Office, the incoming Swedish one and the OSCE Secretariat.

In and around Nagorno-Karabakh, we welcome the cessation of hostilities. The ceasefire brokered in Moscow on 9 November between Armenia and Azerbaijan will hopefully be a first step towards a comprehensive settlement. But a cease-fire is not peace, as we Europeans know all too well. Lasting peace, including the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, still needs to be negotiated. The European Union reiterates its full support to the only established format: the OSCE Minsk Group led by its Co-Chairs, to pursue this objective. We, the European Union, also stand ready to contribute to these efforts and to the implementation of agreements leading to sustainable peace and prosperous development of the entire South Caucasus region.

We reiterate our conviction that the protracted conflicts in our area can be resolved only if participating States agree to solve them in line with the OSCE principles. This is the case for Nagorno-Karabakh but also Georgia, through the Geneva international discussions, and Moldova. We therefore welcome the adoption of the Ministerial Statement on the negotiations on the Transnistrian settlement process in the "5+2" format.

Excellencies, stability in the OSCE area is a

strategic priority for the European Union. We will continue to mobilize our instruments and policies towards achieving this goal.

In the Western Balkans, European Union integration and enlargement perspectives are strong tools for pushing forward positive change in line with our shared interests, from security and stability to economy and efforts against climate change.

In our Eastern neighbourhood, we are now shaping our future Eastern Partnership agenda, which for eleven years has been delivering tangible results for the people.

In Central Asia, the European Union remains committed to supporting reform, democracy, regional cooperation and economic development, in line with our 2019 "Strategy on Central Asia"¹. We wish to support concretely green and sustainable post-COVID recovery in the region.

Together with its Member States, the European Union continues to believe that it is vital to modernise the OSCE politico-military toolbox, most notably the Vienna Document, in order to increase military stability, transparency and predictability.

Mr Chairperson, dear friends, the OSCE is the world's largest regional security organization. It provides us with a unique platform for dialogue and normative framework, and we all prefer that frank words are exchanged in Vienna, rather than bullets and shells on the ground.

That is why I would like to reiterate once again that the European Union fully supports OSCE comprehensive approach to security, encompassing the politico-military, the economic and environmental, and the human dimensions. All these dimensions are very important for the OSCE work. There is indeed neither lasting peace nor security if those challenges are not addressed altogether. This has to be our strong commitment.

* Remarks by the High Representative/Vice-President at the 27th OSCE Ministerial Council, held in Brussels, 03/12/2020

¹ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/06/17/central-asia-council-adopts-a-new-eu-strategy-for-the-region/>

The European Union Confronted with Biden's Challenge: What Transatlantic New Deal?

Mario Telò

The great presidential turning point and its limits

The election of Joe Biden and Kamala Harris is excellent news for the whole world and, in particular, for the Europeans, in terms of both possible political convergences and common values: an approach to the fight against COVID-19 based on science, environmental protection and the fight against climate change, the defense of freedoms and human rights as well as multilateralism are returning to the center of US politics, whereas the populist wave, including anti-EU tendencies, will lose an essential reference, a strategic framework. The historic significance of this progressive message coming from the only remaining superpower, CUT should not be underestimated. The list of opportunities open for the search for convergences with the EU is large: the reintegration of the Treaty of Paris (COP 21); the likely reopening of negotiations with Iran; a more constructive approach to international organizations, from the United Nations to the World Health Organization and the World Trade Organization.

But we are also aware that these symbolic messages and concrete factors of discontinuity will be conditioned by a high rate of continuity, in particular for three reasons:

a) Joe Biden knows that his absolute record of 81 million votes is almost balanced by the 74 million obtained by Donald Trump: despite the scandals, the errors, the blunders, his arrogance, the latter mobilized millions of voters more than in 2016. Populist nationalism is still strong

everywhere in the West and the wave is not exhausted, although in Europe the national populists will have to confide in their local roots. No one knows what the "unpredictable" Donald Trump will be doing with this force in the years to come. That balance of forces will surely condition Joe Biden's policy as well as Western democracies for several years.

b) The complicity of many Republican officials in Trump's refusal to recognize the election results, their resilient loyalty to the unprecedented President behavior, despite the discredit that the accusation of fraud and the 6th January tragedy of Capitol Hill, bring upon the American democracy at the global level, confirms that Donald Trump has "trumpified" the majority of the Republican Party, which is accompanied by the change of the Supreme Court in a conservative sense (6-3) for the next decades. Forced to seek to compose a difficult domestic bipartisan consensus, Joe Biden and Kamala Harris will inevitably have limited margins in their search for convergences with allies and external partners. Internal factors will weigh also heavily on foreign policy and according to the *Financial Times* he will be obliged to often choose between internal unity and international change.

c) A final, essential factor should convince Europeans not to delude themselves and to share a realistic analysis of the geopolitical framework in which Biden / Harris' success lies. The decline in the international role of the United States, which is unwilling and unable to assume hegemonic responsibilities,

in the constructive sense of the concept, that it assumed during the 'Thirty Glorious Years' after WW2, is a structural, long-term phenomenon that will inevitably continue during Joe Biden's presidency. According to the most prestigious representatives of political science, including the Americans (R.O. Keohane, J. Ikenberry...), this decline began in 1971 with Nixon's decision to put an end to the Bretton Woods international monetary system, based on the dollar; it continued during the presidencies of Reagan and G.W. Bush with their more and more marked distancing vis-à-vis the multilateral organizations, and was exacerbated by D. Trump's policy of "America first". Neither Bill Clinton nor Barack Obama have been able to reverse this historical trend. In a world that has become multipolar, the divergence of multiple economic, commercial and strategic interests between the two transatlantic allies is accompanied by divergences in values (death penalty, welfare state and balance between multilateralism and sovereignty), which have led, for example, the most important living European philosopher, J. Habermas, already in 2004, to write a famous book with the title *Der gespaltene Westen*, "The divided West". To prevent a crisis of too high expectations, the alliance should therefore have to adapt through an effort of creativity, reconciling the democratic America with the new status acquired by the EU, which has shown its historical capacity to resist, apart from Brexit, the disintegrating pressure of the Trump presidency.

The "Strategic autonomy" of the EU in the new geopolitical framework

The enthusiasm declared by EU and national leaders after the election of Joe Biden is well justified; hope for future cooperation is associated with their relief at the end of four years of uncertainties, trade wars, genuine humiliations reiterated at NATO and G7 meetings, as well as political differences over

fundamental issues such as the environment, trade, and how to manage the pandemic, security, multilateral organizations, etc.

As soon as possible, the EU should schedule a European Council devoted to foreign policy. It should have been done in advance. It is not too late, however, and the initiative, according to the treaty, may come from the High Representative for the CFSP who is most sensitive to the question of the balance to be struck between EU's Strategic autonomy and transatlantic relations. The EU has an interest in avoiding two mistakes: waiting for the American initiative and positioning itself "in a reaction mood"; or underestimating the opportunity that presents itself. The EU should put forward its concrete proposals for a "New Transatlantic Deal", but, at the same time, should situate its proposals within the framework of a new *Global strategy for multilateralism* which could deepen and update the 2016 Mogherini Document. Should it wait passively for the proposals coming from Joe Biden and the new Secretary of State, Mr Blinken, the EU would de facto end up returning to the "junior partner" status it had within NATO, which European national leaders practiced, with the partial exception of De Gaulle and Willy Brandt during the decades following the world war. The EU is a great economic, commercial and, *in nuce*, political power: it should speak, as Josep Borrell points out, its distinctive language as a power, even at the transatlantic level.

A New Deal for Transatlantic Relations would feature three major chapters:

a) The deepening of EU-US cooperation in the fields of research and the fight against the pandemic, for a generalized vaccination and, as of now, for an ambitious, unprecedented plan for post-COVID economic recovery, would not only be immediately useful to citizens on both sides of the Atlantic, but would be a benchmark model and an aid to the whole world, as demanded by the Secretary of the United Nations, A. Guterres, who rightly and

dramatically warned against the great risk of a deep and long-lasting global crisis and a divide between developed and developing countries. The EU can be more assertive in defending its points of view, given the courageous decisions of the European Council of 21 July 2020, which should ultimately be ratified by national parliaments; with the Recovery Plan, the EU is at the global forefront of the recovery, and has its cards to play in a world where the United States and China have, for different reasons, seriously bogged down their soft power.

b) In the field of security, it is obvious that NATO, declared 'obsolete' by Trump and 'brain dead' by E. Macron, is asking itself the question of how to redefine its identity, stuck after the Cold War and the failures in Afghanistan and Libya. The 2010 document ("NATO Strategic Concept") is obviously outdated, as the Atlanticist professor of the J. Hopkins University, D. Hamilton, also admits. Despite the small steps taken towards European defense (2018, PESCO), the EU will need the additional nuclear security guarantee offered by NATO (Art. 5) at least for the next two decades: it must therefore agree to the increase of its contribution requested by the USA (up to 2% of national GDP for defense budgets), but in exchange for a new strategic concept as suitable to a "partnership of equals" (according to an expression of J. F. Kennedy, quoted by W. Brandt but remained for 70 years at a wishful-thinking level).

It is within this new framework that strategic concepts, with very practical consequences, can be discussed together and updated, such as "cooperative security", "crisis management", "out of area intervention". As for the inevitable pressures to build, by a "Summit of democracies", a bloc of anti-totalitarian democracies, namely an organic link between NATO and the Indo-Pacific Council, several observers see in it the risk of limiting the EU's "strategic autonomy" in a multipolar world, where international organizations, especially the UN, must maintain and strengthen their

central role. It is clear that the EU is not interested in a close alliance of democracies against x or y, especially if the latter were to reinforce the tendencies towards a new Cold War: we should not risk pushing, for example, China and Russia towards a strengthened military alliance, with disastrous consequences like the blockade of the UN, of the multilateral organizations and also regional crises. That's why the Franco-German 2020 proposal for "An alliance for multilateralism" still looks as more consistent with the EU interests and values.

c) Putting an end to trade wars will be the first step in the field of transatlantic economic cooperation. In the recent past, trade and investment negotiations between the EU and the United States (TTIP, 2013-2016), despite the sophisticated level of the standards discussed, have not succeeded for profound reasons which subsequently worsened: protectionist pressures within both Europe and the United States, channeled not only by right-wing and far-right populists, but also by part of the radical left, well represented in the United States within the Democratic Party. These domestic constraints explain, at least to some extent, the new Treasury Secretary Yellen's recent commitment to stop any trade negotiation for two years. The EU, rather than taking up and reviving the TTIP as it was left in 2016, should support limited transatlantic agreements (automotive, digital, etc.), in addition to a joint initiative within the WTO on the multiple points where the United States and Europe have common interests, especially in the face of a China which is both a partner and a competitor: the protection of intellectual property, against the transfer of technologies, the limits to state aid and subsidies-notification. Of course, with two preconditions for the EU: that the EU should absolutely not drop its autonomous multiple interregional negotiations, in particular its ratification of the Comprehensive Agreement on Investment (CAI) with China, important for its chapters

on access to the market and “sustainable development” and for the Asia-Pacific strategy of a global power like Europe. Secondly, the fundamental mechanism of the WTO appellate body should be quickly restored by the return of the US to a constructive approach.

These thoughts do not at all diminish our satisfaction for the most beautiful news of the

horrible 2020: the defeat of D. Trump in the presidential elections in the United States. But if Europe forgets these elements of analysis and does not move forward rapidly with its proposals for a Transatlantic New Deal, it will risk either a future crisis in transatlantic relations, due to naive and exaggerated expectations, or missing a historical opportunity.

Overcoming the Hungarian and Polish Veto

On November 16, 2020, the governments of Poland and Hungary vetoed the adoption of the Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) 2021 – 2027 draft, and the proposed Decision on Own Resources, after verifying the existence of a sufficient majority in the Council to approve the Regulation on the conditionality of the Rule of Law in the framework of access to European funding.

Ahead of the European Council on December 10 and 11, the Union of European Federalists (UEF) calls on the Hungarian and Polish governments to withdraw their veto. It is imperative to launch a global package of 1.8 billion euros, of which Poland and Hungary will also be great beneficiaries, provided that their governments respect the fundamental values of the Union.

Otherwise, UEF urges the Council to launch the Recovery Plan by adopting by a Qualified Majority Vote (QMV) the “Next Generation EU” Regulation, regarding the issuance of debt worth 750,000 million euros. This proposal is based on Article 122 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), with the support, if needed, of complementary national guarantees.

The other related regulations set to channel the Recovery Fund, particularly the Regulation of the Recovery and Resilience Facility, as well as the budget corresponding to the year 2021, could also be adopted by QMV in the Council. This could be done without prejudice to the extension of the current MFF, and in full respect of Article 310.4 of the TFEU.

Alternatively, the UEF proposes that the European Council and European Commission consider the launch of an enhanced cooperation under Article 326 TFEU, given that full involvement of the European Parliament can be guaranteed.

“This situation is but the umpteenth example of the practical and democratic difficulties posed by the unanimity mechanism when making fundamental decisions about the multi-year budget and its revenues, fiscal harmonization, and foreign policy, among other critical policy areas, within the Council. It is essential to address, in a federal fashion, the reform of the Lisbon Treaty in the framework of the future Conference on the Future of Europe”, UEF President Sandro Gozi concludes. “It is absolutely unacceptable to put the Union’s long-term budget and the Recovery Plan at risk by two EU governments that do not believe in European principles. Any move that aims at preventing the existence of a conditionality on the Rule of Law linked to the access to structural funds should not be rewarded. The protection of the Union’s fundamental values cannot be traded!”

European Outlook for Scotland in the Aftermath of Brexit

Christian Allard

A difficult year

2020 will become the year to be forgotten across the world; in the European Union and especially in the United Kingdom, the end of the year has been most difficult. In October, Scotland lost the most famous of her fellow citizens, Sean Connery, the Scottish James Bond.

Like many Scots before him, he left his country to find fame and fortune. He found them and yet few know that Sir Sean was, like me, a member of the Scottish pro-independence party, the Scottish National Party. Another point that we had in common, was our accent or rather our inability to change our respective accents. James Bond was in Her Majesty's service, but the actor who played him on the big screen was fiercely Scottish.

The question of Scottish identity

Keeping one's Scottish accent was not recommended in those days in the UK, when the radio, the small and the big screen all spoke in one voice with an indefinable English accent. My French accent has never been a barrier in Scotland, on the contrary it is an asset, the reason why my opinion perhaps weighs more than it deserves. The actor Sean Connery was picked despite his accent, I got elected in part because of mine.

This respect for the opinion of foreigners, of those who have chosen to live in Scotland, is most surprising for newcomers and is explained by the fact that in Scotland there are no foreigners, but a population, a people defined only by their being there. My friend and compatriot, Assa Samaké-Roman, shares

her experience in her story *Scotland: Hadrian and the Unicorn*, a great end-of-year gift for those who want to know more. She writes her surprise when, for the first time, she has the following dialog:

"Where are you from?"

"From France. But I live in Scotland now".

"Really? You're one of us then, a Scottish girl".

In the south of Scotland, in England and even in France, this dialog would have been very different. My friend Assa adds that everyone with dark skin and a frizzy hair like her is entitled to the traditional question, "No but, where are you really from?"; not in Scotland. The Scottish identity is so strong that it is easily shared, it is strong because we share it easily, a lesson for those who think that to share one's identity is to dilute it, to undermine it; in truth, it's quite the opposite.

Brexit, redefining the English identity

In 1997, I voted for decentralization, the devolution suggested by the European Union as a way to protect Scotland from the worst policies coming from the London Parliament, Westminster. It has worked to some extent, the Scottish Parliament has toned down many policies coming out of Westminster and protected us while our English neighbors have taken the full force of the austerity program sparked by the incompetence of successive UK governments.

And for our English friends there was no devolution. Wales and Northern Ireland were able to redefine and confirm their identities with the creation of national assemblies, and I repeat national, because these are four nations

that make up the United Kingdom.

The superimposition of British identity on English identity, which allowed many immigrants from the Caribbean and elsewhere to assimilate and be accepted as British, has isolated the English population. The arrival of waves of immigrants from Eastern Europe and of refugees from the Middle East has accentuated this isolation. Brexit has become the solution to a problem of identity, of English identity, which has not found its way into an enlarged European Union and a decentralized United Kingdom.

Take back control, a populist message

A slogan, a sentiment that proves the English malaise, the desire to cancel devolution to the United Kingdom and the enlargement of the European Union, "Take back control". Unfortunately for all those who chose their past for our future, they did not understand that it was too late to change course, to turn back. The British Prime Minister has already conceded in Northern Ireland, a concession unimaginable in the last century, an incomprehensible concession for a small number of elderly Conservatives who did not see populism coming. There will be a border between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, an economic and customs border in the Irish Sea. The current British Prime Minister's party is set to change its name from the Conservative and Unionist Party to the Conservative and Populist Party. Brexit will not stifle the progressive agenda of the European project, nor the aspirations of the self-governing nations of the United Kingdom to become more self-reliant or, in the case of Scotland, to regain its independence and join the European Union as a member state.

The populist attack on our democratic institutions and our European values is only momentary; like the presidency of Donald Trump, Brexit is doomed to fail in England too, and everywhere else.

