The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

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The Reorganization of the European Party System

Lucio Levi

It is impossible to predict what the new year will bring. But it is clear that we are witnessing a crisis of the world order comparable to the Great Depression of 1929, which represented the prelude to WWII. Only thirty years ago the US and USSR celebrated their reconciliation which ended the Cold War, and Gorbachev opened in the Soviet Union the transition toward democracy. In contradiction with this trend, today's international relations are characterized by the revival of nationalism. Russia is regressing back to the closed society of the Soviet Union and is imposing again an authoritarian regime within its domains. These authoritarian tendencies represent a real threat for constitutional democracies, as shown by Trump's coup d'état attempt of January 6, 2021 and Bolsonaro's alike attempt of January 8, 2023 in Brazil. The defeat of both of them in the recent political elections and the solid international alignment which combats the Russian aggression against Ukraine shows the resilience capacity of democracies against the challenge of autocracies. The violation of the European security order has strengthened the awareness of the need of a collective response to Russia's war but has not produced a timely foreign policy reaction nor a clear inversion of the ongoing trend. Moreover, the old privileged Franco-German relationship, on which the EU's stability has rested, looks dangerously frayed. As there are not the conditions for starting negotiations between Ukraine and Russia, the situation is likely to remain unchanged till the European elections.

Indeed, preparation for the 2024 European elections has already started. The EU is facing a reorganisation and restructuring of its party system. The reason for this lies in the fact that, for the first time since the European election by direct universal suffrage in 1979 took place, the two parties that have governed together over the Strasbourg assembly for the last 40 years – the European People's Party (EPP) and the Socialists and Democrats (S&D) – might not have enough votes to command a majority in the European Parliament. Italian Prime Minister and President of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) Giorgia Meloni met twice with the EPP's leader Manfred Weber in Rome as the two leaders work toward an alliance in view of the 2024 European elections, however distant the latter may appear. It is to be noted that the rapprochement between the EPP and the ECR groups should be related to the formation of a centre-right alignment with a majoritarian vocation able to win the European elections. Moreover, a similar alliance has been established in the Czech Republic with ODS, the party of the Czech Premier Petr Fiala. Weber last December during a meeting of the EPP asserted that only those who are for Europe, for Ukraine and for the rule of law are eligible as potential partners of the EPP. At the same time, the partners of the above-mentioned alliance have marked their distance from the far-right parties such as the French Rassemblement National of Marine Le Pen, the German Alternative für Deutschland and the Italian League, assembled in the Identity and Democracy (ID) group. The significance

of this move is clear: it marks a step towards the integration of Brothers of Italy (the political party led by Giorgia Meloni) into the democratic framework and the coalition of centre-right political parties. Although divided internally on this option, the EPP is seeking to maintain a dominant position on the centre-right political alignment. At the same time, Weber is seeking to reach, in competition with the party of Socialists and Democrats, an agreement with Renew, the liberal group strongly influenced by Emmanuel Macron, whose commitment aims to bankrupt the EPP's and ECR's design to reach the majority in the European Parliament, to confirm von der Leyen at the top of the European Commission and defeat Metsola's candidacy to that office.

The responsibility to govern Italy has obliged Meloni to address the problem of the respect of European agreements and not alienate the support of the European Union's partners. To reach this goal, the Italian leader has changed her orientation toward the EU and the Atlantic Alliance.

On the other hand the EPP has renounced the traditional alliance with the Socialist group in the European Parliament, which has governed the EU since the first direct election of the European Parliament. The collapse of the European People's Party coalition with the Socialists and Democrats is not a negative novelty since it opens the way to the formation of a left-right cleavage similar to the American party system. Freedom House's annual report on the development of freedom around the world reveals that democratic freedoms have been in steady decline for 17 consecutive years. Only 20 percent of the world's population now lives in countries classified by Freedom House as "free", less than half the amount in 2005 (46%), while in 2022 41% live in "not-free" countries (in 2005 18%) and 38% live in "partly free" countries (in 2005 18%).

With the European elections on the horizon, the perspective of a new alliance, that can spring from the changing political position of the Italian Five Stars Movement, is materialising. Originally born as a populist and anti-establishment party, claiming to be neither left nor right, has recently undergone a severe decline in the support of the voters (from 33% to 10%). Therefore, it has adopted a left-leaning program. Giuseppe Conte, the leader of the Five Stars Movement, is actively working to create a coalition with the Greens and the Social Christian movement, represented by the left wing of the former Christian Democratic Party, today a component of the S&D group.

Lastly, the Liberal-democratic group (ALDE) aims to occupy the role of the Parliament's new centre under the aegis of the French President Emmanuel Macron, who has the historical opportunity to federate the liberal-democratic forces and lead a centre coalition, which could play the role of needle of the scale of the European party system between the centre-right and centre-left coalitions.

This scenario is a mere hypothesis which simply describes manoeuvres aiming at reshuffling the nascent European party system and more specifically outlines how parties can change their position in response to the challenges raised by the upcoming European elections.

The competition between democratic and autocratic regimes has a global dimension, but since democracies are a small minority in the world, this cannot be the sector where it is appropriate to relaunch multilateralism and promote international cooperation. However, there are other sectors where international cooperation can help to successfully solve global issues. One example are the environmental transition and sustainable development.

With Lula and Obrador, Latin America Could Finally Speak with One Voice

Roberto Livi

The *Bolsonaristas'* attempted coup threatens to undermine Brazil's new international clout. With Lula, the country is "returning to the world stage" with the full weight of its status as a continent-scale state, and with the recovery of a diplomacy that had earned it strong international prestige.

According to a number of analysts – such as former Bolivian Vice President Álvaro García Linera – Lula's election is the confirmation that Latin America "is experiencing a second progressive wave," although he warns that this phase – unlike the first wave that began with Chávez's presidency in Venezuela in 1999 and lasted until 2014 – is "marked by moderate progressivism." Moreover, as the Argentinian Daniel García Oleado argues, the subcontinent "is at the center of the dispute between two great powers: the United States and China". A trade war that is giving Latin America a new opportunity, while also drawing its ideological limits.

Lula's presidency, with its weight, can improve relations among progressive governments on the subcontinent (from Mexico to Chile, Honduras, Cuba, Colombia, Venezuela, Bolivia and Argentina), facilitate integration projects and accelerate the process that should allow the region to speak with one voice in the international arena. Substantially, this is about putting the policy of integration and sovereignty of Latin America at the center, modeled after the European Union, as long proposed by Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO). It is a project that was also taken up by Lula last August,

when he formally declared his candidacy for president of Brazil. On that occasion, he also spoke about the need to create a single Latin American currency.

As AMLO stated on several occasions, such a project does not involve ideological antagonism with the U.S., but a policy of dialogue and mutual exchange with both the American giant to the North and the Asian giant, China, based on the core principle of Latin America's sovereignty.

This policy presupposes the strengthening, or revitalization, of Latin American institutions established in the first progressive wave, such as UNASUR (the Union of South American Nations), the expanded MERCOSUR and also CELAC (the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States), which, with Brazil rejoining – a decision made by Lula on Friday, January 6 –, acquires a continental scope.

According to AMLO's theses, with Lula's presidency this new progressive alliance would allow Latin America to negotiate "continental agreements" with the U.S. on certain strategic sectors: food, the fight against inequality, the environment, emigration, all across the region that the U.S. calls the "Western Hemisphere," an area where China – and to a lesser extent Russia – is becoming a competitor to the United States.

That is the gist of the package of proposals AMLO presented at the North America Summit that began on Tuesday January 10,

2023, in Mexico City, attended by President Joe Biden and Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau. The first proposal is to move toward continental economic integration: "Let us produce what we consume in America, throughout the continent," said the Mexican president. Second is the creation of an "Alliance for Welfare," agreed upon between North and South America, to "reduce poverty, promote inclusion policies and reduce migration flows, through investment and job creation". The third proposal concerns the policy framework in which the previous two should fit: ending the Monroe Doctrine, and thus the U.S. policies of interference South of the Rio Bravo, and replacing them with others based on respect for the sovereignty of Latin American countries.

These are issues to which Biden and part of the Democrats are receptive. In November, the president appointed former Senator Chris Dodd as special adviser on the Americas. Biden considers him "a leading voice on Latin America." Asking him to step in means that the White House chief has realized that his administration's policy towards the countries South of the Rio Bravo is not effective, in a situation of competition with China.

One of the causes of this failure has been the substantial continuation of the policy of extreme sanctions against Cuba (and Venezuela), decided by his predecessor Trump and rejected by all major Latin American countries (and also by Canada and the EU). Both Biden and especially Dodd know that the *"bloqueo"* policy has been a failure, as Obama had already said in 2014.

The Cuban leadership also recognizes that the policy of hard head-on confrontation promoted by Trump and which has had such damaging effects on the island doesn't serve the U.S. interests either. This is why they have said they are willing to pursue a policy of rapprochement, even with a limited scope. In Maduro's Bolivarian Venezuela, such a line has already been in place for months.

Gorbachev, the Tragic Hero of Federalism

Ira Straus

Gorbachev applied incredible skill in guiding change peacefully out of a totalitarian system into a democratizing one. He had to navigate between harsh opposite factions: those who didn't trust anything short of abandonment of the system all at once, and those who wanted to maintain repression with minimal change lest the system fall apart.

In Hegel's language, he had to step down from positions of absolute master-slave relations, and four such positions at that: personal dictatorship, party dictatorship, command economy, and empire. He used a kind of Hegelian dialectical method for guiding transformation through a series of many changes, mediations, and shifts in perspective. But he also refuted Hegel, by showing that it was possible to do this peacefully and rather quickly, without the slaves slaying the master.

But his noble method took a personal toll on him. After enough iterations of his process and shifts from side to side and from one reform to another, not many people on either side, hardliner or democrat, trusted him. He opened the door to public criticism of himself, and the people jumped on the chance, happy to breathe freely for the first time. His popularity in the opinion polls – real polls started getting taken and published thanks to him – plummeted. Even as he moved the country faster and faster, from the first openings of *glasnost* into real elections, his chances of winning a free election were dissipating.

Delaying central elections and the failure of federal reform

This fed into his greatest single mistake: that of delaying free multiparty elections for the central Union government, leaving it in a state of rapid decay. He said this was because the hardliner power ministries put a gun to his head and forbade it. The Democrats said it was because he knew he'd lose any such election. It was occasionally let out from the Center that he had to stay in power for the time being, since only he was capable of guiding the process from stage to stage without breakdown.

Probably all these explanations were part of his motivation. But when he did finally agree to new, free central elections, it was too late; the country split apart before the elections could be held.

For, in the meanwhile, the member Republics had held multiparty elections already in 1990, gaining governments with a dramatic new infusion of legitimacy. The Union state, by contrast, remained basically Party-chosen. It suffered a severe decline in its legitimacy vis-a-vis the Republics.

The Union-wide Congress of People's Deputies had, to be sure, been elected not too much earlier in elections that were for the first time pretty free, but were not fair; reserve seats had ensured the Communist Party a majority. It was a tremendous step forward for *glasnost*, creating a parliamentary faction headed by Sakharov that could speak freely, with immunity, and get cited in the media freely, without censorship. A new public opinion emerged, more authentic and mature, no longer confined to rumors and whispers and an atmosphere of conspiracy.

But once the Republic governments were, in the next iteration of the process, more freely elected in this emerging public mood,

it exposed all the more glaringly the need for a truly elected Union parliament that could act on its views. They were not scheduled – not for a long time. The authorities said they should stick to the schedule, not fall into the Revolutionary trap of cashiering institutions and holding new elections when the mood shifted. That conservative-sounding wisdom proved a cause of actual revolutionary collapse.

The Republics proceeded to demand and claim sovereignty, arguing their laws were now legitimate and those of the unelected Center not. This "war of laws" gravely weakened the Center.

In these difficult conditions, Gorbachev was resourceful in trying to save the Union. He got a referendum on whether to have a new, free, democratic Union. It won with a 76% supermajority, although its wording was vague, it was criticized for promising all things to all sides of the question and not making clear what it would mean in practice, and it was boycotted in six Republics that wanted independence.

He pressed on for a new federal Union treaty with considerable confederal decentralization. The contradictions were significant here, but not unusual in federalism: all confederations have some elements of federation and vice versa. Federalism always denies absolute, consistent sovereignty, yet uses the term for both levels of government. This fills it with apparent contradictions and sometimes real ones. It leads to perpetual struggle and perpetual negotiation, seeing this as less onerous than either consistent absolute would be; it's the price of wanting both to be together and be separate. But people approaching the matter as passionate purists for the Union or for the Republics will think of the admixture as a scandal, unviable, and a betrayal of their side. And so some hardliners denounced it as a sell-out of the Union, while some Republics called it a betrayal of their sovereignty, demanding a weaker, more consistently confederal union instead. Reality was very different from this rhetoric, as so often happens in debates over federalism. (Years later, Shushkevich of Belarus came to Washington and was still denouncing Gorbachev as a typical "Communist", scheming and cheating with his drafts, because he was promising a confederation but was instead trying to slip a federation through because there was still something of a federal state with Union sovereignty in it. He proudly recalled how he himself stood up for full Belarusian sovereignty and freedom and the eventual CIS. The sovereign Belarus had meanwhile replaced him with Lukashenka and become a full-fledged dictatorship again; Russia was still semi-democratic.) Nevertheless the treaty was signed by eight Republics. Gorbachev was ready to sign as well in August 1991 – only to be pre-empted by the August coup of the hardliners, who considered the treaty just a step down the road to collapse of the Union. The coup proved in fact the decisive blow that brought on the collapse of the Union state.

Gorbachev had himself elevated the power of the hardliners not too many months earlier, shifting the balance toward their side and siding with them in conducting repressions against the Baltic states, in a kind of pre-coup; Yakovlev and Shevardnadze left him, warning that a dictatorship was being prepared. Gorbachev relaxed the repressions in the spring and moved again toward reform and toward such Union treaty as could still be salvaged. A price was paid for the back and forth, but he perhaps believed that it was necessary given the pressures he was facing and the need to maneuver between them. The price went up astronomically when the hardliners killed the Union treaty with their August coup attempt. In the process, they removed themselves from the rank of actors within the Gorbachev system.

When the coup failed, the remaining political spectrum consisted entirely of reformers.

The spectrum now ranged from moderate to radical within reform. Gorbachev was no longer in its center, but on its moderate fringe. He got his golden opportunity to carry through his reforms without a crippling resistance, but his political position became untenable: most reformers wanted to go farther and faster, and distrusted him.

He finally agreed to new elections for the Center, at a deliberate pace; he did not try calling the snap elections that might have salvaged some part of the power of the Union Center. The three core Republics declared a new "commonwealth of independent states", dissolving the former Union and with it the central government, long before the new elections were slated to be held.

It was the end. Gorbachev chose to resign and leave peacefully. He figured, probably correctly, that repression was not a viable option; it might have found enough support to start a civil war, but not enough to win it, much less win it quickly or without massive bloodshed. And it would make permanent enemies for Russia all around it – something one might think no Russian nationalist would want, yet some did.

He spared Russia that outcome – the Milosevic outcome. But his foreswearing of repression enabled many nationalists to fantasize ever thereafter about the repression, thinking or daydreaming that it could easily have been carried out, and that their country was quite unnecessarily destroyed by a stab in the back by Gorbachev and the traitor-democrats. It was a myth that replicated in detail the stab in the back myth of the Nazis in Weimar Germany.

Decades later, in a tragic way to have to come the end of his life, Gorbachev saw the consequences of this myth playing themselves out. He witnessed Putin moving Russia back into the Milosevic outcome, attached not only to the doubtful fantasy that the empire could have been saved, but to the even more farfetched fantasy that it could be restored.

The fate of his other geographical goal: a "Common Home" for the "Greater Europe"
We have seen that Gorbachev proved unable to accomplish his two positive goals that concerned geographic space: preserving the unity of the inner empire, reformed into a federation that would be politically self-sustainable; and creating a Common European Home for the greater Europe of the Helsinki area, understood as what was needed to consolidate an end to the Cold War and establish an enduring peace for the leading sector of the world. It is fair to say that he did not have clear ideas on how to achieve either goal; he could only use the method of putting forth the goal as an attractive slogan, building support for it, and navigating the process of discussing it and negotiating it. That proved insufficient. Perhaps, given indefinitely lengthy time, it would have worked to develop the clarity of goal and way to the goal along the way itself. But the time was not given; could not be given.

It would have required a higher order of genius to come up in advance with clear and adequate ideas on these goals: there was simply no serious public and scholarly discussion available about them for him to build on, outside of the small discussion spaces of the international federalist culture. Even with clear ideas, it would have required not only Gorbachev's statesmanship and motivation to implement them, but help from all sides and parties, at home and abroad; something that was in fact lacking on nearly all sides. And he would have needed a huge load of luck.

He had the *virtus*. But not the *fortuna.*

It is an almost transcendent fact that, despite this, he succeeded in ending the Cold War, in a way that eliminated great power conflict for more than two decades. That is no small achievement in the checkered history of international relations.

And he succeeded in peacefully dissolving the empire into freely associated states. That too was a great, and rare, historical achievement.

His still greater goals, if achieved, would have been truly spectacular on the scale of history. Turning an empire into a federation is so good an idea, and so hard! So many attempts have been made, only to fail.

Even in the British Empire, where the settler colonies were hardly seriously oppressed, it proved impossible to turn Empire into Federation. Franklin tried it in 1754, getting the Albany Congress of the colonies to adopt the proposal, to no avail; and proposed another form of it in 1765. Instead the empire split up by way of civil war in 1776. Britain's Imperial Federation movement had a similar lack of success in its decades of attempts starting in the 1870s, but did help set up the Commonwealth into which the empire was able to dissolve peacefully.

