



The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

- EDITORIAL
- COMMENTS
- BORDERLESS DEBATE
- FEDERALIST ACTION
- BOOK REVIEWS
- INTERVIEW

EDITORIAL

- The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Organization of Peace Yesterday and Today *Lucio Levi*
4

COMMENTS

- Berlin: from Wall to Gateway *Enrique Barón Crespo*
7
- Political Education in Germany *Alessandro Cavalli*
12
- A Middle East Helsinki Conference: NGO Action Needed *Rene Wadlow*
17
- The EU's Reform Proposal for the International Trade Dispute Resolution *Andrea Cofelice*
19
- For a European Migration-Policy *Alfonso Sabatino and Antonio Longo*
21
- Federalism is the Only Solution to Problems Facing Hong Kong and Kashmir *W. James Arputharaj*
25
- The Amazon: neither Savage, nor the World's Lungs or Granary *Leonardo Boff*
27
- Ursula Hirschmann, a Woman for the United States of Europe *Giulio Saputo*
29
- The Disappearance of Immanuel Wallerstein *Giampiero Bordino*
31
- Alexandre Lamfalussy: Founding Father and Wise Man behind the Euro *Ivo Maes*
33

BORDERLESS DEBATE
FOUR CHALLENGES THE EU IS FACING AFTER THE EUROPEAN ELECTIONS

What Remains To Be Done *Antonio Padoa Schioppa*

37

Towards a European Political Space *Pierre Jouvenat*

39

A Defense without a State Doesn't Have a Sense, but even a State without Defense.

Towards a New Form of European Statehood? *Domenico Moro*

43

A Green New Deal for the New European Legislature *Alberto Majocchi*

46

FEDERALIST ACTION

UN Parliamentary Assembly Model Tested in Buenos Aires *Clara Subirachs*

48

BOOK REVIEWS

The European Council, Improvisation and the Politics of Events *Jean-Guy Giraud*

49

A Novel about the Beginnings of the Ventotene Manifesto *Mario Leone*

51

For a Global Multilevel Participatory Democracy *Giampiero Bordino*

53

For a Reasonable Governance of the World *Antonio Mosconi*

55

INTERVIEW

Highlights and Achievements of the World Federalist Movement during the Last 25 Years.

An Interview with Bill Pace *Fergus Watt*

60

CONTRIBUTORS

64

The Fall of the Berlin Wall and the Organization of Peace Yesterday and Today

Lucio Levi

Thirty years ago on November 9, 1989 freedom celebrated one of the most splendid victories ever occurred in history. The fall of the Berlin wall, the collapse of the communist regimes and the dismantlement of the iron curtain paved the way to the end of the Cold War and the unification of East and West Germany and Eastern and Western Europe. The end of the Cold War was welcomed as the beginning of an era of peace. The enthusiasm generated by that event led, on the wake of a famous book by Fukuyama, to interpret it as the achievement of a stable social condition based on a universal consent on the principles of liberal democracy and capitalism, the final stationary stage of human history, “the end of history” (Hegel). It was indeed a dream with open eyes, but it is undeniable that a significant progress on the way of international cooperation and reduction of mass destruction weapons was accomplished. Reagan and Gorbachev agreed that peace is the first priority of our time and reached important results on the way of the elimination of mass destruction weapons, notably the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.

The purpose of the Russian and American governments was to act jointly as sponsors of a new global order in pursuit of peace. Like the Franco-German reconciliation after WWII, that paved the way to the construction of common institutions (starting from the European Coal and Steel Community), the preliminary condition of

the Russo-American entente was mutual trust, which was the building bloc of Gorbachev’s visionary project of a European Common Home including Western and Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union and the United States. Gorbachev’s project was based on two new strategic concepts – mutual security and non-offensive defense – and led to start in 1994 the Partnership for Peace, a program of bilateral cooperation between NATO and Russia.

But the process was interrupted by the United States, which, convinced to have won the Cold War, adopted an aggressive policy towards Russia and pursued the design of becoming a world empire. Since this plan rested on a mistaken perception of world power relations, it failed. Trump has chosen the way of nationalism withdrawing the US from arms control, international trade and environmental treaties and agreements. Unexpectedly, after the fall of the Berlin wall, new walls have been erected, more policemen have been deployed at state borders, more refugees have been rejected. A new political cycle, inspired by the illusion that the return to nationalism can offer protection against the fears and dangers generated by globalization, has begun. It is worth reminding a concomitant phenomenon we can call “cultural degradation”, which characterizes the new era: the fact that the results of scientific research are questioned and rejected by right wing political leaders, first of all as regards the protection of

the environment and combating climate change. It is an alarming symptom of the cultural regression of our time and, at the same time, of the weight of short-term economic interests. To sum up the growing international tensions, the return of power politics and international anarchy make us fear that war could return.

The only alternative to this reactionary ideology is adjusting political institutions to the global dimensions acquired by markets and civil society, so that it becomes possible to govern globalization. This shows that the clash between nationalism and federalism is the leitmotif of the post-Cold War era. This is the most significant message transmitted to us by the *Ventotene Manifesto*.

The stabilizing role played by the EU after the fall of the Berlin wall is underestimated. Actually, without the enlargement of the EU to the East, civil wars and ethnic conflicts would have torn apart the whole Eastern Europe. Only the former Yugoslavia and Ukraine have experienced what generally occurs when empires fall: a blood bath. The EU can potentially be the promoter of the construction of a common space of confidence and security with Russia to be extended in the future to the other protagonists of world politics. The need for a global plan for peace and security is vital as the old arms control treaties have become obsolete since they do not include the EU, China and India.

* * *

While the 30th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall is approaching, the question of the protection of freedom and human rights is again at the centre of political debate. The challenge comes from the so-called “illiberal democracies”, which in the 21st century are expanding their influence. Several neo-liberal leaders have turned their back to the democratic principles and shifted their support towards authoritarian, nationalist

and racist ideas. This is what Trump in the United States, Putin in Russia, Bolsonaro in Brazil, Orbán in Hungary, Erdoğan in Turkey, Modi in India, and Duterte in the Philippines represent in different forms.

In an interview given to *The Financial Times* during the G20 summit meeting held in Japan last June, Vladimir Putin has asserted that “the liberal idea has become obsolete. It has come into conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population”. Indeed, Putin’s claim describes only a part of the truth. In fact, as recorded in *Freedom in the World 2019*, the latest report of Freedom House, 2018 is the 13th consecutive year of decline in global freedom. But the general retreat of democracy does not mean that the principles of freedom, rule of law and human rights have failed. To mention only one example, the mass demonstrations held in Hong Kong against Chinese rule show that the force of attraction of democratic values continues to be powerful. Actually, the real reason why liberal democracies are losing consent lies in the fact that they continue to apply their principles only at the national level and have failed to broaden the scope of their values and institutions at the international level.

What is obsolete is the nation state and its survival in the globalization era. The fact is that private centres of power such as global finance, multinational corporations, or criminal organisations have taken a global size and acquired an increasing freedom of action with regard to the regulating power of states. Here lies the root of the decline of the sovereign state, that will be overcome only through the establishment of new forms of statehood at regional and world level. This is the condition that will allow to restore the pre-eminence of politics toward global markets and global civil society.

According to federalist theory, the limit of the national model lies in the exclusive character

of national solidarity, which does not tolerate any loyalty towards communities that are smaller or larger than the nation itself. The federal model is an institutional formula that allows for the coexistence of solidarity towards territorial communities of different size, that may range from small local communities to the entire world. The federal model has to be seen as the overcoming, not as the destruction, of the national model.

It is a reorganization of government in two directions: towards the top and towards the bottom. In fact, the federalist design improves on the limitations of national democracy which is in decline owing to its excessive concentration of power in the hands of national governments. This improvement is achieved by adding new levels of government, popular participation and citizenship, both above and within the nations.

Berlin: from Wall to Gateway

Enrique Barón Crespo

30 years ago, the Berlin Wall, which had transformed the Hellenic Brandenburg Gate from the historical access to the city into an impassable barrier, fell. With symbolic intent, the quadriga crowning the gate, which once Napoleon had taken to Paris, was turned to face the other way. Not only were a city and a country divided by an iron curtain, but a continent and a world were cut in two as a result of the Yalta and Potsdam Conferences. At 169 kilometers, the Berlin Wall was the most visible part of this iron curtain, which stretched 1800 kilometers across Germany and into Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Even so, it was much shorter than the Great Wall of China, at 6770 kilometers. In the long term, the common element shared by these structures was their ineffectiveness in trying to stem the tide, even though they have left a lasting impression, and not just in physical terms.

My contribution will focus on the European dimension of the events, based on my experience as President of the European Parliament (EP) at the time. My intention is not simply to give an autobiographical account, as, right from the start, it was the EP the European forum in which the issue was publicly and openly debated. [...]

In 1989 a series of signs had suggested that the Soviet Bloc was a pressure cooker about to blow. The borders of the Soviet Union had been defined by Stalin at Yalta and Potsdam, where he had imposed his map of Central and Eastern Europe with a traditional imperial political and military logic, according to which: 'whoever occupies a territory also imposes his own social system as far as his army can reach. It cannot be otherwise'. In 1945, the Soviet Army had reached the heart of Berlin – the

Reichstag – next to the Brandenburg Gate. This hugely emblematic location was where the famous photo of the Russian soldier flying his flag over the ruins was taken.

At the heart of the empire, Gorbachev's policy of *perestroika* (restructuring) and *glasnost* (transparency), which was welcomed more in the West than at home, had delivered the immortal warning 'life punishes those who come too late' to the *apparatchik* Erich Honecker, veteran leader of the German Democratic Republic. He was overthrown on 18 October, three weeks before the fall of the Wall. In the meantime, the ever-rebellious Poland had held elections in April, with 99% of the votes going to Solidarity, resulting in the formation of the Mazowiecki government. In the summer, Gyula Horn had pierced the barrier between Hungary and Austria, and tourists from East Germany were occupying the West German embassies and escaping to the West. Mass demonstrations were also occurring in Czechoslovakia.

These fundamental seismic movements were penetrating to the very hearts of leaders and citizens who, in the main, had lived through the war. Faced with these events, positive reactions came immediately from Chancellor Kohl, supported by President Bush Senior and Felipe González, together with deafening silences that reflected the fears of returning to the past and the desire to maintain a 'status quo', as expressed in Mauriac's cynical comment: 'I love Germany so much that I am glad there are two of them'.

After making an initial welcoming statement, I convened an extraordinary meeting of the Enlarged Bureau (the body that at the time brought together the Conference of Presidents

and the EP Bureau) one week later, on 16 November, to decide on our response. [...] The proposal made was to welcome these events, which were in line with the commitment to respect the fundamental rights of individuals, as recognised in the founding Treaties, including the right to free movement and also self-determination through free and fair elections. The decision made was to support the informal meeting that was to be held by the European Council in Paris under the French Presidency, to request the French Foreign Minister, Roland Dumas, to report on this meeting, and to accept the invitation of the President of the *Volkskammer* to visit the German Democratic Republic (GDR).

At the same time, [...] I sent invitations to President Mitterrand and Chancellor Kohl. This invitation for them to appear together was unprecedented. Both immediately accepted. One week later, following the announcement that the Sakharov Prize was to be awarded to Alexander Dubcek, the President-in-Office of the Council, President Mitterrand, and Chancellor Kohl appeared together. [...]

President Mitterrand [...] stated that on 9 November in Berlin, history in action had offered the world the spectacle, which had been unlikely even the day before, of a breach in the Wall that, for nearly 30 years, had in itself symbolised the fractures in our continent. On that day, democracy and freedom had won one of their most wonderful victories. The people had spoken; their voices had crossed borders and broken the silence of an order that they had not wanted and that they aspired to reject in order to recover their identities.

After indicating his excitement, welcoming Chancellor Kohl and expressing his regard for Gorbachev for the role that he had played, President Mitterrand placed the issue in a moment of reflection, in a joint analysis of the consequences for the European balance, and also the willingness of the Community and its members to assist the Eastern Bloc countries

that 'have made commitments to themselves'. His conclusions with regard to the future concerned the very future of the Community itself and the common values which were demanded and which knew no bounds. His first conclusion involved 'affirming our own identity as a Community in order to open up to the East', which 'absolutely depends on the political will to show that, in the end, it is political unity that has prevailed over all the actions taken since the founders conceived the European idea'. [...]

Aware that 'nothing is ever enough; nothing can ever be done quickly enough', he suggested measures to accompany the reform movement, such as the creation of a Bank for the development of Eastern Europe, the extension of training programmes such as Erasmus, and the admission of countries to the Council of Europe and GATT. He highlighted the need to be ready, at the imminent European Council in Strasbourg in December, 'to successfully complete the fundamental plans that will allow our Europe to equip itself with the necessary economic and monetary, social and environmental policy tools and also to complete the internal market'. [...]

For his part, Chancellor Kohl started by saying that 'in Western Europe, the Member States of the Community are actively preparing for the challenge of the 21st century, in which, thanks to the internal market of 320 million people, we can move towards the political union that we cherish and that must be achieved'. He then went on to examine the changes that were occurring with dizzying speed across the continent. He expressed his appreciation of Gorbachev's *perestroika*, which, for the first time since the end of the Second World War, was encouraging the justified hope of an end to the East-West conflict and of lasting stability based around a common freedom for the whole of Europe, 'to which not only London, Rome, The Hague, Dublin and Paris belong, but also Warsaw, Budapest, Prague and Sofia,

and also of course Berlin, Leipzig and Dresden'. After commenting on the progress made by Poland and Hungary, he said that 'the desire for freedom among the Germans of East Berlin and the GDR has brought a peaceful end to the Wall and the barbed wire, with a celebration of coming together, mutual belonging and unity'. 'Those Germans who in the end have come together in a spirit of freedom will never be a threat, but solely a benefit to the unity of Europe.' 'The division of Germany has always been a visible and particularly painful expression of the division of Europe. However, the unity of Germany will only be achieved if we can unify our old continent. German policy and European policy are inseparable. They are two sides of the same coin.' [...]

In conclusion, he felt it necessary to explain the philosophy of the GDR, whose government was holding fast to the goal identified by Adenauer of 'a free and united Germany in a free and united Europe', which was a dual constitutional obligation enshrined in the German Basic Law (*Grundgesetz*). He emphasised that the task had a 'European global dimension'.

The tenor of the speeches made by the political group representatives was generally supportive. [...] Valéry Giscard d'Estaing started his speech by confirming that 'today will perhaps mark the political birth of the EP, at a time when the tide of freedom is flooding across Eastern Europe'. The response should be 'to speed up the union of the Community and provide massive Community aid to the Eastern Bloc countries, subject to two vital conditions: not to run any unnecessary risks in terms of military alliances that could threaten peace, and to speed up the union of the Community in order to achieve a modern federalism based on subsidiarity'. He concluded that explicit support should be given to German reunification, not as a pretext for changing the Community, but as an incentive for its union in order to offer a framework for the political reunification of

the German people. [...]

The Commission President, Jacques Delors, after welcoming the events and assuming responsibility for implementing the measures proposed by President Mitterrand, [...] as a militant pro-European, expressed his conviction that the political cooperation measure adopted by the Council was the most important in the Community's history and that more resources, coordination and speed were needed to ensure that hopes were met. As a result, he said that 'the Community must be strengthened, its proactiveness increased and its integration accelerated; now we must design the architecture for the great Europe'.

The debate ended with an overwhelming majority vote – with only two votes against – for a resolution in which the events in Central and Eastern Europe and the collapse of the Wall due to the people's peaceful aspiration to freedom were warmly welcomed. The resolution recognised the right to self-determination of the GDR's population, including the possibility of becoming part of a unified Germany in a united Europe; it called for a rapid response from the EC in terms of aid and cooperation for Central and Eastern Europe, 'within which institutional ties may be offered to all those countries that are interested in it' (a timid euphemism for accession); and, last but not least, it insisted on the importance of a mutual security policy and disarmament negotiations on the eve of the Bush-Gorbachev Summit. Chancellor Kohl commented at a later date on his astonishment at the firm Socialist support, both in the EP and among the Heads of Government in that political family, for the resolution of the German question.