Subsidiarity in Scotland

It is clear that there is a democratic deficit in the United Kingdom; the fact is that England does not have its own national parliament, but shares Westminster with the 3 other nations which they have had since 1999. Previously, the democratic deficit in Scotland was blatant, because all decisions were taken by a majority in the British parliament. A majority that could hardly have needed the support of Scottish MPs; it is certain that Scotland has been forgotten by Britain's two main political parties for over fifty years. This is certainly why the European project so attracted the Scots and created the foundations of our democratic and autonomous institutions in 1999 under the principle of subsidiarity.

The origin of subsidiarity must have been known in Scotland, because it was some Calvinists who first defined the concept, and the Calvinists were followed very closely by the Catholic Church.

This principle has become the cornerstone of the European Union, certainly gaining a consensus by many political movements, including mine. The principle of subsidiarity requires that decisions be taken as close as possible to those they concern, and that they be taken efficaciously. There is a certain pragmatism attached to this principle, which suits me very well, and perhaps best corresponds to the Scottish need to live in a most egalitarian society and also to have democratic, efficient and above all prudent institutions.

The future of Scotland is bright, it is European

After serving in the Scottish Parliament from 2013 to 2016, I was elected to the European Parliament to represent Scotland until the UK left the European Union, an emotional departure to the sound of bagpipes in January 2020, a difficult start of a year to forget. My European colleagues in parliament have been

wonderful, their support for a Scotland which has voted over 60% to stay in the European Union is remarkable, their understanding of the reality of the consequences of a very English Brexit on our Scottish institutions shows the respect they all have for this country which has become mine.

Scotland's contribution to the European Union has come to an end and we regret it. I think of my predecessors in the European Parliament: "Madame Scotland" Winnie Ewing, who contributed to the creation of the Erasmus program; of Professor Neil MacCormick, who contributed to the constitutional rights of the European Union and to promote the principle of subsidiarity so dear to the Scottish; our contribution must continue.

This interruption must be as short as possible and my appeal is clear: help us to help you better. The most European country in Europe is Scotland, we have proven that.

Our past, our institutions and our future are European, this Scottish European people is eager to return to the European Union. Our idea of Europe is yours, we may be on the map on the outskirts of Europe but, like our Irish friends, we feel at the heart of the European project.

A guide, a route and a destination

With a Brexit that languished for over four years, our Scottish Prime Minister had plenty of time to prepare our way and guide our returning Scotland to the European Union as a new member state, an independent member state of the European Union.

Nicola Sturgeon took over as head of the Scottish Autonomous Government in 2014; before she was Deputy Prime Minister in Scotland since 2007 and before that she was Leader of the Opposition in the Scottish Parliament from 2004. Her experience and her popularity are on the rise.

The World Economic Forum and the Center for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) recently

confirmed a well-known trend, that the best-run countries in the world today are led by women. The recent study tells us that our leaders are consistently and significantly better, especially when it comes to handling the epidemic.

Nicola Sturgeon's popularity has never been higher with a rating of over 80% for satisfaction, and of over 70% for her governance (source Ipsos-MORI). The polls for the party she leads are very positive, with a majority of the Scottish electorate (55%) preparing to vote for the Scottish Independence Party in May this year. Those legislative elections of next May are the second stage on our road to reunite with our European friends. The second step because the Scottish Parliament has already voted to pass the law for a referendum on the independence of Scotland. The final stage will be the referendum and, for the first time, the polls are unanimous that at this year-end a majority of the Scottish electorate is ready to vote yes.

Scotland, a model to replicate?

The growing popularity of a government and a party in power for 14 years, may come as a surprise. The explanation is simple: the Scottish people regained their political commitment and constitutional interest at the turn of the last century, when Winnie Ewing, *Madame Scotland*, reconvened the Scottish Parliament after a 300-year hiatus. And the people of Scotland have continued for the last twenty years to want more democracy and more constitutional independence. The independence party accompanied her.

That is why today the party has more than 125,000 members out of a population of less than 6 million. An example to follow for many political parties around the world; its members are our strength.

Democratic engagement is more important than ever, we have seen this with the rise of populism. This populist movement has

thrived on the abstention of many voters disengaged and abandoned by the traditional parties of left and right. The answer to populism is not to copy their anti-migration agenda or their aversion to the European project: the negativity of their election campaign is certainly not an asset. Scotland has demonstrated, election after election, that a pro-immigration and pro-European agenda is the only answer to populism. Since August this year, the Scottish Parliament has invited all foreigners and refugees residing in Scotland to participate in our Scottish elections.

Not only have we followed the European example of opening our democracy to our European friends, but we have now opened this democracy to everyone over the age of 16. I am sure Sir Sean Connery would have approved, he who was unable to vote for his country's independence in 2014 because he was living abroad. I voted yes for him, I a foreigner who became Scottish, a European of French nationality who lives where life is good, in the country of the first James Bond, an ancient country which has regained its sense of democracy and adapted it to the 21st century.

Tikhanovskaya, Leader of Belarusian Opposition, Wins Woman of Europe Award

On December 2, 2020, Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya was awarded the Woman of Europe Award in the Woman in Power category. The award ceremony, the fifth annual Women of Europe Awards, was organised digitally by the European Movement International and the European Women's Lobby.

According to the jury, representing extraordinary women from politics, business, civil society and academia, Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya won the Woman in Power award for her actions as Belarusian opposition leader and human rights activist. In Belarus and beyond, she has been a strong and outspoken voice for free democracy and the rule of law. And despite fierce opposition, she spearheads the country's pursuit of new beginnings and a fairer society. The movement she has helped build in Belarus is nothing short of inspiring.

Upon receiving the Woman in Power Award, Sviatlana Tikhanovskaya said, *"Speaking in front of you today, I feel like I am not alone. Hundreds and thousands of Belarusians stand together with me. Among them, tens of thousands of women are taking enormous risks defending their right to live in a free and democratic country. (...) I encourage all of you to keep focussing on Belarus and support us in our fight for freedom. I am very thankful to all of you for this award. It belongs to every brave woman in Belarus who fights for freedom and dignity."*

Environment, Society, Institutions. Thinking at Totality to Understand and Change the World

Giampiero Bordino

The crises of various kinds and of an evidently planetary dimension in which we find ourselves (environmental (the more or less recent pandemics, for example), economic, social, political) offer particularly significant opportunities for reflection. Crises, as all our historical experience shows, certainly do not teach or guarantee anything for the future (just think of wars, which are stupidly repeated over the millennia despite their inevitably and literally suicidal, as well as obviously murderous, character), but equally certainly they suggest and nurture fresh views of the world.

In an interview published by *Le Monde* in April 2020, the French sociologist and philosopher Edgar Morin, known as the theorist of “complexity” as an interpretative key of the contemporary world, denounces the prevalence of a “disjoining and reductive thinking” in European and Western culture. A thought that too often does not adequately grasp the relationships that connect the different parts of reality to each other and, in addition, focuses and exalts specialization and the separation of branches of knowledge. “Science – observes Morin – is devastated by hyper-specialization, which is the closure and compartmentalization of specialized knowledge, instead of the communication of the same”. Disjoining thinking appears powerless to grasp, or at least attempt to grasp, totality. In this way, reality escapes and cannot be, literally, “comprehended” (from Latin *comprehendere*, *com-* ‘together’ + *prehendere* ‘grasp’).

In conclusion, according to Morin, “the shortcomings of that way of thinking, combined with the unquestionable dominance of a frenzied thirst for profit, are responsible for countless human disasters, including those occurring since February 2020”.

The prevalence of the disjoining and reductive thinking has two fundamental and serious consequences, which are to be briefly highlighted right away.

On the cognitive plane, it prevents to comprehend the complexity of the world, that is, to adequately grasp the multiple relationships that connect the parts with each other and with the whole, to seek totality and try to observe it beyond the separations and dualisms. The Covid-19 pandemic, for example, arises to a large extent from the lack of understanding, generated also by interests and opportunisms, the connections that bind the human world, the animal world and the vegetal world.

Secondly, on the practical level, it is essential to observe that the lack of a global perception of reality causes a serious weakening of the sense of responsibility on the ethical and political level. Everyone feels responsible only for “his own” part, or rather for what he perceives, practicing the dominant disjoining and reductive thought, as his own, whether a scientist, or a politician or an ordinary citizen.

Totality, a complex perception built by a multiplicity of relationships, must therefore be, if we want to save ourselves, the horizon of cognitive research and ethical and political

practice. Totality is obviously, to put it in the language of Kant, a "limit concept", a horizon to be pursued, a path that one never ceases to travel, because inevitably, no matter how far one walks, there is always something "farther on" to reach. Totality, in other words, is not an "entity" one can definitively appropriate, but a complex and ever-changing system of relationships which is necessary to explore on a daily basis.

Thinking about totality in the world we live in is particularly necessary with respect to two major types of problems that challenge our ability to know and act, which increasingly put the very survival of the human species at stake, and which have an increasingly evident global dimension. Firstly, the environmental problems, relating to all the different contexts (geological, vegetal, animal, and even cosmic) in which human life on earth is placed since time immemorial. Secondly, the social, political, institutional problems relating to men's coexistence, and the ability to face and resolve in a peaceful way and through consent, as far as possible not by force (which as we know inevitably produces homicides and suicides), common issues.

On the environmental level, it is useful first of all to reunite a first totality, that begins to be considered, regarding human history and geological history. The history of the earth is measured in billions of years, that of the plant world and living matter in millions of years; the human one in hundreds of thousands of years, and the one regarding more specifically human civilization in tens of thousands of years. As we can see, these are completely different time scales, which give the idea of the relativity and limits of human history and, at the same time, of the anthropocentric presumption that characterizes our dominant cultural tradition. In this very long period of time, millions of living species appeared and then became extinct.

The human species is to be placed in this

context, and like all the others it has no guarantee of eternity. And what is it actually doing to ensure its own survival? First of all, it is useful to remember, to outline the general picture, that 97.3% of the living matter (biomass) is made up of plants, 2.7% of the animal world and only 0.01% of the "homo sapiens" species to which we belong. It is evident that the role of the vegetal and animal worlds is crucial for the life and survival of the human species. It is, in fact, one of the main "political" problems, decisive for human life, that men are confronted with. Another "reductive disjunction" between problems of the nature and politics, and between their related and traditionally consolidated fields of knowledge, i.e. political and social sciences, and natural sciences, which it is necessary to urgently understand and overcome.

According to a recent report by WWF, the most important international organization for the conservation of nature, in the last 30 years 420 million hectares of land have been deforested in the world, more or less the area of the European Union. This is a process that destroys biodiversity, given that 80% of plant and animal species, according to estimates, live in forests, mostly in tropical areas. On average, 10 million hectares are deforested every year in order to create pastures for livestock and meat production, soybean crops, palm oil, etc., mainly requested by the developed countries of the western world. 97% of soybean meal, for example, is destined for intensive animal farming. All this, as is known and is now recognized by all, is also one of the main factors of climate change, of the currently underway global warming. According to a FAO estimate, 18% of greenhouse gas emissions depend on intensive animal farming, and only 13.59% on transport.

All this also produces significant health consequences, increasingly evident and recognized. According to estimates, 73% of the world production of antibiotics is destined

for intensive animal farming, and thus enters the food cycle, causing the phenomenon of antibiotic resistance and the development of super-bacteria, one of the main and growing causes of death worldwide. At the current trends, according to some forecasts, in 2050 there will be 10 million deaths a year due to these reasons, compared to 8.2 million due to cancer and 1.2 million to road accidents.

With these premises, it is now possible to better understand the phenomenon of pandemics. That of Covid-19, still in progress, is the sixth since the "Spanish" flu in 1918. It is unlikely to be the last, given that, according to the analysis of the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), the body set up by the United Nations to monitor biodiversity and ecosystems, over 1.7 million unknown viruses reside in mammals and birds alone, half of which may have the ability to spill over to humans. Deforestation, the progressive destruction of many ecosystems (also due to large fires, arson and otherwise, such as those that devastated Australia and California in 2020), pushes entire animal species out of their habitat, bringing them closer to environments inhabited by humans, thus multiplying the possibilities for spilling over in infectious processes, in contexts ever more densely altered by man. The world population today is about 7 billion and 800 million people, of which 4 billion and 300 million are concentrated in urban agglomerations destined to grow further in the coming decades.

As the aforementioned WWF report observes, man has significantly altered, especially since the first industrial revolution, three quarters of the planet's dry land and two thirds of the oceans, giving rise to a new era called "Anthropocene", which the French scientist and botanist Gilles Clément recently renamed, ironically but not unfoundedly, "stupidocene". Stupidity, that is the ability to hurt oneself without realizing it, is typical of the human

species, and this determines, among other things, the need for politics, meant in short as the "art of governing", to avoid and control the consequences of it, instead of using it for the sake of power, as too often happens today with populist and opportunistic leaderships (see Bolsonaro's policy in Brazil with regard to environmental problems, to give just one significant example). Many other phenomena, in addition to those outlined above, justify the definition of "stupidocene" given by Clément: consumption models based on the waste of resources, the inability to give life to new forms of "circular economy" capable of reducing this waste, and so on. There is no doubt, however, to conclude on environmental issues, that the human species is doing nothing at all to guarantee its own future and survival. The generations to come should know and understand it first, because they will have to pay the consequences.

As for the economic, social, political and institutional problems relating to coexistence between men and the art of government, thinking of the whole is equally necessary and decisive. Given that humans cannot live isolated from the rest of the world and given the technological revolution in communications and transport and economic globalization (even in the form of an "archipelago" that could emerge from the current crisis), all the relevant problems facing humanity have by now a global character, and can therefore be thought of and faced only from the point of view of "totality" and of the systems of relations that constitute it. Local and global are always interconnected and no one can really say to be "master in my house", given the structural interconnection between the "houses".

At any level, it is now necessary to "think at the world", that is to say, the totality, because everyone has, for various aspects and to varying degrees, "the world at home", in the form of goods, capital, information, images, people, etc., that come from outside and imbue

every place. A small but influential minority of people, the globalized, are also “at home in the world”. Having the world at home without being able to be at home in the world, the most widespread condition so far in all societies, is evidently an unpleasant situation, also perceived as unjust, and is the contradiction at the origin of many social, political and even cultural conflicts of our age. It can help us understand the roots and reasons for these conflicts. If we add to this the growing economic and social inequalities, in particular those in income and wealth and more generally in life opportunities, an overall picture emerges that explains the crisis of representative democracy and the emergence all over the world, by contrast, of neo-nationalist, populist and anti-elite movements.

On the political and institutional level, thinking at the totality means designing and building multilevel institutions and policies, from local and national to continental and global, which in a coordinated way (therefore guaranteed by “*foedera*”, pacts of a constitutional nature) allow us to address our common problems in the different dimensions and at the different levels at which they arise. In this direction, the thought and experience of *federalism* can make a significant contribution, above all in relation to the problem, confronting which the federalist reflection was historically born, of peace between states, which is the precondition for every other value or public good.

Beyond the “disjoining and reductive thought” denounced by Morin, here is another possible horizon that is worth trying to pursue together.

Strengthening Civil Society at UN Level and Improving UEF-WFM Cooperation

The Union of European Federalists welcomes the World Citizens’ initiative aimed at the establishment, at the UN level, of an instrument enabling citizens to put forward proposals on key issues of global governance and reaffirms its support for this action.

The UEF strongly believes in the need for strengthening citizen’s participation as well as civil society organisations’ involvement at the UN level for the improvement of global governance, peace, planet-friendly and people-centred sustainable development as well as justice and resilience in a digital world.

The unexpected COVID 19 pandemic reminds us all that only engaged, responsible and well-informed global citizens can effectively address the major challenges of the new era and contribute to a more just and equitable world, sharing the rapid and transformative technological and digital advances towards a better life for all citizens.

It goes without saying that the establishment at UN level of a permanent structure ensuring citizens’ participation is crucial for the improvement of global governance, the promotion of inclusive and just ecological transition, eradicating poverty, achieving a sustainable world by 2030 and beyond, with human well-being and a healthy planet at its core.

In this context, the UEF

- reaffirms its commitment to strengthen cooperation with the World Federalist Movement and develop a new common agenda with concrete initiatives aimed at tackling new global challenges and promoting peace, sustainability, citizens’ participation and global democracy;
- encourages the UEF members to participate in the Transnational Working Groups of the WFM , in order to develop common actions on global issues such as global security, migration, artificial intelligence, international terrorism and organized crime and so forth;
- recommends the creation of a joint UEF-WFM task force in charge of the responsibility to identify areas of mutual cooperation and promote joint initiatives.

European Fundamentals

Heinrich Kümmerle

When the European Federalists reunited after some 17 years of separation, during which they had tried to unite Europe either as a “supranational Movement of European Federalists” (sMEF) or as “Aktion Europäischer Föderalisten” (AEF) into a single association in 1973, they agreed on three founding fathers of the federal idea and nine fundamental documents.

Lesser known is the fact that they also changed that day the name of their European level organization from “European Union of Federalists” (UEF in French) into the organization’s name “Union of European Federalists” (still the same abbreviation, but now valid for all languages).

By the way, the “Young European Federalists” (JEF in German) reunited in 1972, which is probably why they keep this date as the date of their own foundation, which, however, actually took place on the 28th of May 1949 in Sankt Goar, Germany (“Juventus”).