The attempts in Yugoslavia at reforming the federation not only failed but issued in civil war instead of a peaceful break-up. In Yugoslavia as in the Soviet Union, the Center refused to face new elections while the Republics held theirs, undermining the legitimacy of the Center. The hard nationalist policy of Serbia under Milosevic finished it off.

In Czechoslovakia, the Center submitted wisely to new democratic elections in good time. Still the Union broke up anyway! But it had the good fortune of a prospect, soon realized, of coming back together economically and militarily under the umbrellas of the EU and NATO.

Could such a prospect have helped with the Soviet case? It could have greatly helped it. But it was not available.

The Soviet space was far too big for the EU. The NATO space could have fit it, but Russians were not enabled to believe in such a prospect.

Why not? NATO did say at times that Russia was not excluded from joining, but in an unconvincing manner. NATO did not make the effort – it would have required a non-trivial effort, but not unreasonably difficult given the size of the stakes – to find a way to make Russian membership work without destroying NATO in the process; and Russians were not making the effort to figure it out for the West.

From 1991 to 2002 Russians at the highest level proposed joining NATO, as the solution to the problem of the break-up. For a time Yeltsin was able to establish this as the strategic goal of the democratic regime. Gorbachev himself had raised the idea with James Baker in 1990; Baker in 2001 published an article advocating it, and regretting that he had pooh-poohed it at the time. It was a rare admission of a mistake from a diplomat of his skill and vision. Far worse was the repeated Western failure during the Yeltsin years.

The failure to follow through on Russia's aspiration for joining NATO was arguably the one true betrayal of Russia by NATO. It contrasts with the allegation that NATO betrayed a promise to Gorbachev to not expand at all, an allegation for which evidence is lacking, even though it is frequently repeated, often with footnotes and citations that are said – mistakenly, but perhaps somehow sincerely believed – to show it as historical fact. Gorbachev himself clearly denied the allegation as a matter of historical

fact, even while vaguely affirming the spirit of it as a political complaint against NATO expansion. And in spirit, NATO's expansion elsewhere did indeed, in the absence of a serious path for Russian entry, have the consequence of re-alienating Russia. It was the inevitable result of the failure to think through and provide a path for Russian entry: NATO was bound to endure, survive, and expand; the only question was whether it would try to include Russia, or do it against Russia.

The failure meant that no umbrella was to be thrown over the dissolution of the inner Soviet empire, as had been done for the dissolving Czechoslovakia; and that the greater umbrella for the dissolution of the outer Warsaw Pact empire – Gorbachev's aspiration to a "Common European Home" as an umbrella to maintain a common security space – would also be lacking, despite the creation of pro forma institutions as the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE). Real security unions are not formed in a day, on paper. NATO was the real security union, formed cumulatively by the labors of many generations in two world wars and a cold war. CSCE was a thin supplement to such real union as existed through other means.

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The miracles he was unable to achieve; the mistakes he made
It would have been a true miracle if Gorbachev had succeeded not only in those spheres where he did succeed, near-miraculously, but in those geographical spheres where so many others had failed. He did not succeed in them. Is it his fault?

He made mistakes along the way; in that sense, yes, he has fault. But...

As one who spent years studying federalism,

the mistakes perhaps strike me harder than most people. They are worth reviewing.

There was his failure to accept new elections for the Soviet central government in good time. There was the problem that, in his promotion of reform from below, he did not at first let multiple parties form and run for office, but used a variant of the old Soviet method of encouraging Popular Fronts to be set up in each Republic, this time for reform not for repression. They evolved quickly into National Fronts, seeking independence. There was his inattention to federalism until late in the process.

There were serious reasons for these steps, but they proved serious mistakes.

It is far from clear that the Union could have been salvaged, even had these mistakes all been avoided. The mistakes were indeed avoided in Czechoslovakia; the union failed anyway. The underlying reality is that it is a near impossibility to turn an empire, with its ingrained structures of mutual distrust and resentment between center and periphery, into a federation. It seems so simple to use the instruments of central power to negotiate, noblesse oblige, a transfer of power downwards to a more equal federation; yet it so rarely proves feasible.

Perhaps if Gorbachev had been free of the other economic and political problems, if he had faced a blank slate, and been able to concentrate on the federal problem from the start, he could have done it? Perhaps. We can never know. There was never a blank slate before him. It was the other problems that stared at him as a crisis from the start, commandeering his attention until it was quite late to get to the Union problem. Ingrained Soviet mentalities persisted. The underlying reality of life is that we have to build our

future out of the ingrained structures and mentalities that exist, not the ones we would have needed to do best.

Marx had taught the Soviets as much: "Men make their own history," he wrote, "but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living." We cannot help but make mistakes in these conditions.

There is no life without mistakes.

Gorbachev chose the path of life for himself and his country. His mistakes were small compared to the scope of the problems he faced and steered his country through. He skillfully avoided the far greater mistakes that were placed temptingly in his path.

The market economy toward which he guided the country was established under his successors, albeit in ways that he criticized sharply. The criticism was not in all respects fair. The massive corruption of buying off the nomenklatura was begun under his rule; it was carried further under his successors. It badly tainted the outcome, but it kept the transformation peaceful, a not small accomplishment.

The democracy he built was incomplete as long as the Center was not freely elected. It was completed instead by the dissolution of the Center. This sudden "completion" was from the start a tainted democracy in most of the Republics. The cost was paid by Democracy itself.

The democracy grew more sound with time in many of successor states. It disappeared in others, whose provincial elites were far less democratic than those of the former Center.

The break-up took the greatest toll on democracy in Russia itself, the core Republic. The Russian public rejected the Democrats. It blamed them for the break-up of the country. The majority of seats in its legislative elections after 1991 went to extremist parties of Left and Right: Soviet nationalists and Russian nationalists. The regime was later consolidated under Putin, but as a "managed democracy", using "administrative means" to get electoral outcomes acceptable to the powers that be, and using nationalistic appeals to regain popularity.

"Managed democracy" became "sovereign democracy" as Putin himself became more nationalistic. He spoke of a "dictatorship of the law". For a brief time, this seemed to mean reconsolidation of central authority and the uniformity of federal law (too much authority had dissipated to the provinces in face of the ruble crisis of 1998, just as too much had in the "parade of sovereignties" of 1991; and while in both cases central authority quickly recovered in most respects, fears were raised – unfounded fears, it must be said – of a repetition of the Soviet break-up), but soon it came to mean something very different: a dictatorship, plain and simple, hiding behind the guise of the law to conduct its repressions. With time it grew cumulatively more authoritarian. The major free media were squeezed out of existence one after another over a period of many years, leaving only marginalized outlets free, and they were also mostly crushed in 2022.

The controlled elections were increasingly dishonest in their methods and even in the counting. The political repressions grew more severe. Political opponents were assassinated, with the regime forming a standard habit of passing the killings off as "provocations"

committed by its enemies to make the regime look bad. To be sure, this kind of projection of blame was not a new invention; it was an old KGB meme.

Regime doctrine moved from moderate consolidationism or conservative liberalism to counter-revolutionism, placing it only a step short of fascism on the political science spectrum. New laws, announced upon the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, moved the country close again to totalitarianism.

It is a sad time for Gorbachev to be passing.

His legacy is again in doubt. For some, his death is like a punctuation point for the collapse of his legacy. But they are mistaken. His achievements are far from all undone. And his promise remains, waiting for people to find their way back to its realization.

Gorbachev was the true Tsar-Liberator. His liberations paralleled but exceeded those of the one known to historians as the "Tsar-Liberator", Alexander II.

Alexander stepped down from only one of his master positions, not three as did Gorbachev. He successfully liberated the serfs, by the wave of his autocratic wand, not by persuasion and changing the political culture to a new consensus. The liberation ended up incomplete, rather like the liberation of the slaves in America

turned out to be after Reconstruction was ended. He held onto his power, while slowly making limited institutional reforms. In 1881 he was assassinated en route to announcing a reform of the judiciary. He was succeeded by a counter-revolutionary, Alexander III, who is admired today by Mr. Putin.

Gorbachev was the greater of the two. He ended a full-fledged totalitarian system of government and society, not just an authoritarian one, and not just one social part of it. He brought to a peaceful close not one but four systems of extraordinarily sharp master-slave relations.

Gorbachev cannot reasonably be blamed for his successors' failure – and the world's failure – to consolidate the achievement. He can instead be remembered for the great things he achieved, and for the still greater possibilities he opened up. Some of the achievements remain; the others can be renewed, even if it requires again great effort and wise leaders

The immediate situation of today is defined by Putin, but not the era. His ideas are too weak and unrealistic for that. They are ephemeral. It is Gorbachev whose ideas and legacies persist, with special longevity; for they meet the scope of our time.

Gorbachev has passed. The Gorbachev era remains.

An Absolute Leader for a New Era

Adriana Castagnoli

As long as Beijing's goal has been economic development, reformers' policies and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s goals coincided. But since President Xi Jinping decided to have an economy less susceptible to American pressure, party control has prevailed. In an economy where the chain of command matters, it falls to loyal and competent executives to implement the leader's vision.

Moreover, the omission of any mention in his report to the 20th CCP Congress of strategic opportunities for the country, as well as peace and development, has exposed his anxieties about an increasingly volatile world, in which Washington is contesting the rise of China as an authoritarian superpower.

Xi's grim warning of "dangerous storms" on the horizon indicates that he believes that international risks have worsened, especially since the start of the war in Ukraine in February. The party chief sees a world made more treacherous by the US support for the disputed island of Taiwan. China's vulnerability is made more acute by its own technological bottlenecks and the Western-led alliance plans to increase the US military presence throughout Asia.

Faced with this scenario of a likely escalation of conflict, Xi has created the premises to integrate the Politburo with officials he believes will support his call to "struggle" with their loyalty to him and the party, and their ability to expedite programs to upgrade high technology, military modernization and social controls.

In particular, young people, whose unemployment rate has never been higher, are a concern for both the commanders of the People's Liberation Army and senior officials of the Congress. Technological self-sufficiency and ideological indoctrination also serve to ward off subversive ideas among the youth.

The sancta sanctorum of Chinese politics, the Politburo Standing Committee, is co-opted from among the most talented senior party officials. The 20th Congress approved a new version of the party constitution at Article 2: "Xi Jinping's Thought on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era". While this revision does not add much to Xi's power in practice, nevertheless the exclusion of some prominent figures, such as Wang Yang, who began their careers in the Communist Youth League, is an indicator of the tight-control strategy pursued by Xi and, above all, the exclusion of the most prominent representatives among the reformers. The League was once a career avenue for many officials, including Xi's immediate predecessor Hu Jintao. But Xi called it arrogant and closed its school.

We are seeing a number of indicators suggesting a loss of momentum in economic growth. Incidentally, the service sector, the main driver of employment for the young and educated, continues to lag behind, with no clear objective or strategy in sight to remedy the situation.

According to a survey by the Global Times Research Center, young Chinese have a less favorable attitude towards the West in the last year, mainly due to the repression in some

Western countries, their double standards and the ideological confrontation with China, as well as their own failures. But there is also a considerable part of them who recognize that China still lags behind the West and call for strengthened trade with Western countries.

The growing focus on self-sufficiency and security, rather than on growth per se, is also at the heart of the recent crackdown on some of China's fast-growing sectors – Internet technology and education –, which until recently were key sources of the growth of well-paying jobs.

But China's economic miracle was also built on integration with the outside world. Self-sufficiency is a seductive concept, particularly in an age of heightened geopolitical tensions. But for China it may be a blind alley.

WFM and UEF Celebrate the Montreux Declaration of 1947

The World Federalist Movement and the Union of European Federalists celebrated on December 8, 2022, the 75th anniversary of the Montreux Declaration, a call for a world federation drafted at the occasion of the first international congress of the "World Movement for World Federal Government" in 1947.

In light of the worldwide challenges we are faced with, among them the climate crisis, the war in Ukraine, migration, the fragile post-COVID recovery and the food and energy crisis, this event was of the utmost importance.

Gathered in the European Parliament – the House of European democracy and the only transnational permanent Parliament in the world –, the delegates of a dozen countries discussed the future of European and worldwide federalism.

Sandro Gozi, President of the UEF and Member of the European Parliament, said: *"Federalism unites people and preserves freedom. To avoid the world being governed by the G2 between Washington and Beijing, Europe must first go through a serious political reform of its own."*

Fernando Iglesias, Co-President of the WFM, said: *"75 years after the Montreux Declaration, the cooperation between European and world federalists is more necessary than ever. The success of the European model shows that transnational democracy and federalism are possible. The world needs Europe. All the European crises are not European, but global. Europe needs a more peaceful and integrated world."*

The two organisations reiterated the need for international collaboration and unity. The statement that concludes the celebration quotes the original Montreux Declaration: *"The world federalists are convinced that the establishment of a world federal government is the crucial problem of our time."*

The federalist community called in its statement *"Great power to strive to develop a federal system."* They remark that the 75th-anniversary celebration of the Montreux Declaration marks an additional step towards the global recognition of commonly-agreed rules for relations between states.

Brussels, 08/12/2022

A Perspective from Northeast Asia on Total Elimination of Nuclear Weapons

Tadashi Inuzuka

Steps to create a nuclear weapon free zone (NWFZ) should start through voluntary efforts of states within that zone. In Northeast Asia (NEA), given the current political environment and existential nuclear threat, those states are the Republic of Korea and Japan.

A great challenge the Republic of Korea (RoK) and Japan face is confidently pivoting from the nuclear umbrella provided by the US and the security it provides, also known as Positive Security Assurance (PSA), to a Negative Security Assurance (NSA). An NSA is a guarantee from surrounding nuclear weapon states – the US, China, and Russia – not to attack or threaten the area with nuclear weapons. This shift from a PSA to NSA is key to nuclear disarmament in the zone and ultimately the creation of a nuclear weapons free zone.

The NEA-NWFZ 3+3 approach we propose and its comprehensive set of confidence building measures not only facilitates the transition to an NSA, but ultimately helps realize the full potential that an NWFZ can achieve: both non-proliferation and disarmament.

NEA-NWFZ context

In 1945, Korea was divided along the 38th parallel; the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Russia, and China are tacitly grouped in the North, and the RoK, Japan and the US support the South. The 38th parallel that still separates the Koreans is a symbol of a new cold war, and the DPRK nuclear arsenals are a very real security threat in the zone. It is urgent to put an end to this constant nuclear threat by creating a NEA-NWFZ.

The DPRK left the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and is not a member of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. We believe that getting this state, as well as other countries in the zone and surrounding nuclear powers, back to the diplomatic table requires a different approach which encompasses a comprehensive and broad set of measures.

The 3+3 comprehensive approach we propose includes a variety of initiatives, including ending the Korean War, stabilizing the economy and energy supplies for the region, and creating a permanent regional security council. We believe this broad set of elements are integral to successfully forming a NEA-NWFZ.

RoK and Japan: Initiatives from within the Zone Parliamentarians

On August 9th, 2022, RoK and Japanese parliamentarians launched "Parliamentarians for 3+3" (P3+3) when attending the 77th Nagasaki peace memorial ceremony for the victims of the atomic bomb together. P3+3 is an international group of parliamentarians coming together to promote a NEA-NWFZ. These representatives are working to assist the government(s) of RoK and/or Japan to formalize their intention to take steps towards a NEA-NWFZ within the framework outlined in the 3+3 comprehensive approach.

In May 2021, former President Moon Jae-in

and President Joe Biden jointly declared: "We reaffirm that diplomacy and dialogue based on commitments between DPRK, RoK, and the US, such as the Panmunjom Declaration of April 27, 2018, and the Singapore Joint Statement of June 12, 2018, are essential to achieve the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and a lasting peace".

And a year later, on May 21, 2022, President Yoon Suk-yeol and President Joe Biden announced in the Seoul Joint Declaration: "President Yoon and President Biden have repeatedly stated their common goal of complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, and agreed to further strengthen close coordination toward this end".

At summit level, leaders have stated that denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula is a priority through diplomatic means. We should build on these statements and take concrete steps to get there through the 3+3 comprehensive approach.

Conclusion

The NPT has been somehow effective for non-proliferation, but has largely depended on the willingness of the nuclear-weapon-states for disarmament. Northeast Asia faces an existential nuclear threat and we should urgently find a comprehensive diplomatic solution to a nuclear weapon free zone that achieves *both* non-proliferation and disarmament. We believe that the 3+3 comprehensive approach with its wide-ranging set of measures, from economic to energy to security, gets us there.

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[1] A recent example of 3+3 was published as a Policy Proposal by the Sejong Institute and the Research Center for Nuclear Weapons Abolition, Nagasaki University (RECNA).

Low Intensity Conflicts in South Asia

James A. Williams Arputharaj

Major conflicts have erupted in South Asia basically over language and ethnicity issues. When Pakistani rulers imposed Urdu language over the Bengali population in East Bengal, the people revolted and Bangladesh was born. Similarly, in Sri Lanka, when President Bandaranaike declared "Sinhala-only policy", the Tamils revolted. Many at that time commented that one nation with two languages had been changed to one language-two nations. The Tamil Tigers were defeated in a war in May 2009 and the discrimination of Tamils still continues.. There are Hindus, Muslims and Christians among the Tamils, while Sinhalese, the majority community, follow Buddhism and Christianity.The religious extremism in both Sri Lanka and India has contributed to low intensity conflicts. There is violence against minority Hindu community in both Bangladesh and Pakistan.

In recent months, Sri Lanka saw massive unrest due to the economic challenges facing the people. The crowds who stayed on the streets for weeks together declared that "for decades, you divided us on the basis of our language and religion to win elections, now we are united as one to fight against you". The protests led to the resignation of both the President and Prime Minister.