The debate in the EP was important due to its timeliness, namely less than two weeks after the fall of the Wall, and particularly due to the nature of its participants: leaders and parliamentarians who had mostly lived through, participated in or suffered from the Second World War. Most Germans, members

of the largest population in the centre of the continent, without any defined borders but with a strong cultural and historical identity, cherished the hope of reunification. For many others, the prospect of a unified and powerful Germany, which could once again adopt its '*Sonderweg*' or special path, was seen as a threat. However, both the atmosphere and the result showed that the Community spirit had become deep-rooted among Western Europeans and also that it constituted a legitimate aspiration for those excluded from power by the construction of such an indestructible wall as an iron curtain, as I had the honour of saying directly on behalf of the EP before the democratically elected parliaments of Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.

The words and silences of Mitterrand and Kohl during their joint appearance were particularly important. Much has been written and speculated about their differences, although it would have been strange if they had not had any. The important point is that they were able to channel positively and overcome these differences, despite the long history of confrontation, including on a personal level. That is one of the virtues of the Community method, or rather its spirit, which made it possible for Pierre Uri, a French philosophy professor who was persecuted by the Vichy Regime, to draft the Treaty of Rome from beginning to end, under the supervision and control of Hans von der Groeben, a senior German civil servant. On 28 November, Kohl announced in the Bundestag his 10-point plan for German unity, which included a plan for a German confederation and its membership of the European Community, thus rejecting the temptation of neutral unity. The parties in the process of adapting the international treaties had a 2+4 format (the two German states plus the four occupying powers: USA, USSR, Great Britain and France), whereas the European Community dimension involved

12 Member States, and a wider European dimension involved also the CSCE.

Two weeks after this unique public debate, I presented a decalogue of proposals to the European Council in Strasbourg, including enlargement, German unity and the need to add political union to the planned agenda of an Intergovernmental Conference on the Union, decided to lead the way. The role played by the European leaders of the Member States was decisive. Coming from different political perspectives, they were able to understand the extent of the changes in hand and the value of unity. [...]

However, not everything was a bed of roses. Still in December, President Mitterrand made his only official visit to the GDR, at a time of clear tension with Chancellor Kohl, which manifested itself in his non-attendance on 22 December at the formal opening of the Brandenburg Gate, which leads straight into the Pariser Platz. Although accepting the German desire for reunification as legitimate, the French President added 'if they want to and if they can'. Kohl's 10-point plan failed to answer three basic questions: his explicit non-recognition of the Oder-Neisse border with Poland; the speed and format of the reunification process; and also the issue of resulting alliances. One other factor was added: the election on 29 December to the Presidency of the free Czechoslovakia of the writer and resistance fighter Václav Havel. Mitterrand attempted a response with his plan for a Federation within the Community and a Confederation within the Council of Europe. Havel was the first to reject this division.

The acceleration of the process, in which the citizens of the GDR voted with their feet, threatening to provoke a mass exodus, precipitated events. In March, the population of the GDR voted for the first time in free elections, overwhelmingly supporting reunification. At European level, at the Dublin Summit, the Franco-German plan opened the

way to reform. On 1 July, the German political and monetary union became a reality. [...]

On 3 October, the Day of German Unity was celebrated for the first time, with one of the largest mass demonstrations that I have ever witnessed in my life. All protocol and order-keeping services were overwhelmed when faced with the human tide that converged on the Reichstag. In the formal sitting of the Bundestag, the Federal President, Richard von Weiszäcker, placed the Commission President, Jacques Delors, and myself, as EP President, on either side of him. I had the honour of speaking on the same day at the formal sitting held in the Paulskirche in Frankfurt, which had been a sanctuary for German constitutionalism since 1848.

That same month, I spoke in Rome at the European Council meeting at Palazzo Madama, seat of the Senate of the Italian Republic, on the EP's vision for the European process. I made a proposal to actively participate in the negotiations of the future Treaty and expressed concern about the initial signs of implosion in Yugoslavia. [...]

At the next Council meeting, held in the *Sala della Lupa* of Palazzo Montecitorio, we managed to convene the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, in addition to the Intergovernmental Conference on Economic and Monetary Union, which had been the subject of long preparations since 1987. For the first time, our proposal for the European Parliament's participation through

the Preparatory Inter-institutional Conference was accepted, through which we were able to significantly strengthen the democracy and effectiveness of the nascent Union. [...]

Although the tango says that 20 years is nothing, in this case many things have happened. The European Union has grown from 12 to 27 Member States and from 320 million to 500 million citizens. It has a single currency, the euro, which works, which protects us and which, in spite of us, has become a global reserve currency. At this point, we must pay tribute to Chancellor Kohl, who led the way in changing the framework for the euro, against his own public opinion. The EU is a pioneering model for political organizations of the future, in a globalized world based on regional multilateralism. G-20 meetings more closely resemble the European Council than G-7 meetings, due to their organization, paraphernalia and dynamic.

People power peacefully broke down the Wall dividing Europe and the world. However, there are still many mental walls between us in the noble cause that we share. They are more difficult to combat and overcome than physical walls. The laborious gestation of the Treaty of Lisbon, which salvaged the wreck of the Constitutional Treaty, bears witness to this. However, here too, we are breaking down the walls of mistrust and narrow nationalism. It is to be hoped that its implementation throws open an important gateway to the future of a European Union open to the world.

Political Education in Germany*

Alessandro Cavalli

There are many reasons why Germany is a *Sonderfall*, a special case. Also in terms of political education. There is no other country that has done and continues to do as much as Germany to educate citizens about democracy. The causes of this specialty obviously lie in the history of the 1900s and above all, after the defeat of 1945, in the will of the winners to convince (or, perhaps, force) the Germans to change mentality, that is their political culture. The allies (especially American and British) had immediately begun in the territories of their competence an intense work of re-education of the people, that had been dragged into one of the most aberrant forms of totalitarianism. The Germans, at least those who remained in the West, on this side of the iron curtain, took the matter seriously and set up a large number of public but also private organizations, investing substantial intelligences, skills and resources, difficult even to imagine for countries, like Italy, where political education was entrusted almost exclusively to political parties. In Germany too the parties are not absent. Their foundations (also fed by public money) promote various initiatives, aimed above all to train their cadres and their militants. Even private foundations (first of all Bertelsmann and Körber) have been present with numerous initiatives for several decades. However, by far the most active sector is the public institutional network, at both federal and regional levels, which revolves around the BPB (which stands for *Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung*), founded sixty-five years ago and organized within the Federal Ministry of the Interior.¹

Since then, many things have happened; there has also been the '68 movement which, however, not only did not undermine the

building of political education, but rather was even, in a sense, one of its consequences, with the claim of coherence between values and behaviors carried out by the student movement. The one of the sixty-eight has been the first generation not to comply with majority opinion, and to develop what, somewhat rhetorically, is called critical consciousness. It was also the first generation that questioned the responsibilities of the generations of their grandfathers and fathers, whether they had been guilty of crimes, or had acclaimed the *Fuerher*, or had tolerated the wrongdoings without doing anything.

Then, almost thirty years ago, the "unprecedented event" (*unerhoerten Begebenheit*) of the German reunification, as Wolfgang Lepenies wrote at the time, unheard-of because it was unexpected, but also because it allowed one of the most extraordinary social-engineering enterprises in history: the transition from real socialism to capitalism, by the construction from above of a new society and a new state on a territory inhabited by 16.5 million people. The interpretations of this unheard-of event are very different: they go from annexation (*Anschluss*, to recall the ominous fate of Austria in 1938), to adhesion (*Beitritt*) of the GDR to the BRD, or to the simple re-union of what was somehow "forcefully" unified in 1866 by Bismarck's Prussia.

In terms of political education, it was necessary to start from scratch, since the "ossis" (so the fellow citizens of the East were scornfully called in the West) had been subjected to an educational cure of a kind different from, if not opposed to, that of a Western democracy. Educationalists and psychologists were

mobilized, as well as political scientists and sociologists. The courses of “teaching political education” and “teaching social sciences” multiplied in Eastern universities, as happened before in the western ones; the Eastern *Länder* equipped themselves with *Landeszentralen für Politische Bildung*, private foundations extended their interventions, the same did the foundations of the political parties, the professional associations of teachers and all that complex of small and large civil society agencies that deal with youth organizations and policies.

The canon of *politische Bildung* was set in a document signed in 1976 in Beutelsbach, a small municipality in Swabia. This document has obtained the consent of all the political forces of that time and in particular of the Christian democrats, the liberals and the social democrats. The *Beutelsbacher Konsens* is based on three fundamental principles: 1. Political education must have nothing to do with the indoctrination put in place by authoritarian and totalitarian regimes: its purpose is the construction of conscious citizens who know how to form one’s own opinion; 2. It must deal mainly with controversial issues, where different opinions are compared; 3. It must foster commitment and participation. It does not concern, if not indirectly, what Habermas would call “constitutional patriotism”: the “fundamental law” (*Grundgesetz*) is a point of reference, not a normative text to be celebrated, but a text to be discussed, updated and adapted to the changes undergoing in society.

The word and the concept of *Bildung* indicate something more than education and training, they also indicate the acquisition of a rich and well organized mind, not far from what Morin would have called a “head well made”. *Politische Bildung* indicates the formation of a citizen who knows how to consciously take a position and be an active presence in public life, without necessarily being or becoming a professional politician. The term *politische*

Bildung therefore covers a very broad semantic space that goes from education to civil coexistence (courtesy towards all humans and good neighborly relations), civic education or citizenship education (centered above all on constitutionally guaranteed rights and duties), political education proper (which concerns behavior in the political sphere), education for democracy (and therefore a specific form of the political system). The areas of overlap between these different concepts are obviously wide and nevertheless it is appropriate not to hide the lines of distinction.

Germans show a widespread and sound conviction that democracy does not assert itself due to its intrinsic virtues, but must be constantly supported by an education to democracy, capable of forming competent citizens, both cognitively and in terms of the ability to engage in participatory and discursive practices, and to get involved to defend one’s values.

Last March, the 14th Political Education Congress was held in Leipzig, Saxony’s capital, attended by more than a thousand people, officials from state agencies at all levels, youth policy and association workers, scholars and teachers who discussed the role of emotions in politics and society. The theme of emotions, feelings and passions in politics is an ancient and ever present theme, especially in a historical phase in which ideological anchors and trust in institutions have collapsed, and opinions are subject to winds and trends of fashions, leaving those who intend to explain everything with the model of the rational actor dismayed and perplexed. Among the many themes that have been debated in the dozens of workshops which have animated the congress, I would like to point out at least three: the need to link political education at school and outside of school, the need for participatory and active teaching methods, and the connection between political system and political education.

In German schools, to varying degrees and modes from *Land* to *Land*, there is a specific teaching that takes different names, sometimes on a bi-weekly basis, or monthly or otherwise. These are spaces where current events enter the school in their own right. And current affairs are not just about Germany, nor even in the first instance. The focus is on the world, above all on environmental issues, Europe and its neighbors, France and Poland, the traditional enemies of past history, countries with which youth exchange programs have been underway for years.

Particular attention is paid to the need to establish interactions and relationships with the extra-curricular activities of youth, religious, cultural, recreational and sports associations. Welding between school and extra-school matters, so that these are not two mutually extraneous worlds, is a widely discussed topic, the importance of which testifies to the existence of a problem. In Germany, as indeed also elsewhere, it is believed that there should be complementarity and not competition or hostility between these two worlds, disconnection is often perceived as a problem. Take team sports, for example. There is no doubt that they are contexts where respect for rules, respect for opponents, cooperation and competition can be learned. They are all traits (in the language of modern educational thinking one should speak of "competences") that have to do directly with political culture, and it is not surprising that much care is devoted to the training of all those who, in school and outside, deal with young people. Just think of the relevance that, for example in the field of political socialization, do have the coaches who deal with sports in late childhood and adolescence, and who are adult reference figures whose authority is often greater than that of parents or teachers.

The same applies to the many musical activities that are part of the school context: choirs, orchestras and youth jazz bands populate

the scholastic panorama almost like sporting activities, and their organization functions as a laboratory / training ground of civil virtues that do not have directly to do with "politics" in the strict sense, but are somehow the premise to it. Leafing through a magazine specializing in the field, we realize that, in addition to the purpose of training in listening to and practicing music, a considerable space is dedicated to the transversal competences of the social behavior that making music together involves. In sport, cooperation serves to "team up" for a competition; even in the case of music the competitive element is not entirely absent, but is accompanied by the idea of a performance where the individual "tunes in" with the group, and this is also "political" in a broad but not improper sense of the term.

The emphasis on building a relationship between school and extra-school has implications for educational action, in the sense that the practice of democracy is based on "doing" as well as "knowing". In this regard, there is no doubt that the pedagogical tradition to which political education is linked is that from Pestalozzi to Dewey, and cooperative learning. Democracy cannot be taught (and learned) by listening to a lesson and reading a textbook. We must learn to dialogue, and also to discuss animatedly, articulating our opinions and listening carefully to and respecting those of others, avoiding, above all, the demonization of those who do not share our positions. Just the opposite of what is learned from television talk shows, where the aim seems to be to prevent the adversary from expressing himself, and where the public is encouraged to take sides with one or the other following one's gut feelings.

Around the *politische Bildung*, also a fairly large publishing sector has gradually emerged: several publishing houses produce teaching material for teachers and students, several magazines are aimed at teachers and an academic audience.

The basic theme that has transversally crossed almost all of the thirteen sections of the congress has certainly been the task of political education in the face of the returning right-wing extremism (the one on the left, at the moment, is of less concern). The institutions of political education in Germany owe their reasons for existence to the fight against extremism, right and left. First, Germans had to overcome National Socialism, and come to terms with their own past, then they had to act as a bulwark against communism, that had conquered part of the country; now they must face a new threat, the Euro-sceptical neo-nationalism fuelled by hostility towards immigrants and the fear of Islam. A new problem arises for public institutions of political education. How in the long run, with taxpayers' money, will it be possible to pursue the goal of countering right-wing extremism, racism, anti-Semitism, anti-Islamism, when the party that supports these stances has won in the political elections of 2017, in a democratically legitimate way, as many as 94 seats in the federal parliament? It is unlikely that the voters of *Alternative für Deutschland* and the elected parliamentarians would recognize themselves in the *Beutelsbacher Konsens*. It does not appear that the *Bundeszentrale* so far has been subjected to explicit public attack or criticism by the AfD. It is unpredictable what will happen in the future and this will depend a lot on how the German political system will evolve in the passage from a sort of attenuated bipolarity (that has allowed the alternation between periods of "big coalition" and periods of center-right or center-left governments) to a multi-party system where from time to time composite coalitions could be established, with or without the exclusion of the extreme formations of right and left.

It is important to observe how today the *Bundeszentrale*, in the materials it makes available to its public, addresses the issue of right-wing extremism. It cannot avoid addressing this

issue for the simple fact that fighting against extremism is, I repeat, the *raison d'être* of the institution itself. It recently published two dossiers on extremism and right-wing populism on its site. The first begins with excerpts from three video interviews with three experts, two political scientists and a social psychologist, who define the phenomenon (7-8-minutes), another interview follows with a German sociologist of Turkish origin on the subject of "racism", then follow 5 texts (roughly 10 pages each) of historians, biologists, psychologists, sociologists on different aspects of racism, other video-interviews and texts on conspiracy theories, ideologies, anti-Semitism and anti-Islamism, language, group actions extremists, on denial, on organizational practices, on measures to combat the phenomenon. Overall, about ten video-interviews, about a hundred articles, dozens of references to iconic audio and video documentation available in the BPB video library, including a document from the National-Socialist period where somatic traits are described in detail to identify the true Aryans. Similar attention is given to the theme of "populism". Here, however, the perspective is extended to all of Europe, with wide-ranging essays on the phenomenon, articles for each national case, and in the extensive documentation there is also a group photo taken in Koblenz last year at the "international" meeting of populists, in which you see all the leaders with the smiling faces of Marine Le Pen, Geert Wilders and Matteo Salvini at the very center of the picture.

The effort to be clear without being prejudicially accused of partisanship is evident; the German adjective *sachlich* expresses well the intent on the one hand to concreteness and on the other to objectivity. Proceeding along the *Sachlichkeit* ridge requires a delicate balance between impartiality and non-indifference. This explains the wide recourse to the expert opinion of scholars and in particular of historians and social scientists and, where opin-

ions may not coincide, an attempt is made to offer the opportunity for a confrontation that remains within the poles of the democratic sphere. To give an example, the theme of the denial of nazi crimes is not avoided, but what is avoided is giving the floor to negationist exponents, resorting instead to the documentation of controversies on the phenomenon in the judicial context and to the opinion of experts who propose explanations on why and how the phenomenon has presented itself and spread, possibly in a comparative perspective. Orientation towards objectivity does not imply absolute trust in an alleged scientific "truth". The awareness of the limits of objectivity is present and even explicit, but this is not resolved in avoiding controversial questions, but not even in embracing an extreme relativism in which every opinion is recognized as having equal legitimacy. It is clear that the subjectivity

/ neutrality theme constitutes the theoretical pivot around which the system of political education revolves. And it is also a very real and problematic issue. A node that can be tackled, but not resolved, with a (cautious) confidence in the ability of social sciences to offer reliable knowledge on the basis of which to orient the processes of teaching / learning.