The reunification congress from April 13th to 15th 1973 in Brussels, which met under the motto “The United European Federalists Fight for European Democracy”, determined that the European Federalists are inspired by Immanuel Kant, Alexander Hamilton and Pierre-Joseph Proudhon, and already listed the common fundamental documents presented in this article in the preamble of the new statutes.

The fact that Immanuel Kant and Alexander Hamilton are the leaders of federalist thought is still undisputed today. In 1795, the former laid the foundation with his philosophical draft for perpetual peace for all federalists. Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the United States of America and

author of 51 out of in total 85 articles in the *Federalist Papers* (1788), essentially laid the foundations of modern, representative democracy. Pierre-Joseph Proudhon is listed as third because he is considered to be the source of the idea of communalism (probably better known as integral federalism), which as early as 1947 was seen by the majority as the view of federalism that should actually be striven for. Proudhon is still generally known today for his provocative statement “Property is theft”, which comes from his work “*Qu’est-ce que la propriété? Ou recherche sur le principe du droit et du gouvernement.*” (1840).

The nine foundations of federalism named by the European Federalists are the guidelines of the “Federal Union” (1939); the “Guiding Principles for a New Europe” of the Europa-Union Switzerland (February 1940); the “Ventotene Manifesto” (July 1941); the “Geneva Declarations” of the European resistance fighters (May 1944); the “Hertensteiner Program” (September 1946); the “Declaration” of the first UEF Congress in Montreux (August 1947); the “Political Resolution” of the first Congress of the EUROPA-UNION Germany (May 1949); the “Federal Charter” adopted by the second UEF Congress in Montreux (April 1964); and the historic “Declaration of Principles” adopted at the Nancy Congress of the sMEF in April 1972. In the meantime, several years have passed, and I, personally, deem the following documents as noteworthy and likewise important: the “Political Declaration” from the Unification Congress of the UEF itself, which was stipulated on April 15th, 1973; the EUROPA-UNION Germany’s “Twelve Theses for Europe” (April 14th, 1964); the

“Kiel Program for Europe” of the EUROPA-UNION (June 27th, 1978); its “Charter of European Identity” (October 28th, 1995); and the “Charter of Fundamental Rights” of the European Union itself (December 1st, 2009).

With the 14 documents listed here, one has a comprehensive overview not only of European federalism, but also of federalism as a whole. This distinction is made since the World Federalists distinguish themselves from the European Federalists only in that the World Federalists wanted to achieve a world union through a world parliament already in 1947 (constitutionalists), whereas the European Federalists decided in 1947 to first create a free Europe, then including the rest of Europe, which then would have functioned as a blueprint for other world regions and a later world union. You will find all these documents online as annexes to the book “Europe is for Everyone!” (2020)¹.

From the very beginning, the European Federalists differentiated themselves into two strands: constitutionalists and functionalists. The former wanted to create the European federal state through a European Parliament – the Altiero Spinelli approach –, whereas the latter promoted the growing together of the member states through common institutions – the Jean Monnet approach. The above mentioned split into two federalist organizations occurred since the European Economic Community entered into force, and reflects the difference between these political visions: the Italian federalists chose the constitutional method of action, while the German and Dutch federalists chose functionalism.

Communalism, leading to the deepest change in European structures, emerged, at least in my opinion, out of the currents of the *Ordre Nouveau* (France) and the acceptance of the Christian principle of subsidiarity, and thus still today it offers the only sustainable federal solution for present and future societies, of

which the majority of the European Federalist was convinced already in 1947.

Therefore, constitutionalists and functionalists should consider themselves still altogether as communalists. To support this opinion, I highly recommend Michael Wolffsohn’s book “Zum Weltfrieden - Ein politischer Entwurf” (in German) (2015).

The biggest challenge to the communalist idea is in short the following: those who have made themselves comfortable in the current and mostly outdated structures are against a federal restructuring from the bottom up, starting from the municipalities, across the regions up to a federal state. Thus, from the beginning, together with nationalists and centralists, they have put a brake on any further federal development and have helped to ensure that the United States of Europe, as well as a future world union – which equates to eternal peace –, remains a dream for many. Furthermore, I would like to stress that the European idea is absolutely not compatible with the pan-European idea, and thus European Federalists are undoubtedly not “superstate Europeans”, who are still nationalists (Kemal Derviş sort of rebranded the pan-Europeans as such in a speech in Stuttgart in 2005). The institutional model promoted by the “superstate Europeans” is, in my view, “European nationalism”. In fact, the distinctive character of “European nationalism” is the extension of the centralized and indivisible model of the nation-state to the European level, in other words, a European nation-state. Whereas the European federalists are not only convinced of the world union, which is clearly stated in the UEF’s motto: “A United Europe in a United World”, but also in a pure federalist approach manifested in the motto of the European Union: “United in Diversity”.

Andrew Duff argues in his book “On Governing Europe – A Federal Experiment” (2018) that the European Federalists are

strongest in those countries which exhibited an essential resistance during the Second World War. Therefore, the European idea has no fundament in the United Kingdom at all; the relicts of the Federal Union represent an exception. And that is why the British favor a European confederation. Whereas in France the former Vichy regime is still influential, causing the UEF spirit to vanish and keeping the idea of a “Europe of the fatherlands” as preferable. This also explains why the UEF spirit is mostly visible and active in Italy. But why not in Germany? This is caused by the UEF’s birth defect, which materialized in the fact that the UEF forced the UEF-members in Germany in 1947 to merge with non-federalists and “superstate Europeans” in order to become an accepted UEF section with the proper name EUROPA-UNION Germany, which finally happened on November 20th, 1947. The UEF representative for Germany, Ernst von Schenk, had signaled repeatedly before that that only one common German organization could become a UEF section. Nowadays, many assume that this caused the EUROPA-UNION to become the biggest UEF section, but the membership numbers show differently. Over all the years, these numbers stayed the same as before the forced merger. Only on the EUROPA-UNION’s organizational boards do the “superstate Europeans” slowly but steadily poison the UEF spirit in Germany, interestingly supported by some Austrian federalists, where the pan-European idea was created in 1923. That is

why even board members of the EUROPA-UNION try to erase, for instance, the “Twelve Theses for Europe” (1964), reject an originally foreseen membership of the EUROPA-UNION in the World Federalist Movement (WFM), or even reject new UEF decisions, like promoting the transnational lists.

Even worse, all over Europe, “superstate Europeans” close their ranks in and outside of the UEF, using not only the European Movement’s network to promote the European superstate – some may even call it the IV Reich. As “litmus test” you can take the “intronization” of the last president of the European Commission or the reluctance to involve parliaments and the civil society in vital decisions about the future of Europe.

While on the other side, the UEF – and this some 50 years after its reunification and some 75 years after its founding – still consists of confederalists, “superstate Europeans”, World – and European Federalists, and discusses internal procedures. Most common of all is only that UEF’s origin is not known by most of its members, nor are its founding documents.

I am convinced that this knowledge would ease not only UEF’s internal communication, but also the popularity and acceptance within our European societies, in which the UEF should become the main actor and mediator for the balance of interests within the European societies, whilst insisting strongly on the realization of the European idea. The European idea is the only way to create the United States of Europe – and lasting world peace!

¹ <https://europa.kuemmerle.name>

Fifty Years Since the Werner Report: the First Step Towards a European Currency

Alberto Majocchi

Fifty years ago, on 8 October 1970, the Report to the Council and the Commission on the realisation by stages of an economic and monetary union in the Community¹ was published. It was also known as the “Werner Report”, named after Pierre Werner, former Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of Luxembourg, who chaired the group responsible for drafting it. This was an ambitious plan, that followed the decisions of the six Member States of the European Economic Community at the Summit of Heads of State and Government in The Hague on 1-2 December 1969, to complete the Economic and Monetary Union by 31 December 1980. This goal was reiterated at the Paris Summit of 19-20 October 1972. However, in October 1973, the fourth Arab-Israeli conflict broke out. Once the conflict ended, the OPEC countries increased the price of crude oil in order to “punish” the West, and even imposed a ban on oil exports to the US. These drastic measures drove the price of gasoline up by 400%, thus aggravating an economic crisis already underway in the West.

Plans to start a process, that would later lead to a single currency, were brought to an abrupt halt. It was only when the Maastricht Treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 that its introduction was made possible. The Treaty set out a three-stage programme: first, the liberalisation of capital movements among the Member States from 1 January 1990; second, from 1 January 1994, convergence between national economic policies and the strengthening of cooperation

between national central banks. And finally, on 1 January 1999 the euro was to be introduced and a single monetary policy implemented. The Treaty also established the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks, and defined their aims. Regarding the ECB, its primary objective was to maintain price stability in order to safeguard the value of the euro.

However, the Werner Plan represented an important step on the road to the single currency, as it stressed the importance of harmonising budgetary policies, in order to achieve not only the stability of the balance of payments, but also the internal objectives of stability and development of the European economy. In reality, the harmonisation of budgetary policies set out in the Report would have deprived the Member States of an instrument to control their economic systems, without however creating a common budget. Therefore, the Werner Plan’s gradual approach was less advanced than the conclusions reached in the subsequent MacDougall Report of April 1977.

The MacDougall Report started by analysing the role of public finance in national contexts at that time, both in the federal states within the Community, and in the three unitary member states, then compared it to the weight of the budget within the European Communities. Noting that when the document was published public expenditure by the Community institutions was about 0.7% of the Community’s GDP, the report identified three

distinct stages of economic integration:

- *pre-federal integration*, where public expenditure could increase to up to 2.0%-2.5% of GDP;
- *federal integration*, where the number of Community responsibilities would be increased, enabling objectives of stability and economic growth to be achieved, with public expenditure reaching 5%-7%;
- *federal integration*, where the number of Community responsibilities would be further increased, as welfare and defence policy fell within federal competences, and the size of the budget could expand up to 20-25% of GDP.

According to the MacDougall Report, monetary policy must be accompanied by active fiscal policy in order to compensate for the States' loss of an instrument to control interest and exchange rates. Compared to the proposals contained in this Report, Werner's approach was much more restrictive, and only stated that "the development of monetary unification must be based on sufficient progress in the field of convergence and then in that of the unification of economic policies." However, it also added that, "Parallel to the limitation of the autonomy of the Member States in the matter of economic policy, it will be necessary to develop corresponding powers at the Community level." It thus reached an important conclusion, envisaging the establishment of a decision-making centre for economic policy, and a Community system of central banks, i.e. the transfer of powers hitherto attributed to national governments to a supranational level. This final stage should be reached at the end of a gradual process and, in fact, the Werner Report "in no way wishes to suggest that

economic and monetary union are realizable without transition. The union must, on the contrary, be developed progressively by the prolongation of the measures already taken for the reinforcement of the coordination of economic policies and monetary cooperation." Regarding the objectives of budgetary policy, the Werner Report also seemed more cautious than the McDougall Report: the only measure considered necessary was to harmonise fiscal policy management among the Member States, without increasing the size of the Community budget. However, it should be pointed out that the recommendations in this plan were reiterated later in the articles of the Maastricht Treaty, which envisaged the creation of the single currency in stages, and made the transition to the single currency conditional on compliance with pre-established fiscal policy constraints regarding the size of a Member State's budget deficit and amount of debt.

Today, the Monetary Union has reached a turning point: in order to face the Covid-19 crisis, the decisions of the European Council of 21 July foresee the possibility of using funds raised on the market to finance the *Next Generation EU* and, to cover the debt service, a 0.6% increase in own resources. This is an important step towards achieving a fiscal union, whereby the second pillar of economic and monetary union will finally be established. Awareness of the long journey that began just fifty years ago must also spur us to take the final step: completing the Union's federal structure, and moving beyond the unanimous vote when it comes to deciding fiscal policy, and indeed the launch of a common policy in the field of foreign policy and defence.

¹ https://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/pages/publication6142_en.pdf

The Multiannual Financial Framework, the EU's Seismometer

Michel Dévoluy

The multiannual financial framework (MFF) translates the major strategic choices decided by the EU into figures. The MFF also reveals the EU's progress towards political integration. In short, the MFF captures, like a seismograph, the tectonic movements of European construction.

In this respect, the MFF for the period 2021-2027 is exemplary. The introduction of the 750 billion euro recovery plan marks a leap forward. But the blocking of this new MFF by Hungary and Poland is a reminder that the Union remains, in this field, of an intergovernmental nature.

Putting the MFF in Perspective

Originally, the European Economic Community (EEC) only had annual budgets, presented by the Commission and voted by the Council of Ministers and the EP. From 1980 onwards, the adoption of these budgets gave rise to numerous blockages and even rejections. The proper functioning of the EEC was hindered. Hence the idea of getting out of these repeated crises by inserting the annual budgets into an interinstitutional agreement, valid for several years, between the Commission, the Council of Ministers (the Council) and the EP. But make no mistake about it, this has not prevented member states from jealously keeping their hands on the purse strings.

The Medium-Term Financial Perspective (their original name) dates back to 1988. Scheduled for five years, they have covered a seven-year period since 2000. Known since the Treaty of Lisbon as the Multiannual Financial

Framework, this tripartite agreement determines the overall annual ceilings for the major budget headings. The MFF "aims to ensure the coordinated development of Union expenditure within the limits of its own resources" (Article 312 TFEU). Since the Council adopts the MFF by unanimity of the Member States, its validation remains under the threat of a veto.

In practice, the broad lines of each MFF are drawn by the European Council by consensus. Inter-governmentalism plays a decisive role here. We are familiar with the long discussions during which each Member State plays its part, especially vis-à-vis its electorate. Thereafter, the Council merely implements the decisions taken by the Heads of State and Government. Particular attention is paid to the Union's own resources. Here again, the role of national governments is crucial since the categories of the Union's own resources are decided, after consultation of the EP, by unanimity of the Council. The weapon of the veto is therefore still there. This threat is all the more powerful because if new own resources are established, or repealed, they must, in addition, to enter into force, be validated by all Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional rules (Article 311, TFEU). Since the list of own resources has remained stable until now, the latter provision has rarely been activated. But it is fully applicable for the 750 billion that the EU is about to raise on the markets. In short, each Member State can derail the major breakthrough represented by the recovery plan linked to the Covid crisis.

The CFP 2021-2027

The previous MFF (2014-2020), at 28, provided for a total amount of committed credits of 960 billion (starting price), spread over 7 years. That's 1% of the EU's annual GDP. The five main headings of this MFF were, in descending order of importance: Smart and inclusive growth (46%); Sustainable growth and natural resources (38%), including the CAP; Europe in the world (7%); Administration (7%); Security and citizenship (2%).

The MFF 2021-2027 (at 27) does not depart from the rule of the media marathon to reach a consensus. After 4 days of negotiations, the European Council converged, on 21 July 2020, towards 1074 billion euros for the 7 years (at the beginning price). That is 1.1% of the EU's GDP. With seven headings, the priorities differed from the previous MFF:

1. Single market, innovation and digital (14%);
2. Cohesion and values (35%);
3. Natural resources and environment (30%), including the CAP;
4. Migration and border management (3%);
5. Security and defence (2%);
6. Neighbourhood and the World (9%);
7. Administration (7%).

Each of the titles is quite explicit about its general objective. It should be noted that the fight against global warming, which does not appear as such, can be found in several headings and is close to the 30% of the MFF. Another precision, the policy of "rebates" (initiated under the pressure of Margaret Thatcher with her famous "I want my money back") remains topical. It allows certain countries, large net contributors to the budget, to reduce their contributions to the EU's own resources. This concerns the so-called frugal countries (the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Denmark) and Germany, for a total of about €50bn.

The European Council having taken a decision, the tripartite process could then get under way. The EP tried to extract

additional resources in order to better finance programmes considered as priorities. While they had hoped for at least 39 billion, an agreement with the Council on 10 November gave them 16 billion euros (out of 1074!). In particular, the EP was able to impose an additional 4 billion for research, 3.4 billion for health, 2.2 billion for Erasmus and 1.5 billion for the surveillance of external borders. The EP thus had a voice in the matter, certainly in homeopathic doses, but all the same. The CFP 2021-2027 therefore seemed to be well under way.

What's New: the «Next Generation EU» Recovery Plan

The European Council of 21 July also validated the €750 billion recovery plan linked to the pandemic. That's what's new! This sum, obtained by joint indebtedness, will be distributed among the Member States. 390 billion will take the form of subsidies to the States most affected by the pandemic. Repayments will then be made from the EU budget. On the other hand, the remaining 360 billion will go through loans to the Member States, which will have to reimburse the sums received from the EU directly. In any case, the loans are foreseen with very long maturities.

The main beneficiaries of this plan are, in descending order, Italy, Spain, France, Poland, Germany, Greece, Romania, Portugal, the Czech Republic, Hungary, etc.

These exceptional contributions from the EU will be integrated into national recovery programmes which the European Commission will be responsible for evaluating. These programmes will then be validated by the Council by qualified majority. It should be recalled that the EU Court of Auditors and the EP carry out important control work in the implementation of EU expenditure.

Until now, the EU has had three types of resources: a percentage of each Member State's GDP, a percentage of the VAT levied in

each State and a miscellaneous item (customs duties collected at EU level, fines imposed by the EU and taxes paid by EU officials). These three resources represent respectively 75%, 15% and 10% of the total MFF. As you can see, the EU does not levy taxes on its citizens, except for its civil servants. From now on, this aspect will have to change. The union will be indebted, on behalf of the 27, to the tune of 750 billion euros. The Union will need new own resources to repay the €390 billion (the €360 billion is directly borne by the Member States). A €6 billion tax on non-recyclable plastics is planned for 2021. It is moreover destined to be extinguished. In reality, it will be mainly intended to finance the 16 billion euro extension to the MFF that the EP has snatched from the MFF.