In India, there are marginalisation and deprivations of the poor communities across India. In connivance with the local Governments, multinational mining companies displace the tribals from their traditional lands. The human rights activists who fight on behalf of the tribals are silenced and arrested. Across India, there are many such incidents where Government plans super-highway roads by taking away agricultural lands, and people protest against this.

However not all of them take the route of armed conflicts, as political parties diffuse the situation by convincing them that when they get elected, they would restore the status quo, which hardly happens.

Another continuing disturbing situation is that of Kashmir. "Kashmir is not for sale"-someone commented observing the Indo-Pakistani conflict which is mainly over Kashmir. Kashmiris have their unique culture, language and heritage. At the time of partition of India in August 1947, Kashmir was still an independent kingdom. In October 1947, when the Pattan tribes bordering Pakistan attempted invasion of Kashmir, the then Hindu King Hari Singh signed the instrument of accession to the Indian Union on 26th October 1947, in lieu of coming under the domination of Pakistan. The Indian Government assured autonomy and self-rule in Kashmir by inserting an Article 370 in its constitution. Only Defence and Foreign policy was relegated to the Central Government in the true sense of federalism. However, Kashmir had its own constitution and flag.

In 2018, the Indian President abrogated Article 370 on the night of 4th August, terming the move as "one country, one constitution", used as a political slogan. For over one month, 7 million people of Kashmir were locked down with no access to internet and mobile phones to prevent any protest. Still, election to the state Government is not held and it is still under the

rule of the Central Government.

In 1948, UN Resolution 39 directed peaceful resolution of the conflict by forming a commission and marking a Line of Control (LoC). However, the 1965 war changed everything, as Kashmir was divided among India, Pakistan and China. Much water has flown since then. Pakistan also abolished state rule in Gilgit Balistan (part of Pakistan occupied Kashmir, PoK) in 1984. For the people split among three countries to come together to have a referendum is near to impossible.

Federalism therefore is the only solution to the problems faced by the people of South Asia. Governments should practice federalism, by providing autonomy to regions, respecting the local language, religion and enable them to govern themselves.

We live in an era where national boundaries do not matter when it comes to market, communication and environment. Climate change does not respect LoC's. No longer there are homogenous communities or countries. Many countries are becoming more and more multiethnic and multilingual. The Governments need to respect regional autonomy and the wishes of the people even if they belong to a minority religion or region.

Federalism is based on the principle of subsidiarity, where decisions are taken at the level where it is required to address governance issues. Local aspirations of the people should be respected and democratic voices need to be heard.

Religious Support for Democratic World Federation. Part II

David C. Oughton

The Inadequacies of the Current United Nations System

Many Baha'i and Catholic leaders, as well as many other leaders of other religions[1] have been teaching that the current anarchy between national governments and the lack of a global system of world law are preventing humanity from adequately solving the major problems concerning war, weapons of war, genocide, economic insecurity, climate change, protection of our oceans, air, atmosphere, outer space, and other "common areas" of our planet.

Previous and current forms of international order have been important steps in the evolution of global governance, but they are now inadequate in our interdependent global society. The League of Nations, created after the First World War, was based on unanimous voting in both its Assembly and Council. That meant that just one member could veto any resolution. The League was unable to prevent the aggression of the Axis Powers that led to the Second World War. The United Nations Organization was formally created on October 24, 1945, in order to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war."[2] The UN has accomplished many improvements in the world[3]. It has overseen the decolonization of many parts the of world. It has provided many countries with developmental aid. It has improved the health and infrastructure of the world through its Specialized Agencies. It has provided many examples of peace-keeping and peace-building operations.

The Bahá'i International Community has been recognized since 1948 as an international non-governmental organization at the United Nations. Baha'is from around the world have promoted many UN programs and have been instrumental in discussions about UN reform.

The Holy See has official observer status in the United Nations. When Pope Paul VI addressed the UN General Assembly in 1965, he said that "people turn to the United Nations as if it were their last hope for peace and harmony" because it is based on the principle that relations between nations must be "regulated by reason, justice, law and negotiation, and not by force, violence, war, nor indeed by fear and deceit." He told the leaders of the world that "the edifice which you have constructed must never fail; it must be perfected and made equal to the needs which world history will present. You mark a stage in the development of humanity for which retreat must never be admitted, but from which it is necessary that advance be made."[4]

Even though the United Nations has been successful in preventing a third world war, the UN system has often been weak and ineffective in preventing many wars or solving many global problems. This is because the United Nations Organization, like the League of Nations, is a confederation of national governments. It is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all national governments. The UN is unable to outlaw war. In fact, the UN is based on the principle of collective

security (for example, the Korean War and the First Persian Gulf War).

The UN General Assembly is not democratic. Each of the current 193 member-nations have the same one vote, regardless of the size of its population. China with a population of 1.4 billion people, Nauru with a population of 9,300 people, and all of the other 191 member nations in the UN have the same one vote. It is thus possible for a resolution in the UNGA to pass by a two-thirds majority that represents only 8% of the world's population. The sixty-five least populous countries with a combined population below one percent of the world's population can block the passage of a substantive resolution in the UNGA[5]. The UNGA can only pass non-binding resolutions which state how nations should behave. Even if a member-nation votes for a UNGA resolution, it is not required to follow it.

The UN Security Council has often been impotent in preventing or ending wars because of the veto power of any one of the five permanent members (U.S.A., U.K., France, Russia, and China), even if all of the other fourteen members of the UNSC vote for a resolution. Whenever any one of the five permanent members or their allies are involved in a conflict, a veto or the threat of a veto has been used[6].

The UN system must rely on dues from national governments, which are not always paid[7]. The UN is based on international law, which is a system of customs (traditions about how nations should treat each other, such as granting diplomatic immunity) and treaties. But nations are not required to enter into treaties. The United States and some other countries have refused to become parties to the Law of the Sea Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, concerning the International Criminal Court[8]. The United Nations International Court of Justice will only accept cases about treaty violations if all national governments involved in the case agree to have it heard and abide by its decision. National leaders suffer no consequences for violating or for withdrawing from international treaties. Even though most nations keep most of their treaties most of the time, national governments violate or withdraw from treaties when they feel it is in their national interests, without any concern for the common good[9].

From World Anarchy to World Law

Instead of basing international relations on treaties, I argue that the global community needs to develop a system of world laws that would be created by a democratic world parliament. Instead of each country having the same one vote as in the United Nations General Assembly, the number of representatives from each nation voting in a democratic world parliament should be determined by its population and other factors. A resolution would become binding world law when it is approved by a super majority of representatives, and reflects a super majority of the world's population. World laws would concern global problems and the relations between nations.

In order to transform the current UN confederacy into a democratic world federation of national governments[10], a World Executive Committee would be needed to enforce world laws against individuals who violate them. Economic sanctions against an entire nation would not be done as in the present international system. Such an executive committee would not have veto power over enforcing world laws or prosecuting individuals.

Individuals (including national leaders) involved in genocide, crimes against humanity, and international terrorism would be prosecuted by world courts if national courts

are unable or unwilling to prosecute. Border and land disputes between countries would be settled non-violently by binding arbitration in world courts.

Just as local, state, and national police arrest those who violate local, state, and national laws, a world police force would be needed to arrest those who violate world laws. Those who are convicted of violating world laws would be incarcerated in world prisons.

In order to create this system of world laws, the peoples of the world need to engage in a debate about the provisions in a world constitution. The powers and limitations of the organs of the world federation; the checks and balances between them; the rights, powers, and limitations of national governments; and the rights and responsibilities of all world citizens would need to be explicit in a world constitution.

Under a democratic world federation, the war system (which currently costs over 1.5 trillion U.S. dollars each year) could be eliminated. A common misconception is that wars can never be eliminated because there is always conflict between people. There will always be conflicts of interest between individuals (even between spouses who love each other) and between many different groups of people, but conflicts do not have to become violent and can be resolved nonviolently. The problem is whether political power is determined by conflicting groups in a nonviolent democratic process, or whether it is determined by violent conflict between opposing groups through violent revolutions and wars.

Besides outlawing war and enforcing world laws against individuals, a world federal government would be better able to solve global problems than individual national governments or the United Nations Organization are now able. For example, there is a need to manage the global economy. Transnational corporations need to be regulated. Companies and individuals who contribute to global warming could be prosecuted. Rain forests could be bought and managed as world parks.

The present international system obviously promotes national citizenship and patriotism (loyalty to "the fatherland") in order to be able to fight wars against humans in other countries. A democratic world federation could promote world citizenship and *humatriotism* (loyalty to the human family)[11]. World citizenship and world democracy can be promoted by a pledge of allegiance to the world, a world flag and global symbols, a world anthem, and the celebration of some world holidays.

One way in which a democratic world federation could be formed is to first create regional federations of nations, that would solve problems for different parts of the world. If these regional federations are effective, then they could eventually join together in order to form a world federation. Another incremental way that a world federation could be created is to first focus on a particular world problem, such as climate change or nuclear weapons, and form a global agency that would be able to create an enforceable legal system that would eliminate nuclear weapons and regulate nuclear energy.

Various proposals have been made about how to fund a world federation. One way would be to require each nation to pay 0.1% of its gross national income[12]. Another way would be to charge a user tax on nations, corporations, and individuals for international travel and for exploring and using the resources of the common areas of the planet.

The Role of Religions in Building a Firm Foundation
As long as many people hold on to their deep-

Comments

seated nationalistic feelings and obsession with national sovereignty and national interests, it is unlikely that a democratic world federation could be created in the near future. But the role of the world's major religions is to build a firm foundation so that a future democratic world federation can be just, effective, and responsible for promoting the common good. The world's religions should fulfill this role by emphasizing the reality of a world community, world citizenship, and the human family as stewards of our common planet. The world's religions need to emphasize what has been realized because of many years of inter-religious dialogue: that they share different versions of the Golden Rule[13]and many common commandments such as "do not murder, steal, lie, or be unchaste" or "respect life, rights, truth, and sexuality." All of the major religions teach about love and compassion in order to help those who are suffering. These ethical teachings are the basis for the *Declaration toward a Global Ethic* and the *Charter for Compassion*[14] that have been highlighted at the Parliaments of the World's Religions.

The world's religions should teach that world peace for a world community requires a democratic system of world law and order[15] The Baha'i Faith and modern Catholic social theology have been teaching this for many years. Many individuals in other religions agree that there is a need for world law and order. When a critical mass of religious people around the world agree on this need, then the dream of the ancient Jewish prophets can finally be realized: "They shall beat their swords into plowshares and their spears into pruning hooks. One nation shall not raise the sword against another, nor shall they train for war again."[16]

[1] For example, see Swami Satprakashananda's *"World Peace–How?"* (Vedanta Society of St. Louis, 1973) and Nikkyo Niwano, *A Buddhist Approach to Peace* (Tokyo: Kosei, 1977). Niwano says that if people follow Buddha's teaching about relieving suffering through love, compassion, and nonviolence, then the whole world will become one "Buddha-land." In order to work for this goal, Niwano says that a world federation should be our blueprint

[2] Preamble to the United Nations Charter.

[3] For a description of the many accomplishments of the United Nations Organization, see Chapter 11 of Ronald Glossop's *Confronting War* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2001, 4th edition).

[4] Pope Paul VI addressed the United Nations General Assembly on October 4, 1965. Pope John Paul II spoke at the UNGA on October 2, 1979 and on October 5, 1995. Pope Benedict XVI spoke about human rights at the United Nations on April 18, 2008. Pope Francis spoke at the United Nations on September 25, 2015.

[5] These statistics are from Joseph E. Schwartzberg, *Transforming the United Nations System* (United Nations University Press, 2013), p. 6. In order to solve this problem of "one nation, one vote" in the UNGA, Schwartzberg proposes a system of weighted voting where a nation-member's weighted vote would be determined by this formula: dividing by three the total of its percentage of the total population of all U.N. members, its financial contribution as a percentage of the UN budget, and the percentage of the total number of UN members (0.518). For example, the weighted vote for China would be 10.587; the weighted vote for the United States would be 9.237; India's weighted vote would be 7.051; 178 countries would each have a weighted vote under 1.000; the least populous countries such as Tuvalu and Nauru would have a weighted vote of 0.173. According to Schwartzberg's proposal, decisions of the UNGA about global and general questions would become binding law if made by a two-thirds majority of the weighted votes, provided that the total population of the concurring members represents a majority. Some other questions would require a three-fourths majority. See Chapter 2 of this book for further details.

[6] This has been the case with the Vietnam War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflicts, the British-Argentina conflict over the Falkland Islands, China's involvement in Tibet and in Darfur, the war in Iraq, Russia's involvement in Ukraine, the civil war in Syria, and many other violent conflicts. In order to eliminate the veto of the permanent members in the United Nations Security Council, Joseph Schwartzberg has proposed a system of weighted voting for twelve seats, each representing a major region of the world. Because the United States, China, and India have a large enough weighted vote in the UNGA, they would each have their own seat in the UNSC. The other nations of the world would be grouped together according to geographic regions. Each of these regions would have a weighted vote based on their collective population and contribution to the UN. According to Schwartzberg's proposal, a resolution would be binding if passed by a two-thirds majority that reflected at least 50% of the world's population. See Chapter 4 of his *Transforming the United Nations System* (ibid.) for further details.

[7] The United States government withheld some of its UN dues during the 1990s in order to pay a smaller percentage to the UN annual regular budget (from 25% to 22%). Eventually the U.S. government paid its UN dues. The annual regular budget of the United Nations system is now about 5.6 billion dollars. (Compare this with recent annual U.S. military budgets which are around 700 billion dollars; the rest of the countries of the world together spend approximately that same amount each year.) Almost every state in the United States has a larger annual budget than the UN system.

[8] The permanent International Criminal Court is different from the ad hoc tribunals that have been created by the UN Security Council. The ICC can investigate and prosecute individuals for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide only if national courts are unable or unwilling to prosecute them. About two-thirds of the national governments of the world (but not the United States, China, or Russia) are now parties to the workings of the ICC.

[9] The Trump Administration's decision to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty with Russia, President Trump's decision to withdraw the United States from the Iran Nuclear Treaty and the Paris Climate Treaty, plus the violations of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty by North Korea and some other countries demonstrate the problem of dealing with global order through a system of treaties.

[10] The history of the United States could be a model for this transformation from a United Nations confederation to a democratic world federation. During the 1780s after the American Revolutionary War had been won, the newly independent Americans debated whether to transform the Articles of Confederation into a different system that would unite the thirteen sovereign states into a single country under a federal constitution. See Carl Van Doren, *The Great Rehearsal: The Story of the Making and Ratifying of the Constitution of the United States* (New York: Viking Press, 1948). For the differences between a confederation and a federation, see Ronald Glossop's *World Federation?: A Critical Analysis of Federal World Government* (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1993), pp. 26-30.

[11] Theodore Lentz, founder of the Peace Research Laboratory of St. Louis, coined the term "humatriotism." He maintained that through education, "we must find a way to lift our consciousness from the narrow or local level to the global." *Humatriotism*. (St. Louis: The Futures Press, 1976), p. 20.

[12] This is Joseph Schwartzberg's proposal in his *Transforming the United Nations System*, op. cit., pp. 216-221.

[13] For example, Confucius said, "Do not do to others what you would not have them do to you." (Analects 15: 23) Jesus said, "Treat others the way you want them to treat you." (Matthew 7: 12)

[14] The Charter for Compassion was created by Karen Armstrong and was first promoted by the Parliament of the World's Religions in 2009. Since then, several hundred cities around the world have declared themselves to be "compassionate cities." See https://charterforcompassion.org

[15] However, some religious groups and their leaders oppose democratic world federation. Some conservative Christians such as Pat Robertson have argued against any type of world government as an evil secret conspiracy that is actively opposing God and religion. In his book *The New World Order* (Dallas: Word Publishing, 1991), Robertson claims that a "man-made new world order" is not Christ's will for humanity. He sees any type of world government as the Kingdom of the Anti-Christ. (Baha'is, Catholics, and others who argue for the need to create a world public authority/democratic world federation do not favor a nondemocratic "one-world government" that would be the only government in the world that would eliminate national governments and impose uniformity on everyone in the world.) For other objections to world federation, see Ronald Glossop, *World Federation?: A Critical Analysis of Federal World Government*, op. cit., Chapter 5. He responds to each of these objections in Chapter 6.

[16] Isaiah 2: 4 and Micah 4: 3.

COP27: from Bad to Worse; the Strength to Deal with the Threats

Roberto Palea

Judging from the facts, the COP 27 in Sharm el- Sheikh ended in abject failure as regards the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and dependence on fossil fuels.

In the peak years of the Sars-Covid virus pandemic (2019-2021), CO_2 emissions stabilised following the slowdown in production and the reduction in transport and urban mobility.

As soon as the effects of the pandemic subsided and the economy slowly began to recover, CO_2 emissions also picked up pace again; this situation has worsened considerably due to the energy crisis, following Russia's invasion of Ukraine and the geopolitical tensions between Russia and the NATO countries.

In the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015, in line with the proposal from the authoritative IPCC, the set objective was to keep the climate temperature increase well below 2.0°C compared to the pre-industrial era; at the subsequent COP 26 in Glasgow, this limit was specified at 1.5°C, which corresponds to CO_2 emissions into the atmosphere of 450 ppm (parts per million).

At that time (2015), the increase in the temperature of the planet compared to pre-industrial times was estimated at 0.9°C, which corresponds to CO_2 emissions of 400 ppm.

Currently the WMO (World Meteorological Organisation) has estimated that the planet's average temperature has grown by 1.15°C and in July 2022, the Air Force estimated that CO_2 emissions stood at 417 ppm, according to the survey of the European satellite Copernicus.

We run the risk, in just a few years' time, of reaching those thresholds for temperatures (1.5°C) and emissions considered by the IPCC as representing a *serious risk* for the very survival of human life on Earth.