The German experience suggests some paths of reflection that can help to tackle the issue of political education also in other countries. They can be summarized in three points: 1. Peoples are not "naturally" democratic, but can be educated and trained in democracy; 2. Politics and democracy cannot be a matter of education if divisive issues are not addressed: the controversial nature of the subject is the basis of politics and democracy; 3. The only possible objectivity is that provided by science, accompanied however by the awareness of its limits.

*A slightly longer and modified version of this paper was published earlier in "Il Mulino", 2019, vol. LXVIII, n. 503, pp. 459-466.

¹ <https://www.bpb.de/>

A Middle East Helsinki Conference: NGO Action Needed

Rene Wadlow

On 23 July 2019, the Russian Government's paper "Collective Security for the Persian Gulf Region" was presented in Moscow by the Deputy Foreign Minister, Mikhail Bogdanov. Bogdanov stated that "The main principles are incrementalism, multilateralism, and strict observation of international law, primarily the U.N. Charter and Security Council resolutions. The looming strategic challenge outlined is creating a holistic mechanism of collective security in the region and cooperation among all the states in the region on an equal basis."

The elimination of extremism and terrorism in the Middle East and ensuring sustainable political settlement in Syria, Yemen and other countries of the region is a priority.

He continued "Over decades, tensions in the Gulf area have persisted. This negatively impacts security, political and economic stability in the region and in the world. New hotbeds of tension are being added to the existing ones. A major centre of the transnational terrorist network has sprung up near the Gulf area."

The Russian proposal for Collective Security for the Persian Gulf follows closely the procedures which led to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and the creation of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. Bogdanov stressed multilateralism as a mechanism for all involved in the assessment of situations, the decision-making process, and the implementation of decisions. This process should begin now as tensions seem to be growing.

"Practical work to launch the security system deployment in the Gulf area can be initiated

through bilateral and multilateral consultations among stakeholders, including regional and extra-regional states, the U.N. Security Council, the League of Arab States, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf. These contacts should lead to the establishment of an action group to prepare an international conference on security and cooperation in the Gulf area. The group is tasked with the geographic coverage of the future security system, its range of participants, agenda, representational level, forum venue as well as with preparing draft decisions, including identification of security, confidence-building and control measures."

For the moment, the Russian proposal lacks three elements which had played an important part of the Helsinki process. The first lacking element is economic cooperation, which was an important motive of the Helsinki Process, as the early 1970s saw ever-greater economic links among European and North American states.

The second missing element was what the Helsinki Process called "the human dimension", which was a code term acceptable to the Soviets for human rights. There were throughout Europe demands for greater liberty of expression, liberty of association, and religious liberty. The Helsinki Accords gave a justification for the safeguard of these expressions of human rights. Some of the early human rights efforts took the name of "Helsinki Watch".

The third missing element in the Gulf proposal, which was important in the Helsinki Process,

is the idea of weaving together of civil society. The early 1970s in Europe was a time when people, especially youth, wanted to be able to meet and discuss, to share their hopes as well as their frustrations. The Helsinki Process was a door opened to civil society to meet, an important factor in breaking down the Cold War divisions which had kept people apart.

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act was the result of three years of nearly continuous negotiations among government representatives meeting for the most part in Geneva, Switzerland. There had been, before the Helsinki negotiations, many years of promotion of better East-West relations by non-governmental peace builders. Although there was no direct access of non-governmental organizations to the Helsinki negotiations, as

the negotiations were carried out in Geneva, those of us who were NGO representative to the U.N. Geneva knew people in most of the U.N. missions who were involved in the Helsinki Process. We could provide working papers which were considered by those negotiating the Helsinki Accord.

Thus, as NGO representatives concerned with peace, stability and justice in the Gulf area, we must be ready to make proposals and to facilitate the negotiating process.

As Mikhail Bogdanov concluded *"Russia is ready to collaborate with all stakeholders in order to implement these and other constructive proposals, with a view to ensuring durable security in the Gulf."* As Citizens of the World, we are certainly stakeholders in this process. We need to be ready to make constructive proposals."

The EU's Reform Proposal for the International Trade Dispute Resolution

Andrea Cofelice

In the current debate on the decay of commercial multilateralism, attention has mainly focused on the crisis of the WTO regulatory authority. Less explored, but equally evident, is the crisis that hit international trade dispute settlement mechanisms. This is true both for *state-state disputes*, used by governments to challenge other governments' trade policies, and for *investor-state dispute settlement* (ISDS) cases, involving private investors submitting complaints against governments, usually for alleged abuses, discriminations or arbitrary expropriations.

Most state-state disputes are managed within the WTO, whose members can turn to a *Dispute settlement body*, which is organized in *panels* (a sort of first degree chambers) and in an *appellate body*, to challenge other states' application or interpretation of trade rules. This body, composed of a permanent staff of judges, lawyers and other officials, issues binding decisions for states.

Although this dispute settlement mechanism is generally considered as one of the WTO's greatest achievements, since it fostered trade rules institutionalization and helped to reduce the threat of trade wars, its authority has often been questioned by the most influential members of the Organization, who fear the risk of erosion of their national sovereignty. The USA, in particular, after ignoring a series of unfavourable decisions, since 2016 has been blocking the appointment of new judges to the appellate body, which is currently reduced to the minimum functioning threshold (i.e. three members, instead of the seven envisaged). During this year, the mandate of two out of the three judges still in office will expire: if they are not replaced, the appellate body will de facto

cease to function, putting into question the whole WTO dispute resolution system.

Despite the urgent need for a revitalization of this mechanism, the debate within the WTO on possible reforms has focused merely on procedural aspects, such as an increase in the number of panel experts, digitization of documents, adoption of majority voting (instead of unanimity) by the appellate body, etc. To date, systemic reform proposals have been formulated exclusively by civil society groups¹.

On the other hand, there are no permanent courts to deal with ISDS. Generally, investor-state matters are referred to ad hoc panels of independent arbitrators, whose composition is defined in each case by the appellants themselves (these panels are usually composed of legal experts, professors, lawyers, former judges, etc.). The details on the kind of conflicts that can be referred to ad hoc arbitration panels are set out in individual trade or investment agreements: currently, there are some 2,500 treaties with investment dispute provisions in force around the world.

Over time, however, this system has both come under increasing criticism by the international public opinion, and become one of the main hurdles in the negotiations on major regional and trans-regional trade agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement, the Trans-Pacific Partnership or the (proposed) Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership between the EU and US.

What are, then, the main problems with the current ISDS system? An intergovernmental working group set up in 2017 by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law

(UNCITRAL) has identified three key issues.

1) *Lack of consistency, coherence, predictability and correctness of arbitral decisions*: different ISDS panels too often tend to adopt divergent and unjustifiably inconsistent interpretations of both general principles of international law and individual provisions set out in trade or investment agreements.

2) *Concerns pertaining to arbitrators' selection mechanisms and qualifications*, with particular reference to the lack of independence and impartiality of decision-makers, as well as to the inadequacy, lack of effectiveness and transparency of the disclosure and challenge mechanisms available under many existing treaties and arbitration rules.

3) *Excessive costs and duration of ISDS cases*.

The EU, acting within the UNCITRAL working group, acknowledged that these issues have a systemic nature: "Costs are increased when the interpretation of the law is unstable, because different ad hoc tribunals may always potentially come up with divergent interpretations [...], which is in turn linked to the concerns with the methods of arbitrator appointments which is in turn linked to the concerns with arbitrators' independence and impartiality". Therefore, these critical aspects cannot be effectively tackled and resolved by simply relying on ad hoc interventions; by contrast, a structural reform of the entire ISDS system is necessary.

On the basis of these premises, last April the EU officially proposed the setting up of a *standing mechanism* (i.e. a *court*) for the settlement of investor-state disputes. In a nutshell, the proposal provides for the court to be structured in: a) *a panel of mediators*, with the task of encouraging the amicable settlements of disputes; b) *a first instance chamber*, composed of full-time appointed judges, selected on the basis of rigorous ethical qualifications and guarantees of independence (as is the case for other existing

international courts); c) *an appellate body*, to hear appeals against the first instance chamber on the grounds of errors of law or manifest errors in the appreciation of the facts.

Furthermore, in order to guarantee legal certainty and their effective enforcement, ISDS court's decisions should not be open to appeal at domestic level or through other international mechanisms, since the proposed court would already feature an appeal mechanism. This aspect, coupled with the absence of any reference to the protection of universally recognized fundamental rights, perhaps represents the main problematic feature of the EU proposal, which is otherwise widely acceptable. Indeed, adjudicating investor-state disputes in "clinical isolation" from international human rights law would imply, for the future court, the risk of adopting decisions (unappealable, on the side) in potential conflict with international and EU law concerning, for instance, work safety, environmental protection, food security, etc. In order to avoid potential conflicts and increase the chances for court's decisions to be accepted (and consequently enforced), it would be at least appropriate that the appellate body could examine the compliance of the first instance chamber's decisions with the main UN and ILO conventions on human rights.

Beyond this specific aspect, the EU reform proposal of the ISDS system, which is under discussion by the UNCITRAL working group, is certainly appreciable, since it enhances the predictability and coherence of arbitral decisions, and helps removing most of the serious ethical concerns characterizing the current dispute settlement system. The hope is that the proactive role played by the EU in this context may mark the start of a broader political strategy, aimed at relaunching and strengthening institutional trade multilateralism, including the WTO regulatory authority.

¹ See, for instance: Levi L. (2017), *Governing Globalization and the Role of the World Trade Organization*, Centre for Studies on Federalism Research Paper, February 2017.

² Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1, para. 10.

³ UNCITRAL Working Group III, *Possible reform of investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS). Submission from the European Union and its Member States*, Doc. A/CN.9/WG.III/WP.159/Add.1, April 2019.

For a European Migration-Policy

Alfonso Sabatino and Antonio Longo

“The Law of World Citizenship shall be limited to conditions of universal hospitality ... It is not a question of philanthropy ... It is a right of temporary sojourn, a right to associate, which all men have. They have it by virtue of their common possession of the surface of the earth”.

Immanuel Kant, *Perpetual Peace* (1795)

Premise

The migration of peoples is, increasingly, a global issue. It is estimated that around 258 million people (see the UN's *International Migration Report, 2017*) are concerned, about 3% of the earth's population, which has been steadily increasing in recent decades. They are mainly heading for Asia (80 millions), the European Union (57.3 million, of which 36.9 non-EU citizens and 20.4 EU citizens (*Eurostat, 1.1.2017*)) and North America (58 million), and represent around 15% of the North American population and 7.4% of the EU population, if we duly consider only the immigrants from outside the EU, as the others are European citizens who enjoy free movement in the EU. Unfortunately, the migratory flows that are directed towards Europe, North America, Asia and Australia, and determine their regressive internal political reactions, are generated by political constraints and economic need, and by the dramatic and unequal distribution of power and wealth in the world. Given these structural reasons, migration can be defined as the social question of the 21st century, just as the workers' question characterized the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

There follows that, in the current social and international framework, Europe must first of all become aware that either it will take on

the problems of the world, thus becoming the model and engine of the world unification process, or it will pay the consequences, in terms of continued destabilization, ungoverned migrations, outbreaks of war at its borders, trade protectionism, nationalism, terrorism and more. It goes without saying that Europe can face these challenges only if it advances in its process of political unification, based on the construction of its own supranational (federal) government in the fields of economics and security.

The migration issue, therefore, requires innovative European solutions. In relation to this political objective, it must be remarked that, for years, the EU and its national governments have been tackling the migration issue with two approaches, both of them wrong.

The first is to consider migration as an emergency, rather than a structural phenomenon. As an answer to that emergency, the European policies so far experimented swing back and forth between the need to save lives, manage relief and relocate refugees between different countries, and, on the contrary, the ill-concealed desire to not really face the problem and hand it over to one's adjoining country. The second is the persistent centrality of national governments in the management of migration flows, with the use of the intergovernmental method in the management of Community-level affairs. This prevents the affirmation of the Union's general interest and its intervention in setting up a European plan with possibly common solutions. It is for this reason that, in the absence of a real European plan, there remains only a perennial “emergency-driven and national” management of the problem.

Faced with the evident failure of such a national management of the migration problem, it is time for the European institutions, as well as the European political forces, to present to the public opinion comprehensive proposals, consistent with the structural nature of the problem and with the respect for human rights. Some have been heatedly debated in the last European elections in May 2019.

Those now elected to the leadership of the Commission (and therefore of the Union) must propose a credible European Plan on the issue of migration. That said, we can outline three macro-areas of analysis, logically and politically correlated, with a view to identify problems and solutions: a) the areas upstream (the causes); b) those along the flow-management (the migrants' movements); c) those downstream (the management and inclusion-processes of migrants).

Moreover, Europe must be fully aware that the migration problem is manifested on a territorial level along three main directions: from the South (Africa), from the South-East (Middle East) and from the East (Ukraine). In practice, from the three EU-neighborhood areas, clearly vital to its safety and development. However, the EU can set up a serious migration policy regarding its neighborhood areas only if it tackles in advance and correctly the relationship it intends to establish with Africa.

A. The heart of the problem: Africa-Europe relations

1. Africa is a young continent with a strong demographic development. Its population is expected to double from 1.1 to over 2 billion inhabitants over the next thirty years. In practice, a demographic growth certainly not sustainable, given its current conditions of development: a social bomb ready to explode at the world level.

2. On the other hand, Europe is an "old" continent with a low trend of population growth. Despite the monetary union, the single market and the numerous common policies, it is still politically divided, like Africa. Both continents are therefore politically weak, in a world that instead presents - in the West and in the East alike- global, consolidated (USA) or expanding (China, Russia, India) powers. Thus, there is an evident need to tread on parallel paths aiming for Europe to complete and for Africa to start a process of political unification; both should consider the idea of an economic and social integration between Africa and Europe, based on a great political project co-managed by the two continents and aimed at a sustainable development.

A European Plan for Africa (*Europe for Africa*), outside the hegemonic temptations possibly arising from the colonial past, represents the premise and the strategic condition for the solution of the same migration issue.

3. Europe's main task is primarily a political one: encouraging initiatives aimed at advancing the process of African unity and economic integration. In this regard, the following should be noted: 1) the "*Treaty establishing a continental free trade area*", signed in Kigali on 21 March 2018 by 44 of the 55 member states of the African Union; 2) the creation of a continental *Agency for Electrification* with the related plan to achieve the goal of fully (100%) electrifying the continent in 10 years. Both initiatives show that in Africa there are energies available to take in their own hands the destiny of their land. For these reasons, the priority can only be a political agreement between the AU and the EU, for an international cooperation for the purposes of security and development in both continental areas.

4. From an economic point of view, *Europe for Africa* should translate into a *Development and*

Integration Plan for African Union countries. There are already partial initiatives in this sense: the European Commission has proposed (as part of the *European Investment Plan*) guarantees to mobilize public and private funds worth € 88 billions to support investments for the supply of energy, water resources and funds for the training of human capital. Furthermore, to implement the electrification plan, a EU financial aid valued at 5 billion dollars for ten years is needed, which would generate a leverage effect on private investments of up to 250 billion dollars. Certainly, the objectives could be more easily achieved with the creation of an *Agency for the development of Africa*, with a common AU and EU mandate, equipped with financial instruments and also powers of direct intervention against corruption, wastes and abuses.

B. The managing of migration flows

1. The persistence of an almost exclusively national involvement in the management of migration flows (with the consequent contrasts between EU countries) is at the origin of the recurrent crises that manifest themselves on this central point. They arise from a very strong contradiction between the European competence on immigration, on the one hand – which is subject to the Community's ordinary legislative procedure, requiring a majority vote of the Parliament (which represents the European citizens) and of the Council of Ministers (which represents the States) –, and, on the other hand, the management of incoming flows (procedures and operational practices), as well as the physical allocation of migrants on the territory of EU countries (which still see the States as the final decision-makers on the entry of migrants on their own territory). This contradiction must be resolved.