Other European taxes are planned for 2023: 1. resources will be added to the CO2 emissions trading scheme; 2. a carbon tax at the EU's borders; 3. a tax on the digital giants (i.e. between €10 and €25 billion).

By 2026 are also envisaged: 1. a tax on financial transactions; 2. part of the tax on multinational companies should bring in around €15 billion; 3. fines related to infringements of competition law, which would accrue to the States, should remain in the European budget (around €11 billion).

But all these resources, including the authorisation of the 750 billion loan, still have to be validated, in accordance with the treaties, by all member countries, unanimously.

Respect for the Rule of Law, the Risks of Deadlock

The theme of respect for the rule of law was

already present in the July 2020 negotiations on the MFF. It became a key issue with the agreement of 5 November between the EP and the Member States. From now on, the funds distributed to the States should be conditioned on the respect of the rule of law (freedom of justice, of the media, of the opposition and of citizens). Belonging to the EU and benefiting from its budget requires respect for the values of the Union as enshrined in the treaties. Another argument is that states, especially the "frugal" ones, do not want to release funds managed by states subject to corruption. Legally, it will be up to the Council, on the basis of a proposal from the Commission, to suspend funding by qualified majority. This conditionality is not to everyone's liking. Poland and Hungary are against it and have reiterated their opposition several times. But they know very well that they cannot do anything alone against a qualified majority (65% of the population and 55% of the Member States). So they have chosen another option. As long as this conditionality will not be lifted, each one, they insist, will put a veto by refusing to definitively validate the MFF 2021-2027 and by refusing the new EU own resources.

These two states are thus taking €1800 billion (the MFF and the recovery plan) hostage. This is the sum that the Union urgently needs to function over the next seven years and to react to the Covid 19 crisis. But that is not all! The recovery plan paves the way towards fiscal federalism, and thus towards more integration. The unanimity rule, a founding pillar of today's Europe, may well cost the EU's finances, but above all its political ambitions.

The European Challenge for Germany's New Political Leadership after Merkel

Junius

"A spectre is haunting Europe": which German leadership will rule the country after Angela Merkel's departure in September 2021? After 16 years in power, the Chancellor is seen today as the guarantor of continuity of Berlin's pro-European stance. Somebody saw her even as the most prominent European leader of the first twenty years of this century.

Let us consider, first, her undoubted European merits. As from her first chancellorship in 2005, Merkel was immediately confronted with the need to revamp the European political dynamics: shortly before her appointment, the negative results of the referenda in France and the Netherlands had led, in fact, to the rejection of the European Constitution and crashed the federalist ambitions to establish a political union at the eve of the new century, after Joschka Fischer's speech at the Humboldt University in 2000. To recover a European agenda, the young Chancellor helped achieving a new – albeit minimal – consensus on shared institutional reforms in the EU and initiated during her first EU Presidency the negotiations for the later Lisbon Treaty. Immediately afterwards, she was confronted with the implications of the financial crisis and the sovereign crisis, until today the most serious threat to European Union's survival. Several of her leading political allies in Germany wanted to expel Greece from the euro area, with a view to caution against any future manipulation of public accounts and break of fiscal rules by other euro area members. Instead, the chancellor kept the euro area united and established the tools to permit the Bundestag to support financially the

weaker countries via newly created European facilities, today merged in the European Stability Mechanism. After the Fukushima incident in 2011, moreover, she opened the way to energy reforms and climate change policies in Europe by announcing the exit of Germany from nuclear energy, also a move which required courage and determination.

When dozens of thousands of migrants started their Odyssey from Middle East to Europe in 2015, Angela Merkel let 1 million refugees settle in the country, in full contradiction to Germany's traditional conservative policy on immigration. At the same time, she continued to back the European Central Bank's innovative monetary policy against the criticism of an important part of the ruling class and sections of her own voters, including after the recent case in front of the Constitutional Case. Her coherence in sticking to EU policies also in emergency conditions possibly cost her a high political price, with the emergence of a far right and anti-system political party (the AfD) which targeted Merkel in the public discussion as a betrayer of German interests.

During her second EU Presidency, she had a fundamental role in designing the EU agreement on the multiannual budget, which has for the first time ever permitted the European Union to issue a common debt and to finance the Next Generation EU programme through the levy of new EU taxes. Also, in these days she is staunchly defending the common EU strategy to respond to the Covid-19 pandemic, despite inevitable popular dissatisfaction with the speed of the

vaccination in a situation of high uncertainty. But Angela Merkel's sixteen years were not deprived of ambiguities, including the muted response to President Macron's speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017, which had raised hopes for a new impulse to establish a European political union. The recent polemical exchange of arguments between the French President and the CDU's previous President Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer on the merits of Europe's strategic autonomy from NATO has revealed the lack of alignment between Berlin and Paris. While being a steady supporter of multilateralism, the Chancellor did also not depart from Germany's traditional policy, which favours including a German permanent seat in a reformed UN Security Council, instead of a European one. On migration, while opening to an important inflow of refugees, she did not necessarily support a comprehensive and more European overhaul of the Dublin Treaty. Question marks on Germany's European stance were raised also by some of the chancellor's choices on energy provisioning from Russia, and prominently by the construction of the Nordstream 2 pipeline. Strengths and weaknesses of Merkel's European path demonstrate how determinant the German stance will continue to be in the years ahead. German strategic priorities after Merkel might depend upon the success of two politicians: Armin Laschet and Annalena Baerbock, the former being the newly elected chair of the Christian Democrats since a few weeks only and the second the co-chair of the Greens since 2018. Depending upon the electoral results of next federal elections, they might be the Chancellor and the Foreign Ministry of a new coalition. Under their leadership, the CDU and the Greens produced two strategic texts on Europe's foreign policy. What is in general common to the position of the CDU and the Greens (as well as of other parties in Germany) is the belief that Europe should progress towards the establishment

of three unions in the fields of health (also in view of Covid-19), security (control of frontiers and fight against terrorism and organised criminality) and defence. What is specific to the two new documents of the CDU and the Greens is the intuition that Europe should develop those three unions by functionally building-up the transatlantic link as a tool for multilateralization of policies. Advancing in parallel in European and transatlantic integration should serve the purpose of reinforcing Biden in the US, contrasting the risk of a return of Trumpism and thereby defending democracy globally. To paraphrase a European federalist motto: CDU and the Greens, albeit in different form, explain that they want to unite Europe to defend democracy not only in Europe, but also in the US and worldwide.

The CDU position paper – approved on 26 January by the Parliamentary Group in the Bundestag – is called “Re-establishing a Strong Transatlantic Bond – For a Forward-looking and Comprehensive Partnership”¹. The text by the Greens – which Annalena Baerbock co-signed with Robert Habeck in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* on 23 January – is entitled “Looking Forward: Europe's Offer for a Transatlantic Agenda”² and should be read together with Baerbock's speech at the Heinrich Böll Foundation on 28 January³.

According to the CDU, the United States cannot be anymore the exclusive guarantor of world security. Moreover, the US are slowly but steadily distancing themselves from Europe, because of internal demographic and global geopolitical reasons. It is therefore of essence, from an European point of view, that on the one hand the security of the two shores of the Atlantic remains inseparable, and that on the other one Europe takes a greater responsibility to stabilise Eastern Europe and the Balkans, Africa, Middle East and the Arctic. This should happen both in military as well as political terms: the NATO should remain the backbone of a military and political alliance, the US keeps its

military presence in Europe intact and Europe, on its side, even exceeds the 2% target for military expenditure at national level. Progress towards European defence should go hand in hand with cooperation with the US, ensuring mutual compatibility of conventional weaponry and modernisation of nuclear carriers.

The new Euro-Atlantic partnership should strengthen multilateral institutions, like the UN, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). It is within these multilateral bodies that Europe and the US should forge an alliance of democracies and check the compliance of international law by authoritarian and anti-democratic states. As a contribution to the establishment of such standards also in the area of digitalisation, the EU legislation (GDPR, DSA and DMA) should become the benchmarks for legislation in the US and other democracies, and tendentially a new global standard. Cooperation with China and Russia should be possible, whenever it is of mutual interest, but always subject to the respect of clear conditions in terms of respect of international law.

Annalena Baerbock, in her 28 January speech, identified the current juncture as similar to the 1989 democratic revolution, thanks to a new triangle of opportunities: first, the reinforced commitment of UN Secretary-General António Guterres to 'Build-back-better' policies; second, Biden's move to cancel in a few weeks only the Trump era via a set of presidential decrees and his resolve to launch a USD 1,9 tn recovery programme in Congress; and third, the EU Green Deal and the EUR 750 bn Next Generation EU. This creates a global opportunity for further action in the direction of fostering international democracy, on which Baerbock further elaborated in the FAZ text of 23 January.

Europe should develop its own sovereignty not as a divarication process from the rest of

the world, but as a superpower of cooperation. The core of the new partnership should be to establish a single price for CO₂ in Europe and the United States, as a joint reference to run global climate change policies. Euro-American deliverables should include common infrastructures for the transition of industry to hydrogen, shared technologies for the establishment of batteries and battery recycling, as well as a compatible recharging infrastructure for electric mobility. The European legislation should also become the joint framework for European and American interaction on digitalisation, also allowing a common taxation policy and check of existing oligopolistic structures. All these policies, created in the framework of multilateral institutions because of the European and American joint initiative, should be progressively broadened to all democracies and tendentially to the world.

As to security, the Greens recognise the need for Europe to take more responsibility in stabilising relations with Russia, Turkey and China, and propose a new Eastern Security Compact. On the other hand, they see the need for a rebalancing from military expenditure (all Europeans spend together four times more than Russia) to security against hybrid threats (cyber risks, economic dependencies), to the point that in Baerbock's view Europe should stop hosting nuclear weapons.

In sum, an intense discussion (including many other contributions) is animating the German public opinion on the country's combined future within European and international multilateral institutions. This is not only a medium-term strategic debate.

Four questions will need to be responded as a matter of priority, at least in part, even before the new elections. What offer should Europe make to the Biden administration, to institutionalise the new transatlantic alignment and help contrasting a return of anti-democratic forces on both sides of the

Atlantic? What offer should Germany make to France to help Europe progress towards more strategic autonomy, although within multilateral structures forged on a renewed strong bond with the United States and without developing a European nationalism? How to react to an increasing number of anti-European statements and actions from Moscow and Ankara? And at the same time, how to keep channels for dialogue open? How should Europe respond to Vladimir Putin's surprising speech at Davos on 27 January, pleading for a reset of European and Russian relations? How

should Europe react to Recep Erdogan's recent decision to restart bilateral negotiations with Greece after 5 years, opening new perspectives of dialogue with Europe?

Without doubts, a stronger and more determined Europe might help Germany's attempt to square the circle and advance together in its European and transatlantic integration projects after Chancellor Merkel's departure. And Germany and Europe – acting in unison – could play a determinant role also in defending democracy across the Atlantic and around the world.

¹ https://www.cducsu.de/sites/default/files/2021-01/Positionspapier%20-%20Das%20transatlantische%20Band%20wieder%20st%C3%A4rken_1.pdf

² <https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/baerbock-und-habeck-fuer-eine-transatlantische-agenda-17159562.html>

³ <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wLmt-6gYmbs>

Towards a European “Dual Army”: the SPD Proposal of a 28th Army

Vincenzo Camporini and Domenico Moro

Last October, the *Bundestag's Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands* (SPD) working group on security and defence policy issued a working paper¹ on establishing what it calls the 28th Army: a European Army, in addition to national armies, under the control of the European institutions. This proposal takes the debate on equipping the EU with an autonomous army a step further, beyond the words of President Macron, whose proposal is critical.

The SPD document addresses the possibility of unblocking the process of establishing an autonomous European Army. The idea is that the willing states should abandon the path of intergovernmental cooperation by establishing an autonomous European Army, the 28th Army, alongside their respective national armies, where necessary adapting the Treaties. It would be made up of professional soldiers recruited on a voluntary basis. At first, the army would be structured in tactical groups of 1,500 men, which would be progressively increased to 8,000. The army would report directly to the European institutions. After a transitional phase during which it would be financed by contributions from participating states, the European Army would ultimately be funded from the European budget.

The SPD's proposal is nothing new: their defence model is based on a federal model, notably the US federation. The US was the first to introduce what Australian constitutionalist Kenneth C. Wheare (*On Federal Government*, 1951) called the dual army model, founded on an (initially) small federal army and a larger military structure based on state militias. Today these militias are known as the National

Guard, and the governor of each state is the commander-in-chief.

The SPD document emphasizes the importance of opening a public debate. While the principle of parliamentary control over a European Army is seen as an imperative, the proposed corresponding institutional architecture is perplexing. According to the document, the European Army is under the direct authority of the European Commission, supported by the establishment of a European defence commissioner and a new parliamentary commission for defence.

The idea is only partially convincing. The EU's current institutional structure provides that the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy (HR) is appointed, by qualified majority, by the European Council in agreement with the President of the European Commission. The HR is also Vice-President of the Commission and, in that capacity, is appointed by the European Parliament. He chairs the Foreign Affairs Council, which includes defence ministers. Therefore, the provisions of the Treaties seem to ensure the balance between the institution representing the citizens, the Parliament, and those representing the states, the European Council and the Council of the EU.

A federation is not only an association of citizens, as the SPD document seems to think, but also of states which, when joining together to base their mutual relations on law, rather than on force, choose the federal model due to their different/divergent interests. Otherwise, they would choose the path of the national unitary state. Differences in views on economic matters are discussed daily, and differences

of points of view on defence and security are probably even greater. Just think of the co-existence in the EU of neutral states and other more interventionist states, as well as the different positions adopted regarding NATO.

It is certainly correct to call for the establishment of a Defence Commission of the European Parliament, but the HR is, *de facto*, the Commissioner for Defence. However, a provision that the decision to launch a military mission be made by the Commission alone would considerably alter the current institutional balance. Suffice to say that with the Recovery Plan, the issuance of European debt – for the first time in the history of the Union – and the introduction of autonomous tax resources, the Commission would significantly increase its powers.

Looking ahead, the EU's institutional structure should instead envisage the transformation of the European Council into a collegial Presidency on the Swiss model, with responsibility for foreign and security policy. The Commission should deal with the rest.

Another of the document's proposals concerns the tasks of the European Army which, in addition to the Union's collective defence, would be used to *"provide emergency aid and defend the territory of the Union from major disasters"*. Essentially, the European Army would also be used for intervention within individual member states. In principle, this does not seem to be a fully acceptable provision. The risk is that the European Army, in addition to intervention for reasons of territory protection, may also be used for more general purposes over time.

The thirteen American colonies, that gave birth to the first federation in history, opposed this eventuality. The state militias, now the National Guard, have always been responsible for defending state borders, even against intervention by the federal government (J. Madison, *The Federalist Papers*, n. 46). It is up

to a State's National Guard to intervene, in the event of unrest or natural disaster, to defend or assist the civilian population. Therefore, the planned European Army should only deal with European defence and be used in interventions outside the EU. National armies should deal with state defence, integrate the European Army in its role when necessary, engage in territorial defence on the Swiss model, and possibly also address the consequences of natural disasters.

Finally, the SPD document argues that since it is *"imperative to avoid creating parallel structures with existing EU institutions"*, the latter should be integrated into the structures of the 28th Army and the *"military planning and conduct capability"* (MPCC), recently established, be used as an operational structure. Secondly, the commander-in-chief of the 28th Army should be an equal member of the EU Military Committee (EUMC).

The problem of duplication exists, but the solution should be the opposite to that proposed, i.e. the integration of the 28th Army into existing EU structures. The commander-in-chief of the latter should certainly be part of the EUMC, but should be appointed by the European Council, on the recommendation of the HR, and be its president. Only by starting from the European framework can the military instrument be made interoperable, standardised and capable of assessing existing deficiencies in military capabilities.

The SPD document has opened the debate on the establishment of a European Army by presenting a concrete proposal, on which a discussion may finally be opened. This opportunity should not be missed. Therefore, the proposal should be brought to the attention of the planned Conference on the Future of Europe, the forum for discussions on the role of Europe in the world and on the model the EU intends to choose for itself in the defence sector.

¹ <http://www.csfederalismo.it/images/commenti/comments/Diskussionspapier-.pdf>

The Role of Hydrogen in the European Energy System

Roberto Palea

Since taking office, the Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen has shown its determination to push Europe into a world of the future, accelerating Europe's race to be (under the European Green Deal and then the Next Generation EU) the first climate-neutral continent by 2050. As the President said in her recent State of the Union Address¹, that "mission" must be at the heart of the Green Deal, not least because, despite the lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the planet's average temperature is continuing its perilous rise.

To address this unfavourable global situation, the Commission has deemed it necessary to increase its emission reduction target from 40% to 55% by 2030, supported in its decision by a large group of entrepreneurs and investors. The effort proposed is very challenging, and cannot be achieved unless all available resources and technologies are used, including those for the production and use of hydrogen from renewable energies.