Moreover, environmental disasters, such as land desertification, and extreme events across the globe, such as fires, floods, long periods of drought followed by sudden devastating rainfall, are becoming increasingly frequent.

The recent blizzards and winds in the United States and along its east coast not only affected New York, with peak temperatures of -57 degrees Celsius in various mountainous areas, but also paralysed the entire country.

These occurrences made us think not only of serious, extraordinary events, but of events due to structural changes in the climate (scientists spoke of a Polar Vortex originating from the warming of the Arctic, with the polar ice melting at a rate four times faster than known beforehand).

These facts would amply justify our fears that we are already experiencing an environmental disaster, having already passed the"point of no return".

It was then argued by some commentators that the total failure of COP 27 could be avoided

with the legitimately desired launch of a "Loss and Damage Fund", financed by rich countries in favour of those under-developed countries that have suffered the consequences of pollution (including China).

In reality, however, there is no current agreement for this Fund, that has been on the agenda since 2009 (agreements are always deferred from one COP to the next), since no definitive decision was reached in Sharm el-Sheikh either and, according to tradition, all discussions were once again deferred to the scheduled COP in Dubai in 2023!
Given this gloomy backdrop, we must strive not to yield to any temptation of inertia and indifference, and face the future, whether easy or difficult, with realism and confidence.

Meanwhile, federalists must not give up, but, if anything, merely defer their proposal for a global agreement – in the hope of a more favourable geopolitical situation – which would include:
- The promotion of a global institution, the World Environment Organization (WEO), managed by a high-level independent Authority (following the example of the ECSC in the process of European unification) which operates under the control of the UN with the aim of countering global warming (and managing the funds pledged by the G20)
- Revaluation of the W.T.O. (World Trade Organization) to negotiate an adequate carbon price for each country and support the proposal made by the OECD for a global tax on the activity of multinational companies
- Encourage the World Bank to issue Green Bonds in the form of SDRs (Special Drawing Rights) in cooperation with the International Monetary Fund.

In response to the onset of the new international geopolitical situation, we need to support appropriate and adequate measures for 2023 to achieve the following aims: a) restoration of peace between Russia and Ukraine and their respective allies; b) dealing with the climate, energy and food crisis.

In order to re-establish peace between Russia and Ukraine, a rapid "ceasefire" is required and, then, an authoritative external mediator needs to be chosen. The latter will need to exploit the current situation caused by stalemate on the field of battle and by the endless drain on the two Parties' financial and economic resources, in order to get the contenders to accept reciprocal concessions, including territorial ones. He or she will also need explicit support from China and guarantees from the EU, the United States, NATO and the UN, to the proposal that all ideas of deploying missiles in East European countries aimed at Russia will be abandoned. Furthermore, the contested territories will need to become a demilitarised zone under the control of the UN.

It is clear that the current war effort and the prospect of rebuilding a war-damaged Ukraine involves and will involve an enormous financial commitment by the West, which will penalise its ability to deal with the global climate and energy crisis, as well as the global food crisis.

The African Union and Egypt will also need to be engaged for the production of electricity in the sub-Saharan area, which includes the Sahara Desert ($9,200,000$ km^2), using photovoltaic and wind energy sources. Clean, low-cost electricity will need to be produced on a large scale and without interruption, with any surplus over local requirements being transported to Europe through existing power lines.

In addition, solar and wind sourced electricity can be converted into hydrogen using fuel-cell technology, and transported to Europe, via Morocco, through existing pipelines that connect Spain with the rest of Europe.

Using electricity produced through alternative sources, the abundant water resources existing in the subsoil can be brought to the surface, or power plants can be run for the desalination of sea water.

Large tracts of land could be irrigated and used for agricultural purposes to feed African populations.

New technologies in modern agriculture, assisted by modern cultivation and transport machinery, would increase the land's capacity for production many times over, to the benefit of the community.

In general, the energy crisis could lead to an alternative to natural gas, through greater energy efficiency and the transition to clean energy sources, especially in the energy-intensive sector (such as steel production and the iron and steel industries).

The United States has just passed the Inflation Reduction Act, and is developing its energy resources to bolster its position against gas price volatility and global energy tensions.

Technological development will provide the world with many solutions to improve energy saving and efficiency. Many industries are turning to next generation technology, including sodium batteries or thin-film solar panels instead of the silicon type.

And steel producers are investing to use green hydrogen in the iron and steel industry.

Urban and extra-urban mobility will be based on electric or hydrogen vehicles, redesigning cities "on a human scale".

Finally, technological developments have again raised the question about possible energy production through nuclear fusion plants, which seems to have proved successful in experimental work.

Moreover, many Latin American states, including Brazil, are implementing ambitious plans to save the rainforests and improve performance of the Amazon's "green lung".

Technological research and the transfer of the latest technologies to countries with poorer facilities may turn out to be a successful weapon in improving the prospects of the entire planet in terms of climate and pollution.

It is an extremely broad topic: in *Nature* (vol. 612 of 22/29 December 2022), Andreas Goldthau and Simone Tagliapietra have published a Summary of their latest, highly recommended works on Energy Crisis issues and solutions for adoption in 2023 to try to save the Planet.

These works, which are too extensive, specialised and in-depth to be summarised here, clarify the enormous potential of the latest technologies that could be adopted to help with humanity's survival, thus boosting the hopes of all of us.

Escaping Consensus: COP27 and the Role of Majority Voting to Accelerate the Transition to Net Zero

Lorenzo Pietro Spiller

Occurring in the context of the most unstable and non-resilient energy market in recent years, the 27th session of the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (or UNFCCC) took place in Sharm-El-Sheik last November. Notwithstanding the tumultuous geopolitical situation, the outcome of this year's negotiation should not have been drastically affected by the current crisis, since COP aims to ensure the smooth implementation of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol, and the Paris Accord, all having a medium to long term perspective on decarbonization and energy transition, whereas the current situation is expected to have a considerably shorter timeframe.

In fact, representatives of fossil fuel exporter countries were able to bring the current crisis into play during the conference, underlining the need for fossil fuels to ensure the stability and reliability of the energy market and to deliver affordable energy for many years to come.

And no wonder, since this year's COP was characterized by a high number of representatives from oil and gas businesses, 25% more than last year in Glasgow, and by an immense "Green Zone" where thousands of businesses (including oil and gas) were able to present their products and services, organize side events and engage with global press and analysts. Although polluting businesses are crucial stakeholders in the path to decarbonization, and they should be involved in climate talks such as the COP to ensure their commitment to innovation, green investments

and financing of climate tech ventures, enabling them to showcase their activities in a "trade fair" style clashes with the spirit of the event, which should be considered the forefront of the transition to a net zero economy, and jeopardizes its effectiveness in setting forth the guidelines for such transition.

After two weeks of prolonged and intense negotiation, the most important decision taken by the conference, encapsulated in the final text approved by consensus on Sunday 20 November, is the commitment to set up a "loss and damage" fund. This resolution commits developed countries to fund and manage a financial instrument aimed at compensating the damages suffered by developing countries because of serious climatic events like droughts, floods, and fires. It is a considerable step towards climate justice and the acknowledgment that developed countries have an "obligation to refund" for the greenhouse gasses they emitted during the last century. From another viewpoint, this measure should partially deflate developing countries' argument that they are not responsible for climate change, and hence they should be able to grow economically without climate boundaries and restrictive regulation. In this respect, it would be ideal to impose that developing countries should spend the compensation amounts to finance green infrastructures only. All in all, although this loss and damage fund is hugely positive news, it is to be noted that the functioning and implementation of the fund are yet to be

defined, and the following years will be crucial to ensure that it is established and managed in an effective, just and virtuous way.

Apart from this brilliant political result, the Parties agreed on a timid final resolution, less courageous than last year's one and watered down in the last weekend of negotiations by the opposition of several countries whose economies rely heavily on fossil fuels. More specifically, the resolution continues to consider both "low-emission" energy sources and renewables, as they would be on an equal footing within the energy transition. At the same time, it still consents "abated coal" to be part of the energy mix. In line with the many critics that came from climate activists, the writer believes that countries should identify a clear path to decarbonize the economy and net zero, and such a result cannot be achieved without a massive push in the deployment of renewable energy sources and the phasing-out from every fossil fuel source, at least when it comes to industrial use and electricity and heat production, by 2050. Moreover, the concept of abated coal (i.e., the production of energy from oil involving technology that captures and stores the CO_2 produced in the process) is utopic since, at the current stage, carbon storage is not economically viable at a large scale and the aggregate CO_2 captured so far is less than 0.1% of the present yearly pollution of 38 gigatons of CO_2.

One may wonder why, despite all the scientific evidence that climate change is happening fast, the last being the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published in 2021, and even if climate policies of significant polluters such as the US and Brazil became consistently greener after Biden and Lula got elected, the final COP27 resolution was so timid and disappointed many. The most logical reason is that the COP is an intergovernmental body, abiding by the logic of consensus as the standard voting mechanism, where a small minority in terms of number of delegates can lock the negotiations and limit the

more ambitious climate targets of the majority. This requires a brief excursus on the history of the voting procedure within the Conference of the Parties. As cumbersome as it may sound, sessions of the COP are often governed by a draft rule of procedures that was prepared in Geneva in 1996, slightly amended thereafter but never formally approved by the parties. Therefore, at each yearly session, the COP can decide whether to abide by such rules (or a portion of them), but it is not legally required to do so. Within those rules, rule 42 would discipline the voting system to reach an agreement on the matter of substance, and the 1996 draft offers two alternatives: one is consensus, the other a majority of two-thirds of representatives, provided that the parties "exhausted all efforts to reach a consensus" beforehand.

This year, the COP adopted the draft rules with the exclusion of rule 42, adopting consensus as the official voting rule. No wonder why, then, the negotiations were so prolonged and a loud minority, composed predominantly of representatives of middle eastern countries, were able to keep fossil fuels in the ideal energy mix coming out from the final resolution,

To achieve more tangible results and reposition the COP at the forefront of the transition to net zero, it is logical to argue that, starting from COP 28 in Dubai next year, the voting system should be amended to introduce majority voting of two-thirds of representatives on every decision referring to decarbonization objectives, energy transition, and innovation. Stakeholders, and especially governments, should acknowledge that we are not navigating safe water, we are running out of time, and the principle of sovereignty, requiring unanimity voting, should give way to majority voting to ensure that the guidelines, measures, and resolution adopted by the COP can keep the temperature increase by 2050 below 1.5°, as foreseen under the Paris Accord, grant the survival of humanity on this Earth as we know it.

Cryptocurrencies Without Rules

Mario Platero

At the root of the Ftx contagion there is something much deeper and more momentous than the financial catastrophe that has knocked out cryptocurrencies last November. The accounting, administrative and management chasms – and the colossal losses – that emerged after the bankruptcy of Ftx, one of the most important groups for the trading in virtual currencies – and the expected indictment of its legendary founder, Sam Bankman-Fried, 30, become the symbol of a frontal conflict between an increasingly disruptive digital economy, which does not want rules, and a traditional economy which is based on codified methods of behavior to protect the market, the shareholders and the consumer himself. In essence, a strict legislation in finance has the ultimate goal of protecting us from the risk of systemic crises similar to the one that hit the cryptocurrency sector with the speed of a hurricane.

We learn a detail every day, but John Ray III, the liquidator in the Enron scandal, in charge of the Ftx case in the Delaware court, said he had never seen in 40 years of the profession "such a complete failure of corporate controls or such total absence of credible financial information as in this case". Ftx is worth zero today. It pulverized $ 30 billion of capitalization just a few months ago. It has dragged pension funds like Canada's OTPP for Ontario teachers, or solid investment companies like Sequoia into chaos. More generally, the cryptocurrency sector has lost more than 70%. Janet Yellen, Treasury Secretary and former central banker, says rules and controls are needed at this point. But imposing rules on cryptocurrency means stripping it of its original meaning, to the point

that the Nobel laureate Paul Krugman, always a critic, wrote that the entire market may have come to an end. Possible, also because central banks will soon offer digital currencies to in turn disintermediate the banking sector. After all, why was absolute secrecy needed only and always in the simplification of transactions offered by cryptocurrencies? Just to release creative energies? Or to encourage the illicit trafficking of criminals, tax evaders, drug traffickers who now only use cryptocurrencies for their trafficking?

Thus we return to the ongoing conflict between those in the digital economy who claim they can best express their creative innovation in an undefined bubble without borders – except those of computer codes – and those who, like Yellen, invoke the introduction of strict rules . Bankman-Fried (prophetic surname!) belongs to the new fantasyland where anything goes. Starting at the age of 24 from an arbitrage operation on cryptocurrencies, he has become a billionaire and legendary in just a few years. Also for his philosophy of alleged altruism: in recent months he had bought other groups that operate in cryptocurrencies to "rescue" them. Then it was discovered that he used investors' funds to personally speculate on the market through his other company, in violation of the law. He was able to do so because he wasn't subject to the rules and controls as happens to every financial institution. His world, like that of Elon Musk, who attacks and deliberately violates the rules of the SEC, the stock market control agency, of Peter Thiel, of Vivek Ramaswamy, who has launched an anti-ESG (Environmental, Social and Governance principles) fund.

It's a fantasy world that rests on acronyms like Yolo (*You Only Live Once*) coined by rapper Kendrick Lamar ten years ago, suggesting living in the moment, without planning budgets or financial resources. It fits in with another Silicon Valley postulate for getting money from investors: *"Fake it until you make it"*. A philosophy that wants to destroy the perimeters of the rules followed by those who instead proceed in transparency and credibility. If it is true that capitalism benefits from "creative destruction", as the great Joseph Schumpter explained, it is also true that there is a fundamental difference between cutting a dead branch or archiving an outdated technology, and cheating. The problem? With rules, the entire cryptocurrency sector could come to the end of the line. But we will have imposed perimeters on the digital economy, necessary in order not to get hurt, both they, the new young and billionaire protagonists, and we, mortal commoners.

Inflation: What Risks for the Euro Zone?

Michel Dévoluy

With a rate of 10% in 2022, inflation is making a strong comeback and confronting the euro zone with the limits of its peculiarity. The Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is characterized by two major features. The participating economies are still too heterogeneous and the States resist giving up their sovereignties, with the exception of monetary power. Indeed, a single monetary policy requires a consensus. This is enshrined in the heart of the EMU treaty signed in Maastricht in 1992. The independent European Central Bank (ECB) has been created and given the mandate to maintain price stability. This objective has been so well respected since the advent of the euro in 1999 that inflation seemed to be a thing of the past. Then it took off with the war in Ukraine.

The fight against inflation is necessary for several reasons: the decline in purchasing power of monetary incomes; the loss in export competitiveness; the reduction of the burden of non-indexed debt; the increased information asymmetries between agents; an increased uncertainty. Clearly, inflation clouds the perception of the economy and reduces its growth potential.

Inflation also creates inequality. Incomes and assets depend directly on the degree of exposure of economic actors to price increases. Some suffer from inflation, others can better protect themselves against it. Not to mention the windfall effects resulting from unjustified increases.

Another source of inequality is that not all prices move at the same rate. Theoretical inflation is an average calculated from a standard consumption basket. In practice, the spending patterns of the various subjects differ. The hardest hit are those whose forced purchases relate to goods most affected by the increases, such as gas and electricity at present.

Mobilizing the right remedies against inflation involves understanding its causes. So-called "monetary" inflation occurs when the creation of money exceeds the needs of the real economy. The price-wage loop refers to the "inflationary spiral" mechanism: wage increases lead to an increase in prices, which causes a new wage surge. "Exogenous" shocks suffered by an economy also trigger inflationary processes. This is the case during shortages or surges of imported goods.

The evolution of inflation also depends on the expectations of actors on the future behavior of the economy and prices. Another cause, less studied, the instantaneous dissemination of information at the global level, the opacity of market powers and the complexity of financial instruments facilitate erratic price increases. Excessiveness was already observed with regard to properties and income. It is now present in the waltzing of some prices.

Inflation-fighting strategies run throughout economic history. We will mention them for the record before coming to the thorny issue of the fight against inflation in the euro zone. The indexation of wage incomes is attractive at first sight. But it poses the risk of triggering a price-wage loop. The wisest thing would then be to reserve this device for maintaining the purchasing power of low incomes, with the obstacle of the threshold effects inherent in this type of measure.

Comments

Curbing inflation by restricting public spending only makes sense if the economy is proven to be overheating with the presence of a low unemployment rate.

The administrative control of all prices is an authoritarian procedure which conflicts with the practices of market economies. Less brutal, "tariff shields" set ceilings on already regulated prices, while income compensation and "tariff checks" aim to alleviate the loss of purchasing power linked to price increases. These policies weigh down public finances. They should therefore focus on supporting the less wealthy.

Remains the main weapon. Restrictive monetary policies. They take the form of an increase in interest rates intended to weigh on the cost of borrowing and of a tightening of the conditions for obtaining credit. However, these policies are counterproductive if they break the dynamics of growth and employment. They should therefore be used with caution.

With inflation in the euro zone maintained at around 2%, the ECB has become exemplary and has built up a good credibility. But what to do with an average rate of 10%? This surge is not due to the laxity of the ECB, but to the war in Ukraine. Moreover, a recession is looming. Faced with such a situation, resorting to a brutal monetary rigor would be inappropriate.

In regard to the magnitude of the shock, let us acknowledge that the ECB has acted with restraint so far. It raised its main key rate to "only" 2% in November 2022, knowing that it was still at 0% in June. The ECB's strategy thus avoids fueling the economic slowdown while providing signals intended to curb inflationary expectations. We might still be surprised at so much wisdom when inflation is at 10%. But this restraint in unleashing heavy artillery stems from arguments willingly left in the background. High inflation erodes the public-

debts repayment burden. But these have become colossal in recent years. In addition, moderate interest rates ease the cost of new government borrowing, that is essential to balance budgets.