2. In this context, the current contradictory management of migration flows can be overcome: a) outside the EU, with the launch of a *Europe for Africa* plan, as indicated above;

b) within the EU, by entrusting the European Commission with exclusive executive powers on the management of the external border of the Union, as well as on the possible relocation of migrants between member countries and / or on their free movement within the Union, once the policy to be followed has been decided by a majority vote, by the European institutions.

In particular, asylum applications should be collected and evaluated by a federal European Agency (for example, in the US there is the *US Citizenship and Immigration Services*, while in the EU these tasks could be performed by FRONTEX).

3. We must also denounce the hypocritical distinction between migrants fleeing wars, dictatorships and terrorism, and migrants fleeing because of starvation from the Sahel and other areas affected by climate change. The former have the opportunity to invoke the international protection provided for by the 1951 Geneva Convention and thus obtain refugee status. The latter, on the other hand, are considered economic migrants, with the consequent possibility of not being accepted and of being repatriated, in the presence of agreements with their countries of origin, or otherwise condemned to live in hiding in the countries of landing, with obvious risks for public order and their personal destiny. For both, in reality, their survival is at risk, and that should lead to a twofold solution with a EU regulatory initiative to supplement the 1951 Geneva Convention. Similarly, as a protection of human life, the problem arises of extending the duty to save lives at sea to the presence of conditions that make life and free human development difficult anywhere in the world. And, again on the subject of discrimination, there is to repeal, on the basis of Art. 22 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the Dublin III Regulation, that prevents the free movement of migrants in Europe.

C. The integration of migrants

1. An effective integration is possible in a welcoming society, able to include migrants in the economic, social and civil development of the country. The different models of integration in place are, instead, based fundamentally on the principle of national sovereignty, today in crisis due to the process of European unification and globalization. These old models can no longer represent an effective framework for inclusion, for adherence to shared community values and for political participation.

2. Among the costs of “non-Europe”, we must also include those of the “non-inclusion of immigrants in the European society”, not only in economic terms, but also in cultural, social, security-related and political terms. To favor these processes, it is necessary to define projects of inclusion (concerning education and culture, inclusion in the regular labor market, and the acquisition of social, economic, political and citizenship rights), and to set up a special European Agency (of a federal nature) with the specific objective of devising, coordinating and monitoring employment policies to be implemented locally, nationally and throughout Europe (see in this sense the *Office of Refugee Resettlement-ORR* in the USA, responsible for the financing and management of federal programs aimed at the professional placement and assistance to refugees, whose implementation is the responsibility of member states and local authorities). The creation of such a EU Agency (the tasks of the US ORR could be undertaken and expanded by the EU Agency EASO) is possible on the basis of the current EU legislation, with a co-decision between Parliament and the Council, on a proposal by the Commission. To this Agency it would be necessary to attribute powers of direct

intervention towards those States that do not respect the international norms on the violation of human rights, the European laws on migration, as well as the decisions taken by a majority vote by its decision-making bodies, as happens, for example, for the decisions of the Governing Council of the ECB.

3. The task of such an Agency must therefore be completed, at the political and institutional level, with the introduction of European mechanisms for the formation of a civic conscience and a European political will. To this end, it is necessary to introduce some institutional and political innovations such as: a) making mandatory the participation of both the European citizens and the permanently resident migrants in the “European civil service”. This “service” would offer opportunities for interpersonal acquaintance, thus favoring the inclusion of participants in new social and cultural relations; b) assigning active and passive voting rights linked to the granting of “citizenship through residence”, as already happens in some EU countries, but extending that to a European-wide level, in order to induce the political forces to take on the problems of migrants and not be against them. The recognition of the passive suffrage would contribute, then, to the presence in the deliberative assemblies at various levels (from municipal councils to the European Parliament) of migrant representatives, with the right to participate in political decisions of common and their own interest.

The recognition of citizenship through residence, with the related right of circulation throughout the EU territory, would contribute, finally, to overcoming the illegal condition of many migrants, and to naturally distribute their presence where there are greater possibilities of getting jobs.

Federalism Is the Only Solution to Problems Facing Hong Kong and Kashmir

W. James Arputharaj

Kashmir is not for sale. Someone commented, observing the Indo-Pak conflict which is mainly over Kashmir, that both India and Pakistan are fighting over Kashmir as dogs would fight over a bone. Kashmir does belong only to the people of Kashmir, who were independent of India and Pakistan. Kashmiris have their unique culture, language and heritage. At the time of partition of India, in August 1947, Kashmir was still independent. In October 1947, when tribes bordering Pakistan attempted an invasion of Kashmir, the then Hindu King Hari Singh signed the instruments of accession to the Indian Union on 26th October 1947, in lieu of coming under the domination of Pakistan. The Indian Government assured autonomy and self-rule in Kashmir by inserting the Article 370 in its constitution. Only Defence and Foreign policy was delegated to the Central Government, in the true sense of federalism. Nevertheless, Kashmir had its own constitution and flag. However, now, having in mind the state elections to be held in 3 states of India, the ruling party made the Indian President to abrogate Article 370 on the night of 4th August 2019, terming the move by the political slogan "one country, one constitution". There is an elected state assembly in Kashmir which was suspended a couple of months ago. Though both houses of the Indian Parliament discussed and endorsed this Presidential order, there was absolutely no consultation with the people of Kashmir. Even the MPs elected from Kashmir could not attend the Parliament, as more than

4000 political leaders and businessmen were arrested for more than a month. The guns were taken away from the local Police, and the Central Reserve Police, about 30,000 of them, landed in Kashmir. India is still imposing a draconian law, introduced by the British Raj and called Section 144, which does not allow assembly of more than 4 persons. Nowadays 7 million people of Kashmir are locked down for more than one month, with no access to internet and mobile phones; the main mosques were locked even on the Eid festival days. Interestingly, a significant number of political leaders and businessmen who were arrested had indeed supported the federal structure within India by participating in the elections (local, state and national), while some others always dreamt of "Azad Kashmir" (independent Kashmir). While most powers in the world have observed that removing the autonomy status is an internal matter of India, and Kashmir is an integral part of India, which International Law allows people to be deprived of their fundamental rights, when the people of Kashmir were not at fault? Having not discussed with the people of Kashmir about the recent move, the Indian Government is worried of uprising and protests. But how long could 7 million people be locked down without access to communication and unable to earn their livelihood? "We cannot hear anything, not even the news about ourselves", lamented a Kashmiri who could not attend the funeral of his sister as he came to know of it after 2 weeks, though she lived 50 km away.

In 1948, UN Resolution 39 directed a peaceful resolution of conflict by forming a commission and marking a Line of Control (LoC). However, the 1965 war changed everything, as Kashmir was divided among India, Pakistan and China. Much water has flown under the bridges since then. Pakistan also abolished State Subject Rule in Gilgit Balistan (part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK)) in 1984. For the people split among three countries to come together to have a referendum is near to impossible.

Similar to Kashmir, there were other Kingdoms, like Sikkim, which were annexed to the Indian Union at different points in time, with instruments of accession and offering autonomy. But Kashmir now is the question on the minds of people. The secular, democratic and federalist character of the Indian state is challenged.

Hong Kong

The situation in Hong Kong is similar, but at the same time the context is different. Though the legislation introduced for extradition to China is withdrawn after continued protests, many youth activists are still in jail.

Hong Kong was a Chinese territory for more than 2000 years. By an agreement with the UK in 1898, the island of Hong Kong was leased to the UK after China lost a war with Britain. When the status was restored at the end of the lease in 1999, China gave his consent that autonomy would be maintained, as agreed in 1984 when both countries decided to restore the status. Many youth who are protesting were born when the island was under British rule and had embraced democracy as a way of governance, and are now unable to agree to mainland China controlling their lives.

Assembly of people for peaceful protest and dissent is not tolerated in both India and China, who anyway have ratified the UN Convention on Human rights. The latter becomes the concern of the international community whenever people within nation states are oppressed by their own Government, denying their right to liberty. Responsibility to Protect (R2P) applies to these two situations, as the nation state has failed to protect its own people.

Federalism is the only solution to the problems faced by the people of Kashmir and Hong Kong. Governments should practice federalism by providing autonomy to regions, and enabling them to govern themselves.

We live in an era where national boundaries do not matter when it comes to market, communication, the environment and climate change; and they do not respect Lines of Control. And there are no longer fully homogenous communities or countries. Many countries are becoming more and more multi ethnic and multi lingual. The Governments need to respect regional autonomy and the wishes of the people, even if they belong to minority religions or regions.

Federalism is based on the principle of subsidiarity, whereby decisions are taken at the level where it is required to address governance issues. Local aspirations of the people should be respected and democratic voices need to be heard.

We do hope and pray that good sense will prevail with the Governments of India and China. And the people in both places did not choose separatism, but their work within the federal framework and fight for their rights and justice.

The Amazon: neither Savage, nor the World's Lungs or Granary

Leonardo Boff

The Pan-Amazon Synod that took place in Rome this October, requires a better knowledge of the Amazon ecosystem. Myths must be ferreted out.

The first myth: the Indigenous people is wild, genuinely natural, and therefore, in perfect harmony with nature. The Indigenous people are regulated not by cultural but by natural criteria. The Indigenous people are in a sort of a biological siesta with nature, in a perfect, passive adaptation to its rhythms and logic.

This ecologization of the Indigenous people is a fantasy, resulting from the fatigue of urban life, with its excessive technology and artificiality.

What we can say is that the Amazon Indigenous peoples are as human as any other, and as such, they are in constant interaction with the environment. More and more, research reveals the interaction between the Indigenous people and nature, and their mutual effects on each other. The relationships are not "natural," but cultural, like ours, in an intricate web of reciprocity. Perhaps the Indigenous peoples have something unique that sets them apart from modern man: they experience and understand nature as part of their society and culture, an extension of their personal and social body. For them, nature is not, as it is for the modern man, a mute and neutral object. Nature speaks and the Indigenous men listen to and understand her voice and her message. Nature is part of society and society is part of nature, in a constant process of reciprocal adaptation. For that reason the Indigenous people are much better integrated than we are. We have much to learn from the relationship the Indigenous people maintain with nature.

The second myth: The Amazon is the lungs of the world. Specialists affirm that the Amazon jungle is in a state of climax. That is, the Amazon is in an optimal state of life, a dynamic equilibrium in which everything is well utilized and therefore everything is in balance. The energy captured by plants is put to good use through the interactions of the food chain. The oxygen they liberate during the day through photosynthesis is utilized at night by the plants themselves, and other living organisms. Therefore, the Amazon is not the world's lungs. But the Amazon does function as a great fixer of carbon dioxide. In the process of photosynthesis great quantities of carbon are absorbed. And carbon dioxide is a principal cause of the greenhouse effect that warms the Earth (in the last 100 years it grew by 25%). If one day the Amazon were totally deforested, nearly 50 billion tons of carbon dioxide a year would be launched into the atmosphere. That would cause a massive extinction of living organisms.

The third myth: the Amazon is the world's bread basket. That is what the first explorers thought, such as von Humboldt and Bonpland, and the Brazilians planners while the military were in power (1964-1983). That is not true. Research has shown that "the jungle lives by herself" and in great part "for herself" (see Baum V., *Das Ökosystem der tropischen Regenswälder*, Giessen 1986, 39). The jungle is luxuriant but the soil is poor in humus. This sounds paradoxical. Harald Sioli, the great specialist in the Amazon, put it clearly: "the jungle actually grows on the soil and not from the soil" (*A Amazônia*, Vozes

1985, 60). And he explains: the soil is only the physical support for an intricate web of roots. The trees' roots are intertwined and mutually support each other at the base. An immense balance and rhythm is formed. All the jungle moves and dances. This is why, when one tree falls it drags several other trees down as well. The jungle maintains her exuberant character because it is a closed chain of nutrients. Aided by the water that drips from the leaves and runs down the tree trunks, a bio-layer of leaves, fruits, small roots, and wild animal droppings decomposes into the soil. It is not the soil that nourishes the trees. It is the trees that nourish the soil. Those two sources of water wash down, carrying the excrements of tree dwelling animals and of the larger species, such as birds, coatis, macaques, sloths and others, as well as the myriad of insects that live in the tree tops. An enormous quantity of fungi and countless micro-organisms make these nutrients available to the roots. Through the roots, the plants absorb them, guaranteeing the captivating exuberance of the Amazon

Hileia. But it is a closed system, with a complex and fragile equilibrium. Any small deviation can have disastrous consequences.

The humus commonly is not more than 30-40 centimeters deep, and can be washed away by torrential rains. In a short time, sand would appear. The Amazon without the jungle would be transformed into an immense savanna or even a desert. That is why the Amazon never can be the granary of the world, but will continue being the temple of the greatest biodiversity.

The specialist of the Amazon, Shelton H. Davis, noted in 1978 a truth that is still valid in 2019: "A silent war is presently being waged against the Aboriginal peoples, against innocent peasants and against the ecosystem of the jungle in the Amazon basin" (*Victims of the miracle*, Saar 1978, 202). Until 1968, the jungle was practically intact. Ever since, with the great hydroelectric projects and agribusiness, and now with the anti-ecologism of the Bolsonaro's government, the brutalization and devastation of the Amazon continues.

Translation by Melina Alfaro

Ursula Hirschmann, a Woman for the United States of Europe

Giulio Saputo

Today we would like to remember a woman who has been the living proof of the European vocation of the Resistance, who has always fought for the rights of the weakest and who was committed to realizing the Ventotene project to which she was dedicated from the very beginning. A project that she has spread and defended risking her life during the Nazi-fascist dictatorship in Italy and in Europe, a revolutionary project through which she dreamed to realize also all women's emancipation, unifying them in the fight for common individual and collective goals.

From "Noi senzapatria" ["*We with no homeland*"] by Ursula Hirschmann, 1993

"I am not Italian, despite I have Italian children, I am not German, although Germany has been my homeland once. And I am also not Jewish, although it was just a coincidence that I was not arrested and then burned in one of those furnaces in some death camps. We "déracinés" of Europe that have 'changed more borders than shoes', as Brecht says - this king of the "déracinés" -, we also have nothing to lose except our chains in a united Europe and therefore, we are federalists."

Ursula Hirschmann was born in Berlin on the 2nd of September of 1913 from a family of the middle class with Jewish origin. She attended the University of Berlin with her younger brother Albert Otto (who would be a candidate for the Nobel price) and she met there, for the first time, Eugenio Colorni. In those years, Ursula carried out a clandestine anti-Nazi activity together with other socialist and communist youngsters, since the social-

democratic party in which she was previously engaged had not taken any initiative to oppose concretely the emergent Nazi wave.

Once left Germany and escaped to Paris by her brother, she started attending the European anti-fascist circles and she got closer to communist groups. Convinced in not joining the communist party, she remained with the socialists to support the politics of the "united front" and she got more and more distant from her ex companions because of the continuous attacks to the people around her, conducted by the supporters of the Soviet doctrine, with the accusation of "deviationism" (treason). Reunited with Colorni, she closed the communist parenthesis and she decided to go to Trieste, marrying him in 1935. Once concluded the studies in languages at the Venice University, she took part in the antifascist activities together with her husband. When he was arrested, in 1938, she decided to follow him in Ventotene.

She participated with the group she was confined in the discussions about the "Manifesto for a united and free Europe" and worked for its diffusion on the continent together with Ada Rossi and the Spinelli's sisters. She moved to Melfi with Colorni and when he escaped from the confine to join the Resistance in Rome, she considered their sentimental relationship in crisis, and decided to go to Milan with her daughters to continue the Resistance activity and the federalist propaganda: she cooperated with Guglielmo Usellini, Cerilo, Fiorella e Gigliola Spinelli in the publication of the clandestine review "*L'Unità Europea*". After the foundation of the Italian European Federalist

Movement, she emigrated in Switzerland with Spinelli and Rossi. The European Resistance owes very much to the coordination work of Ursula from Geneva that will continue with the organization of the first convention for the United States of Europe in a newly liberated Paris (Orwell, Camus, Mumford and many others will attend the event).

She married Spinelli and she decided to cooperate with him in the fight of all his life, convinced that democracy can develop only if it is founded on an historical new basis: the one of the federated peoples (from her letter to Rossi, 4 January 1948). Ursula will always operate actively with a leading role in the organization of the federalist activity, until the foundation in 1975 of *Femmes pour l'Europe* in Brussels. This association aimed at reuniting the front of European women engaged in politics and in the cultural field, focusing on concrete problematics ranging from the promotion of access to education to the defence of equal pay, until the fight for the improvement of life conditions of immigrant women and in developing countries.