Hydrogen is present in water (11.19% of its mass), which covers 71% of the Earth's surface. Its chemical bond with oxygen is so strong that it is very expensive to isolate it. Despite this high cost, it is produced industrially, using polluting techniques, transforming coal or oil (also called "gray hydrogen") or methane gas ("blue hydrogen"). Current demand is equal to about 500 billion cubic metres, therefore it is only used when there are no valid alternatives: about 65% by the chemical industry, 5% by refineries, 10% by other industrial activities.

This impact on the climate can only be eliminated by using "green" hydrogen, produced using an electrolyser (or fuel-cell)

powered exclusively by renewable energy.

This objective has yet to be pursued, because in 2020 "green hydrogen" accounts for only 0.1% of global hydrogen production. However, it is technically viable as experiments and small production runs have shown.

Despite these difficulties, the Vice-President of the Commission, Franz Timmermans, head of the Green Deal, declared² that "*The new hydrogen economy can be a growth engine to help overcome the economic damage caused by Covid-19*". The production and use of hydrogen from renewables, which does not generate greenhouse gas emissions, is needed to power the storage and accumulation systems of renewable energies (which are intermittent by nature), foster electric mobility through the use of fuel cells, convert existing building stock, power aircraft, ships and trucks, and decarbonise particular energy-intensive industrial plants (e.g. steel production).

On 8 July the Commission released the Communication "A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe"³, setting out ambitious targets for hydrogen production, using electrolysis plants powered by renewables. The plan illustrated in the document set the goal for the EU of creating plants for 40,000 MW of electricity from renewables by 2030. To stress the urgency of this change of pace, it has also set an intermediate target of 6,000 MW by 2024, capable of producing up to one million tons of hydrogen from renewables: a huge leap, considering that, at the moment, only 250 MW of renewables are available for electrolysers throughout the world.

According to the document, in 2050 about a

quarter of renewable electricity will be devoted to hydrogen production from renewables. This should accelerate the competitiveness of hydrogen from renewables, whose production cost has already dropped by 50% since 2015, and could further reduce by 30%, making “green” hydrogen more competitive than hydrogen from fossil fuels.

Since it is impossible to reach the required levels of electricity production from renewables on European soil alone, renewable energy production in African countries should also be stimulated, and organised to permit the transport of hydrogen produced in these countries to European territory. This explains SNAM’s ideas for producing hydrogen in the countries on the southern shores of the Mediterranean, making Italy the European hub, and exploiting its interconnections with the various distribution networks. According to SNAM CEO Marco Alverà⁴, 70% of Italian pipelines are already able to transport hydrogen gas between the two shores of the Mediterranean.

As part of the Next Generation EU, the Commission has identified hydrogen as a unique opportunity for research and innovation, technological leadership, economic development and employment and, finally, to develop partnerships with African Union countries. However, Germany also shares the same conviction, and has announced a 9-billion euro National Hydrogen Investment Plan, with the aim of producing 5,000 MW electrolysis plants by 2030. Following Germany’s announcement, France also launched a 7-billion euro National Hydrogen

Plan. These plans have in turn attracted the interest of entrepreneurs who, together with the Commission, set up the *European Clean Hydrogen Alliance*⁵ in March.

Despite the drop in the cost of producing electricity from renewables (solar and wind energy), efforts are focused on designing and manufacturing electrolysers that further reduce production costs (which has already halved in the last decade): this process is continuing.

In the interim, during the transitional period, blue hydrogen obtained from methane (e.g. ENI’s proposal) could still be used, taking into account that “green” hydrogen can already be mixed with “blue” hydrogen at a percentage of 10% or 20%, with significant results.

In the light of the considerable interest hydrogen has raised in Europe, Jeremy Rifkin’s somewhat visionary, yet forward-looking arguments in his 2002 essay *The Hydrogen Economy*⁶ come to mind. His essay concluded with the following remark: *“There are rare moments in history when a generation of human beings are given a new gift with which to rearrange their relationship to one another and the world around them. This is such a moment. We are being given the power of the sun. Hydrogen is a promissory note for humanity’s future on Earth. Whether that promise is squandered in failed ventures and lost opportunities or used wisely on behalf of our species and our fellow creatures is up to us.”*

It took the shock of the Covid-19 pandemic emergency to move Europe towards Rifkin’s rational dream, and create a willingness to make it come true worldwide, starting in our continent.

¹ https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/soteu_2020_en.pdf

² https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_20_1259

³ <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/en/txt/pdf/?uri=celex:52020dc0301&from=en>

⁴ [\(pdf\)](https://www.qualenergia.it/articoli/scenari-di-boom-dellidrogeno-ma-sara-verde/#:~:text=Secondo il suo Amministratore, Marco,hydrogen backbone).

⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/growth/industry/policy/european-clean-hydrogen-alliance_en

⁶ <https://www.foet.org/books/the-hydrogen-economy/>

Islamophobia and Defaced Secularism

Barbara Spinelli

In the beginning, the French called them Arabs, a name that assumed pejorative connotations at the end of the 1970s, producing insults such as *bicot* or *bougnoule*. Then the Arabs became Islamic, or worse, Islamic-fascist, if they did not take the necessary public distance from the terrorist acts carried out in the name of Allah. After September 11, the second epithet spread. The journalist Thomas Deltombe criticized the “Islamization of looks” in the early 1980s. These were the years in which banning the veil worn by Muslim women in public spaces was discussed. Some interpret the prohibition as the prohibition of hiding one’s face everywhere, while the law applies only in public institutions: “The citizen has the right to believe or not believe, and can manifest this belief or non-belief externally, in the respect for public order”, writes Nicolas Cadène, a member of the Observatory of Laity, in an excellent manual published in October 2020 with a preface by Jean-Louis Bianco, president of the government institute: *En finir avec les idées fausses sur la laïcité* [Do away with false ideas about secularism]. Many immediately called for the expulsion of the two authors from the Observatory. Fortunately, President Macron did not give up. In the *Regard* magazine, Aude Lorriaux has recalled the definition of Judaism that Sartre gave in 1944: “It is the anti-Semite who creates the Jew”. A reductive and rightly controversial definition, which however was adapted to Islam by the writer Karim Miské in 2004: “It is the Islamophobe who creates the Muslim” (this variation is also debatable: actually, the Islamophobe “creates” the radical Islam). This is roughly the story that precedes the attacks of recent months, and the disputes over Islam and laicity that

have begun again in France. Even more than in the past, Islamophobic arguments emerge from the territories of the extreme right and become language that is not always explicit but dominant. Macron avoids drifts, but it is still he who denounced the “separatism” that afflicts the vast Muslim community (4.7 million). In Nice, he promises support to the martyred Christians, but not to the Muslims who have nothing to do with terrorism. The Minister of Education Jean-Michel Blanquer accuses of complicity with terrorism anyone who defends in academies “intersectionality”, a term coined by the American jurist Kimberlé Crenshaw to describe the superimposition (or “intersection”) of different social or religious identities. The Minister of Internal Affairs Darmanin orders the closure of the Pantin mosque near Paris (it had released a video on the Paty affair), and of two associations fighting against Islamophobia. Meanwhile, he declares himself “choked by the halal or kosher departments in supermarkets”. The Minister is taking aim at the “Islamic-leftist” (islamo-gauchistes) deputies of Mélenchon’s *France Insoumise* party. French laicity is disfigured, transformed into an instrument of war rather than of coexistence with communities jealous of their own autonomy, in the respect of public order.

With some exceptions, even in Italy the sight is Islamized, and secularism is presented as a supreme value, impervious to compromise (“Every compromise means giving in”, tweets Darmanin, in contrast to Cadène who states in his manual that laicity “is not at all a value but a method”). Authors like Gad Lerner write that religions are “categories of the

past". Christianity and Islam are mentioned (not Judaism, protected by beneficial taboos). The Jewish exception makes the designation of Christianity and Islam as "categories" even more offensive. Who gives us the right to set the expiration date of religions, as if they were labelable canned food?

A post by Carlo Rovelli, a philosopher of science, lights the fuse in Italy two days after the ferocious beheading of the teacher Samuel Paty in Conflans-Sainte-Honorine. To explain what freedom of expression is, Paty had shown in his classroom a cartoon by Charlie Hebdo – the ugliest one, the one showing the Prophet naked, kneeling and with his bottom uncovered. It is not yet clear what he said to his Muslim pupils: whether he really invited them to turn their heads away or leave, if they felt offended. If this is the case, Paty is still the victim of pure brutality, but his lesson of civil education was not well done.

This is what Rovelli states, reasoning like this: "I don't think there should be laws that prohibit publishing this or that. But I think that offending, and then – after realizing that offending hurts people –, continuing to offend is not a behavior neither appreciable nor reasonable. We have to live together on this planet. Can't we do it respecting each other? It costs nothing to avoid offending Muslims by posting offensive images of Mohammed. And let's face it: have you seen them? They are indeed offensive. Do we think we are more democratic, better champions of freedom, if we offend each other? By offending each other, we

only feed violence, divide us into conflicting groups, show a hard snout "I don't let you scare me even if you kill me!; I'm tougher than you". We don't just feed violence. We are feeding what Macron wants to avoid: the separatism of entire communities. And this in times of lockdowns, when the population is called to unite against any Covid-denying secessionism. When it is advisable to facilitate compromises with all the religious communities, even the fundamentalist ones, if not prone to violent acts.

The more or less latent Islamophobia declares itself in favor of a false laicity, that implies mitigated, subdued religions, and minimizes the virtues of compromise. Sociologist François Héran, one of the leading migration-experts in the *Collège de France*, aptly recalls how compromise and giving in are never synonymous. He quotes the philosopher Paul Ricoeur: "Compromise is not a weak idea, but on the contrary an extremely strong one. In a compromise everyone remains in his place, and no one is deprived of his own principle of justification". French laicity is a great achievement, but it risks failure when it is misused. If freedom of expression were discussed in schools without repeatedly showing the Charlie Hebdo cartoons, and what it means were explained with words – evoking, for example, the history of political-religious caricatures in France, as suggested by Héran –, we would have made an important step forward towards compromises that do not divide nations beyond measure.

US Middle Class First: Biden's New Multilateralism

Mario Platero

It has been clear in every speech: Joe Biden's foreign policy will revert to multilateralism, will strengthen relations with its European allies, will restore the credibility of multilateral organizations. Yet, after the Trump treatment, nothing will ever be the same again. Biden's approach to multilateralism will be new and will be defined first and foremost by America's need to strengthen its economy and social fabric.

We all know how the two elections of 2016 and 2020 showed a stark split in the country and a deep dissatisfaction of the US middle class. Because of this, despite Biden's relaxing message for the post-Trump era and the pleasant, friendly, constructive attitude of this President, the clock of history will not be turned back. The new administration will not pick up the thread of the multilateral discourse from where Barack Obama left it in January 2017, after elevating – in 2009 – the G20 to a formal leader's gathering, launching a dialogue with Iran and free trade agreements such as the TPP for the Asian Pacific basin and the TTIP for the Transatlantic area (which as we know, were later withdrawn). Biden is already searching a very different path from those we were used to. On a short term he will leave the US Embassy in Jerusalem, will reopen a dialogue with Tehran and will re-affirm the importance of human rights to both China and Russia. But there is not a new doctrine as of yet. And we do not know yet whether his will be a transition path, or if it will already be a platform on which all of the Washington establishment will lay the foundations for a new course lasting possibly the next 20 years.

There are still too many uncertainties, too much polarization and, again, above all, the American people is split in two, with one half of the country still determined not to embrace "openness" and still intrigued with Trumpism. It should be added that the left of the Democratic Party is equally critical of the old pillars of globalization. This is why Biden's foreign policy will be characterized above all by economic objectives. In a couple of occasions Biden even pledged to put "America First", an interesting pragmatic choice within the dramatic and positive change in tones and rhetoric: aggressiveness, rudeness, lies coming from the White House are gone, let's hope for ever.

Being realistic, Biden knows that if he wants to have a chance of being reelected in 2024 and does not want to lose in two years the razor thin majority in Congress (both Obama and Clinton lost the midterm elections), he will have to pursue first and foremost the internal American interests. And he said that quite openly from the very speech celebrating his election victory: "We will fight to give everybody a fair opportunity. This is what everybody is just asking for: a fair opportunity".

Allies and antagonists, therefore, will be called upon to do their part. Europe or China will have to understand that some concessions have to be made, otherwise the threat of Trump or Trumpism could surface again with new votes prompted by guts rather than reason. We also know that much of the blame for the middle-class crisis lies with rapid technological innovation. But globalization and Chinese or European unfair trade are easier scapegoats to point at. Biden's two main foreign policy

minds, Secretary of State Antony Blinken and National Security Council head Jake Sullivan understood this perfectly well even Before the elections took place.

Let's see what Blinken said last July in a speech at the Hudson Institute: "We're living in a time of shifting power... away from states and a growing questioning of governance within states; tremendous economic, demographic, technological, environmental, geopolitical change that we're all experiencing every day. In fact, the rapidity and pace of change is such that I think there's a general sense that we've lost our North Star. People are increasingly confused. They feel a sense of chaos. ... as well as a tremendous inequality problem, both within our own country and around the world. We are facing, I think, the most challenging and complex international [crisis] certainly in decades, if not longer".

In his acceptance speech for his appointment at the White House, Sullivan used similar tones about the environment, technology, immigration, trade. And in a document of May 21st last year, published after almost three years of research by the Carnegie Endowment, edited among others by Sullivan himself, new considerations and objectives emerge. For example, identifying the impact of American foreign policy on states representative of American regional realities, such as Nebraska, Colorado and Ohio. The focus: the middle

class. It is clear that the impact of this study has been strong, judging by what Sullivan said on the day he accepted his new post: "We must put ordinary people at the center of our agreements, improve the lives of American families. The alliances that we will build will have to meet a central requirement, our foreign policy must produce results for these families and unite America". So very clear.

To this aim, Biden, from a strategic point of view, wanted to give a broad historical breath for the rediscovery of the American soul. In his acceptance speech, he recalled historical moments, such as the Lincoln Presidency in 1860 which saved the Union, or that of FDR in 1932 who promised a "New Deal", or that of Kennedy who promised a new frontier in 1960. You surely noticed that Biden cited the beginnings of those historical administrations. So let's get ready. Italy, which will host the first G20 summit of the Biden era next year, the summit of the revival of multilateralism, has prepared itself. The summit will focus on a slogan of three Ps: People: safety and health; Planet: environment; and Prosperity: self-explanatory.

Three P's that will suit just fine Biden's, Blinken's and Sullivan's vision of America's interest. Provided that those three P's will allow to secure an advantage also for the middle-class families of Nebraska, Colorado and Ohio.

The Nation, an Ideology to Legitimate the National States

Alessandro Cavalli

I am convinced that “nations” as meta-historical collectivities do not exist, they are historical phenomena that had a very precise beginning in the French Revolution and are in all probability destined to disappear more or less slowly with globalization, or rather with the Telematic Revolution. “Nations” are ideological phenomena constructed to legitimize a new type of state, the national state, which appeared in history between the eighteenth and the nineteenth centuries. Then Napoleon spread the contagion almost everywhere in Europe and, subsequently, the epidemic spread almost all over the world.

The fact that they are ideological phenomena does not mean that they are not “facts”; that human beings have beliefs is a fact, just as real as the belief of the ancients (and also of the Popes at the time of Galileo) that the sun is turning, based on appearances, around the earth. Thus, it is an empirically verifiable fact that many human beings believe in the existence of nations (as well as many believe in the existence of God, even if no one has yet been able to demonstrate it empirically).

Beliefs arise and develop when they are the answer to a question, a need. Political power needs legitimation. The aristocracies and monarchies have ruled by the grace of God, but at some point in time the people (actually the rich and educated bourgeoisie) rebelled, they no longer believed in the legends that justified power based on blood and dynastic lineage. It was necessary to find other legends to justify the new power; so, the king of Sardinia and all the other rulers began to govern “by the grace of God and the will of the nation”. At a certain point, with the ideas of democracy, the grace

of God disappeared and the will of the nation remained. The idea of nation is closely linked to the idea of government by the people and for the people, that is, democracy. Mazzini was rightly cited, as he was at the same time a nationalist, a pro-European and a globalist, but at that time he had not yet seen the contradiction between the sovereign national state and democracy. After the two world wars, at least in Europe, the idea of the nation state has shown all its negative sides and it is evident that it is a form of state that must be, and probably will be, overcome.

In certain parts of Europe, the national ideology has served some countries to survive the imperial yoke of the USSR, and this explains why in the East it lasts longer. Even in England (not in the United Kingdom) it resists because it is nostalgically linked to the imperial idea. However, two centuries of coexistence between nation and democracy cannot be easily erased, because two centuries of history cannot be erased, just as national states cannot be erased; they must be overcome, resized, become member states of a new form of statehood linking democracy to supranational institutions. But these institutions are struggling to establish themselves, and in times of crisis people are afraid and want to take refuge under the umbrella that exists, that is, the national state, and not under the umbrella that does not yet exist. When the nation-states will be downsized, the idea of nation will have partly exhausted its function, without the need to celebrate its death, because, for better or worse, for a not insignificant period of time it had been coexisting with the idea of democracy.