Even if the ECB wanted to react forcefully to inflation, could it really? Here the question of the disparities between the States arises head-on. Heterogeneity within the euro zone is revealed, in hollow, in the distribution of national inflation rates. In September 2022, they ranged from 24.2% for Estonia to 6.2% for France; with 17.1% for the Netherlands, 12% in Belgium, 10.9% in Germany and 9.5% for Italy. It must be emphasized that the *single* monetary policy conducted by the ECB must imperatively reconcile very different national situations. Huge dilemma. If a crisis occurs, it becomes practically impossible for the ECB to choose a policy which would be optimal for each of the Member States. It's unfortunate. But inevitable as long as the economic, social and political structures of the States are significantly different. The ECB's mission would be simplified and more effective if the euro zone were more homogeneous. To do this, it should be more integrated. Hence more political.

The lack of political union does not only hamper monetary policy. It weighs directly, or indirectly, on all the major economic decisions of the Member States, particularly in budgetary matters. Sharing the same currency while preserving national sovereignties requires both coordination procedures and collective control of national policies. Coordination spurs the convergence of economies, promotes coherence between national policies and promotes unique responses to common challenges. This last point is illustrated by the search for a common European strategy to contain the surge in gas prices. Coordinating mobilizes the European

authorities, with the Commission in the lead. The procedures are long and involve a lot of regulations, meetings and reports. Already complex on paper, these mechanisms can be difficult in terms of relations between States and with Europe. When they fail, it is always the fault of "somebody else", which feeds resentment and serves as a pretext to blame Europe - cheaply.

A control mechanism lays down standards to be followed. Then it monitors and, if necessary, sanctions the non-complying states. The heaviest control mechanism concerns public deficits and debts. The challenge is to prevent the fiscal laxity of a Member State, leading, through contagion and spillover effects, to weakening the euro, a common good for all the countries concerned.

These coercive budgetary rules are enshrined in the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) resulting from the provisions of the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Economic Governance (TSCG) signed in 2012. In short, to defend their sovereignties, the States of the euro zone agree to live under the tutelage of rules which monitor national decisions. A strange procedure of tying one's hands to remain free.

The examination of the inflationary shock suffered by the euro zone is a stark reminder of the unique, complex and unstable nature of the EMU. Basically, everything stems from the refusal to accept a significant transfer of sovereignty from the Member States to Europe. However, the solution exists: to go resolutely towards a federal construction. The ball is in the States' court, and time is running out. The history of European construction will not go back to the same recipes forever.

The Future of the English Language in the European Union. Proposal for a Conference on Euro-English

Anne Parry

The UK has left the European Union, yet English remains one of the working languages along with French and German. The idea of imposing a different language rather than accepting the status quo where English is the main language is unlikely to work for reasons I will explore below. In this article I would like to look at how European citizens may now take ownership of the language and develop their own version of Euro-English, with the help of linguists, teachers and students from all member states, and the Conference on the future of Europe (COFE) online platform.

British, American or Euro-English?
English is now recognised as a global language with many different varieties, as described in David Crystal's seminal work *English as a Global Language* among others. But only two varieties have achieved world-wide recognition, due to the publication of authoritative dictionaries and grammars of the language in the 18th century. Anyone writing formal English today has to decide whether to choose British or American English, particularly when considering spelling choices (*colour* or *color, centre* or *center*).

At the time of the American Constitutional Convention in 1787, Noah Webster was a pioneering scholar, lexicographer and teacher. He realised that the English dictionaries available in the US were inadequate to describe the period of constitutional change and set about his life's work writing his *American dictionary of the English Language*. In the Preface to this work, Webster explains:

'Language is the expression of ideas; and if the people of one country cannot preserve an identity of ideas, they cannot retain an identity of language. ….. But **the principal differences between the people of this country and of all others, arise from different forms of government, different laws, institutions and customs** *…..*

No person in this country will be satisfied with the English definitions of the words **congress, senate and assembly, court**, *&c. for although these are words used in England, yet they are applied in this country to express ideas which they do not express in that country.'*

The *Merriam-Webster dictionary* is now recognised as the authoritative resource for current American English usage.

I would like to suggest that there are parallels between the period when America broke away from British rule in the 18th century, and set up its Constitutional Convention to form an independent federal government, and the present-day situation in Europe, where the EU is also in a constituent phase, requiring federal changes in the way it is run if it is to face up to the challenges of the future. A collaborative exercise in defining Euro-English may reinforce that sense of European identity which is a necessary addition to national identity if we are to escape the siren call of national populism.

Why is English the main language in European institutions?

English, like Portuguese, French, Spanish and Dutch, initially became a **global** language because of empire. As Europeans colonised all corners of the world, they took their languages with them and English became established as the language of communication and administration in India, South Africa, Australia, the United States, to name just a few. Nowadays English is spoken by about 1.5 billion people world-wide, of whom over a billion use English as a second language, with fewer than 400 million speaking it as their first language.

After the Second World War, the post-imperial European states reached out to each other and created a common space which later developed into the EU, where countries worked together towards an 'ever closer union'. Initially, Dutch, French, German and Italian were identified as the working languages in the EEC, but when the UK joined in 1973, English became an official language, and gradually became more dominant as its influence increased.

The use of English increased with the accession of Sweden, Finland and Austria in 1995. After the fall of the Berlin Wall, countries which had turned away from Russia looked towards western democracies, in particular the UK and the USA, for their future and that of their children. In Poland and other countries, English replaced Russian as the second language taught in schools, and when the EU opened its doors to countries from eastern Europe in 2004 and 2007, the role of English was reinforced as it was simply the most commonly used shared language.

Euro-English and European identity

Language is a key part of our identity, it defines who we are and enshrines our culture and world view, but it is also a tool for the creation of a shared world view. Where a language is imposed against the will of the people and is associated with power and oppression, it may cause resentment, but where it is the language of choice of a community it can create a sense of belonging. I suggest that by addressing and taking ownership of Euro-English in the EU, European citizens will be able to consolidate their shared identity while establishing a new European variety of the English language needed to mirror the culture and institutions of our Union.

While the UK was a member of the EU, it was natural that the English used in the institutions would be the British rather than the American variety of the language, but since Brexit, the EU no longer needs to depend on its ex-member state. There has been much resentment towards the British and the use of the English language in the EU, and it is reasonable to suspect that this derives not from an inherent dislike of the language itself but from past imperial rivalries, and more recently from the often Eurosceptic attitude to the Union displayed by the British government and members of the administration, by British MEPs, including Nigel Farage, the former UKIP leader accused among other things of inciting racial hatred with his Brexit propaganda, and by journalists such as Boris Johnson, who made a successful career of denigrating the EU before he became Prime Minister. It is difficult to forget the numerous times that Britain requested, expected and obtained opt-outs and rebates, refusing to take part in the Schengen project, the Euro and other shared projects. It is now time for the EU to move on from Brexit and to celebrate and consolidate its role in the world. I believe that rather than abandoning English as the main language of communication, a re-evaluation of **Euro-English** may be a helpful tool to accomplish this. A description of the language variety built up with the help of the citizens, in particular the younger members of the Union, could become an integral part of a new-found European sense of unity.

A common language for Europe?

There has been extensive debate about which language should be used in EU institutions. But languages are eco-systems that develop and change naturally in contexts where people interact with each other, and it is hard to persuade people to speak to each other in a language with which they are not familiar when they share a language which allows them to communicate efficiently. What are the alternatives to English?

Some people have proposed the use of ancient or artificially developed languages, such as Latin or Esperanto. But languages develop in communities, and allow the members of these communities to build relationships and share ideas. Esperanto failed as a global language, principally because there were no native speakers and no culture behind the language, so it was known only among people who were interested in attending symposiums to discuss it. Unfortunately for enthusiasts of invented languages, they don't seem to work.

Should French or German become the main language in the EU?

The EU has 24 official languages, but only English, French and German are considered working languages in the European Commission, whereas all 24 languages are working languages in the European Parliament.

The French have often resented the prominence of English in the EU, where it was seen as a *langue véhiculaire*, as opposed to French which was the real *langue communautaire*. In 2021, French MP Julien Aubert proposed in the Assemblée Nationale that French should become the only working language in the EU, but his proposal was not welcomed by speakers of other languages, some of whom suggested that English was the best choice, as it was now a neutral language, no longer the language of any of the larger member states, and despite the efforts of the French Presidency of the Council in 2022, English remains one of the working languages.

The German Bundestag has repeatedly called for German to receive an equal position in the Commission alongside French and English, and the use of German has increased in EU institutions, as has the number of people learning German across Europe.

French and German will no doubt be studied more in other EU countries in the future, but if either of them were to become the single working language in EU institutions, this would create a political problem similar to that of English being seen as the dominant culture, which was resolved by the UK leaving the Union. We should not forget that the main language spoken in Ireland is English, but Ireland does not have the weight or the imperial background to create a problem like that of the UK.

The interpretation service in the European Parliament is extremely successful, as we have seen during the COFE sessions, where participants were able to speak in their own language while others could listen in their language of choice, but ultimately communication will be facilitated by the use of a shared language.

It is to be hoped that the study of languages in the future will guarantee that all EU citizens become fluent in more than two languages, but for the moment, leaving aside all other issues, it would seem sensible to continue to use Euro-English as the main language of communication in the EU.

Linguistic Imperialism in EU institutions – an example

While the UK was a member of the EU and English was the most widely used language

of communication, it was natural that British citizens would play a large part in translation services. This sometimes led to British translators laying down the law about what was or was not acceptable English, without showing appropriate sensitivity. It must have been annoying for speakers of other languages who were doing their best to communicate in a second language, to be constantly corrected, in particular by people whose commitment to the joint European project often seemed half-hearted, and was tinged with English exceptionalism.

One document, *Misused English words and expressions in EU publications, May 2016*, written by Jeremy Gardner, a senior translator at the European Court of Auditors and published just before the Brexit referendum, gives a list of words which are used 'incorrectly' by non-native writers in EU documentation, often because they are "false friends". The tone of the document is arrogant and redolent of British exceptionalism. In the *Preface* to this edition, Gardner refutes the idea that

'some terms are now so ingrained in EU usage (the **acquis***) that we have to use them* **even if they are wrong** *and, more importantly, even if our readers do not understand them. This view sees certain past texts, particularly '***the treaties***', as being akin to some kind of holy book handed down on tablets of stone, whose very word is sacred.'*

He ridicules the use of *acquis*, a wonderful word that summarises in 6 letters the concept of '*the collection of common rights and obligations that constitute the body of EU law*', and he dismisses the importance of the Treaties, the very foundation of European law, rather than wondering why it is the case that British people have never heard of *acquis* and have no idea of the importance of the Treaties.

In an entertaining article in the New Yorker by Lauren Collins in June 2013, describing an interview with Gardner, we read that in the end he admits that:
'it is sometimes less onerous to use an incorrect form when that form is more widely comprehended. "You notice that everyone makes the same mistakes," he said. "Very often, you go native."'

It would have been more useful if he had come to terms with Euro-English as a changing language, rather than simply suggesting there was something wrong with it.

So what is Euro-English and how does it differ from British English?
According to Wikipedia, Euro-English *'is an alleged group of* pidgin *dialects of the* English language *as used* in Europe, *based on common mistranslations, and the technical* jargon *of the* European Union *(EU) and the native languages of its non-native English-speaking population'*.

This derogatory description highlights the way Euro-English is seen from outside and perhaps also inside the EU. Instead, we need to find a way of taking pride in the use of Euro-English! The language used in EU institutions continues to develop new terminology, and the English used by European citizens in their exchanges with other Europeans often draws on features of their mother tongues, which most teachers of English would describe as mistakes, but we may consider as features of the interlanguage in the development of Euro-English.

As in all varieties of English, we find lexical, grammatical and pronunciation differences from British English. So, vocabulary items such as *acquis*, or *subsidiarity*, as defined in Article 5(3) of the Treaty on European Union, are concepts that all citizens of the EU should be familiar with, and are at the heart of Euro-English. There will also be new meanings of 'false friends', so for example in Euro-English the word *transpose* is often accepted as meaning 'to incorporate a Directive

into national law', and it seems reasonable that this use of the word should be accepted as standard in the context of EU administration.

As Euro-English develops, the distinction between count and non-count nouns in British English is likely to become less important and forms which would be considered incorrect, such as *informations, an advice, how many luggages?* may be accepted.

In Euro-English we often find the present tense used with *since*, as in 'I am here since July' instead of the British 'I have been here since July'. Most non-native speakers will find this version easier and it does not seem to lead to misunderstandings, so it may be considered acceptable, although it may be necessary to clarify the concept when using *for*, so 'I am here for two weeks', referring to present and future time, has a different meaning from 'I have been here for two weeks', referring to present and past time.

Non-native speakers of English often say that native speakers are difficult to understand because they 'eat their words'. This is because the rhythm of some versions of spoken Euro-English is becoming more like that of Romance languages, which tend to give syllables more equal weight than in British English, which often reduces unstressed vowels to *schwa*, so the word 'computer' is pronounced /kəmˈpjuːtə/ with two weak vowels (ə) and the stress on the second syllable. In Euro-English many speakers will give the syllables equal weight and may stress the first syllable giving a pronunciation something like /ˈkompjuːtɜːr/, which will be more easily understood by people familiar with the spelling, but not with the pronunciation of weak vowels in British English.

Proposal for a Conference on Euro-English
The Constitutional Convention in the USA in Philadelphia in 1787 was attended by 55

Delegates, but 'no women, no slaves, no Native Americans or racial minorities, no laborers'. Fortunately, the tools of democracy have made progress since then, all European citizens have the right to vote for their representatives in the European Parliament, and the Conference on the Future of Europe has given us another tool, that of participatory democracy, based on the involvement of citizens selected by sortition, and the opportunities offered by the online Conference platform, available in all the EU official languages.

I believe that a debate about language change should start at school, when children are at their most curious and inventive about language change. In an experiment organised by the New York Times, teenagers came up with interesting new words such as *trendaissance, Covidloop, seath* etc. Our European school children could take part in a pan-European project to learn about how language is constantly changing, and become protagonists in the development of Euro-English. This project could be organised in a new online space, similar to the COFE platform, to be known as the **Conference on Euro-English**, and I suggest it may have **three main sections**.

Section 1 – introducing new language
During their English language lessons at school students could have fun inventing new Euro-English words that express concepts that are not covered adequately by existing English words, and present them to students of different nationalities, just as the users of the COFE platform made *proposals (ideas)* for political reforms. *Likes (follows)* and *comments* could be invited from students from different countries, and the proposals with the most support could be taken forward to a Conference on Euro-English, where students would explain their new Euro-English words, with prizes for the best presentations. A committee of linguists/lexicographers from

different countries could oversee the project and ensure that new words are recorded when there is sufficient agreement from peers from a majority of member states.

Section 2 – learning the language of the institutions

In a second section of the platform, there could be an interactive glossary of terms used in EU institutions, including videos of EU officials explaining what the words mean and what role they play in the governance of the EU, and a space for discussion and suggestions.

Section 3 – our shared European history and culture

In this section, students and teachers could co-create a truly European understanding of our shared history and culture, expressed in Euro-English. At present we have 27 national versions of the history and culture of member states, which national governments tend to guard jealously. Our students could propose and discuss in English key moments of European history and culture, sharing texts, images and videos in order to build a common understanding of our European heritage throughout the Union.

This section could include the presentation of key European figures from each country. So for example, Italian students could research and present the stories of the founding fathers and mothers of Europe, and documents such as the Ventotene Manifesto, written by prisoners who fought against fascism on the Italian island of Ventotene during the 2nd world war. Students could also share presentations of the Treaties which have formed the basis for the development of the union over the years, as well as the texts of famous documents as such the Schuman declaration of 1950, the speeches of David Sassoli, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, etc. These and others are all part of our shared history and culture, and should be as well known to EU citizens as the history of their own countries. This common understanding could form a basis for the construction of our united Europe, as invoked by Timothy Snyder in his message to Europe from Judenplatz in Vienna on 9 May 2019.

An annual Conference on Euro-English award ceremony

The students giving the best and most appreciated contributions to the Euro-English platform could take part in an annual Conference on Euro-English award ceremony, to celebrate our European history and culture, with participants from all member states and prizes for the best contributions.

Conclusions

The European Union is a beacon of democracy in a world where authoritarian empires threaten our existence. In order to guarantee our future, we need a multi-lingual society with a strong identity and strong institutions. A shared language that we identify as our own will make an important contribution to this shared future. The EU encourages and funds the study of minority and endangered languages, and is required under Article 22 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union to respect linguistic diversity. But it is also important that European citizens should be able to speak together in a shared language, and now that the UK is no longer a member state, it is reasonable to continue to use English alongside other languages. To further the cause of giving European citizens ownership of this global language, we have suggested a **Conference on Euro-English,** with particular importance given to the role of schools and students in adapting the language to changing circumstances and building our (linguistic) future together.

Federal Europe Is the Solution

Nicola Vallinoto

Reply to Giorgia Meloni's speech during her end of year press conference.
At the end of year press conference when a journalist asked her whether it is not "time to build a United States of Europe," Giorgia Meloni, new Italian Prime Minister, said she "disagrees with the federal model of the European Union. The Europe that can provide better solutions is a confederal Europe, that is, sovereign nations that decide to share some major matters rather than continuously surrendering pieces of sovereignty to create an extremely bureaucratized European superstate that risks flooding the system."