Ursula Hirschmann believed that it is necessary to put an end to the reciprocal distrust existing among women actively engaged in political life and feminists. It was essential for her to collect

all energies – participating on an equal basis in the political, social, cultural and economic choices – for common goals:

To arrive there, they have to overcome another obstacle in the path of their fight. For them in fact, women must begin first to free themselves from their individual chains (the fight for abortion, for equal pay, etc) and 'afterward' they can be engaged in politics [...]. Women should, on the contrary, fight on all fronts [...]. The fight for the political unification of Europe can be an important step and a model for women [...]. Women will have to start considering Europe as a city in formation, susceptible of taking the form that will be given to it.

Shortly after, Ursula will get ill and she will never be able to get back actively to a commitment that today is probably more relevant than ever, looking at the fragmentation of the struggles of our contemporary civil society.

Federica Turco will say about her: “Ursula represents a powerful figure of political militant that, at the same time, is engaged in organizing a complex familiar life (...). Her freshness, her determination, her dedication have always been the one of the young Berliner that decided, in July 1933, that Europe was her home and, therefore, from that moment on, she has been feeding on Europe”.

The disappearance of Immanuel Wallerstein

Giampiero Bordino

At almost 89 years, on August 31, 2019, Immanuel Wallerstein, one of the greatest contemporary historians and sociologists, passed away. He has been a witness and interpreter of the era of successes, contradictions and crises of capitalism, of great international conflicts and the “cold war”, of decolonization, of the 1968 movements, of globalization (of which he was somehow a forerunning prophet), of the triumph and then the decline of the American empire. Since 2003, Wallerstein, who by the way had been a founder and militant of the *Student Federalists Movement* in American universities since 1944, three years before the *World Federalist Movement* was created, has also been, with some significant articles, one of the most famous collaborators of our review.

Between the Seventies and the Eighties of the Twentieth Century, Wallerstein published his most famous work in three volumes, *“The modern world-system”*, which illustrates, analyzes and interprets, since its origins in the 16th century, capitalism as a planetary economic and social system, a real “world-economy” with its dialectical articulations between a “center” and “peripheries”, with its hierarchies and its internal conflicts.

In his great historical reconstruction, Wallerstein had, by his explicit admission, a famous inspirer and reference, though critically re-read and cited, in Karl Marx. He also has some fundamental references closer in time, with some of whom he has directly worked and collaborated in the years of his long cultural and academic commitment. There is, first of all, the French historian Fernand

Braudel, who precedes him by a generation (he was born in 1902 and died in 1985), one of the great masters of the historiographical school active around the Parisian magazine *Annales*, of which Braudel was director between 1946 and 1968. Braudel sees and depicts history as a story of “long-lasting structures” (modern capitalism is precisely one of these long-lasting structures), going over and beyond the short breath of events that ripple its surface. It is no coincidence that Wallerstein has been the head of the *Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems and Civilization* at the Binghamton University in New York for several years. The other important intellectual referent of Wallerstein, of more distant years, is the Hungarian historian, sociologist, anthropologist and philosopher Karl Polanyi (1886-1964), author in 1944 of a work destined to great resonance: *“The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time”*. His critique of the “market society”, that is, of the society in which “everything is a market”, prefigures fundamental analyses and trends in the cultural and political debate of the following decades.

Among Wallerstein’s collaborators and friends, there are also some of the most significant intellectuals of the global radical left engaged in the critique of capitalism and in the struggle against neo-colonialism and imperialism, from the Martinican-French writer Frantz Fanon to the Italian economist and sociologist (also a lecturer at the *Fernand Braudel Center*) Giovanni Arrighi, from the Egyptian-French economist Samir Amin to the German sociologist and economist Gunder Frank.

In Wallerstein's analysis and reflection, the distinction between the concepts of "world-economy" and "world-empire" plays an important role. The world-economy described in his books is a horizontal structure with respect to the different territories: it could originate and develop, and become hegemonic between the 16th and the 19th centuries, even in the absence of an empire-world, that is, of a vertical and unified political center of power. In essence, what characterizes the world-economy (the modern and contemporary capitalism, in other words) and allows its hegemonic role, is the separation between the economic sphere, of world dimensions, and the political sphere, fragmented in sovereign territorial entities (in Europe, the national states), therefore powerless to regulate and control capital and markets.

Wallerstein, in an article published in *The Federalist Debate* in November 2005 ("*The Ambiguous French NO to the European Constitution*") on the occasion of the French referendum that rejected the draft European Constitution, observes that to be satisfied with that negative outcome are essentially three sectors of public opinion, although different and even politically distant from each other: the Eurosceptic right, the American neo-cons

and also a large part of the radical left. In the latter, according to Wallerstein, the awareness is missing that precisely the absence of a common European political power (today obviously not in the form of an empire, but of a continental federal democracy) makes it impossible to both develop social policies and counter the American imperialism. Also in subsequent interventions published in the review Wallerstein reiterated that the political union of Europe is necessary for these purposes. It is significant that in the last few decades, in the time of the decline of the American empire, and as it is evident today with the Trump presidency, the United States has increasingly aligned itself against the political unification of Europe and against its supporters, regarded as enemies.

In sum, a "world-democracy", that allows for the control and regulation of the "world-economy" (in other words, for the civilizing of capitalism and globalization), is necessary today. So, the cultural and political legacy of Immanuel Wallerstein, a scholar who certainly cannot be suspected of pro-European rhetoric or globalist "radical-chic" leanings (as today's sovereignist and neo-nationalist populists might say), can help us all to better understand our present world.

Alexandre Lamfalussy: Founding Father and Wise Man behind the Euro

Ivo Maes

In 1949, a young Hungarian immigrant arrived in Belgium. He had just a few dollars in his pocket, but he was armed with strong willpower to build a new life. Almost fifty years later, Alexandre Lamfalussy was unveiling the first designs of banknotes in euro, now the world's second major currency.

As the first President of the European Monetary Institute, the forerunner of the European Central Bank, Alexandre Lamfalussy was clearly one of the “founding fathers” of the euro. However, as the book by Christophe Lamfalussy, Ivo Maes and Sabine Péters argues, Lamfalussy was more than just one of the founding fathers of the euro. He was “The wise man behind the euro”.

Alexandre Lamfalussy was a committed European federalist. Moreover, as an economist, he had a deep conviction that a common market can only survive with a common currency.

Lamfalussy also had clear ideas about the nature of a future Economic and Monetary Union. They were largely based on his deep scepticism about the functioning of financial markets. He was a strong advocate of a symmetric EMU, not just with a strong monetary pillar, but also a solid economic pillar, “an economic government”. He was one of the first proponents of a banking union, with a role for the European Central Bank of micro-prudential supervision of financial institutions. Basically, Lamfalussy had always had a profound belief that a central bank has a crucial role to play in safeguarding financial stability.

Alexandre Lamfalussy was born on 26 April 1929 in Kapuvár, in Hungary. He had a happy childhood, brought up in a cultivated

entourage. But the Second World War ushered in a painful time for the young Alexandre. After the war, he got a place in a university that was renowned for shaping the nation's elites. But he soon realised that the communist regime would not allow him to retain his freedom of thought and speech.

In January 1949, he fled Hungary and took refuge in Belgium, where he continued his studies at the Catholic University of Louvain. At the time, Louvain was one of the leading places for economics in the French-speaking world. The dominant figure was Léon-H. Dupriez, an eminent specialist in business cycle analysis.

During his student days in Louvain, Lamfalussy joined the *Cercle Européen*, along with some of his friends. For them, European integration was a very profound conviction, which had a special dimension for Lamfalussy, who had just crossed the Iron Curtain. These men were convinced that it was necessary to break down the barriers which divided Europe. Quite apart from the important economic motive, there was also a clear cultural dimension, a feeling of belonging to a common cultural heritage.

Lamfalussy gained his doctorate at Oxford, under the supervision of Philip Andrews and Sir John Hicks, one of the first winners of the Nobel Prize for Economics. In *Investment and Growth in Mature Economies. The Case of Belgium*, Lamfalussy focused on the weak investment and growth performance of Belgian industry. His analysis became a classic.

Lamfalussy then returned to Belgium and started a career as a banker at the Banque de Bruxelles, the second biggest Belgian commercial bank. At just over forty, he became

Chairman of the Board there. In the early 1960s, he was involved in the creation of mutual funds and played a role in international investment banking. However, during Lamfalussy's time at the helm of the Banque de Bruxelles, some traders took important open foreign exchange positions, triggering heavy losses. It became Lamfalussy's first exercise in financial crisis management. After that, he took political responsibility for the losses and resigned.

During his time at the Banque de Bruxelles, Lamfalussy's interest shifted to monetary and financial issues, both national and international. He took part in meetings of several groups on the reform of the international monetary system, one of the most famous being the Bellagio group, whose members included Sir Roy Harrod, Robert Mundell, Jacques Rueff and Robert Triffin.

In 1976, Lamfalussy joined the world of central banking. He was selected by the Bank for International Settlements for the key post of Economic Adviser. He later became General Manager. During this period, Lamfalussy was to take up a central position in all the major debates going on in the economic and financial world: the exchange rate mechanism, the excessive growth of international bank lending, the impact of financial innovation and Europe's efforts to establish a zone of monetary stability. Alexandre Lamfalussy had spoken out clearly about all these themes and, in doing so, he often took a controversial stand. As Jacques de Larosière observed, "In the light of subsequent events, we are compelled to acknowledge that his assessments were generally correct and far-sighted".

At the BIS, Lamfalussy was in a first-rate position to observe the international and European monetary system. He took part in the meetings of the G10 governors, including the informal dinners, where the most open and confidential discussions between the world's central bankers were held. Lamfalussy also attended the meetings of the European

Community's Committee of Governors. He turned out to be "the professor" among the central bankers.

The sharp appreciation of the US dollar at the beginning of the 1980s was to have a profound effect on Lamfalussy. He saw good reasons for no longer relying on flexible exchange rates to correct external imbalances. And events at the time pointed up the risks these imbalances carried, especially in the form of strong protectionist threats, a theme that is still very relevant today.

Lamfalussy also warned about the debt build-up in Latin America. Moreover, he pointed out the relationship between the United States' lax monetary policies and its balance of payments deficit. He later played a significant role in the management of the Latin American debt crisis. Lamfalussy quickly came to take a sceptical attitude to financial innovations. The big financial innovation of the 1970s was the so-called "floating rate notes": long-term bonds, but with frequent interest rate adjustments, depending on movements in short-term rates. This appealed to the banks, since they mainly relied on short-term funding. It was also appealing for borrowers because the short-term interest rate was lower than the long-term rate. Some Latin American countries, which had large balance of payments deficits, took on substantial loans. With the sharp rise in commodity prices, real interest rates were strongly negative for these countries. However, when American monetary policy was tightened sharply in 1979, the situation changed completely. Nominal interest rates soared, while the recession led to plummeting commodity prices. Real interest rates shot up dramatically. As Lamfalussy observed:

"Innovation allowed banks to transform margin risk into capital risk which, in this case, was probably a greater threat to the stability of the international banking system – not to mention its rather disastrous effects on the borrowers themselves".

So, Lamfalussy made a major contribution to creating a "BIS atmosphere", namely, the need to keep an eye on imbalances, to debt build-ups and bubbles. Lamfalussy thus became the principal architect of the "macro-prudential" approach adopted by the BIS in the area of financial stability, marked by concern for the financial system to be considered as a whole.

During his time at the BIS, Lamfalussy was also a member of the Delors Committee, which was to play a pivotal role in the process of European monetary union. As the meetings of the Delors Committee took place at the BIS in Basel, Lamfalussy was *de facto* its host. Lamfalussy played an intellectually stimulating role in the Committee, continuing in his role of professor among central bankers. With the help of his colleagues at the BIS, he compiled three research papers: a description of the functioning of the ECU banking market, a study on monetary policy operations in stage two of EMU, and an analysis of fiscal policy coordination.

In Lamfalussy's view, fiscal policy coordination is a vital component of any European economic and monetary union. He saw two main reasons for that. The first one closely reflected his preoccupations with the policy mix on the international monetary scene: "the determination of a global fiscal policy in a way that is sufficiently responsive to evolving domestic and international requirements". The second reason foreshadowed the "binding rules on budgetary policy" in the Delors Report itself, namely, the need "to avoid tensions arising from excessive differences between public sector borrowing requirements of individual member countries". With his experience of the Latin American debt crisis, Lamfalussy did not believe in market discipline.

On 1 January 1994, Lamfalussy, at that time nearly 65 years old, became the first President of the European Monetary Institute. Lamfalussy had mixed feelings. As retirement

beckoned, he was offered his dream job. His sense of duty won over.

These were turbulent times for the EMU process, with the financial markets still in turmoil after the European Monetary System crisis and the laborious Maastricht Treaty ratification process. However, the second stage of EMU started on 1 January 1994. The Institute's tasks fell into two broad categories: on the one hand, strengthening the coordination of the monetary policies of the EU Member States and, on the other hand, organising preparations for the final stage of EMU, especially the conduct of the single monetary policy and the introduction of the single currency.

One of the main issues unresolved at the time concerned the concrete scenario for the changeover to the single currency. This was a very complex and delicate issue, as it affected the banking system, financial markets, enterprises and the public at large. The European Monetary Institute's scenario would be adopted by the European Council in Madrid in December 1995. The scenario strengthened confidence in the EMU process and marked the moment from which the international financial community started to take EMU seriously.

In a series of speeches and articles, Lamfalussy also tackled the benefits and costs of EMU. In his view, EMU would lead to major benefits, although he acknowledged that this also implied costs. He emphasised that, in order to ensure these "large and lasting net benefits", countries had to ensure sustainable macroeconomic convergence before joining EMU. One area that needed to be tackled was fiscal policy. But for Lamfalussy, the greatest challenge concerned the labour market, "wage and price flexibility is essential to facilitate economic adjustment to various kinds of shocks ... With or without EMU, employment policies have to be in the forefront of attention of European policy-makers".

In 2000, Alexandre Lamfalussy became also

the Chairman of the Committee of Wise Men, which developed a new approach for the regulation of European financial markets. The Committee's work significantly speeded up changes in regulation and increased the transparency of the regulatory process. Lamfalussy was to lay the foundations for the prudential Supervisory Authorities, which were later set up in the wake of the financial crisis and the de Larosière Report.

During these years, financial stability would become, more and more, Lamfalussy's main preoccupation. In 2004, he focused on the organisation of prudential supervision in the European Union, which he described as a "mind-boggling patchwork". He pointed out that central banks had a crucial role in the management of financial crises, especially in "preventing a potential crisis from turning into a real one... In such a situation, they should provide liquidity to the system, so as to avoid liquidity shortages pushing otherwise solvent banks into bankruptcy". Lamfalussy added that the timely provision of liquidity was very much a matter of judgment, which implied that central banks had to be intimately familiar with financial institutions: "they must possess direct information on banks risk-assessment methods and capabilities, on their decision-making processes and control mechanisms and, not least, on their expertise and skills in using innovative financial instruments. Such information cannot be acquired by reading second-hand reports, however lucid and

transparent such reports may be".

For Lamfalussy the crucial issue was whether one should give a responsibility to the ECB in the supervision of the large, systemically important, banks. This was obviously an early anticipation of the 2012 debates on whether to set up a banking union.

The financial crisis confirmed Lamfalussy's beliefs: "whether they like it or not, central banks are in the front line when it comes to keeping crisis manifestations under control".

Given the severity of the crisis, central banks reacted with a variety of "non-standard" measures. This led not only to a spectacular expansion of their balance sheets, but also to a change in the composition of their assets, with more risky assets: "As a result central banks have started navigating in uncharted waters, in terms of both operational techniques and their relations with governments". Lamfalussy said he did not expect a quick end to the crisis. So, financial stability should remain an objective for central banks, in just the same way as price stability.

Lamfalussy's advocacy of European monetary integration had its origin in two main sources: a profound European conviction, marked by the devastations of the Second World War and the Iron Curtain, and his mistrust of floating exchange rates systems. As observed by Wim Duisenberg: "You have never believed that a true single market is in the long run compatible with a quasi-floating exchange rate system".

Bibliography

Alexandre Lamfalussy. *The Wise Man of the Euro. A conversation with Christophe Lamfalussy, Ivo Maes and Sabine Péters*, Preface by Jacques de Larosière, Leuven: LannooCampus, February 2014.