In Pursuit of a European Identity

Grazia Borgna

In the debate on the “rediscovery of identity”, the question of European identity also comes up: what unites us? what makes us feel like a community of destiny? Who are the friends and who are the enemies? Many authors have grappled with this delicate issue.

In 2008, Tzvetan Todorov, in his essay “European identity”, asked himself the question of what European identity is. Although a long time has passed, his arguments remain highly topical. Resuming his reflections today is important, because he did not limit himself to denouncing the shortcomings, especially of Europe, but identified, with concrete proposals, the way to overcome them and bring citizens closer to politics.

He wonders whether Europeans do feel a sense of belonging, of identity not only at the national level but also at the European level. And he notes that the current economic and institutional European Union has failed to warm up the hearts, to unite them in a community founded on the perception of having a common identity. He affirms that the lacking element in the European construction is not having been able to hold culture, the European dimension of culture, in high regard. And he states: “Culture must become the third pillar of the European construction alongside the economy and the legal and political institutions”. “Europe has lost sight of the European project as such ..., [and] in order to regain strength ... it needs an additional impulse, ... a shared passion”. To this end, it must strengthen its own identity. He believes that the perception of a common identity will strengthen democracy and participation.

He poses a question which he believes we must start from in order to understand European

identity. If the main characteristic of Europe is that of having guaranteed the coexistence of a great plurality of cultures, what is the element that holds them together? Is it the fact that coexistence is regulated? Or that citizens do feel part of a whole? And what is the path that allows us to identify the common identity of Europeans?

To perceive the sense of belonging and a common identity, the European citizens have to retrace the history of Europe. He reminds that European civilization has its roots in the world of Greek and / or Christian culture. But he observes that these cultures have gradually enriched themselves with the contribution of other civilizations with which Europeans have come into contact. And to these were added the contributions brought by the Enlightenment and Humanism. Consequently, he says, we cannot refer, as some argue, especially the right, to an immutable collective identity, established once and for all. Identity evolves, changes continuously.

If we want to understand what the common identity of Europeans is, without disregarding past history, we must follow, according to Todorov, another path. What, according to the author, distinguishes Europe from other multinational states is its relationship with the Second World War. A relatively recent fact. Europe was born from the “desire to eliminate war between member countries; ... it proclaims ... the renunciation of the use of force in case of conflict; ...it sets ... an insurmountable limit to the effects of diversity”. Principles aimed at preventing conflicts and which have been written down in legal norms. Todorov gives some examples: – no member state must have a hegemonic position; – the principle of

secularism must be respected; – the “general will” (one which takes into account the “point of view of the others”, not a sort of “the will of all”, but the overcoming of “us” as opposed to “the others”) must be respected.

The distinctive element of Europe consists in the fact that “it is not a nation, but a form of coexistence of nations”. The specificity of Europe lies in this balance between unity and plurality. This is its identity, its culture.

Todorov seeks an answer to the question: “what does Europe lack to warm up the hearts of its citizens?”, and affirms that although it is true that Europe, in order to achieve Peace, has learned to convert “plurality into unity”, the mere enunciation of these principles is not enough. It is necessary to “launch the political engine of the Union and ensure its action in the various areas of common life in which unity is preferable to plurality”. And he indicates those that, according to him, “are the main ones: ecology, scientific research, immigration, the economy, security, energy. Areas in which power, if it remains in the hands of national governments, is inadequate to tackle such problems and actually undermines the solidarity between the peoples of Europe. This solidarity can only arise if the peoples feel a sense of responsibility towards each other, and this feeling in turn derives from the democratic participation in the common choice of one destiny”. Today, “each people looks after itself, ... the threats of World War II are far away now”. Young Europeans “find it hard to imagine that the countries among which they circulate so freely could have waged war to each other in the recent past”. Todorov reiterates that the unifying value of Europe is Peace, but he notes that the call for peace is no longer capable of mobilizing the Europeans, who “consider the absence of wars to be an established fact”. But Europeans, Todorov says, should know that “they do not live in a world from which all motives for violence and aggression have miraculously disappeared”. Europe is called,

precisely because it has achieved it internally, “to make a contribution to the consolidation ... of the plurality of human societies, ... in a state of coexistence and balance ... for peace on earth”.

Giving value to the peaceful coexistence of consolidated pluralities, and to openness to the world brings us back, says Todorov, to the characteristics of Greek civilization: an open, cosmopolitan society. Very different, for example, from a centralized, closed empire like the Chinese one. Recalling Ulrich Beck’s thought, he emphasizes that a profound cosmopolitanism has always inspired Europe. Todorov, however, points out that unity and Peace are not a natural fact, but derive from precise choices. Europe is founded on a “Statute”, establishing rules that safeguard, but at the same time limit, diversity. The aim was not just to safeguard the principle of “tolerance,” of “acceptance of diversity.” But to assert much more, and something deeply different. Mere tolerance cannot generate social cohesion, because it entails a hierarchy between those who tolerate and those who are tolerated, thus generating tensions. The European Statute puts all Member States on an equal footing. And this was possible because, Todorov recalls, Europe has got a situation that favored coexistence: it is made up of “a set of smaller entities that obey a common norm”, but above all they “enjoy equal rights”, and the individual entities “have a legal status”. Coexistence is regulated at all levels. If one of these three characteristics is absent or dominant, “we are witnessing other forms of coexistence.” It is these characteristics that make Europe a unique supranational democracy in the world.

When Todorov speaks of a “Statute”, he is referring to the Treaties that Europe has gradually given itself as a result of intergovernmental agreements. We must observe that if it is true that this method has advanced the unification process, it has not given Europe the necessary

strength to intervene adequately when the globalization process was taking hold. Because, as Alessandro Cavalli recently wrote in his essay "The difficult construction of a European identity", "without a sufficiently strong European identity, capable of supporting the Europeanization process, the European Union is destined to suffer the effects of globalization without being able to govern them". Maintaining strong governmental powers not only weakens Europe's decision-making power, but also weakens the states themselves, unable to tackle problems no longer within their reach, and to answer adequately to the needs of citizens. The weakness of states brings serious consequences for the stability of democratic systems. Todorov warns us against the illusion that the horrors of totalitarianism are behind us.

Indeed, if we look today at Europe and the rest of the planet, we must acknowledge the existence of undemocratic temptations. A political confrontation is taking place, especially in the Western world, on the outcome of which the future of the Earth and the men who inhabit it will depend. This is not a return to the class struggle of the past, but the rise of different "visions" on the type of socio-economic development capable of guaranteeing democracy, freedom, and social justice, and on the kind of state that is adequate to achieve it. A clash between federalism and nationalism. In Europe, we have witnessed the rebirth of Nazi-nationalist-sovereign groups. We must note that although Europe is the most advanced democracy with regard to the recognition of human rights, only a part of its citizens share and support them. The other part is fighting them. This is a phenomenon that has global dimensions. The sovereignist parties, which have been defeated in the European and American elections, nonetheless enjoy a consensus.

At the root of the polarization of society, there is above all the increase in inequalities. Since

the 1970s, the Member States of the European Union have weakened the social model that ensured citizens a safety net from the great risks of life (illness, unemployment, accidents, old age, etc.) and gave the certainty that no one would be left without a minimum of safeguards. The recent economic and health crises show that if the state is unable to ensure security, work and a dignified life for citizens, the loss of consent and social conflict are inevitable.

The evolving world scenario poses serious problems to Europe with regard to its internal and external adaptation of its institutional set-up. To Todorov's arguments it should be added that the Europe of the Treaties lacks a Constitutional Charter that together with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union outlines a state project in which citizens count and are sovereign, and democracy is assured not only at the national level but also at the supranational level. Looking at the need for security, Todorov tackles the delicate issue of borders and the defense of Europe. While aiming to be a "soft power", without an imperial project, he states that "Europe must have a military force", because "its interests do not coincide with those of any other part of the world". And considering that Europe's unity is not irreversible, its identity must be safeguarded. This must become a driving force for unity.

If Europe wants to safeguard its identity, it must protect it. Todorov stresses that some protective policies are already in place: those who want to join the Union must commit themselves to respecting its constitutive principles, recognizing and respecting the diversity of others. But he observes that, if Europe wants to expand its borders to the countries to the east and the south, and to propose its own example of Peace, it must adopt other solutions. The limits and principles that regulate the Member States of the Union cannot be applied, for example, to the numerous neighboring states

with which Europe has many interests in common, but whose regimes are so different. It could make use, however, of treaties of association.

Since 2008, when this essay was written, the world has changed dramatically. The current economic, environmental and social crises demonstrate that decisive steps forward are needed not only at the European level, but at the global level too, to safeguard Peace and promote development. It is clear that without a democratic government, the global economy, left to itself, produces very serious damages. There is a lot of resistance in the world summits to change course. On the other hand, Europe has recently taken important decisions. Faced with the need to tackle the environmental and social challenges of today's world, it has decided to steer the development

model toward an eco-sustainable economy and full employment, especially for young people. This might let the Union's democratic and social soul re-emerge and awaken citizens in their sense of belonging. Other steps are being taken at the institutional level as well. With the European elections in 2014 and 2019, more power was given to the Commission, understood as the emerging European government. This enabled the Commission to launch the Next Generation EU investment plan, with a majority vote overcoming the paralyzing national veto. Indeed, the power of European governments has been reduced.

A broad consultation of European civil society is being planned, a Conference on the Future of Europe which, by giving citizens a voice, can make the exercise of European citizenship a reality.

¹ Tzvetan Todorov (& Nathan Bracher, transl.), *European Identity*, in *South Central Review*, Vol. 25, No. 3, *Intellectuals, Nationalisms, and European Identity* (Fall, 2008) pp. 3-15 (13 pages)
Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40211275>

Denis de Rougemont (1906-1985): The Future is within Us

Rene Wadlow

Self-government will be, first of all, the art of getting people to meddle in things which concern them. It will soon call for the skill of challenging, once again, decisions which concern them, and which have been taken without them...Self-government specifically consists in finding one's own way along uncharted paths.

Denis de Rougemont

Denis de Rougemont, whose birth anniversary is 8 September, was an intellectual leader among world citizens often walking on uncharted paths. A French-speaking Swiss, after his studies of literature at the University of Geneva, at 25, he moved to Paris, where he quickly became part of a group of young, unorthodox thinkers who were developing a "Personalist" philosophy. The Personalists around Emmanuel Mounier, Alexandre Marc, Robert Aron and Arnaud Dandieu were trying to develop an approach based on the 'Person' to counter the strong intellectual currents of communism and fascism, then at their height in European society. De Rougemont was one of the writers of the 1931 *Manifesto of the New Order* with its emphasis on developing a new cultural base for society.¹

For de Rougemont, revolutionaries attempting to seize power, even from the most repressive regimes, invariably fall into the power structures they hoped to eliminate. Only the power we have over ourselves is synonymous with freedom. For the first time, the person has not only the need but also the power and ability to choose his future.

He wrote: *"The powers of the State are in direct proportion to the inertia of the citizens. The State*

will be tempted to abuse them as soon as it thinks there are signs that the citizens are secretly tempted to let themselves slide back into the conditions of subjects...Dictatorship requires no imagination: all we have to do is to allow ourselves to slide. But the survival of mankind in an atmosphere we can breathe presupposes the glimpsed vision of happiness to be achieved, a ridge to be crossed, a horizon".

"The model of society which Napoleon established by a stroke of genius, with a view to war and nothing else, is the permanent state of emergency, which was to be the formula of the totalitarian states from 1930 onward. Everything is militarized, that is, capable of being mobilized at any time, spirit, body and goods."

In 1935, de Rougemont lived in Germany as a university lecturer in Frankfurt. There he was able to see the Nazi movement at first hand, and had seen Hitler speaking to crowds. He later wrote of this experience. *"The greatest theologian of our time, Karl Barth, wrote 'A prophet has no biography; he rises and falls with his mission.' This may be said of Hitler, the anti-prophet of our time, the prophet of an empty power, of a dead past, of a total catastrophe whose agent he was to become. Hitler, better than orthodox or deviationist Communists, Fascists, Falangists and Maoists, answered the basic question of the century (which is religious, in the primary sociological sense of re-binding) by offering a comradeship, a togetherness, rituals, from the beat of drums by night, to the sacred ceremonies of Nuremberg by day."*

One of de Rougemont's early essays was *"Principes d'une politique de pessimisme active"*. He and those around him saw the dangers

and the opportunities, but were unable to draw together a large enough group of people to change the course of events. As he wrote: *"From the early thirties of this century, young people who were awakened, but without 'resources', were laying the foundations of the personalist movement. They knew that the totalitarians were going to win – at least for a tragic season – and tried to put into words the reasons for their refusal, in the face of this short-lived triumph."*

In 1939, he published his most widely-read book, *Love in the Western World (L'Amour et l'Occident)* where he traced the idea of romantic love, from the Manicheans through the Bogomiles, to the Cathars, to the poetry of the troubadours.

During the war years, he lived in the USA writing and broadcasting on the French section of the Voice of America. In 1946 he returned to Europe, living most of the rest of his life near Geneva. There he became highly active in the movement for European federalism, but he was critical of the concepts of a European Union as integration of existing States. He remained loyal to the position he set out in the mid-1930s. *"Man is not made on the scale of*

the huge conglomerates which one tries to foist on him as 'his fatherland'; they are far too large or too little for him. Too little, if one seeks to confine his spiritual horizons to the frontiers of the Nation-State; too large if one tries to make them the locus of this direct contact with the flesh and with the earth which is necessary to Man".

He put an emphasis on culture, stressing a common European civilization, but with great respect for the contributions of different European regions. His idea of federalism was to build on existing regions, especially trans-frontier regions. He was an active defender of ecological causes, seeing in the destruction of nature one of the marks of the over-centralization of State power. Thus, he was stinging against the nuclear power industry, which he saw as leading to State centralism. As he wrote: *"Starting afresh means building a new parallel society, a society whose formulae will not be imposed on us from above, will not come down to us from a capital city, but will on the contrary be improvised and invented on the plane of everyday decision-making, and will be ordered in accordance with the desire for liberty which alone unites us, when it is the objective of each and all."*

¹ See Jean-Louis Loubet Del Bayle, *Les Non-Conformistes des années '30*, Paris, Seuil, 1969

Padoa-Schioppa and the Icing on the Cake that Marked the Birth of the Euro*

Alfonso Iozzo

In Memoriam.

Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa had an outstanding ability to analyse facts and situations, identifying the economic, political, and social problems that society had to tackle.

I have been his friend since the end of the 1970s, and have always shared his ideas and assessments, mainly on the European unification process from the federalist perspective. Here, I will limit my recollections to a few things where I have lasting memories of his fundamental contribution to the creation of the single currency.

After the Second World War, Europe began a complex integration process. However, from the 1970s, it started to experience difficult crises which worsened after the US decided to abandon the gold standard in August 1971, thereby undermining the Bretton Woods system. Padoa-Schioppa's idea of an "inconsistent quartet", i.e., that the free movement of goods and capital was incompatible with autonomous monetary policies and currency exchange rates, showed that creating a single currency was necessary to advance European integration. He stubbornly committed himself to this, despite knowing that for economists the project would be very difficult to implement.

However, not only was Padoa-Schioppa good at analysing and understanding facts, he also had an excellent sense of the importance of organisation to get results. At the end of 1991, to the disbelief of many, the creation of the European currency had become the specific objective of the Treaty under discussion in Maastricht. In Rome, on the eve of the

departure of the Italian delegation led by Giulio Andreotti, of which he was a member, Padoa-Schioppa met Gianni Ruta, the former secretary of the Rome branch of the European Federalist Movement and the financial director of STET, a company that had recently issued the first ECU bond. Ruta pointed out to him that while the proposal submitted to the European Council did indeed envisage the creation of the European currency, it did not indicate the date of its entry into force.

Padoa-Schioppa immediately shared the importance of that "detail", and during the flight convinced Andreotti to propose adding that date, calling it the "icing" on the cake.

Once in Maastricht, Andreotti met with French President François Mitterrand and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, and convinced them that a final date for the entry into force of the euro needed to be set. However, the CDU leader asked Andreotti whether he realised what the Treaty would entail for Italy. Andreotti replied that he did, but added that he wanted to go ahead because this would be in the Italian people's interests. The final date was therefore set for 1999.

On the Sunday evening after the summit ended Padoa-Schioppa called me: "We have the European currency, it went well! But the shot fired is so powerful that we'll need to pay attention to the recoil: We can't stand behind the cannon, we need to be ready to react." In fact, shortly afterwards, in September 1992, the market attacks against the pound sterling and the lira started, undermining the European Monetary System, which had to function for the changeover to the euro to take place.

The pound sterling withdrew from the system, while the lira officially remained in the Exchange Rate Mechanism with its fluctuation band widened from 2.25% to 15%. The structure was saved and the arduous journey towards the European currency could go ahead.

In 1999, when the European Central Bank was established, Padoa-Schioppa was called on to become a member of its Executive Board. He told me: "I am not aiming at being in charge of international relations (the German member was obviously in charge of monetary policy), but of the organisation, because a clearing system absolutely has to be set up between the central banks of the participating countries," as the ECU central banks had done. Padoa-Schioppa supported the project at the time as Director-General of the European Commission. At the ECB, he created and implemented the system later known as "Target 2".

At the euro's toughest moment, when the Greek crisis erupted, this system made it possible for capital from Greece to be refinanced without needing a formal resolution.