Contrary to what the Prime Minister said, I believe that a federal Europe is the solution to the problems that European citizens are concerned about. Italy is better off being part of a federation instead of a confederation, where the strongest countries have the upper hand. Moreover, it is good to emphasize how the federation is not a superstate as Meloni would have us believe. In a supranational federation, only certain matters are the prerogative of the higher level. Foreign and security policy as well as energy policy are certainly among them. In these cases, the sovereignty of states is shared, not surrendered, at the federal level, and decisions are made by majority vote, not unanimity, with a bicameral system representing the states and the people. Shared sovereignty through a common federal government also means lower costs for citizens.

Just think of the savings we could achieve with one energy purchasing centre and one military force instead of twenty-seven armies.

On one point I completely agree with Giorgia Meloni: all issues that can be better solved at the national level must remain a national responsibility according to the principle of subsidiarity.

The model to which the Prime Minister refers is De Gaulle's *Europe des Patries*, a Europe in which states remain sovereign. History shows us that such a model does not work. The United States of America in the beginning was a confederation. After a few years they realized that the confederal model did not allow for effective decision making and in 1789 they decided to become a federation and have a common government.

Europe needs to acquire its own autonomy if it is not to remain subservient to the great powers. If we want the EU to be less bureaucratic and take care of the important issues, it needs to be given the powers by the nation-states to make quick decisions when necessary.

For this reason, the Italian government should follow up on the demands of the Conference on the Future of Europe and foster a constituent process that can provide the EU with the tools to become a global player and attempt to govern, rather than submit to, globalization.

The Ventotene Mockery

Piergiorgio Grossi

John Steinbeck, the American writer author of *"The Grapes of Wrath", "Of Mice and Men"* and *"Tortilla Flat"*, has been war correspondent for the "New York Herald Tribune" for six months during the Second World War. His correspondences have been collected in a volume published in Italy with the title *"C'era una volta una guerra"*(*"Once there was a war"*). Steinbeck followed the American troops after their landing in Salerno from October 1943 until the following December. In his correspondence he narrates an episode unknown to most people, the conquest of the island of Ventotene.

The episode of the taking of Ventotene can be reconstructed through Steinbeck's correspondence, the written testimony, conserved in the Municipality of Ventotene, of the commander of the destroyer "USS KNIGHT" Frank J. Tarallo, and the oral testimonies of the inhabitants of Ventotene, collected by Filomena Gargiulo in her book *"Ventotene isola di confino"*, published by "Ultima Spiaggia".

Ventotene was an island of internal exile where up to 800 anti-fascists had been imprisoned until the summer of 1943. In September 1943 there were no longer internees, who had been freed after the fall of Mussolini, but about 250 Italian soldiers remained, mainly prison guards, certainly not combat groups, and a garrison of 87 German soldiers assigned to oversee the radar station at the top of the island, which for the Americans, who were preparing the landing at Salerno on 9th September, would have been strategically important.

The task of occupying Ventotene and deactivating the German radar station was assigned to a unit of 43 American paratroopers, 3 officers and 40 soldiers, veterans from Africa who were boarded on the USS KNIGHT, personally known by Steinbeck himself during his stay in Italy.

The first mission was to convince the 250 Italian soldiers to surrender, and it was relatively easy: on the afternoon of 8th September, a pilot boat approached the port of Ventotene and, equipped with a loudspeaker, threatened to open fire from the American ships' cannons around the island, if the Italian garrison had not surrended. Italians, certainly already informed of the just announced armistice between Italy and the allies, gladly accepted to surrender, and, in the same night, a tender with 5 American soldiers and officers went to Ventotene's port to make sure that the Italians surrended.

There was a severe blackout on the island and even the American tender sailed with the lights off to avoid a possible German fire.

Maintaining complete darkness, however, caused the American tender to miss the entrance to the port twice: the first time they landed in a bay in the south-east and only after lighting a torch, they noticed that it was not the port's bay, but the inlet of the old Roman port instead. The second time they landed on the pier's breakwater, same scene.

Only on the third attempt they entered the port, disarmed the only German sentry and waited for the 250 Italian soldiers to reach the port and lay down their arms.

Comments

At this point a civilian enters the scene, a man described by Steinbeck as dressed in an amusing pink suit (it was night, maybe it was a pajamas), who introduces himself as a former political confined and who, speaking English and German, offers himself as an interpreter and informant. He was probably the count Alberto Bracco, known as *"caramella"* because of his use of a monocle similar to a candy (he was perhaps considered an anarchist, category that had not been freed after the fall of Mussolini). In their tales, the islanders also call him *"il conte rosso"* ("the red count"), it is not known whether because of the pink suit or of his political ideas. His information was precious: he indicated the exact number of the Germans, 87, that the Americans ignored, and, above all, he informed that the Germans near the port believed that the two nocturnal landing attempts of the tender were actual landings of troops at different points, and the Germans, fearing of being surrounded, had retreated to the only hill on the island preparing to resist, blowing up some ammunition depots and the radar station itself, not to let it fall into enemy hands. In the meanwhile, after the surrender of the Italians, the 43 American paratroopers had landed in the port before sunrise, ready for action. Attempting an assault with 43 soldiers who didn't know the area (as the failed landing attempts proved) against 87 German soldiers, presumably well armed and in strategic positions, was extremely risky and would have caused human losses, even among civilians, if a naval bombardment would have taken place.

It is not known whether on the initiative of an American petty officer (as said by Steinbeck) or at the suggestion of the pink-suit character (as said by Tarallo and the islanders), it was decided to try to deceive the Germans. An unarmed American petty officer with a white flag walked with "count Bracco" towards the German post. During the talk with the German officer, "count Bracco", who acted as an interpreter and was known and trusted by the Germans, said that 600 marines had landed on the island and that the wisest thing to do was to surrender, to avoid unnecessary bloodshed. In that case the Germans would have been treated with dignity as prisoners, according to the Geneva Convention.

The bluff was credible because, as related by the count, the Germans were convinced that a landing had really taken place during the night, and they had surely verified the arrival of the paratroopers who had occupied the roof of the barracks and of some houses. The number of 600 was the consistency of a battalion, so it was a credible number.

After a short negotiation, the 87 Germans agreed to lay down their arms and leave the station. Escorted up to the Town Hall square by the 40 paratroopers, they laid down their weapons and were imprisoned on the third floor of the Town Hall (already equipped as a prison for confined people).

At this point only did the Germans, observing the coming and going in the Town Hall square from the window grates, realize that the Americans were not 600, but only the 40 who had escorted them.

Thus the taking of Ventotene took place without bloodshed and without firing a single shot.

All traces of the "red count" have been lost, the islanders knew him only as *"caramella"*; the contacts between the inhabitants and the confined were in fact strongly hindered, and the confined themselves didn't like to trust the islanders, because they suspected that among them there were fascist spies.

A report made by the paratrooper commanding officer probably exists, but it has never been made public. The only official testimony is Tarallo's one (posthumous) and Steinbeck's war correspondence dated December 3, 1943, which we can trust not only for the author's prestige, but also for the confirmation of the islanders' testimonies.

Ventotene was the first municipality in the province of Latina to be freed.

Franco-German Disagreement: How to Resolve it?

Antonio Padoa Schioppa

The disagreement between France and Germany on European Union policies, the most alarming one since the end of World War II, has led a sharp observer such as Jacques Attali to write that even the possibility of a future military confrontation between the two countries can no longer be ruled out a priori. Let us hope that this is only a rallying cry, but surely there is a gap between the two governments, at least on the common European defence. How to overcome it? In my opinion, two key points should be highlighted. The first point concerns Germany. By all means, it is not taken for granted that the positions that Scholz seems to be advocating these days, or at least accredited by him, are shared by everyone in his country. Not only had he talked about common European defence in the past weeks, not only had the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs argued for its urgency, but so had, in different tones, the Strategic Compass approved by the EU last March and influential Bundestag members such as Schäuble and Roettgen.

The debate seems to be ongoing even in the German press and public opinion. It will be the election campaign for the upcoming 2024 European elections that will disclose what positions the major German parties, from the Christian Democrats to the Social Democrats to the Greens and Liberals, will take on this front.

The second point concerns France. President Macron has the means to make the German government and Parliament openly side with the strengthening of the European common defence and foreign policy.

He has to uphold two positions clearly: declaring, firstly, that the *force de frappe* will be conceived by France as an instrument for the defence of the entire Union, as requested in the previous months by Schäuble himself; and secondly, that the French seat at the UN, as regards strategic decisions, will be used as a European seat, while waiting for a reform of the Security Council invoked by many, and not only in Europe.

If Macron acts this way, it is highly possible that not only Germany, but also most EU Member States, including Italy, Spain, and Poland, will concretely adhere to the strengthening of European security. The war in Ukraine has revealed the absolute urgency of this strengthening project, even in the constant interallied connection within NATO and with the United States.

France must make the same apparent sacrifice of sovereignty that Germany has previously made when it gave up the mark, which has proven, over time, to be essential for Germany itself, as foreseen and declared by Kohl in the face of a hostile public opinion.

The interests of individual States and the values shared by the majority of EU citizens go in the same direction everywhere in Europe, including France. The just aspiration to sovereignty can only be protected in this way. Our future freedom and that of those who will come after us depend on it. However, we must not miss the fleeting moment. Tomorrow may be late.

Qatargate and the Role of the European Parliament

Alberto Majocchi

According to many commentators, the Qatargate scandal risks generating a wave of public mistrust in the European Parliament. Angelo Panebianco, in an article in the *Corriere della Sera* of 16 December 2022, rightly observes that the virus of corruption is a risk in all democratic societies, and he points out that the European Parliament appears particularly fragile because, despite being directly elected by citizens, in reality it is not a truly "representative" body.

The reason for this lack of representation is linked to the fact that the European elections are still held in national constituencies. Consequently, for many, elections are a vote for or against the incumbent government in their own country. This flawed element is real and must be addressed by reforming the voting mechanism through legislation. However, according to Panebianco – after observing that the citizens who vote know little to nothing about the competences of the European Parliament, or any other of its elective institutions – it is much more important that there is no direct connection between the election results and the type of government that will be formed, as happens in other elections, at the national and local level.

This observation is substantially correct, even though the *Spitzenkandidaten* system has been used since 2014, whereby the presidency of the Commission is assigned to the candidate of the political party with the largest number of seats in the European Parliament. This is a link, albeit still weak (as the election of the current President Ursula von der Leyen has shown), whereby citizens can use their vote to influence the choice of who will lead for a term the Commission, i.e., the executive body of the EU.

Qatargate is clearly a very serious incident, not least because of its large scale and likely involvement of a large number of MEPs. Even though the Parliament reacted firmly and quickly, this incident of corruption undermines trust in European institutions. However, there is another aspect to consider. As Gianfranco Pasquino observed in *Domani* on 21 December 2022, "a sure lesson comes from Brussels (and Strasbourg), which too many commentators seem to overlook: the European Parliament is anything but a marginal and useless body. On the contrary, in addition to representing hundreds of millions of European citizens, it is an important forum for political, social, economic and cultural decision-making." If this were not the case, it would be incomprehensible why Qatar and Morocco have invested millions of euros in influencing the opinion of an institution that many consider insignificant. In fact, the role of the Parliament has been strengthened through the Treaty of Lisbon and the practice of the Union, even if its participation in decision-making on taxation and on foreign and security policy is not yet on an equal footing with the Council.

Much has recently changed within the Union. In particular, after the crisis generated by the pandemic, the *NextGenerationEU* was approved. This intervention plan amounts to 750 billion euros, earmarked for investments

to achieve three objectives: energy transition, digital transition and social inclusion. This plan is financed by issuing bonds on the market, thus breaking the taboo that the Union cannot raise resources through debt. At the same time, the own resources ceiling was temporarily raised to 2% and the Commission committed itself to submitting proposals for new types of revenue.

Once again the strategic factor highlighted by Jean Monnet seems to apply to this context, namely that significant progress towards a federal Union in Europe is only possible when the Member States are involved in a stalemate from which "we can escape […] only in one way: with a concrete, resolute action on a limited but decisive point, which leads to a basic change on this point and progressively modifies the terms of the problems as a whole." This is what happened with the pandemic in terms of debt financing and the creation of new own resources.

Furthermore, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the sanctions imposed on Russia, which resulted in a drop in Russian gas imports to Europe, the EU had to take steps to seek new sources of gas supplies from other areas of the world, but above all to find new ways to strengthen the security of its member countries and set up a European foreign policy capable of guaranteeing a new role for Europe in the world. Therefore, relations with the African Union are particularly significant, especially to develop the production of renewables to replace energy sources using fossil fuels.

However, the Qatargate crisis has highlighted another important political aspect, that corruption also occurs in left-wing parties, which are traditionally more committed to defending the political and social values that characterise the development of the Union. This fact should not come as a surprise, if one considers that Altiero Spinelli had already underlined in the 1941 Ventotene Manifesto that "the dividing line between progressive and reactionary parties no longer coincides with the formal lines of more or less democracy, or the pursuit of more or less socialism, but the division falls along a very new and substantial line: those who conceive the essential purpose and goal of the struggle as being the ancient one, the conquest of the national political power, and those who see the main purpose as the creation of a solid international state." In more current terms, the fundamental dividing line is no longer between the right and the left, but between nationalist and sovereignist forces and forces fighting for the completion of the federal unification process of Europe.

These observations could determine the strategy to be pursued to achieve the goal of a true federal Union. On the one hand, a Monnet strategy should be used to advance in the area of a European tax system characterised by debt financing of investments and new own resources; and, on the other hand, a Spinelli strategy should be used to create a deployment of forces willing to fight for a greater role of the Parliament in creating new resources and determining a financial plan for the Union, and to eliminate the unanimity vote in the Council in the areas of taxation, foreign policy and security. This deployment will have to emerge and strengthen before the next European Parliament elections in 2024, with the aim of defeating the sovereignist forces and giving a constituent role to the newly elected Parliament.

On the Results of the Conference on the Future of Europe *

Paolo Ponzano

The 49 proposals and 328 measures that conclude the Conference on the Future of Europe are the result of the first supranational consultation of European citizens, which is unprecedented in the history of participatory democracy. It is difficult to define the national origin of the proposals, since they are the result of both citizens' panels and recommendations elaborated by the working groups and discussions held in the same groups and in the plenary sessions of the Conference. Based on the footnotes in the final report, it could be argued that the largest number of proposals comes from the citizens of a few countries (especially Holland, France, Italy, Belgium, Germany, closely followed by Lithuania and Denmark). Since, as mentioned above, the proposals were discussed and reworked in the working groups and in the plenary session, one could not draw the general conclusion that only the citizens of these countries actively contributed to the results of the Conference. However, the statement remains valid that, with the exception of the discussions held in the working groups and in the plenary session, which obviously had a transnational character, most of the events organized to provide inputs to the work of the Conference were held nationally and mainly in the aforementioned countries. This situation has contributed to limiting the transnational character of the Conference and its conclusions.

Another limit already indicated by the Conference lies in the difficulty of the digital multimedia platform in allowing a real debate between citizens and civil society organizations on a transnational level. In terms of quantity, the registrations on the platform of citizens and civil society organizations were still at an insufficient level (about 50,000) to be fully representative of public opinion in the entire European Union. However, this result was not eased by the unexpected closure (at short notice) of the registrations on the multimedia platform on February 21, 2022. A comparison made with the citizens' consultations organized in the past by the European Commission shows that the number of responses to the White Paper of the Commission chaired by Juncker (containing the five scenarios defined by the Commission for the future of Europe) had reached the remarkable level of 200,000. A fortiori, it should be remembered that one million signatures from the citizens of at least seven Member States of the European Union are needed for the European Citizens' Initiatives (ECI) to draft a European law proposal to be taken into consideration by the European Commission. We are therefore still far from the representativeness required within the Union by the provisions in force or practiced in other consultations already carried out.

Despite the aforementioned limitations, the Conference on the Future of Europe represented the first example of participatory democracy at the European level which allowed a small group of the European population, especially young people, to express themselves on the policies and institutions of the Union. A desirable improvement in the functioning of the multilingual digital platform and an increase in transnational debates, as well as the support of the media and the press,

should favor the progressive formation of the "European public sphere" advocated by Jurgen Habermas as an indispensable precondition for the creation of a real European "demos". A European supranational democracy needs a European public space, where citizens can discuss and debate, exchange ideas and form an opinion. It is therefore necessary to overcome the linguistic barriers - which have so far represented an obstacle in this field - so that the citizens of the various European countries can discuss the problems that can only be solved at a European level, and be in a position to propose shared solutions.

As can be seen from the citizens' proposals, the vast majority of these can be implemented on the basis of the Treaties in force, while only a minority (about ten at the most) would require an amendment to the Treaty of Lisbon. This situation has led to a difference of opinion between the European institutions on the follow-up to be given to the Conference, which was already foreseeable from the outset. The Council of Ministers - reflecting the divisions existing between the Member States in this field - wanted to reaffirm its traditional position according to which it is the responsibility of the European institutions - and in particular of the European Commission - to give an operational follow-up to the results of the Conference, elaborating the law proposals necessary to adopt European regulations or directives in the matters indicated by the European citizens. Since the Council can only act on a proposal from the European Commission, it is therefore necessary to wait for the latter to present the necessary legislative proposals before intervening on a legislative level.

The European Parliament – which from the outset declared itself in favor of an amendment to the Treaty of Lisbon now in force since 2009 – emphasized the fact that in about ten cases citizens had formulated requests which demand, in order to be adopted, an amendment to the Treaties. Therefore, the European Parliament took the opportunity to present, immediately after the conclusion of the Conference, a resolution asking the European Council to convene a Convention, as foreseen by Art. 48 of the Lisbon Treaty, to start the procedure for revising the Treaty itself. In this way, the EP intended to immediately capitalize on that part of the requests of European citizens which coincide with the proposals often put forward by Parliament itself (in particular the attribution to the EP of a right of legislative initiative, and the abolition of the unanimity rule in favor of majority decisions), which it considers essential for making the European Union more democratic and more effective.