Alexandre Lamfalussy – *Selected Essays*, Ivo Maes (Editor), Forewords by J. Smets and G. Matolcsy, Budapest: Magyar Nemzeti Bank and National Bank of Belgium, January 2017.

What Remains To Be Done

Antonio Padoa Schioppa

In these weeks and these months, the debate about the future of the European Union intensified more than it ever has in the past. The European election has forced the political classes to take sides in an explicit or at least somewhat clear way.

The recent appeal by the French president Macron reiterated, with renewed clarity, the fundamental themes discussed in his now well-known speech at the Sorbonne in September 2017. He again stated the will to bring to life a European sovereignty capable of participating equally in the politics of tomorrow's world, when only few large continental States will effectively have a say in it. Among these, Europe should be active as well, provided it is endowed with an effective political union. It is meaningful that the French president directly addressed all of the Union's citizens, with an evident correlation to the impending voting session in the European Parliament.

However, one must observe that in Macron's formulation the protagonists of this constructive turning point towards a political union of our continent seem to be, almost exclusively, the governments of the Union's Member States themselves. The establishment of multiple Agencies is suggested, but very little is said about the European Commission and too little weight is given to the role of the European Parliament. In other words, the French president's approach mainly remains intergovernmental. This also seems to be the attitude of the new leader of the leading party in Germany (the CDU), Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK), who will probably succeed Angela Merkel.

It would not only be unjust but also incorrect to disregard the relevant results attained

recently by the current Union, particularly in the monetary policy and on competition policy, two fields where the federalist approach has been clearly adopted by the treaties. However, the Union still continues to lack some fundamental features enabling it to operate efficiently and in a democratically legitimate manner for the goals of peace in *security, welfare* and *solidarity*, which together with *democracy* and protection of *rights*, constitute the aisles of the big cathedral of Europe.

In short, the path that remains to be followed can be outlined with a few key-points, each to be put on the Union's agenda on the basis of the fundamental subsidiarity principle. The response to the two crises Europe has faced in the last decade lies firstly with granting the Union an actual, democratically legitimate government. This has been lacking in these years and ought to be up to the Commission, though without taking away the European Council's significant role as political stimulus; a role which it has and does still play, but which should not be its exclusive prerogative.

Secondly, it is necessary that the Union's government develops a precise operative strategy in order to guarantee the security of European citizens, because it is firstly the lack of security that explains the anti-European resistances. In concrete terms, what is needed is a wide range of policies, mainly: a) a common defence limiting the risks of international crises potentially disrupting peace; b) an economic policy strongly supporting environmental protection; c) big investments in European public goods, that is, in alternative energies, basic research, development and guarantees of AI; d) social policies on employment, especially for youth and for the reduction of inequalities;

e) an efficient and shared migration policy based on common guidelines and guarantees. Thirdly, in order to meet these goals it is urgent to give the Union a sufficient budget, at least doubling the current amount of 1% of the gross domestic product of the Union itself.

The establishment of a tax on carbon emissions (a carbon tax) would alone suffice to double in a few years the European budget. At the same time it would constitute a historically relevant measure – on a global level, as well – towards controlling the major climatic and environmental risks weighing on the planet, which are now threatening to become irreversible in the span of a few decades. The institution of some specialised Agencies will be necessary, but these will have to operate under the control of the Commission and the European Parliament and be subject to the Court of Justice's jurisdiction.

Fourthly, all of the Union's policies need to be developed with the determining contribution of the European Parliament both on a legislative level and regarding the fundamental choices of government, internal and external to the Union. The power of co-decision has to become the rule: in European taxation, as well as in the decisions of foreign

affairs; in the common defence, as well as in the legislative harmonisation; in the choices regarding security, as well as in the guidelines on the Union's migration policy. The European Parliament must have its own autonomous power of taxation.

Fifthly, it is essential that the two organs representing the States, i.e. the European Council and the Council of the Ministers, always take their decisions with a simple or qualified majority, thus finally abolishing, with no exception, the paralysing veto power. In this way it will be possible, of course within the range of the Union's competences, to come to a decision even when there is no unanimous consensus on the chosen ice to make. Furthermore, the amendment of treaties needs to take place with a qualified majority, following the Convention procedure set up by the Lisbon Treaty.

It is essential that these objectives be enunciated by the parties supporting the advancement of the European Union and that the citizens be well-informed, without being beguiled by populist slogans, which are as much peremptory as they are unsubstantiated. The majorities that are taking shape in the Parliament will be determining for the future of the Union.

Towards a European Political Space*

Pierre Jouvenat

Introduction

The 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections campaign revealed the emergence of a transnational political space¹: beyond national considerations, which were still dominant, political parties timidly dealt with European issues and alliances at European level. But then it was only a question of joining EP parliamentary groups after the elections. However, fostering public debate is the role of parties, not of parliamentary groups. The European debate therefore requires a trans-nationalization of political families, much beyond the current European political parties, which only consist of umbrella organizations for national parties. This note examines the present state of affairs, distinguishing between the desirable and the possible, the short- and the long-term. In the immediate future, emphasis must be placed on developing synergies between national and European parties, with the emergence of transnational parties in mind. Legal incentives are needed. In particular, the electoral law of the European Union (EU) should not only promote a European public debate, it must also encourage all political parties to take on a transnational dimension. It is therefore proposed to modify the election mode of MEPs by adopting the method of “double proportionality”. This paper is an invitation to argumentation, without any pretension to join the academic debate on party systems.

A. Role of political parties: the wrong way

It is commonplace to denounce the shortcomings of the current system of affiliations between national parties and

“political parties at European level” (in official terminology, hereafter “Europarties”), which is complex and hardly visible. Occasional alliances without any effect on public debate, the Europarties are in an institutional rather than an activist logic.² There is therefore a consensus on the need to “strengthen” them. But then one makes a double mistake:

- Europarties are formally recognized for the first time by the Maastricht Treaty. But the original conceptual error of giving them a specific role persists. The Lisbon Treaty states: “Political parties at European level shall contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union”. As an extension of this statement, it is generally advocated that Europarties should provide direct links with European civil society; connect EU-level democracy with Union citizens; stimulate citizen mobilization on European issues; and more generally contribute to the making of a *demos*. Yet, this mission is not exclusive to, nor even the preferential role of, Europarties. National parties have a territorial base and are therefore best placed to *provide* European integration with a local foundation of citizenry participation. Thus, it is a mistake to demonize and seek to marginalize them. Instead, one has to “europeanize” national parties. This is just as important, if not more important, than strengthening Europarties.

- In our concern to strengthen Europarties, one suggests that they should evolve towards full-functioning organizations, thus becoming true laboratories of ideas and militant forces. However, in so doing, one wrongly suggests that they should exist on their own. For instance, when it is argued that Europarties

should emancipate from their institutional members, the national parties, and broaden their base. There is thus an unfortunate tendency to make a clear distinction between two categories of parties, and even oppose them against each other, whereas in the perspective of trans-nationalizing politics, one must develop synergies between national and European parties, not divide them.

The insignificance of affiliations between national parties and Europarties is explained by the predominance of parliamentary groups over parties, due to the fact that the EP, whose powers have increased over time, remains the only place in the EU's institutional system for a true political confrontation of parties. Moreover, groups have much larger human and financial resources than Europarties. Therefore, expertise and ideological thinking on European politics, or even the ability to exert influence over other EU institutions, have developed within the groups' apparatuses, not within parties. Consequently, for a national party, what only matters is its MEPs' membership in a group. However, parliamentary groups are

not supposed to lead the public debate, let alone conduct election campaigns. That is the role of parties. This anomaly must be addressed by shifting attention towards the trans-nationalization of parties.

B. What kind of trans-nationalization is possible?

In federal states such as the USA or Germany, a limited (for now) number of parties interact with institutions at all levels of the federation, from local to federal, with the same identification. They are in a way "party federations". In the EU, given the diversity of national political systems and the considerable ideological dilution, which resulted from successive waves of enlargement, as well as the *sui generis* nature of integration, such a level of homogeneity is inconceivable in the foreseeable future. Especially as in most Member States there is a trend towards fragmentation and instability of the ideological spectrum, which is constantly reshaping. In addition, there is still little incentive for parties to act collectively at European level, as there is little power to be taken (see box below).

A "transnational party system" within the EU?

The creation of transnational parties is made difficult by the many non-concordant cleavages that characterize European politics: the recurrent double left/right and more/less integration cleavage, to which are added different visions on the EU's borders (issues of enlargement and multi-circle Europe), acceptance or rejection of globalization, and also specific issues such as immigration (East-West cleavage).

Yet, academic research (Mair, Bardi, Hix, Bartolini, Sartori...) mainly focused on the feasibility of a transnational system. A study commissioned by the EP³ concluded that "while it is possible to conceive the emergence of transnational parties, the emergence of a transnational party system is more problematical". This requires more than simply the presence of transnational parties. There must also be a European structure of political competition, in particular for the control of a transnational political executive. This structure exists today only in an embryonic stage. The problem is therefore institutional rather than political.

The *Spitzenkandidaten* process for the Presidency of the Commission is a first step towards a transnational partisan system. The Commission, if politicised, may become the expression of a political majority. But the other key positions (the EP President set apart) remain intergovernmental in nature, outside the party game.

However, any integration process implies a change of scale and a transnationalization of political parties' activities. Parties must adapt their *modus operandi* accordingly. Within the context of the EU, although the constitution of relatively homogeneous political families at European level remains the ultimate objective, this trans-nationalization will happen through a dynamic process where partisan structures will be evolutionary and of "variable-geometry", due to several factors:

- Evolution of the degree of integration of the EU and the ensuing transfer of political power from national to Community level: decision-making level and party action level go hand in hand;
- Diverging views, despite ideological proximity, on thematic priorities and programmatic choices, which are constantly evolving;
- Ranking of issues over time

(environmental protection, social policies, migration challenges, etc.), according to the parties' perception of the most appropriate level of action⁴;

- Reshaping of national political systems, inevitably leading to adjustments in transnational alliances.

However, at all times and particularly ahead of a European election, each political family must have a transnational structure that is visible, credible (from the point of view of both the parties concerned and the citizens) and operational to deliver messages on European issues. Currently, the addition of hundreds of national party programs makes European issues totally invisible. Hence the importance, in the immediate future, and in the absence of genuine transnational parties, of promoting synergies between all parties in the same political family, both vertically and horizontally.

Transnational parties: top-down or bottom-up approach?

Denouncing the opportunist alliances of national parties without a coherent agenda for Europe and arguing that it is inappropriate to transpose to the European level what does not work at the national level, new political parties which claim to be "transnational" have been created *ex-nihilo* with the sole aim of talking more about Europe, or doing it differently, emphasizing their ideological and programmatic cohesion⁵. Experience shows however that these parties are (still) inaudible, for lack of the necessary territorial base. Indeed, to be "transnational" a party must compete at all levels of the Union, from municipal to European. While these initiatives have the merit of providing a stimulus for politics to take a transnational dimension, in the long term, however, it will not be possible to create a European civil society, unless marginal, without transforming major traditional political parties, even though these will increasingly be subject to upheavals.

Halfway through is the status of "individual member" of Europarties, some of them wishing to broaden their democratic base beyond their institutional members. This status can be justified insofar as national parties are still neglecting the European political debate. There too, it has to do with the stimulus role. But it is an additional risk to oppose European and national parties against each other. In any partisan system, activism is first exercised at the local level and membership in a local chapter of a transnational party gives the activist, *ipso facto*, membership status of that party without any territorial considerations. The distinction between institutional and individual members is no longer relevant.

C. European elections: The problem of confusion of stakes

The confusion of issues is a recurrent feature of European elections. There is a double problem:

- In the absence of an organized and structured debate at European level, national parties conduct electoral campaigns in isolation, with the result that national political considerations inevitably take precedence over European issues. At best, when the latter are discussed, each party insinuates that its sole views will prevail in the EP⁶ (see box below).

- Electoral competition does not acknowledge the fact that one may assess parties' sectoral policies and thematic priorities differently depending upon what is considered being the most appropriate level of action, national or European. Different level means different programmatic approach. Thus, in a context of increasing volatility of the electorate, where fewer voters are loyal to a party, it is not abnormal that someone supports a different political family depending on whether the elections are municipal, national or European.

The instrumentalization of European elections for national political agendas

Some examples of drifts which mislead voters on what is at stake:

- Call for a sanction vote against the government in place, without bringing attention to the fact that European elections are for the election of MEPs who will have no competence in national governance.
- Recurrent criticisms of national policy components that are outside EP competences.
- Call to form national "coalitions" and common lists to have more weight in the electoral competition (such as the failed attempts to unite left-wing forces in France, or the "European coalition" in Poland), without bringing attention to the fact that elected candidates would then inevitably join different groups in the EP, after having given an illusion of unity.
- Competition centered on the objective of improving the party's position on the national scene (which can lead to resignations in the event of failure), whereas only power relations at European level matter

Given that issues, programs and decision-making mechanisms are different at national and European level, the message to the electorate must be conveyed in a different way. The europeanization of national parties in this sense is of course a priority. In mature federations, the debate on federal issues is led by local sections of parties (themselves organized along the federal model).

Within the EU, the europeanization of politics, particularly the clarification of stakes, must find an institutional translation that corresponds to the *sui generis* nature of integration. In the absence of genuine transnational parties and given the regrettable distinction between Europarties and national parties (condemned to last), we have no choice but to give Europarties more visibility.

* This article is published in two parts. The second part, to be published in the next issue, deals with specific proposals for reform of the European electoral law.

¹ We are referring here to a "political" space because this paper only deals with the role and organization of political parties, thus excluding other actors in the public debate such as medias, think tanks and NGOs. This analysis puts aside the controversy over the loss of credibility of political parties, taking for granted representative democracy within the Union's institutions. Also taken for granted is the perspective of the "ever closer Union" envisaged by the Treaties.

² They are in line with the intergovernmental logic of the EU: bringing together decision-makers of their political family ahead of European summits or Council meetings; coordinating action by party members within EU institutions and peripheral organizations, and shaping agendas; facilitating exchange of information; and organizing congresses where electoral programs and manifestos are adopted by consensus on the lowest common denominator.

³ European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) - European University Institute, *How to Create a Transnational Party System*, San Domenico di Fiesole (Italy), 2010 (directed by Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair).

⁴ Two opposed parties at national level may have the same European affiliation or two parties forming a national coalition may join different formations at European level. These situations are often considered to be inconsistent while they are justified in the absence of genuine transnational parties.

⁵ Without seeking to be exhaustive, one can mention relatively old initiatives such as the EFP and PACE, and more recent ones such as Volt and European Spring, the latter being an emanation of the DiEM25 Movement which has brought together under this label both DiEM25 electoral antennas and existing national parties, thus combining top-down and bottom-up approaches.

⁶ Paradoxically, at the 2019 European elections, the only major transnational meeting widely advertised by medias brought together neo-nationalist parties in Milan. Debates between *Spitzenkandidaten* had very limited impact on the electorate.

A Defense without a State Doesn't Have a Sense, but even a State without Defense. Towards a New Form of European Statehood?

Domenico Moro

The perspective opened by Juncker with his initiatives about the European defense has a precedent only in the direct elections of the European Parliament and in the birth of the euro. Indeed, as happened after these two steps towards the process of European unification, even the way towards a common European defense can be an opportunity for a broad discussion on the next steps that will have to be taken in this direction, on the future of the European Union and on its institutional structure.

Generally speaking, the steps forward in security policy are also an opportunity to emphasize the problem of the emergence of a European defense in terms of the concomitant birth of a European "State". In these cases, the model of State which we think of is, invariably, the bureaucratic and centralized national State as it has historically been affirmed in Europe. From this point of view, the most stimulating ideas are provided by some works which, in order of time, are the conference held by Robert Cooper at the Center for the Study of Democracy and the book "*Difendere l'Europa*" ["*Defending Europe*"] (2017).