These very valuable months allowed former Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras, former

President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, and German Chancellor Angela Merkel to reach the very difficult agreement that prevented not only Athens from declaring insolvency while remaining in the euro, but also the crisis from spreading to other countries, including Italy, which would probably have resulted in the end of the single currency.

From the creation of the ECU clearing system to the Delors Report, from the drafting of the Maastricht Treaty to the ECB's technical structure, Padoa-Schioppa's contribution to the creation of the European currency was of historical importance, and will remain invaluable.

There are many facets to Padoa-Schioppa's extraordinary work, and to his personality as a professional and a man, but there is not enough space here for me to mention any others.

However, I cannot fail to remember his last great project: the reform of the international monetary system, launched in 1944 by John Maynard Keynes, but subsequently diminished. Padoa-Schioppa restarted it in 2010 with the "Ghost of Bancor" conference, creating with Michel Camdessus a highly qualified working group, in which he was active until the final days of his life.

* This article was first published by *Il Sole 24 Ore*, on 17 December 2020

The Death of Valéry Giscard d'Estaing

Tremeur Denigot

Valéry Giscard d'Estaing died not long ago of Covid-19. Europe loses a great European, and France another of its former Presidents a year apart from the death of his great political rival.

He is a man of paradoxes who disappears after a very long life devoted to national and European politics. A long life exposes one to the evolution of the judgment of his contemporaries, and Giscard has been evaluated and understood differently according to the times, sometimes badly, and this also raises the question of timing for a man whose career has perhaps suffered because of that, as he arrived in France a little too early, and in Europe a little too late.

It is also difficult to place this pro-European liberal centrist in the preconceived boxes of French-style political analysis. Too much to the left for the right, not enough French, much too European, much too "modern" and politically liberal, although economically not enough (for Chirac), too much to the right for the left, too rigorist, too old-fashioned and distant, too big-bourgeois, too pre-Thatcherist, etc. France is certainly not a nation of center politics, or rather does not see itself as such. Giscard would have been much loved in Italy's Christian-democratic party, a country where he is still appreciated. He will be regretted differently outside and inside. Undoubtedly excessively criticized in France, and praised perhaps just as excessively in Europe.

VGE will be considered as a young president of a Republic that was still largely Gaullist, national-centered, statist and conservative, and his record will undoubtedly be reassessed over time. Despite his major accomplishments, which have been complacently polished by his opposition, yet he has fewer corpses in his closet with regard to his analogous figures, albeit of high-profile

in this regard, in the 5th Republic. But above all, he undoubtedly contributed to bringing France into modernity and letting its society evolve with major reforms, a great accomplishment for this Kennedy with the appearance of a provincial squire; at the same time, he carried out a policy of international and European openness, in particular with Schmidt, forming the Franco-German couple which became famous. We owe him the inventions of the ancestor of the G7 and the European Council, which show his visionary international activism and his multilateral prism through which he saw the states as major players, including in the EU, of which he always had a basically confederal vision.

As a former president, so whimsical and stylish, he did not hesitate to become again a simple national, then European deputy, and later also President of a Regional Council. Other ex-Presidents do not have this kind of simplicity, even if their style is more "people-friendly".

He will then become President of the Convention on the future of Europe, coping with the federal goat and the intergovernmental cabbage, giving birth in this ill-communicated ambiguity to a failure sanctioned by his own country, which discovered, incredulous, the possibility of a political Europe without knowing what form it should really take. But did VGE have his own ideas on the matter? Despite this setback, he will continue his European activism by advocating a European core of more integrated countries, and being in favor of a fiscal union, but without ever arriving at thinking of a solution in federal terms. VGE will be revived in posterity, time will do its work, and it will very likely be more European than national. Actually, he may not be the only President of the Fifth Republic to experience such a fate.

UN at 75: how to Renovate the “Global Political House”?

Andrea Cofelice

Last September, the UN celebrated its 75th anniversary: over 120 heads of state and government took part (mainly through pre-recorded messages) in a high-level event promoted by the General Assembly, to take stock of the work of the Organization and reaffirm its centrality in the international relations system.

In its 75 years of history, the UN has displayed a remarkable degree of *resilience*, managing to survive the crises and changes of the international system (a different fate occurred to the previous League of Nations), without showing, however, a comparable ability to *reform* its own governance system, to put it in tune with a globalized and interdependent world. The internal power structure, including the right of veto by the five Security Council's permanent members, still reflects the international balance that emerged at the end of WWII. Some UN bodies have lost their relevance, while others, although provided for by the Charter, have never been implemented; at the operational level, the problems of duplication and institutional redundancy, bureaucratic inertia and chronic underfunding are well known. Above all, the UN has not been able to accommodate the qualitative change of the international system: the UN continues to be mainly an intergovernmental organization, while current international relations are marked by the presence of new centres of power (regional organizations), private actors (civil society, multinational firms and financial companies) and public institutions different than governments (i.e. parliaments, local authorities, judicial bodies).

The issues of legitimacy, effectiveness, representativeness and democratization of the UN, which were already raised in the past, are all still on the table. What, then, is new about the current anniversary? First of all, the international context: as recalled by the Secretary General Antonio Guterres, today we live in an era characterized by “a surplus of multilateral challenges and a deficit of multilateral solutions”. The Covid-19 pandemic has highlighted the fragility of the current international system, but the list of challenges is much longer: growing geopolitical tensions; the erosion of the international liberal order and of democratic values at national level; an increase in armed conflicts, especially civil ones; increasingly complex threats to human security; an increase in poverty and inequality; climate change and biodiversity collapse; risks of a new nuclear proliferation.

The urgent need to address these challenges with a renewed vision of multilateral cooperation led member States to adopt, after months of negotiations, a political declaration¹ to strengthen the role of the UN in global decision-making processes. The declaration, after recalling the results (but also the failures) in its 75-year history, identifies 12 priorities for the years to come. In addition to issues that have traditionally characterized the work of the UN, but on which “ranks must be closed up” (such as sustainable development goals, gender equality, climate change, reform of the General Assembly and the Security Council) new commitments have been raised, such as the need to improve cooperation in the field of pandemics, digital

technologies and artificial intelligence.

These commitments are formulated broadly enough so that the declaration was adopted by consensus (also with the surprising support of the United States). At the same time (and this is perhaps the most innovative element), the Secretary General received the mandate to formulate, by September 2021, guidelines and recommendations on how to advance the common agenda. The Secretary General has proved to be able to combine vision and pragmatism: given the impracticability, in the current phase, of a grand bargain on the reform of UN political bodies – due to the lack of any consensus among member states on the reform of the Security Council –, he managed to get the reform of the UN development system approved, as well as to reorganize the “peace and security” pillar and the management of the Secretariat.

The Secretary General will need adequate political support to carry out this effort; however, this support is unlikely to come from the most influential members of the Security Council: with current leaderships, the Council appears to be an *obstacle* rather than an *enhancer* on the reform path. The United States, once supporters and “architect” of the United Nations project, under the Trump presidency not only withdrew from the main multilateral forums (UNESCO, WHO, Human Rights Council), but seemed committed to deconstructing the liberal global governance system that emerged in the second post-war period; the UK is largely absorbed by the consequences of Brexit; Russia and China are exploiting the power vacuum to seek to reshape whole categories of global norms.

Consequently, the EU can take this opportunity to assert its leadership in the reform process. Support for multilateralism is a beacon of the EU’s foreign policy, as reiterated by President von der Leyen in her last State of the Union

address, and reaffirmed in the Council Conclusions setting out the EU’s priorities at the 75th General Assembly of the United Nations (September 2020 – September 2021), under the theme “Championing multilateralism and a strong and effective UN that delivers for all”. The challenge, then, is to identify viable proposals and solutions to promote change “by design – not by destruction”.

How to formulate a European response to the multilateralism crisis? Anticipating a Commission communication on the subject (expected by the first months of 2021), in a recent public debate the High Representative Josep Borrell foreshadowed European action on three levels. First: investing political and diplomatic capital in all human rights forums, to continue affirming universal principles and norms and countering any attempt, fuelled by instrumental arguments on respect for sovereignty or cultural and political diversity, to re-establish a “relativism of rights”. Secondly: promoting the formation of coalitions of states (and regional actors) actors who share concerns with the EU about the stability of the international system, which is undermined by the growing tensions between the US and China. The recent launch at the UN of the “Alliance for Multilateralism”, a Franco-German initiative that has received the support of the entire EU, is a step in this direction. Finally: promoting a flexible multilateralism, with the possibility of differentiated regulatory regimes and alliances with variable geometries according to different issue-areas, on the model of plurilateral agreements in the WTO.

The EU is a driving force of multilateralism: today it is necessary to pursue this commitment with greater unity, ambition and a sense of urgency, inspired by the values set out 75 years ago in the UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

¹ UN General Assembly, “Declaration on the commemoration of the seventy-fifth anniversary of the United Nations”, doc. A/75/L.1, 16 September 2020.

An Army of Humanity to Fight Crimes Against Humanity *

Tad Daley

In 1945, as WWII ground its way toward a conclusion at Hiroshima and Nagasaki that portended only darker days ahead, a young man named Duncan Cameron was charged by the United Kingdom with treason. His offense? Refusing to take up arms for his country. When questioned under oath in the dock, however, the precocious 18-year-old insisted he was no coward, and no pacifist. Duncan Cameron announced that he was quite willing to fight to defend not the nation where he happened to have been born, but all of humankind. And he declared that he would gladly put his life on the line to enforce a universal rule of law, by serving as an officer in a “World Police Force.” Perhaps we might call him, in retrospect, a planetary patriot.

This year marks the 75th anniversary of not only the end of that terrible war, but the birth of the United Nations. The UN Charter was signed by 50 countries in San Francisco on June 26th, 1945, and came into force four months later on October 24th. World leaders plan to gather this September in New York, coronavirus permitting, both to celebrate the occasion and to chart a course for the years ahead.

Two major civil society initiatives, known as UN2020 and Together First, have emerged to focus on that latter ambition. Mostly, alas, outside the United States, they have labored to craft and push global governance innovations which might be enacted as soon as that September 2020 summit. And they are also exploring larger, longer-term ideas – perhaps aiming for the UN’s centennial in 2045 – regarding the ideal global structures by which nine or ten billion humans might

optimally organize themselves as a unified global civilization.

One of the most important proposals now circulating in this debate is to invent at last the force that was not available for young Cameron to join. The United Nations needs soldiers of its own – to put a stop to genocide, crimes against humanity, and abominations that rival Dante’s inferno when national governments are unwilling to dispatch their own forces to do so. There has never been any shortage of violent conflicts inside one state which directly engage the interests of outside states – leading to military intervention. This rarely leads to optimal outcomes for the citizens inside those states! Syria might be the best contemporary example. It is perhaps not hyperbole to assert that “the main reason” for the humanitarian catastrophe inside that country since 2011 is the sharply divergent interests of outside actors like the United States, Russia, Turkey and Iran – all of which have deployed their own boots on the ground in Syria.

But there is equally no shortage of internal violent conflicts where the opposite strategic calculus prevails. UN member states, over and over again, have proven unwilling to put their own forces at risk – no matter how macabre the atrocities – when the fight in question does not directly engage their own national interests. The catalogue of such cases just since the Cold War’s end wearies the soul. Bosnia, four years of international abandonment (most agonizingly in Sarajevo and Srebrenica) before the 1995 Dayton Accords. Darfur. Congo. The abuses of the Rohingya by the government of Myanmar. The violations of Boko Haram in

Borderless Debate: 75 Years Of The UN And The Need For A Renovation Project

West Africa. The barbarities of ISIS in Iraq and Syria. "Never again", we say. Again and again, we see.

Rwanda remains the prototypical, still unbearable case study. Hutu extremists began massacring members of the Tutsi minority after a plane crash killed President Juvenal Habyarimana in 1994. UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali pleaded with 19 developed UN member states to dispatch just a handful of troops – who could have quickly established safe corridors and safe havens, and provided refuge for hundreds of thousands of innocents. All 19 turned him down. Most Americans were sickened by the violence in Rwanda, reported nightly on their television newscasts. But no one could credibly argue that America had any vital national interests in Rwanda! President Clinton, under pressure to intervene, could not have made that more clear. "We cannot dispatch our troops to solve every human misery. ... We are prepared to defend ourselves and our fundamental interests when they are threatened." The same was true for virtually every other country in the world. So for ten long weeks, perhaps three quarters of a 3 million souls were tortured, and raped, and hacked to pieces alive in Rwanda. "I swear to you," said Boutros-Ghali later, "that we could have stopped the genocide in Rwanda with 400 paratroopers."

Enter stage left the proposal to create a permanent and directly-recruited "UN Volunteer Force" (UNVF). Its *raison d'être* would be to defend not the national interests of any particular state, but our common human interest in creating a world free of such outrages. It would be filled with crack soldiers from all around the planet, well-equipped, extensively trained, superbly led by experienced military officers. They would explicitly volunteer to put their lives on the line not to defend their own country but to protect humanity – even when their own country has no dog in the fight. Perhaps we might call these

courageous women and men of the future "world citizen soldiers." To bring an end to crimes against humanity, the world needs an army of humanity. This idea was first formally put forth in 1948, when the first UN Secretary-General, Trygve Lie, called for establishing a "UN Legion." It was elaborately developed in William Frye's seminal 1957 book, *A United Nations Peace Force*. Former President Ronald Reagan endorsed it in a speech at Oxford in 1992 – calling it "an army of conscience." Governor Bill Clinton advocated it during his 1992 presidential campaign, and in 1993 his new Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, placed it on the UN Security Council agenda. It was considerably elaborated by Sir Brian Urquhart in a landmark 1993 *New York Review* article, "For a UN Volunteer Military Force." Pulitzer-Prize winning author Kai Bird followed up in *The Nation* magazine in 1994 with "The Case for a UN Army." One of the central recommendations of the 1995 Commission on Global Governance was the creation of "a highly trained UN Volunteer Force ... willing to take combat risks." In 2001 Congressman James McGovern of Virginia introduced a "U.N. Rapid Deployment Act," co-sponsored by more than 50 members. And American foreign policy establishment heavyweights Morton Abramowitz and Thomas Pickering revived the proposal again in a 2008 essay in *Foreign Affairs*.

Many mistakenly believe the UN already possesses such a force – the "UN Blue Helmets." But while the UN may own the helmets, the nations still own the troops! The Secretary-General must implore member states to contribute to new UN peacekeeping missions every time, from scratch. That's why Secretary-General Kofi Annan often observed, with unconcealed exasperation, that the UN is the only fire department in the world which can't even hire firefighters until after the blaze breaks out. Perhaps most importantly from the American perspective, a UNVF

could free American presidents from facing the excruciating dilemma that confronted President Clinton in Rwanda. He faced two options, and both of them were miserable. One was dispatching U.S. forces, and incurring, however small the number, some inevitable American casualties to stop atrocities that, however dreadful, had little impact upon us. The other, which by all accounts he chose with much agony, was doing nothing – while the nightmare continued to unfold before all of our very eyes. Who would authorize the deployment of a UNVF? What criteria would they apply? Could preventive deployments sometimes forestall violence? Might its very existence serve as a deterrent? Can we prevent it from becoming yet another vehicle for the strong doing what they can and the weak enduring what they must? These kinds of questions have been thoroughly explored in the literature over the years. None of them are inherently unanswerable.

Perhaps the most important question is whether a UNVF might inspire people to think anew about their primary identities and allegiances. Which brings us back to Duncan Cameron. Might his world police force move more than a few – including many who have no intention of signing up – to openly proclaim themselves to be citizens of the world? That term has come in for a lot of abuse recently – not least from the current occupant of the White House. Perhaps the brutal coronavirus plague, driving home the Big Truth that we all live in one interconnected global civilization, will

cause more than a few to reconsider the lure of hypernationalism, and to reject sentiments like “America First” in favor of “Humanity First.”

A UNVF would give individual citizens all around the world the ability to volunteer to do more than just “serve their countries.” It would give them the opportunity to serve humanity. And then thousands of brave young soldiers might hear the ubiquitous greeting – “thank you for your service” – not just from their fellow nationals. They would hear it from their fellow Earthlings. And then perhaps, someday, we will see a gaggle of reporters and a couple of TV cameras set up on the front lawn of a Minneapolis home. And a middle aged couple will walk out, slowly and heavily, toward the microphones. And one of them will tearfully say, “Our only child Megan was killed yesterday, serving in the UNVF mission in Freedonia. Here is the medal she won in the Twin Cities Triathlon just nine months ago. Here is a photograph of her playing Mrs. Soames in *Our Town* when she was a sophomore in high school. We will never get over losing her.” But then the other one will say: “However ... know this. Because of Megan’s sacrifice, 100 other parents in a faraway land did not lose their own daughters and sons today. Our country has no dog in that fight. But all those children are members of the human race. Just like our own daughter, they are for us all beloved children of the family of humankind. So have no doubt. Our precious little soldier girl did not die in vain.”

* This essay first appeared at *Responsible Statecraft*, journal of the Quincy Institute in Washington, D.C., and is reprinted here at the author’s request.

Pope Francis and the Revolution of Tenderness*

Leonardo Boff

The new encyclical of Pope Francis¹, signed on October 3rd on the tomb of Francis of Assisi in the city of Assisi, will be a landmark in the social doctrine of the Church. It is broad and detailed in its subject matter, always seeking to add values, even from the liberalism that it strongly criticises. It will certainly be analysed in detail by Christians and non-Christians alike, since it is addressed to all people of good will.