Unfortunately, in order to assemble a majority within Parliament to adopt the draft resolution swiftly, the drafters of the resolution added an internal request to the Constitutional Affairs Committee (AFCO) to continue work on possible amendments of the same treaty and to draw up a report for the month of January 2023. This mandate within the Parliament itself has provided an indirect alibi to the Council of Ministers - within which the member states are divided on the idea of reforming the treaty of Lisbon soon- for not giving an immediate follow-up to the Parliament's request and postponing any decision until Spring 2023. This decision makes it problematic to launch a Convention for the modification of the Treaties before the European elections of May/June 2024, since the Member States will want to exploit for electoral purposes the decisions that will be made in the Council before the electoral deadline, on the basis of the proposals requiring no change to the Treaties in force, which the European Commission will present in the meantime.

* A longer version of this article is being published in the "Review of European public law" of the University of Naples.

UE 36: It Is Going to Be "Another Europe"

Jean-Guy Giraud

One of the "unintended consequences" of the Ukrainian conflict – whatever its outcome – will certainly be an acceleration and an extension of the Union's enlargement.

The war provoked a sentiment of insecurity in eastern Europe, which has allowed to officialise in advance the candidacy of three new States in the Russian orbit: Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia.

For the same reason the war will also compel the EU to expedite the adhesion (pre) negotiations with 6 states in the Balkans: Serbia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Albania.

This adds to a EU of (27 + 3 + 6) = 36 Member States and of 600 million citizens taking shape in the relatively near future, in the order of a decade or so.

The composition of this Greater Europe will be marked by the important place that the formerly communist states of eastern, central and southern Europe will occupy. These 19 states (including the already-present ones) will represent:
- 52 % of the total of member states;
- 25 % of the total population of the EU 36 (i.e., 150 million out of 600 million).

Similarly, the EU 36 will be characterised by large differences in population size, even more than the EU 27, with:
- 5 "large" states with nearly 300 million people, i.e. 50% of the population;
- 9 "small" states with less than 2 million inhabitants each.

Hence, the great economic disparities already characterising the EU 27 will be amplified in the EU 36 following the inclusion of countries that are still scarcely developed. For example, we can note the current differences in GNP between:
- Germany (4,300 billion dollars) - France (3,000 billion);
- Ukraine (126 billion) - Serbia (65 billion).

By way of illustration, other profound transformations can be anticipated within a EU36:
- Greater disparities, such as political, cultural and religious,
- An increase in governance complexity: increased risk of governmental instability, further burdening of EU institutions (issues with: number of members, decision-making processes, budgetary requirements, language disparities, etc.) and of management and control procedures,
- Increased risks in terms of respect for democratic rules/values on the Member states' part, and of inter-state conflicts,
- Greater difficulty in reaching agreements on the development of common policies (agriculture, energy, currency, migration, etc.), particularly on foreign and security policy;
- Uncertainty about cohesion and solidarity between states – and even about their very conception of the nature of European integration.

All in all, the "diversity" – already present within the EU 27 – is likely to turn into factual heterogeneity, which would be way more difficult to manage, at least if the parallel objective of "unity" is to be maintained.

This raises the question of whether the original model of integration – reaffirmed through previous enlargements and successive revisions of the Treaties – can be maintained in a EU 36.

It is certainly always possible to imagine clever mechanisms of "differentiated integration" or gradual integration – or even "concentric circles" or more or less federalised "cores" (such as for the Euro).

However, these attempts - on which it will be difficult to negotiate among 37 governments - seem rather uncertain.

It would therefore be legitimate to reflect now on the very nature of this greater Europe: should we envisage a model refocused on an enlarged, standardised and cooperative market – similar to that of EFTA or the OECD?

Can we conceive of an intergovernmental model inspired by the "European Political Community" project launched by Emmanuel Macron?

Translated by Nicholas Serli

On the contrary, can the achievements of 70 years of economic and political integration be maintained – or even advanced? And if so, by what means?

In any case, the EU 36 will inevitably be "another Europe" in many respects. Is it premature to be concerned about this announced change? Judging by the difficulties and cumbersome nature of the reform - and even more so, the 'refounding' – processes that characterise the Union, it will never be too early to discuss it.

At the beginning of the 2000s, a mistake was made not to precede the first major enlargement with a prior and conditional reinforcement – with the result that a number of difficulties or blockages, yet to be resolved, quickly emerged. This should serve as a lesson for the forthcoming second major enlargement – even if the exercise of adapting the Union to this new continental entity is likely to prove even more complex, politically and technically, than the previous one.

African-European Youth Conference Joint Communiqué

Following the first edition of the "African European Youth Conference" that took place in Torino, Italy, on Saturday 22 and Sunday 23 October 2022 We, the young people from Europe, Africa and the Diaspora, united in the "Youth Core Group", met in Torino (Italy) on the 22nd and 23rd October 2022 to convene the first edition of the African European Youth Conference.

Following the proceedings of the Conference, we hereby decided to issue the following Joint Communiqué by declaring what follows:

AU – EU relations

1. Create a road map of all the established tools of cooperation between Africa and the EU, consisting in a clear framework of follow up on the policies and strategies about development and its effects;
2. Create policies that are carried out by young people in a multicultural and multilevel way in order for the institutions to work side by side with young generations (according to the motto "think globally, act locally");
3. Enhance cooperation and coordination among all interested actors (i.e. associations, NGOs and individuals) by creating a funded platform, aimed at connecting Europeans and Africans.

Peace and security

4. The European Union and the African Union should have a common policy and a common approach regarding cooperation on security issues, by taking into account the multi-dimensionality of security from the economic, political and social point of view; in this regard, bilateral agreements between States must be avoided;
5. With reference to the above, we call for a better use of the already existing instruments, such as the African Peace and Security Architecture, rather than creating new tools that would bypass the multilateral dimension;
6. We urge for an immediate and systematic inclusion of youth in conflict prevention, peace mediation, peace building, diplomacy efforts, as foreseen by both the UN Resolution 2250 and the EU's Youth Action Plan; in this regard, we propose to create an African-European youth consultation mechanism on peacebuilding and conflict prevention;
7. We recognise that the root causes of terrorism and violent extremism are linked to the absence of State and related basic services, such as education, employment and the general wellbeing, that create fertile grounds for recruitment of young people by terrorist organisations. We urge, therefore, both the European and the African Union to prioritise these aspects;
8. Furthermore, we call for more investment on prevention and fighting of terrorism by providing more tools to regional institutions, including training the African forces, providing equipment and exchanging information.

Migration and mobility

9. The European and African Union have to work together to achieve a Schengen-like area for students. Therefore, we urge to create an ad hoc Committee to work on a swift and effective establishment of such an area; furthermore, the possibility to obtain visa should not mostly depend on how the economic relations between continents work; given the current lack of transparency of many European consular representations, we strongly stress the need for clear visa procedures, reactiveness and clear and timely answers to visa demands;
10. The mentioned ad hoc Committee should be made up of Members of the European and of

the Pan-African Parliament in equal proportion, as well as of civil society representatives;

11. We urge to reinforce the existing students', professors' and researchers' exchange programmes by also creating a specific academic visa that should be easily accessible;

12. We have an educational aim to permit to understand that the African and European youth have a lot of common values; therefore, we call on strengthening the European-African social programmes, including promotion of projects as the "Youth Exchange"; in particular, we want to increase integration between the new African and European generations by reinforcing exchanges among youth networks, associations, organisations and platforms;

13. The ad hoc Committee suggested above should strongly control the work of Frontex and similar agencies and entities. It should sanction any violations of human rights and monitor the private institutions dealing with migration management, without letting them bypass public authorities;

14. These are only a few examples of the unfair treatments that many youths are facing despite the so-called partnership. There is a need to engage in a partnership of mutual respect;

15. The Commission, furthermore, must work to achieve and overcome the issue of police brutality, without letting private institutions take the responsibility of checking on them;

16. Frontex and other institutions working on the coasts need to be controlled and sanctioned if any right or rule is broken. The European Union must have a common way to integrate migrants, on a multi-national level, assessing all African migrants and asylum seekers as well the possibility to peacefully integrate in case of their migration to Europe, assessing their human rights as happened in and done for Ukraine.

Industrial development and sustainable energy

17. The European Union should strengthen the partnership with the African Union by operationalizing the Global Gateway;

18. The EU should promote the African Continental Free Trade Area and African monetary union, with particular sensitivity towards economic initiatives that empower African women and youth and create decent job opportunities, thus bringing richness in terms of internal migration and wealth, diversification of regional value chain and global supply chain resilience, in addition to agriculture resilience;

19. The EU and AU should foster infrastructure investment in order to equilibrate the imbalances due to the urbanisation trend in Africa and promote decentralised development as an alternative growth model which considers the development needs of marginalised areas, including through public - private partnerships, to counter the current accumulation of wealth in few richened areas;

20. The trilateral cooperation between the African Union, the European Union and third parties can be a cost effective method to promote sustainable development considering the strengths of each actor and avoiding conflicts;

21. The EU and AU should support local agriculture to reach food sovereignty through low environmental impact production;

22. The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights enshrined the accountability of companies and investors in African countries that need to be conscious of the growing focus on human rights both on land and at sea. The use of companies' subsidiaries as a corporate veil should not avoid company's accountability for human rights breaches, including the rights of the child, specifically child labour;

23. We call on the EU to promote an effective transfer of technology for the promotion of renewable energy excellency in Africa, with particular focus on solar energy and hydrogen;

24. We urge for an immediate, coordinated and unified reallocation of resources from the General Allocation of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) of the International Monetary

Fund (IMF) through the creation of an ad hoc instrument that would allow for their rechanneling from the EU to AU;

25. The young people from difficult socio-economic backgrounds should receive fixed quotas of microcredits from public and private institutions of EU and AU to promote their entrepreneurship projects.

Civil society and inclusion, human rights, youth participation and culture

26. We stress the importance of good governance and sound and accountable resource management, including efficient anti-corruption policies;

27. We strongly stress the importance of inclusion as a holistic concept that foresees visa facilitations on both sides, participation of people with disabilities, justice for all and urge both AU and EU to setup appropriate frameworks for making inclusion a reality; in particular, we wish to raise the attention to the diaspora population, that is often facing discriminatory treatment on both sides;

28. We call for a reinforced youth participation in public life and governance. We especially highlight the importance of universal youth participation in elections. We urge, in this context, for an establishment of independent electoral commissions that pay attention to the effective inclusion of young people in the electoral processes; we also call to reinforce the EU initiative for an online youth consultations platform on the African-European partnership;

29. We stress the immediate need to promote and support education at all levels, including the need to enhance social media education to promote inclusion, fight disinformation and hate-speech; in this framework, we attach particular importance to education systems that develop critical thinking and value curiosity;

30. We call on the AU and the EU to promote fora for political dialogue among youth; in

this framework, we encourage the support to youth platforms as the one originated from the African European Youth Conference;

31. We recognise the importance of culture for self-awareness and urge for a swift restitution of cultural goods.

Climate change

32. In order to contribute meaningfully to the mitigation and adaptation of the effects of climate change and in order to ensure climate justice we believe that the EU and AU should allocate concrete funds to follow up on policy promises. Specifically we propose: - the allocation of 20 percent of all EU development cooperation funds to projects devoted to fighting climate change and its effects; - the creation by the EU and AU of a joint fund to finance African and European private actors engaged on the African continent in the energy transition to green energies.

33. The EU and AU should strengthen partnerships for exchange and enrichment of the scientific and academic community in order to enable African universities and institutions to develop their own solutions and knowledge by drawing on European knowledge and practices, without being subjected to them.

34. We believe that as of now the EU and AU should work on a special procedure for "climate refugee" recognition and visa issuance in order to address the phenomenon of forced migration caused by climate change. We hereby declare to follow up on the content of this Communiqué and to transmit it to all the relevant stakeholders for any appropriate action on their side.

We thank all the partners to the AEYC. For further information or to get involved write to twg.euroafrica@gmail.com or visit *https:// onehourforeurope.org/youthconferences.html*

The Youth Core Group Torino, 23 October 2022

XIV Altiero Spinelli Symposium in Buenos Aires

With original presentations and a high turnout, the 14th edition of the Altiero Spinelli Symposium about regional integration in a globalized world, addressed the actual state of the situation regarding the Mercosur-EU Accord signed in 2019.

The event, held on October 26, 2022, at the headquarters of the Organisation of Iberoamerican States (OIE) in Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, Argentina, was carried out within the framework of the diplomatic mission to Buenos Aires of the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of the European Union, Josep Borrell, and his team, including his advisor José Antonio Sanahuja, one of the speakers at the Seminar.

The meeting, organized by the Global Democracy Civil Association, the Altiero Spinelli Foundation, the Altiero Spinelli Chair and with the support of the Delegation of the European Union in Argentina, had as panelists José Antonio Sanahuja, special adviser for Latin America and the Caribbean to the High Representative for foreign policy and security of the EU; Lilia Puig de Stubrin, member of the Parlasur Parliament; Horacio Reyser, secretary of International Economic Relations between 2015 and 2019, and Fernando Pedrosa, specialist in International Relations and President of Democracia Global. The debate moderator was Patricio DeGiorgis, Executive Director of Institutional Management of the Universidad de Belgrano.

The encounter started with the opening words by Fernando Pedrosa, who reminded us of the confusing moment we are currently living in, where the rules of the game are discussed worldwide.

He stressed that it is necessary to think about integrating with the European Union.

José Antonio Sanahuja emphasized the deep changes that are currently taking place in the European Union, and the geopolitical, economic, digital and ecological opportunities that may result from the signing of the Mercosur-EU accord for both regions.

He focused his presentation on topics such as the pandemic and how it leads to resilience, how the war in Ukraine gave rise to a Geopolitical Europe, the systemic change that we are experiencing and the impossibility of going back to the previous one.

On the other hand, he pointed out the need for innovation in the field of energy and electricity production. In addition, he spoke about the necessity to explore the sharing of public policies between both regions on this aspect.

Lilia Puig de Stubrin recalled that it took 20 years to reach an agreement, "this proves an enormous capacity of resilience by the States". Both Stubrin and Sanahuja insisted on the need to treat the agreement as it is, without adding new elements that would favour those actors who are not interested in the agreement being implemented, that is, not giving the opponents the opportunity to find new points to put it in question.

Stubrin also mentioned the special treatment that the agreement had in the Mercosur Parliament in 2021, when it was endorsed by all party blocs in a joint statement.

She also pointed out that "the agreement

means the opportunity for Argentina to leave its isolation and enter the European market". She added that "Our country and the region are prepared to take advantage of and incorporate the ecological and production practices of the European Union".

Horacio Reyser referred to the current events, starting with the elections in Brazil and the upcoming Argentinian elections in 2023. For Reyser, the combination of these factors will lead to a completely different situation from the one that existed when the Mercosur-EU Accord was first negotiated.

In addition to this, he spoke of de-globalization as a consequence of the pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and how climate change continues to be a cross-cutting issue on the world´s agendas.

Furthermore, he stressed the Accord is an opportunity for intra-Mercosur productive development, through the obligation to accept the European standards. From Reyser´s point of view, it is not a duty free trade accord, but rather a new agreement, more advanced and with modern approaches.

At the end of the presentation, there was room for questions, which led to an interesting debate with the participants, moderated by Patricio De Giorgis.

Sign the Urgent Call to Fossil Fuels CEOs

To fossil fuels CEOs

*This Cease and Desist Notice is to demand that you **immediately stop opening any new oil, gas, or coal extraction sites**, and stop blocking the clean energy transition we all so urgently need.*

We know that Big Oil:

KNEW for decades that fossil fuels cause catastrophic climate change.
MISLED the public about climate science and risks.
DECEIVED politicians with disinformation sowing doubt and causing delay.

You must end these activities as they are in direct violation of our human right to a clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, your duties of care, as well as the rights of Indigenous people.

If you fail to act immediately, be advised that citizens around the world will consider taking any and all legal action to hold you accountable. And we will keep protesting in the streets in huge numbers.

Vanessa from Uganda
Greta from Sweden
Helena from Ecuador
Luisa from Germany

Join the Avaaz Campaign
(*https://secure.avaaz.org/campaign/en/davos_2023_loc/?slideshow*)

Sign with your email address

New Ventotene Manifesto Calls for a European and Global Federation

Andreas Bummel

Following several months of drafting, European federalists have adopted an extensive and far-reaching *manifesto*[1] that calls for the establishment of a United States of Europe and outlines the goal of "a global federation". The document highlights that "the 2020 pandemic outbreak and the 2022 Russian aggression against Ukraine have become turning points also for European integration" as they dramatically illustrate the need of stronger European and global unity. In terms of the Russian aggression, global integration along federal lines is advocated as a long-term strategy to prevent and counter nationalistic and autocratic aggression.

According to Domènec Devesa, a Spanish Member of the European Parliament and convenor of the project, the document was approved by the Spinelli Group[2] of the European Parliament this summer. The group is a cross-party network of over 50 European Parliament deputies who pursue the objective of a federal reform of the European Union. It is named after Altiero Spinelli, one of the founding fathers of European integration and of the Union of European Federalists.

Building on the *Ventotene Manifesto*
The new statement, titled "Proposal of a Manifesto for a Federal Europe: sovereign, social, and ecological", runs over more than 40 pages and was drafted in the backdrop of the 80th anniversary of the *Ventotene Manifesto* in 2021, which was written in custody by Spinelli and others on what was then a prison island; the *Ventotene Manifesto* served as an important analysis, guideline and vision for European integration after the Second World War.