Starting from the latter, in the introduction to the book it is noted that "[...] in a long-term perspective, if started immediately, European defense is not impossible. Indeed, it will become unavoidable when we finally begin to relaunch a clear and definite European State project, in boundaries that are certainly much more restricted than those of the current European Union. *A defense without a State doesn't make sense.*

But not even a State without defense [my italics]". For his part, Robert Cooper, in his conference, argues that "Armies belong to States. If you want a European army, you have first to create a European State. And that is not the direction we are going in either. The basic unit of political account in Europe remains the State – the nation State if you will – though I always hesitate to use that in a country [the UK -Transl. Note] having today at least four nations -, the State which has elections, parliaments, which taxes its citizens, provides them with health care, courts, police, prisons, education, street lighting and many other things, and which remains the primary focus of loyalty and identity of its citizens. It is this State which owns the armies too and which will continue to do so for the foreseeable future". Both authors just mentioned agree on the fact that defense and statehood go hand in hand, even if in the first case a time lag does not seem to be completely excluded. Cooper's observations, however, go further. He does not limit himself to argue that the defense and the creation of a European State are the same thing: "No State, no army" is the phrase with which he concludes his report at the Center for the Study of Democracy. Cooper also provides a description of what he believes is a State, that is, an entity that deals with all the public services a political community needs, including the provision of health services, courts of justice, police, prisons, up to education and street lighting. Since Cooper speaks about a country with four nationalities, which has also

four national football teams – Wales, England, Scotland and Northern Ireland –, with some hesitation does he identify the type of State which he refers to as a *national* State. In fact, the list of public goods he has compiled is well suited to a bureaucratic and centralized State, as are the European national States, but it certainly does not describe a federal union. In the latter, as can be the United States, and taking up the list of public goods mentioned by him, it should be noted that healthcare, before the Obama reform, was predominantly private and State-managed, while now it is private and it is in equal measure State-managed and federal; the courts of justice are State-managed and federal; education is a State competence; police departments are State-managed and federal; prisons are State-managed and federal; street lighting is State-managed and local. But above all, with reference to the defense, what Cooper forgets is that in the USA, at least until 1916, and formally still today, the “dual army” system (K. C. Wheare, *On federal government*, 1951), federal and State-managed, applies. The type of State which Cooper thinks of would ill adapt to the European situation and, as far as the defense is concerned, it will probably be necessary to think of the American model that prevailed at least until the US federal institutions began weakening.

With reference to the realization of a European defense, the problems that are raised by what has just been mentioned are two. The first is the gradual implementation of a European defense and, therefore, the gradual realization of a European statehood. The second is the type of State and defense that can be achieved with reference to the European Union. On the first point, Albertini’s reflections can be helpful (M. Albertini, *Tutti gli scritti, 1971-1975*, 2008). They have been advanced as soon as the concrete possibility of promoting political initiatives for the realization of the European monetary union was at hand. He was well aware of the fact that, as mentioned before, the construc-

tion of the European federation “*is more a political than an institutional fact*”. Albertini was able to take an innovative position that, from the point of view of an active political thinking, represents a radical step forward. In fact, he argued that “*the decisive point seems to me this: we must accept and support, against any logic, a gradual operation of monetary unification preceding, and not following, the creation of a European political power, because the protagonists of the process as far as its execution is concerned[...], do not behave according to logical criteria*”. Huntington did a similar sociological remark about the dual control, States and federal, of the U.S. militias and a regular army (S. Huntington, *The soldier and the State*, 1957).

As an aspect to be investigated further, we must ask ourselves whether, in the light of the progress that has been made in the last two years in the field of European defense, the observation made by Albertini for the European currency may still apply with reference to the defense. Compared to 45 years ago, when that reflection was made, the EU has made enormous progress towards a true European statehood. The direct election of the European Parliament has been obtained (what is a parliament, if not an organ of a State?); so did the doubling of the European budget; the realization of the European internal market; a single European currency. What are an elected parliament, an internal market and a currency, if not further federal institutions that have joined the previous federal institutions, such as the Court of Justice and the trade policy as an exclusive European competence?

If referred to European defense, Albertini’s observation on the monetary union – whose realization may precede the creation of a European political power –, in the current European institutional context seems less abstract, even if we are only witnessing its first cautious steps. Certainly, achieving European defense presents different problems than the European currency. To achieve that, it was necessary to recognize the principle of the European Central Bank autonomy,

without which Germany's consent would not have been obtained. This is not possible for European defense, which needs a strong control by a European democratic government and the European Parliament. In the case of European defense, it is not a question, however, of replacing the national armed forces with a single European army, but of gradually transferring to the European institutions a share of the national armies, similarly to when, at the beginning of monetary unification process, it was decided to share a portion of the national currency reserves. At European level, the institutions – European Council, European Commission, European Parliament – for the control of an initial core of European federal army already exist. It is a matter of accepting the fact that there will be two levels at which there will be armies, one national and one European, and that, for a long time, they will coexist, as it happened for the United States of America, for over a century of existence of that federation. A more suitable way of expressing this concept, as has been suggested recently, is to define the EU as a “federal union”, an expression that better than others describes a union that is a “union of States and citizens”.

The American experience raises the problem of assessing whether or not it involves a clarification of the sound definition of State that Max Weber gave in its time (“the State is that human community which, in the limits of a given territory – this element of the “territory” is characteristic – demands for itself (successfully) the monopoly of legitimate physical force”). This definition is certainly well-suited to the European centralized national States, but does not seem to conform to the American federal experience, whose constitution provides for the presence of armed forces at the federal and State level. The European federal union, when it will be born, will be, as Albertini argued, a “State of States” and this would already suggest two levels to which the “monopoly of legitimate physical force” will correspond. The European federal union will not have the “monopoly of monopolies”, but more

simply, as can be deduced from the American experience, the monopoly of the federal level, to be exercised outside European borders, and States’ monopolies to be exercised mainly within State borders.

Certainly, the monopoly of physical force is not limited only to the armed forces, since in a bureaucratic and centralized State there are also police forces. But the federal police, in the USA, was born at the beginning of the last century with the establishment of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Before then, there was only the State or local police and, in order to prosecute crimes on a federal scale, private agencies were employed, such as the famous Pinkerton agency which, at the end of the 1800s, had a number of agents that by far exceeded that of the members of the American federal army. In the American experience, the monopoly of physical force, more than being at a specific State level, is shared between the federal and State level and this seems to correspond more to the idea that the American federation, at least for over a century of its history, can be called a “State of States”.

The current political thinking will perhaps have some difficulty in admitting a possibility of this kind but, as mentioned above, “in a long-term perspective, to be prepared right away, a European defense is not impossible”. It goes without saying that starting to prepare immediately the road to European defense is tantamount to preparing immediately for a European statehood. However, in this regard it is necessary to clear the ground of an argument that could be an obstacle on this path, namely the idea that to create a European State, it is necessary to establish a single armed force in place of 27 armed national forces. The European institutions have already ruled out an outcome of this kind, but the EU as such needs a defense and therefore the American experience can be a good point of reference. To date it is premature to say what the defense model that will inspire the EU may be, even if the American dual army model would seem the most plausible.

A Green New Deal for the New European Legislature

Alberto Majocchi

In the new term of the European Parliament, one certain priority is the need to come up with an agenda to manage the structural interventions necessary for the sustainable development of the European economy, in particular to address the dramatic problem of climate change. It is no coincidence that, after the remarkable success of *Fridays for Future*, promoted by Greta Thunberg, the Green group has established itself in the recent elections in many European countries, thus being able to strongly influence the work programme of the new Commission and the new Parliament.

What needs to be done is to clearly establish the objectives of a Green New Deal, now being openly discussed in the political debate. It is evident that the ever-looming problem of limiting CO₂ emissions is the first issue that needs to be addressed. The 2015 Paris agreements were significant as they involved 195 countries, which committed themselves to setting up national emission reduction programmes in line with the target of keeping the increase in global average temperature to well below 2°C. However, these agreements have some serious limitations; not only are the submitted national programmes insufficient to achieve this target, but the available resources – both to help the least developed countries and to finance the transition in the more affluent areas of the world – are still scarce.

After President Emmanuel Macron's speech at the Sorbonne University in September 2017, the idea is becoming more widespread that – even in Europe – market instruments

such as tradable emissions permits should be combined with fiscal instruments. Specifically, with a carbon pricing in proportion to the carbon content of fossil fuels, to be combined with an equivalent border tax adjustment on imported goods, such as to impact on carbon footprints which include emissions relating to goods from countries that do not put a price on carbon.

The price suggested by Macron was € 25-30 per tonne of CO₂. However, a report by the High-Level Commission on Carbon Prices, headed by Joseph Stiglitz and Nicholas Stern, has already stressed the need to switch to a price between 40 and 80 dollars in 2020 and to 50-100 dollars in 2030. A recent report by the Commission chaired by Alain Quinet (*La valeur de l'action pour le climat*), drawn up on behalf of the French government, stipulates that a level of € 250 per tonne of CO₂ should be reached in 2030. These figures, in fact, seem to be consistent with those suggested in the literature, namely that a price should be set equal to the marginal damage caused by pollution. In the case of climate change, a recent study by Stanford University scientists estimates this marginal damage at \$ 220.

However, what happened in France after the government's decision to introduce a limited energy tax increase, with the revolt of the "yellow vests", showed that the strategy to be implemented must be more clearly articulated. Indeed, a price on emissions needs to be set high enough to send a signal to the market that the goal is to proceed with determination

towards overcoming the use of fossil fuels; that price would then be gradually increased until it reaches the level set as a target, so as to allow for the adjustments made necessary by the higher cost of energy. At the same time, through a carbon dividend, two other important objectives must be pursued: guaranteeing social equity and supporting the ecological transition.

To achieve this set of objectives, carbon pricing needs to be part of a broader tax reform project (an international committee has already submitted a European Citizens Initiative on this issue, whose admissibility has been already recognized by the Commission), which includes both revenues and expenditures. First and foremost, this measure must be based on the principle of *revenue neutrality*, as revenues must be recycled into the economy, to avoid a negative macroeconomic impact. However, from this principle important innovations in the European tax structure also will follow.

Regarding revenues, the carbon dividend coming from the increase in the price of fossil fuels shall be allocated to reduce taxation on the lowest incomes, in particular on labour incomes, in order to compensate for the greater burden placed on the poorest families and guarantee the social equity of the measure. At the same time, it must be used to trigger the necessary transition of the economic structure towards the goal of a carbon-free economy. This is a demanding and expensive process. To achieve the goal of a sustainable European development within the context of a globalised

economy, the existing considerable subsidies for fossil fuels should first be reduced. Then tax reductions for families and businesses that start energy efficiency programmes should also be introduced (e.g. converting buildings so that they save energy, exploiting solar energy, using sustainable-mobility vehicles). Investments should also be encouraged to create adequate infrastructure (low-cost eco-compatible public transport, renewal of the urban structure, relocating productive activities to reduce commuting costs). Finally, research and development programmes should be financed that aim at ensuring that the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy is fast and affordable, without negatively affecting growth processes and people's living standards. Then, in parallel with imposing a carbon price, the subsidies to renewable energies, already getting an incentive through the increase in the price of fossil fuels, could be progressively reduced as well.

A Green New Deal, involving all levels of government starting with the European level, must be at the core of the programme of the new Commission and the new Parliament, using the carbon dividend not only to allocate new resources to the European budget – in particular from the revenues deriving from the tax levied on imports, which already constitutes an own resource-, but also to launch a profound reform of the structure of European public finance, that would accompany the structural transformations designed to put the European economy on the path to sustainable development and a greater ability to compete on the world market.

UN Parliamentary Assembly Model Tested in Buenos Aires

Clara Subirachs

Last August 23, the Argentine Congress hosted a simulated session of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, in which around 60 students from the departments of Political Science and International Relations from the University of Belgrano took part.

The event was held in the plenary chamber of the Senate of Argentina in Buenos Aires and was organized by the civil society organization *Democracia Global: Movimiento por la Unión Sudamericana y el Parlamento Mundial* in collaboration with the University of Belgrano. It was part of the *International Campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly*, which is endorsed by over 1,600 current and former members of parliament from more than 130 countries.

Students discussed the preservation and conservation of the environment as a global theme, from the perspective of *global representatives* who are called on to represent global citizenship and the planetary interest.

The session was chaired by the provisional president of the Argentine Senate, Federico Pinedo as well as senator Esteban Bullrich, national deputy Fernando Iglesias and Cristian Gimenez Corte, an official representative of the United Nations. Senator Pinedo stated that "We need to establish norms and agreements in order to solve global issues." Senator Bullrich said that "it is very important that we not only discuss these issues but we act to change the situation and find common solutions."

During the opening of the event, *Democracia Global's* Executive Director Camila Lopez Badra stated that "the younger generations are the future", adding that "citizens need a supranational body in which they are represented." Furthermore, she referred to the main topic of the model's debate: "Global

citizens live in a shared planet and we must preserve and care for the environment". Lopez Badra asserted that "climate change affects all of us" and highlighted that "one in every four species in the world is at risk of extinction; the oceans are warming up, there is an increase in pollution of the air and water, and there is an increasing lack of care for the environment." With reference to the forest fires in the Amazon she stated: "Today, the planet's lungs are on fire."

Throughout the discussion, the university's students agreed on the necessity of "taking immediate action in order to have a tomorrow and preserve our shared future." In his closing statement the UN official Cristian Gimenez Corte emphasized the importance of "increasing awareness of the necessity of creating international institutions that hold legitimacy." In his role as President of the World Federalist Movement, deputy Fernando Iglesias welcomed this "academic experience" and affirmed that the event is "a valuable precedent." Fernando Iglesias is a founding member of *Democracia Global*, whose objective is to develop global democracy through the creation of democratic institutions at the continental, international and global levels. "Hopefully, this experience will help global citizens – especially young people – link the key challenges underlying our survival as humankind with the political sphere", Iglesias concluded.

A model resolution on "the preservation of native forests" was the initiative that got the most support among the simulation's participants. The UN Parliamentary Assembly model was tested to raise awareness for the "construction of a parliament that would deal with global issues from a diverse array of perspectives and provide a voice to world citizens."

The European Council, Improvisation and the Politics of Events

Jean-Guy Giraud

Luuk Van Middelaar¹

Quand l'Europe improvise: dix ans de crises politiques

Collection Le Débat, Gallimard, Paris, 2018

The primacy of the European Council

In his book, this well-known author² brilliantly develops an argument which we can summarily present as follows:

- the European Union has been built in order to avoid the renewal of fratricidal strife,
- the EU has been built on a rule of law basis, which has progressively brought peace and unified the European States (“the politics of the rule”),
- however, its initial structure (“the community”) has been incapable of coping with the big political crises which have emerged in the last two decades (Euro/ Ukraine/ Migration/ Brexit/ Trump),
- consequently, the EU had to “improvise” the creation of a complementary and parallel structure (“the Union”) equipped with a political power which is apt to face those crises with a different method (“the politics of events”),

- this structure is managed by a new “Institution”: the European Council, within which the Member States freely cooperate in order to manage those crises with methods that go beyond the limited rules and competences provided by the “Community”.

This summary does not do justice to the clarity and richness of the long argument presented by the author, based on the specific case of the management of the above mentioned crisis by the EU. Therefore, we recommend reading this book entirely, especially to those who are interested in the recent evolution of the great institutional balances within the European Union institutions.

The weakness of the European Council

The purpose of this summary is, however, more specific. In particular, we would like to think about the merit of the author’s conclusion: is the European Council appropriate to the role that has been assigned to it, namely the supreme political power of the EU?

Luke Van Middelaar limits himself to noting the incapacity of the original institutions to face “events” through “the politics of the rule”, from which the necessity of “improvising” and resorting to a different method and a different forum has risen.

He does not even try to develop those arguments which would allow the questioning of the real capacity of the European Council to manage the “politics of events”, even though those doubts are several and actually well-known. Below, we will try to enumerate them without going into detail or trying to give them an order:

- the European Council is not, strictly speaking, a “European” body, insofar as its members are, first and foremost, national representatives and they only exercise this function marginally and ex officio,
- their European legitimacy is, therefore, secondary or “derivative” – unlike the legitimacy of the Parliament and the Commission (or of

the Court of Justice), institutions which are specifically European,

- the members of the Council cannot feel the same feeling, neither individually nor collectively, of common and collective solidarity and responsibility as the members of other Institutions,

- they only intervene in the European sphere in an intermittent and inevitably limited way (in time as well as in authority) because of the primacy of their national functions,

- the very composition of the Council is unstable because of the quasi-continuous renewal of its members,

- the consideration of the national interests of each of them affects heavily (and legitimately) their respective positions within the Council,

- moreover, each state may successively take different positions as its leaders renew,

- the representativeness and the authority of some members may be upset by the instability or even by political crises that may affect their national regimes,

- some members may even display extreme eurosceptic positions, which could prevent the good functioning of the organisation (because of the consensus rule),

- due to their leading function, all members are strongly exposed to the immediate reactions of their public opinions; they only are – and feel – directly responsible to those opinions,

- these various factors result in a great difficulty for the college to define precisely and in a long-term way the “general political directions and priorities” of the Union (see Article 15 TEU),

- *de facto*, certain members of the Council are “more equal” than others due to the great disparity in the economic, demographic and political influence of their different States,

- even within the Council, it is likely that geopolitical alliances or groups of interests develop,

- because of its dominant position and because of the interaction between “general” issues and specific Community policies, the Council

is increasingly involved in the management of the “rule” itself.³

On another note, we could mention the case of “the improvisation” of the Council in the election of the new leaders of the EU occurred on last 3rd of July 2019.