In this article I will highlight what I consider innovative with respect to the previous magisterium of the Popes.

First of all, it is clear that the Pope presents a paradigmatic alternative to our way of living in the Common Home, which is subject to many threats. He gives a description of "dark clouds" which are equivalent, as he himself stated several times, "to a 'third world war' fought piecemeal".

Currently there is no "shared roadmap" for humanity (see paragraph no. 29 of the encyclical), but a guiding thread runs through the whole encyclical: the awareness "that no one is saved alone; we can only be saved together" (no. 32).

This is the new project, expressed in these words: "I offer this social Encyclical as a modest contribution to continued reflection, in the hope that in the face of present-day attempts to eliminate or ignore others, we may prove capable of responding with a new vision of fraternity and social friendship" (no. 6).

We must understand well this alternative. We come from and are still within a paradigm that is at the base of modernity. It is anthropocentric. It is the kingdom of the *dominus*: the human

being as owner and lord of nature and of the Earth, which only make sense to the extent that they are subject to him. It changed the face of the Earth; it brought many benefits but also led to a principle of self-destruction. It is the current impasse of the "dark clouds".

In the face of this vision of the world, the encyclical *Fratelli tutti* proposes a new paradigm: that of the *frater*, the brother, of universal brotherhood and social friendship.

It shifts its centre from a technical-industrial and individualistic civilisation to a civilisation of solidarity and the preservation and care for all life forms.

This is the Pope's innovative intention. In this shift lies our salvation: we will overcome the apocalyptic vision of the threat of the end of the human species with a vision of hope: that we can and must change course.

For that, we need to nourish hope. The Pope says: "I invite everyone to renewed hope, for hope speaks to us of something deeply rooted in every human heart, independently of our circumstances and historical conditioning" (no. 55).

Here resonates the *principle* of hope, which is more than the virtue of hope: it is a principle, an interior motor for projecting new dreams and visions, as was well formulated by Ernst Bloch.

The Pope emphasises: "if the conviction that all human beings are brothers and sisters is not to remain an abstract idea, but has to find concrete embodiment, then numerous related issues emerge, forcing us to see things in a new light and to develop new responses" (no. 128). As we can deduce, it is a new direction, a paradigmatic shift.

Where to start? Here the Pope reveals his basic attitude, often repeated to social movements: "Do not expect anything from above, because more of the same or worse always comes; start with yourselves". That is why he suggests: "We can start from below and, case by case, act at the most concrete and local levels, and then expand to the farthest reaches of our countries and our world" (no. 78). The Pope suggests what today is at the forefront of the ecological discussion: working at the region level, as bioregionalism allows for true sustainability and the humanisation of communities, and connects the local with the universal (no. 147). The Pope offers long reflections on the economy and politics, but emphasises: "politics must not be subject to the economy, nor should the economy be subject to the dictates of an efficiency-driven paradigm of technocracy" (no. 177). He criticises the market forcefully: "The marketplace, by itself, cannot resolve every problem, however much we are asked to believe this dogma of the neoliberal faith. Whatever the challenge, this impoverished and repetitive school of thought always offers the same recipes. Neoliberalism simply reproduces itself by resorting to the magic theories of "spillover" or "trickle" – without using the name – as the only solution to societal problems" (no. 168). Globalisation brought us closer, but did not make us more brothers (no. 12). It creates only "associates" but not brothers (no. 102). In a reading of the parable of the Good Samaritan, the Pope offers a rigorous analysis of the various characters that appear on the scene, and applies them to political economy, culminating with the question: "Which of these persons do you identify with? With the wounded man on the road, with the priest, with the Levite or with the foreigner, the Samaritan, despised by the Jews? This question, blunt as it is, is direct and incisive. Which of these characters do you resemble? (no. 64). The Good Samaritan becomes a model of social and political love (no. 66).

The new paradigm of fraternity and social love unfolds in love in its public materialisation, in the care of the most fragile, in the culture of encounter and dialogue, in politics as tenderness and kindness.

As for the culture of encounter, the Pope takes the liberty of quoting the Brazilian poet Vinicius de Moraes in his *Samba da Bênção*, on the 1962 album *Um encontro no Au bon Gourmet* where he says: "Life, for all its confrontations, is the art of encounter" (no. 215).

Politics is not to be reduced to a dispute for power and the division caused by power. The Pope affirms in a surprising way: "Politics too must make room for a tender love of others... the smallest, the weakest, the poorest should touch our hearts: indeed, they have a 'right' to appeal to our heart and soul. They are our brothers and sisters, and as such we must love them and care for them" (no. 194).

The Pope asks himself what tenderness is and responds: "it is love that draws near and becomes real. A movement that starts from our heart and reaches the eyes, the ears and the hands" (no. 194). This reminds us of the phrase of Gandhi, one of the inspirations of the Pope, along with St. Francis, Luther King, Desmond Tutu: politics is a gesture of love for the people, care for the things held in common.

Along with tenderness comes gentleness, which we would translate as kindness, remembering the prophet *Gentileza* ["Kindness"] (see <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gentileza>), who in the streets of Rio de Janeiro proclaimed to all who passed by: "Kindness begets kindness" and "God is kindness", very much in the style of St Francis. The Pope defines kindness as "an attitude that is gentle, pleasant and supportive, not rude or coarse. Individuals who possess this quality help make other people's lives more bearable" (no. 223). This is a challenge for politicians, but also to bishops and priests: to carry out the revolution of tenderness.

Solidarity is one of the foundations of the human and the social. It finds "concrete

expression in service, which can take a variety of forms in an effort to care for others. And service in great part means caring for vulnerability” (no. 115). This solidarity proved to be absent, and only recently did it come into its own in the struggle against COVID-19. Solidarity prevents humanity from dividing itself into “my world” and “the others”, “them”, since “others, no longer considered human beings possessed of an inalienable dignity, become only ‘them’” (no. 27). And the Pope concludes with a great wish: “God willing, after all this, we will think no longer in terms of ‘them’ and ‘those’, but only ‘us’” (no. 35).

The Pope calls all religions to this challenge of giving a body to the dream of universal fraternity and social love, because they “contribute significantly to building fraternity and defending justice in society” (no. 271).

At the end the Pope evokes the figure of the Little Brother of Jesus, Charles de Foucauld, who in the desert of North Africa, together with the Muslim population, “wanted to be, in the end, ‘the universal brother’” (no. 287). Pope

Francis observes: “only by identifying with the least did he come at last to be the brother of all. May God inspire that dream in each one of us. Amen.” (no. 287)

With Pope Francis we are before a man who, following his inspiration, Francis of Assisi, has also become a universal man, welcoming everyone and identifying with the most vulnerable and invisible of our cruel and inhumane world. He gives rise to the hope that we can and must nourish the dream of brotherhood without borders and of universal love.

The Pope has done his part. It is up to us not to let the dream be just a dream, but instead the fundamental principle of a new way of living together, as brothers and sisters plus nature, in the same Common Home.

Will we have the time and the wisdom to make this leap? Surely the “dark clouds” will continue, but we have a lamp in this encyclical of hope from Pope Francis. It does not dispel all the shadows, but it is enough to glimpse the path to be travelled by all.

*Originally published on the site <https://leonardoboff.org/2020/10/07/fratelli-tutti-una-revolucion-paradigmatica-del-dominus-dueno-al-frater-hermano/>

¹ http://www.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/encyclicals/documents/papa-francesco_20201003_enciclica-fratelli-tutti.html

The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons

Giampiero Bordino

According to data from the SIPRI Yearbook 2020, the most authoritative international source of data on nuclear weapons and military spending, nine states (United States, Russia, China, France, Great Britain, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Israel) now hold such weapons, for a total of 13,400 nuclear warheads, of which more than 3700 are deployed and operational. More specifically, the top three countries are Russia with 6375 nuclear warheads, the US with 5800 and China with 320. In any case, a quantity of weapons capable of destroying the world several times over, far beyond the necessity of deterrence, that is often invoked to justify their procurement. All of this is part of a steady growth, despite the recurring economic and social crises, in military spending worldwide, which has reached 1917 billion dollars (2.2% of global GDP). The United States is in the lead, with an expenditure of 732 billion dollars. The US and China alone cover more than half of global military spending. India, one of the countries with the highest levels of poverty and social inequality, has become the third country in the world in military spending.

In this context, the problem of the control and, more radically, the prohibition of nuclear weapons has emerged to the fore in recent years. The public debate on these issues has developed both within national public opinions and at the international level. In September 2017, the United Nations General Assembly, after a laborious negotiation phase with the participation of 129 States (66 out of 195 potential participants refused to participate) and many other bodies of different nature (international organizations, the European

Union, NGOs, etc.), approved, with 122 votes in favor, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, a non-binding agreement which prohibits the development, testing, possession, deployment, transfer, and of course the use of nuclear weapons. Since then, 84 UN member countries have signed it, but among them, as can be easily understood, there is none of the nine countries that actually own such weapons. Many other countries, although not holders, have also refused to sign, like Italy, because agreeing to the treaty would force it to break its alliance with NATO and the United States should it ask for the removal of the atomic weapons currently stored on its territory.

To become effective, a treaty, according to international rules, must be ratified by at least 50 countries, and this threshold was reached in October 2020. Ninety days after the deposit of the fiftieth instrument of ratification, on January 22, 2021, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has come into effect.

As we said, this is a non-binding treaty, to which none of the countries that actually possess nuclear weapons have given their approval. In essence, it is only the beginning of a possible process, completely unpredictable in its timing and in its conditions of implementation, for controlling these weapons of mass destruction. A symbolic event, a signal of a general direction, a reminder of individual and collective responsibility in the face of the risks of a catastrophe for the entire human species. In other words, a significant reference point, even if completely insufficient, for the public debate and for the individual and collective

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actors who fight to denounce and prevent those risks.

The fundamental problems, decisive for promoting the process of the regulation, control and in perspective elimination of nuclear weapons, go beyond the good will of the actors and their possible agreements (the Treaty on prohibition in this case), and concern the political and institutional system that currently presides over the world order. This system, of which the United Nations is the most important and best known organization, is wholly inadequate to the challenges of various kinds, military, nuclear, environmental, economic and social, etc., which humanity is facing today.

As Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein and other great scientists wrote in their famous Manifesto in 1955, "We must learn to think in a new way. We must learn not to ask ourselves

what measures to take so that the group we prefer can achieve a military victory, since such measures can no longer be contemplated. The question we must ask ourselves is: What measures must be taken to prevent an armed conflict whose outcome would be catastrophic for everyone?"

In this direction, it is a question of devising and building a system that goes beyond the model of the League of Nations, born in 1919 following the First World War, and beyond the model, similar to the previous one, of the United Nations, created in 1945 after the Second. In other words, it is a question of trying to build an effective statehood, not powerless but capable of enforcing rules shared by all the states and other global players, even at the world level, starting from the embryos of *supranational statehood*, such as the European Union, which already exist.

Albert Einstein from Pacifism to the Idea of World Government

Bruno Boissière

Lucio Levi (ed.)

*Albert Einstein from Pacifism to the Idea
of World Government*

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202 pages

The contributions collected in this work, published with the support of the *Centro Einstein di Studi Internazionali* and the *Centro Studi sul Federalismo* in Turin, provide a better understanding of the evolution of Albert Einstein's thought during the first half of the 20th century, marked by two world wars. They describe Einstein's often epistolary relationships with other intellectuals, starting with those he seems to have admired most, Mohandas Gandhi and Albert Schweitzer. But in what was at the time similar to the birth of an "international of intellectuals", the physicist maintained a dialogue on peace and war with many other personalities, such as Max Planck, Sigmund Freud, Thomas Mann, Romain Rolland and George Bernard Shaw.

As early as 1914, Einstein co-signed with Friedrich Georg Nikolai, professor of physiology at the University of Berlin, an 'Appeal to Europeans', which stresses that war can only lead to disaster both for civilization and for "the national survival of individual states". "It is the duty of educated and well-intentioned Europeans to try to prevent Europe (...) from

having to suffer the same tragic fate that was that of ancient Greece", they write before adding: "Must Europe too gradually exhaust itself and perish in a fratricidal war?" "We are convinced that the time has come when Europe must act in concert to protect its soil, its inhabitants and its culture", we can still read in the manifesto which, along with other texts (including the Russel-Einstein Manifesto of July 1955 against the H-bomb), appears in the appendix to this book.

Einstein also regularly denounces nationalism and observes, in a letter dated August 1915: "It seems that men always need some silly fiction in the name of which they can hate each other. It used to be religion. Today it is the State". Without giving up his fight against war, Einstein will gradually develop the idea of a better organization of the world, with a supranational authority capable of regulating conflicts between states. However, as the *Appeal to Europeans* already underlined, "the Europeans must first come together, and if - as we hope - there are enough Europeans in Europe, that is to say people for whom Europe is not just a geographical concept, but in the first place something they cherish in their hearts, then we can try to call for a (...) union of Europeans".

Beyond their historical interest, the documents analyzed in this work retain an element of topicality. As Giampiero Bordino underlines in his preface: "In a world increasingly characterized by opportunistic, and humanely and culturally inappropriate political leaderships, Einstein's thought on peace and war, and in particular on nuclear war, should be disseminated more broadly (...) not only to intellectuals, but also among the political class (...) and in the direction of the citizens in Europe and in the world".

The Decline of Oil Demand and the Future of Petrostates

Adriana Castagnoli

Giuliano Garavini

The Rise & Fall of OPEC in The Twentieth Century

Oxford, Oxford University Press,
pp.420, € 30,20

In September 2020, BP, the oil company that recently declared the intention to become emission-free, has published its “World Energy Outlook”. In this, the company suggests that the global demand for crude oil has already reached its peak, and may therefore be heading towards rapid decline. Major changes are taking place in the oil sector, compared to previous decades. First of all, thanks in part to what happened in America with tight oil, and the two oil crises in the 1970s, the fear of a crude oil shortage has given the way to the admission of its abundance. Secondly, oil-dependent countries have acknowledged that, for the sake of the planet, this dependency must end. Thirdly, the shift towards electrification: a new system of renewable energies is emerging, such as solar and wind power, which by 2050 could provide about half of the global energy needs. Oil and coal usage will plummet, although the use of natural gas will remain crucial. Climate change and political pressures are driving the world towards low-carbon energy sources, and this inevitably alters the power of balance. The axiom contained in *The Rise & Fall of*

OPEC is that international cooperation among petrostates was one of the most powerful driving forces in the international history of the 20th century. The sources of the book are a wide range of archival documents as well as ‘conversations’ with many political actors of the oil world. The book makes an important contribution to the history of the interaction among powerful global capitalist forces such as the big oil companies, the rentier oil states, and the big consumer states and their governments. This triangulation generated, according to Garavini, its own peculiar forms of cooperation: the big oil companies’ oligopoly, lasted until 1973, the creation of OPEC in 1960, and the International Energy Agency (IEA) in 1974.

According to Garavini, the power of these competing interests on the balance of the world has been somehow overshadowed in historiographical interpretations, as a result of an excessive focus on both the logic of the Cold War and the policies of the great powers. The states that instituted OPEC were different in many ways, because of their side in the Cold War, or their religion or language, but they were nonetheless united by being exporters of crude oil.

Garavini links the rise of OPEC to the debate on the development of the Global South and the history of the environment. This is because OPEC was the first ‘organisation of the Global South’ against the overwhelming power of the industrialised consumer countries, at least until the attempt, carried out within the United Nations, to build a New World Order through an explicitly political initiative for the reorganisation of international power, including that of the media, which the process of decolonisation had initiated. However, Juan Pablo Pérez Alfonso, a leading political figure in OPEC and Venezuela, had already proclaimed the failure of OPEC as an ‘ecological force’ at the end of the 1970s.

The history of oil is also that of those producer

countries that have not joined the cartel. For instance, Russia (and before that, the USSR), as Moscow has never been interested in an international commodity policy nor in the New World Order. Since the Cold War, Kremlin's foreign policy focused on oil and gas exports – as historians have well reconstructed – to increase its influence over the Baltic States, Eastern Europe and even Western Europe. As this book also shows, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, leaders of the most important crude oil both producing and consuming countries, played a decisive role in defeating OPEC with the 1986 price collapse and the loss of the cartel's control over them. The tensions that for decades marked the relationship between petrostates, big oil companies and big consumer states, now including China, still persist.

In conclusion, the world is now moving towards low-carbon energy sources, and this is already changing the balance of power in

favour of those who gain the most from this transition. In the short and medium-term, Russia and Saudi Arabia's industry may be strengthened by the growing demand for oil resulting from the post-pandemic economic recovery, considering also that hydrocarbons remain fundamental to the chemical industry's production processes. Provided that the United States, as the largest oil producer, aims to reduce fracking for environmental reasons. China has its own robust oil industry, but, as the world's second-largest economy, still has to import about three-quarters of its needs, making it the world's largest oil importer. Beijing is also gaining from the energy transition process, as it has obtained a global leadership position in green energy. It also has a dominant position in the lithium's market, an indispensable component for electric car batteries, as well as in the related supply chains, controlling about four-fifths of the world's capacity for producing them.

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