Circulated to all Members of the European Parliament this week and officially launched in August on the island of Ventotene, the new document includes notable general observations on the value and importance of federalism, regionally and globally. For instance, it points out that "federalism advocates democracy without borders to deliver peace and shared prosperity. While borders are arbitrary divisions of humankind resulting from history, federalists also recognise that nation-states are the building blocks of regional federations and ultimately of a global one".

The document has four main sections that elaborate on the realisation of the 1941 *Ventotene Manifesto*, the limits of intergovernmentalism and "the end of the Lisbon decade"; the crisis of "postmodern civilization"; reform of the global society and federal union as the tasks of the post-pandemic and post-war era; and finally a new federalist strategy in the current political situation.

Call for a constitutional convention
While the manifesto outlines the "significant and decisive steps towards a more united Europe" that European institutions have taken over decades, such as the abolishment of customs barriers and free movement, the common market, direct elections of the European Parliament, the adoption of a single currency, competition policy, and, most recently, efforts for a "European health union", it is pointed out, among other things, that the EU still "lacks a single foreign policy and armed forces under its sole command".

Further, it notes that "despite the advances in EU labour legislation, social Europe remains underdeveloped, since the European Pillar of Social Rights is not binding, and inert also in the field of minimum wages at the Union level. The power to tax remains exclusively in the hands of Member States and the European Parliament lacks the power to initiate legislation".

In short, the manifesto concludes that the EU at this time "remains a hybrid entity that combines intergovernmental and federalist features, thereby posing some fundamental dilemmas in the domains of democratic legitimacy and capacity to act". It calls for a convention that drafts a federal constitution for the EU and transforms it into "a federal government". Without a constitution, the manifesto says, "citizens are not sovereign".

Towards a global federation

The European vision of the manifesto is based on a strong cosmopolitan perspective which is explained in the introduction and touched on throughout the document. "We, the inhabitants of planet Earth, constitute a single humanity", is one of the paradigmatic statements right at the beginning. It says that "public goods and bads" can only "be addressed effectively through a system of democratic supranational governance" – one that expands to the entire planet. "Whoever is born on planet Earth, is a citizen of the world", it states, and all need to be granted "full and equal global citizenship rights".

The *Ventotene Manifesto* already identified world federation as a second-tier goal but did not elaborate on the subject. The new document provides a detailed vision of global

political integration and supports two parallel and complementary strategies: on the one hand, "the creation of continental democratic regional proto-federations inspired by the EU example", and on the other, a reform of the UN system "to make it more effective and democratic."

On the latter subject, the manifesto endorses, as a first step, the creation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly. "This body should evolve towards a World Parliament elected directly by the citizens", it says. And further:

Created by the UN General Assembly and merely of a consultative nature at first, over time it can be an engine to promote a reform of the UN Charter (already foreseen in its Articles 108 and 109) into a federal democratic world constitution. The cornerstone of this constitution could be a two-chamber global parliament vested with legislative rights on critical global issues: one chamber elected by the world citizens and the other composed of representatives of Member States.

Federalism and democracy

The manifesto includes an unequivocal commitment to democracy and its role in federalist strategies. It points out, quite clearly, that "federalism and autocracy cannot be reconciled". Thus, "the democratic nature of the resulting global federation as well as its constituent parts is the only option". According to the document, "European federalism and world federalism are inherently tied to developing, strengthening and defending democracy, human rights and the rule of law".

The manifesto is an immensely important platform to guide federalists in Europe and the world in their struggle for European and global unification.

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[1] https://thespinelligroup.eu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/20220912_Proposal-Manifesto-for-a-Federal-Europe-political-social-and-ecological.pdf
[2] https://thespinelligroup.eu/

Video Lectures on Global Democracy. Aiming for a Way Forward*

Joseph Preston Baratta

Oded Gilad and Dena Freeman (Eds.)
Global Democracy and Justice Lecture Series
Video series online at https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC-T9ARgZNGjF3lLhpmFFoTw
The work is available in paperback from Democracy Without Borders as *Global Democracy: The Key to Global Justice* (2022).

The last time such resolute and polished advocacy of global democracy – that is, of world federal government – was produced, came with the founding of United World Federalists and the World Federalist Movement in the aftermath of the Second World War (1947). Or perhaps with Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn's *World Peace through World Law*, when the Cold War seemed to have closed down any historic opportunity for such an innovation in world affairs (1958). This series of 25 illustrated lectures, each of about 10–25 minutes, is organized into four themes:
- Developing a Global Framework,
- Problems of Current International System,
- Key World Federalist Thinkers,
- Ways Forward.

The first lecture, on *Federalism*, is a fine introduction, and I found the 3rd, on the *History and Future of Democracy*, the 10th, on *Economic Inequality*, and the 19th, on *Debunking the Objections to Global Democracy*, particularly informative and moving. Since I am a historian of the movement, I really perked up when I heard,

"History is the story of diverse people recognizing their unity and coming together." The 25th lecture, on *Pathways to World Federation*, is full of practical next steps for activists. Another video (in effect a 26th) records the lectures' launch event[1], providing a comprehensive introduction. There is not a word of the old world federalist rhetoric of "one world or none," or "world government, the only solution to the threat of atomic holocaust." The arguments are fresh and contemporary. These lectures will be of particular value to teachers of young people, who relate better to videos than to reading, and they will make the scholars of international relations squirm, particularly Thomas G. Weiss of the global-governance school.

But we must be on guard against disappointment. The young people who flock to this revived *world federalist movement* must be prepared for the resistance of the defenders of the sovereign state system, and of national patriots who cannot see the need for a more perfect union of humanity. The response of the current President of the U.N. General Assembly, Abdulla Shahid (Maldives, a sovereign state, population 540,000), to the UN75 proposals casts a warning. After consultations with member states, he rejected almost all of them. (One that he accepted was "Taking into account the Multidimensional Variability Index for small island developing states.") Even the Stimson Center, in its "Road to 2023[2]," has watered down the proposed U.N. Parliamentary Assembly – a second chamber of the General Assembly elected by the people, the most fundamental reform of the U.N. – to a U.N. Parliamentary Network.

If global public opinion grows to the point of alarming the guardians of the status quo, world federalists and budding world citizens must expect the most vicious and ultimately violent resistance. Hence, I propose in the remainder of this review to draw attention to other substantial studies of the global crises with proposals for popular solutions, including world federation. Many others have been thinking of ways forward:
- Farsan Ghassim, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi,

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and Luis Cabrera, *"Public Opinion on Institutional Designs for the United Nations: An International Survey Experiment,"* International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 66, No. 3 (September 2022), 1-9.

- Stimson Center, *Beyond UN75: A Roadmap for Inclusive, Networked and Effective Global Governance*, June 2021.

- Augusto Lopez-Claros et al., *Global Governance and the Emergence of Global Institutions for the 21st Century* (Cambridge University Press, 2020).

- Jo Leinen and Andreas Bummel, *A World Parliament: Governance and Democracy in the 21st Century* (Berlin: Democracy without Borders, 2018).

- Joseph Schwartzberg, *Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2013).

- Farsan Ghassim and colleagues sampled surveys[3] of populations in Argentina, China, India, Russia, Spain, and the United States on issues of U.N. design, including decision making, bindingness of decisions, enforcement, and sources of revenue. Their social scientific method complemented a U.N. survey in 2020 of some 50,000 people in 82 countries for its 75th anniversary report, *"UN75: The Future We Want, the United Nations We Need."* Generally, they found that public opinion leans toward "supra-nationalist and cosmopolitan ideals," while national policymakers and commentators "resonate less with aggregate public preferences." In brief, they found empirically that the public desires democratizing the U.N., just as Freeman and Gilad showed it contentiously. They predict ideological struggle in the domestic politics of key countries.

- The Stimson Center's report[4] very ably set out some twelve goals for public action, such as *"We will protect our planet."* Great efforts were described to influence the General Assembly on the road to a "2023 World Summit on Inclusive Global Governance," which, as we have seen, seems not on track. A Stimson follow-up urges the NGO (civil society) community to get to work, lest the "Pact for the Future" suffer the same disappointment of the 2005 summit on U.N. reform.

- Augusto Lopez Claros, winner of the $600,000 prize of Sweden's Global Challenges Foundation, has masterfully laid out a program of action[5] toward quite radical U.N reforms, ultimately to give the General Assembly primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In short, world democracy, exactly like that of Freeman and Gilad. The book is virtually a primer on the massive problem of U.N. reform, notably Chapter 21, "Some Immediate Steps Forward – Getting from Here to There."

- Leinen and Bummel, proponents of a U.N. Parliamentary Assembly alongside the General Assembly, similarly lay out the practical next steps to global democracy. Their privately funded organization, *Democracy Without Borders*[6], is leading citizen action.

- Lastly, Joseph Schwartzberg, in a book now becoming dated in a crowded field, is full of guidance to activists, as in Chapter 15, "Getting There."

One practical next step would be to send the lectures to the World Social Forum, which has never endorsed world federation as a goal for action. The authors suggest that the videos be used to watch alone or in a group, in discussions and debates, in book clubs, seminars, and classrooms, mixed with other sites like those on climate change, and in short on all social media.

* Posted to The World Orders Forum on 21 October 2022. The article can also be found at: https://www.wgresearch.org/_files/ugd/bdf8dc_dbb164840d6e4e62aa563b4b8536c1f1.pdf

[1] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYC_Z6rS800

[2] https://ggin.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/GGIN-Report-061322-WEB2.pdf

[3] https://academic.oup.com/isq/article/66/3/sqac027/6649353

[4] https://ggin.stimson.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/GGIN-Report-061721-1.pdf

[5] https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/global-governance-and-the-emergence-of-global-institutions-for-the-21st-century/global-governance-and-the-emergence-of-global-institutions-for-the-21st-century/F267127E1797751C92A418EE7B5D371A

[6] https://www.democracywithoutborders.org

Why It Is Necessary to Tame Artificial Intelligence and Further International Cooperation

Stefano Rossi

Yuval Noah Harari
21 Lessons for the 21st Century
Random UK, 2018

After having explored the history of humanity with his bestseller *"Sapiens"*, the Israeli anthropologist Y. N. Harari measures himself with twenty-one lessons supposed to be leading humanity through the troubled waters of this century.

The book is divided into twenty-one chapters, each of them dealing with a macro-theme. The first four chapters focus on the technological challenges that humanity is facing and will face in the coming decades. The choice to put the technological challenge as the first in his work, is well justified by the magnitude and the complexity of the opportunities and problems that technology can bring to humanity. Even if the author tries to describe it in "neutral terms", the shades overcome the lights.

First, it is likely that Artificial Intelligence (AI) will make human jobs disappear. Whereas automation relieved humans from the most basic and hard tasks, AI seems to go in such a direction that humans could be replaced in all kinds of jobs – particularly the more creative ones. Lawyers and doctors, musicians and painters: AI will do it better soon. In such a scenario, as Paul Mason

pointed out in his *"Post Capitalism"*, the traditional link between jobs and income would be broken, producing in our societies a structural change that is already starting to be felt, e.g. see the evident need to create some forms of universal basic income. The disappearance of jobs would lead to a society where humans will be simply irrelevant, deprived of any economic or political power, in an economy governed by intelligent robots trading among themselves according to algorithms written by AI itself.

Human jobs will not be the only victims of that technological challenge. Personal freedom could be killed by Big Data. If it is true that Big Data knows you better than yourself, mixing Big Data with the new technology's developments would allow the most powerful result never achieved before. To put it with Harari's formula: B x C x D = AHH!, biological knowledge multiplied by computing power multiplied by data equals the ability to hack humans. It is to say that a human will not be in a position to make personal choices anymore, as AI will make them on his behalf before he would even realize that a choice was given. Even ethical dilemmas will be solved by AI – as the self-driven vehicles technology has already shown (*"Whom shall they protect in an accident?"*).

Moreover, the capacity to collect huge amounts of highly detailed personal data makes it possible to usher in a widespread and effective surveillance over people. If Big Data will be at the service of concentrated, non-democratic political powers, the freedom of people all over the world could be at stake (a "digital dictatorship" could arise). The author has no solutions to this scenario, as the concentration of data in the hands of either a public power (governments) or a private power (Zuckerberg) would bear high risks. Thus, the main political issue in the near future could be the property of data and the ways in which it can be controlled. It is interesting to notice that these kinds of issues are being tackled by EU regulations in these years, with the GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation) leading the way.

To complete that (worrying) future scenario, Harari explains how the biotechnological developments could produce great inequality in the world. We have always defined inequality as an unequal distribution of wealth; but within this century, inequality could be measured in terms of physical capacity of the human bodies. Will a rich class with enhanced bodies – smarter, more resistant, and more powerful, living hundreds of years – dominate a poor class of "simple Sapienses"?

According to the author, if biological and information technologies threaten the core of the modern values of freedom and equality, a "global cooperation" is required. But nationalism, religions and cultures make it very hard to achieve such cooperation at world level.

The second part of the book tackles then the political challenge, starting from the necessity to rebuild the off-line communities, put at risk by the on-line connections.

To this end, Harari argues that a "global civilization" already exists, based on worldwide, shared sets of beliefs: the US Dollar, science, and technology. Nevertheless, resurgent nationalism and religious extremism (often exploited for national interests) are affecting the capacity of the Sapiens to cooperate at world level. Harari recognizes that there are some existential challenges that can be governed only at world level (the technological, ecological, and nuclear challenges), and that it is necessary to *"globalize our politics"*, but the lesson on how to achieve that goal is not given in the book. In half a page, the author settles the point by saying that a "global government" is an undesirable and unrealistic project and that we should instead ask our local and national politicians how they intend to tackle the three global challenges – and not vote for them if they have no strategy.

But how can local or national politicians address and govern global issues? It is not within his/her democratic mandate, and he/she has no effective tools to do it. Therefore, the author thinks it is realistic and desirable that national politics try to govern the global issues by finding some form of international cooperation, after having (correctly) proved that: (i) there already exists a single worldwide civilization; (ii) nation-states are not a natural or eternal component in human history; and (iii) nationalism has no feasible plan to govern the technological, ecological, and nuclear challenges. A great contradiction is raised and remains unsolved. Even for a great thinker of our century, it is easier to imagine a world dominated by AI than the overcoming of a system based on nation-states governments.

Here, the federalist thinking can help find solutions to create the political tools to govern global issues, overcoming the blocking by nation-states and bringing about *"international cooperation"* with its proposal of international democracy. A debate with the author could be fruitful, and a twenty-second lesson (the federalist one) could be well integrated in Harari's brilliant work.

It would be interesting to understand what Harari thinks when he speaks of *"global government"*, and to point out that a federal global government could be a practical solution to avoid the concentration of powers the author is so worried about. On the one hand, it would allow to preserve the different levels of national and local governments and make them resilient to the great changes this century will bring, without concentrating too much power in a single level of government. On the other hand, it would balance the already concentrated and unregulated private global powers, bringing the rule of law at global level. Speaking of the rule of law, if – as Harari sustains – a global civilization does exist, we should ask ourselves why the world citizens have no right to vote in relation to that global constituency. It must be observed, indeed, that the right to vote – affirmed since centuries, with various degrees of implementation, as a fundamental

human right – can be defined only in relation to a specific constituency (otherwise, it is just a theoretical tool with no connection to reality). In a world where the only constituency recognized is the national one, it is correct that the people are given the right to vote at national level. But to the extent we recognize that a united worldwide civilization has emerged, the fundamental right to vote is systematically violated if the people are denied the vote at global level.

Many other reasonings can be carried out regarding the effectiveness, legitimacy, and feasibility of a global democratic government within a multilevel governance system. Hopefully, the pressing challenges highlighted by Harari will help share the urgency and necessity of starting to build together, as Sapiens, the political tools for the 21st century.

A History of France Revisited by Its Famous Foreigners

Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Patrick Lemoine
Français mais pas Gaulois - Des étrangers qui ont fait la France [French but not Gauls – Foreigners who have made France; in French*]*
Robert Laffont, Paris, 2023

A history of France from the 20th century to the present day, original and subjective, through the prism of its famous foreigners. "I was born on April 4, 1945, in Montauban to German parents, who waited more than six months to declare my coming into this world – too late! This made me a stateless person, who grew up in the 15th *arrondissement* of Paris with the last black hussars of the Republic, was an unconditional supporter of Raymond

Kopa's French team in 1958, before arriving in Frankfurt and taking German nationality... to avoid military service. Returned to France for my studies, I was expelled in May 1968 – a residence ban lifted ten years later.

Since then, my life has been a sort of bridge between Germany and France, and in 2015 I obtained the right to become French as well. Being able to play with both shirts now corresponds quite well to my state of mind: France owes a lot to its foreigners, without whom its history would have been completely different. Thus, it is also the Great History which takes shape through them: because all arrived according to the political, economic, scientific, cultural movements... and also sport movements".

It is this journey that the two authors retrace, stopping here with an Émile Zola dying at the dawn of the Belle Époque, there at the crowning in Cannes of the movie *Indigènes* by Rachid Bouchareb; and, always, at the side of these men and women who, coming from elsewhere, have for one hundred and fifty years contributed to the glorious and laborious endeavor of making that country.

But this book, apparently historical and matter-of-fact, brings out two themes that in the present time are quite hot in France and in other countries too: that of national and cultural identity, and that of immigration. So it prompted in France many interviews in TV talk programs, articles in the press and, alas, hate-messages in social media, also because, perhaps, the author Cohn-Bendit (one of the leaders in 1968 of the students movement, then elected four times to the European Parliament, and now Vice-President of the Greens) is still a well-known, if evidently divisive, public figure both in France and in Germany. On this occasion, however, he acted simply as the voice of reason, using also a bit of the charisma he still possesses.

All in all, books like this one can be a welcome counterbalance to the irrational arguments of the nationalists. *(l.c.)*

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