Thereby the limits of this hybrid construction of European governance, which raises the question of the need for reform, are revealed to us. In which direction is this reform needed? There is only one complete model that can theoretically be conceived – in the light of political science as well as historical examples: the one of federalism, which is capable of taking different forms depending on the circumstances and the political realities.

In the present circumstances, it is difficult to discern any evolution of the Union towards this model. However, it is equally uncertain that it can sustainably endure this situation of institutional compromise, which has been so brilliantly described by Luuk Van Middelaar.

In conclusion, the author’s detailed description of the Euro crisis (2010/2012) is probably one of the best of the kind.

Translated by Cecilia Mellana

¹ <http://www.gallimard.fr/Catalogue/GALLIMARD/Le-Debat/Quand-l-Europe-improvise>; there is also an English edition of the book: *Alarums and Excursions. Improvising Politics on the European Stage*, Agenda Publishing, 2019.

² Luuk Van Middelaar has been the adviser to Van Rompuy during his presidency of the European Council (2010-2014); <https://www.euronews.com/2019/04/25/van-rompuy-advisor-warns-of-european-day-of-reckoning>.

³ The best example of this is the adoption of the multiannual financial framework of the EU, in which the European Council *de facto* plays a predominant role.

A Novel about the Beginnings of the Ventotene Manifesto

Mario Leone

Wu Ming 1

La Macchina del Vento (The Wind Machine)

[in Italian]

Einaudi, Torino, 2019

The story told in “*The wind machine*” (“*La macchina del vento*”) has taken its Author, Wu Ming 1, a pseudonym of an Italian writer and blogger, fourteen years to complete. The idea of setting a novel in the island of Ventotene came out in 2005, drawing its inspiration from different stories, such as the *Odyssey* and the disappearance of the physicist Ettore Majorana, ending up with the arrival onto the last century’s political-confinement island of a physicist and a phantom time-machine, got lost during the testing phase.

This novel actually should be read starting from the end, exactly from the author’s reflections placed in the credits section. Because the work is a reveling at two levels. The first one consists of the stories of the characters who enlivened the political confinement of Ventotene during the dark ages of the Second World War (Ventotene was the place chosen by Mussolini’s regime to confine his opponents). The second level is fantasy, or rather the reverie (just to mention Giovanni Verga’s work) to endeavor to figure out the thoughts of a political exile, in

particular one named Erminio Squarzanti.

The author acknowledges the differences between the confinement as described in the novel and the one coming out from the official records. The work is packed with invented characters and imaginary events, as well as exiles’ relationships and dialogues, which sound as a stretch to a demanding reader. The writer in fact apologizes to experts on the subject and to the relatives of those who really experienced the confinement, though only at the end of the novel (see pages 332-333). On the contrary, these excuses should have been put at the beginning, like a preamble for a “safe” and more careful reading.

Emilio Squarzanti is a young university student of socialist faith, by means of whom the author gives his critical opinion about the confinement, focusing especially on dual relations: Pertini and Spinelli, Rossi and Colorni, Scoccimarro and Terracini. Squarzanti himself triggers his political analysis: mild at the beginning, it becomes stronger and stronger up to turning into a vehement opposition to the *Ventotene Manifesto* (whose complete heading is “*For a Free and United Europe. A draft Manifesto*”).

We’d rather analyze the passages which describe the conception of the Manifesto and the dialogues between its Fathers. Squarzanti switches from simply listening to these dialogues to replying as follows (see page 102): “*In order to destroy any city a siege is of no use. It’s enough to leave it to its own inadequacy and its state of addiction. And the more technology will develop, the greater will be its addiction*”. It’s a topic the European Federalist Movement’s Fathers were already dealing with: “*Not only any city, but every State is like Ventotene*”, Spinelli says. “*Overcoming Fascism is not enough* – Colorni replies –; *liberating the countries occupied by the Germans is not enough. If we do want no more wars, we must overcome the national States*”.

Nevertheless, Squarzanti’s most important encounter is the one with Giacomo Pontecorboli, another invented character:

Pontecorboli is pictured as a member of the "Giustizia e Libertà" movement and he slowly lets Squarzanti feel the mysterious suggestion of Herbert George Well's "The time machine". In Ventotene island time is struck by the strangely functioning clock located in Piazza Castello, which reflects the almost magical rhythm of the place. This unreal rhythm sets the pace for the reflections carried out by Spinelli, Rossi and Colorni, who were trying to overcome the reality of the world during that winter of 1941. Squarzanti doesn't agree with the contents of the *Manifesto* and tries to gain the support of other exiles. The author mingles the (invented) ideas of Squarzanti with the real philosophical discussions of Severo (who plays the role of Spinelli in the novel), Commodo (who is Colorni) and Ritroso (Rossi).

These ideas take form overnight under the pseudonym of Acribio, and they represent a sort of reinterpretation of the *Manifesto*, modified by the judgement of other exiles such as Fundo and Pertini; the latter wouldn't sign in the end the *Manifesto* because of Squarzanti.¹ Squarzanti blames the *Manifesto* for not taking into account the opinion of the popular masses, for it considers them "passive and lacking consciousness", it shows "no confidence in them", and the proletariat is associated with "worthless impulses, particularism, and very limited views". He accuses the *Manifesto* because it seems to state that only a "small group of enlightened people" ("a revolutionary party" in his own words) might take action from above, even overcoming democratic procedures, to reach the goal of a European Federation, which Fascism had just delayed (see pages 270-273).

But Squarzanti's opinion (the writer complains) doesn't mirror the true spirit of the *Manifesto*, as the following passage proves: "The slow process whereby vast numbers of men meekly allowed themselves to be passively molded by the new regime, adjusted themselves to it and thereby contributed to its consolidation, has now stopped;

instead, the opposite process has begun. This huge wave, which is slowly swelling up, brings together all the progressive forces, the most enlightened parts of the working class unswayed by either fear or flattery from their ambition to a higher way of life: the more perceptive intellectuals, offended by the degradation imposed on their intelligence; the entrepreneurs, ready for new challenges, who want to be free from restrictive red tape and national autarchy, and, finally, all those who, through an inborn sense of dignity, do not intend to bow down under the humiliation of servitude. The salvation of our civilization is now entrusted to all these forces". And then the opinion about Fascism, which only Squarzanti considers as just "an incident". About that, actually, the *Manifesto* says: "Germany's defeat, however, would not automatically bring about the reorganization of Europe in line with our ideal of civilization. In the brief but intense period of general crisis ..., the most privileged classes of the old national systems will try, underhandedly or violently, to dampen the wave of internationalist feelings and passions, and will contribute ostentatiously to the reconstruction of the old state institutions".

There's more, in fact. Squarzanti wrongly believes that in the *Manifesto* there is no real European patriotism, but here too a more careful reading would show: "They (i.e. the reactionary forces) will try to insist on the restoration of the nation state. This will allow them to take hold on the most widespread feeling among the population, a feeling most hurt by the recent events, which can be easily manipulated to reactionary ends: patriotism. [...] The most pressing problem, without solving which any other progress is merely an illusion, is the definitive abolition of the division of Europe into national, sovereign states".

Squarzanti doesn't notice that the *Manifesto* puts the overcoming of national states at the basis of the federative project, which will end with the creation of the United States of Europe: it will then play the role of an interlocutor guaranteeing the balance in

international relations: “the European Federation is the only conceivable guarantee that the relations with the American and Asian peoples can be held on a basis of peaceful cooperation, awaiting a more distant future when the political unity of the entire globe becomes possible”. The *Manifesto* focuses mainly on Americans and Asians because no other populations were detected being able to start a Third World War (not the Africans, and not for their lesser importance).

Squarzanti doesn't even recognize Commodó's (that is, Colorni's) influence. That's a pity, considering that Colorni convincingly signed the *Manifesto* and took care of its publication and diffusion. Moreover, he wrote the preface to the 1944 edition, which played a very important role in the interpretation of the document, as Spinelli himself acknowledged: “my way of thinking wouldn't be what it is now, had I not spent two years discussing with him almost daily, in a critical and constructive manner”.

¹ Pertini himself will confirm his refusal to sign the *Manifesto* much later, after becoming the President of the Italian Republic. During a speech given on 7th October 1982 in front of the Italian MEPs, he said: “I'm going to make a public confession, like some Dostoevsky's characters did”. And addressing Spinelli: “You surely remember that after having signed the *Manifesto* I finally withdrew my adhesion. Then many polemics followed, but I've never explained to you the real reason why I behaved like that. The fact is I was in complete agreement with you, but my comrades in Paris didn't like my act, which would have made the relationship between the Socialist party and other parties more complicated. Eventually I had to obey party's orders. But today I wouldn't act like that again. You do understand me because you too managed how not to obey. At that time, I was not up to doing that, and I did it wrongly” (from “*Diario Europeo*”, A. Spinelli, 1976-1986, edited by Il Mulino, 1992).

For a Global Multilevel Participatory Democracy

Giampiero Bordino

Orazio Parisotto

The Global Revolution for a New Humanism
Grafica EFFE 2, Romano d'Ezzelino
(Italy), 2018

The challenges posed by the ungoverned globalization in which we live, the socio-economic, environmental, cultural and institutional crisis that accompanies it and, at the same time, the possible proposals to successfully face these challenges and this crisis are the major themes treated in the volume by Orazio Parisotto, a scholar of human sciences with a long experience in the world of NGOs and European institutions.

The horizon outlined in the book is the construction of a new humanism that involves the “peace operators” of all continents, aiming to achieve a “peaceful global revolution of a Gandhian type”. Given that “We are all aboard this Planet Earth vessel”, either we are able to build a “new common house”, giving back to politics and institutions (according to the formula of a multilevel, global and participatory democracy, as we will see later) their role of governing our common problems, from peace to the environment, or humanity is destined to chaos, barbarism, in short to self-destruction. Is such a perspective too difficult, almost

impossible to achieve, a dream? The author cites in this regard a credible witness, one who has personally experienced and actually won in his own country a big challenge that many considered impossible, Nelson Mandela: "A winner is just a dreamer who has never given up". On what grounds, in which directions is it necessary to intervene to face the challenges of globalization and build a new common home? Parisotto's book is full of ideas, intuitions and operational proposals. A non-exhaustive synthesis can be attempted, starting from the themes of training and information, to which the author rightly attributes a great value. As Albert Einstein, one of the most frequent references in the book, said: "If humanity is to survive, we will need a really new way of thinking". The hypothesis is that of an intercultural, inter-religious educational model, based on a common worldwide ethic ("Don't do unto others what you don't want done unto you" is, according to the Author, a principle common to all religions). In this direction, the idea of a "universal Charter of fundamental duties" is also proposed, which should represent the shared foundation of common ethics. The proposed educational model, which among other things is explicitly inspired by a holistic vision of the world that goes beyond the mechanistic view typical of the Western tradition (in this regard the famous book by Fritjof Capra, *The Tao of Physics*, is mentioned), is divided into three different and interconnected dimensions: psycho-physical, environmental, civic.

In this context and to these ends, the problem of information also arises. Information is now strongly threatened by the spreading of "fake news" on the net, and therefore requires the launch of a new course that guarantees its reliability and controllability. "This challenge is fundamental for our future".

A second major topic on which it is necessary to intervene is, according to the Author, the environmental and socio-economic one. The

neo-liberal model, dominant in recent decades and based on the uncontrolled exploitation of natural resources and human labor, has failed. In 2018, at the Davos summit, the world leaders had to acknowledge that inequalities have reached today an unsustainable level: the richest 1% of the world population owns as much wealth as the remaining 99%! At the origin of this situation there is, in general and in the first place, the impotence of institutions and politics to control and regulate capital and markets. Markets and capital are now transnational and supranational, while political powers are not yet so. It is the phenomenon analyzed by the economist Joseph E. Stiglitz in a very well-known passage concerning fiscal problems, taken up in Parisotto's book: "*In the presence of a situation in which capital moves easily from one jurisdictional area to another, if we try to impose a stricter tax on capital, capital simply moves to another place. Thus, ironically, at a time when inequality has continued to grow, and it did grow enormously over the last thirty years, the ability to redistribute income through capital taxation has been greatly reduced*". More generally, beyond the increasingly serious problem of inequality, the impotence of politics and institutions is evident in regard to the great environmental emergencies that are threatening the earth and its inhabitants: those of water, soil and air, of demography, and finally also of some new technologies (genetic manipulation, for example). In the face of these emergencies, if a radical change in the architecture of institutions and powers which overcomes the limits of national states and intergovernmental organizations is not made, the perspective of self-destruction is to be realistically forecasted in not too distant times. The necessary turning point, drawing inspiration from the historical model of the federalist thought, consists in building institutions and powers at the supranational, continental and world level. It is no coincidence that the Author deals specifically with the

theme of UN reform, outlines the proposal for a global institution “of the Third Millennium”, and proposes the idea of a Global Tobin Tax to guarantee its autonomy and operational capacity. The author devotes ample space also to a critical reflection on the process of the political unification of Europe, which “although not yet completed, represents the greatest initiative of peaceful unification of an entire continent pursued so far”.

In essence, one of the essential foundations of the new humanism proposed by the author is a political-institutional system of multilevel “participatory democracy”. Six levels of participation are outlined, mutually complementary and interconnected: family, municipal, regional, national, continental, world-wide. As the great historian of civilizations Arnold J. Toynbee wrote in his last book “*Mankind and Mother Earth: A Narrative History of the World*”, published posthumously in 1976, and quoted by Parisotto: “*The present-day global set of sovereign states is not capable of preserving peace, it is not capable of saving the biosphere from man-made pollution or of conserving the biosphere’s non-replaceable natural resources. International political anarchy cannot last longer ...*”.

Translated by Lionello Casalegno

For a Reasonable Governance of the World

Antonio Mosconi

Guido Montani

Supranational Political Economy. The Globalisation of the State-Market Relationship
Routledge, New York, 2019.

There is no need to present the professor of international economics Guido Montani through his excellent academic curriculum. We federalists are interested instead in remembering, for those who have not had the fortune to follow his political story, that he was one of the closest collaborators of Mario Albertini¹, the leader who managed to merge, for the goal of European integration, the radical federalism of Altiero Spinelli with the gradual constitutionalism of Jean Monnet. After obtaining the direct election of the European Parliament and putting the European Monetary System in the pipeline, Albertini began to reflect on the goal that Europe should pursue in the world. His answer was: peace. “Unite Europe to unite the world” became his watchword at the MFE Congress in Bari in 1980.

This mention, albeit minimal, of Montani’s biography seems to me to explain why he, among many economists, felt the need to explore the transition from international economy to supranational economy, from the politics that tolerates and sometimes prepares for war to that which is committed to prevent it.

Montani's book was also written as a response to the rejection of multilateral institutions by the United States, which had devised them in the past, at the very moment when the ecological crisis has reached the threshold of irreversibility in numerous processes, and also other global emergencies prove unmanageable by part of the nation states. Trump considers the European members of NATO to be enemies if they do not pay their required contributions to military expenses; he challenges WTO rules by imposing duties and does not replace the US members of its jurisdictional body to avoid decisions contrary to American interests; he prefers bilateral agreements (*divide et impera*); he drastically reduces the US fees to the UN to punish agencies like UNESCO, guilty of approving critical resolutions against the US government; he uses the dollar as a weapon to sanction States deemed "enemies" (eg Iran); he may decide to exit unilaterally from international treaties already approved, such as the Paris agreement on climate change; he explicitly points to the disintegration of Europe; in sum, he comes into conflict with the common good of humanity.²

The book consists of three parts. I wish to give a quick idea of their content and then focus on the third part which, dealing with global governance, is more interesting for the connection between federalist theory and practice in the difficult phase of the transition from hegemonic to cooperative global control systems, between the tail blows of the last hegemonic power and the dawn of the organized multipolar world.

1. The first part traces the history of economic thought from Smith (political economy, relationship between state and market), to the marginalists Jevons, Walras, Menger, Marshall (they no longer speak of state and international relations. Economics and politics become two separate disciplines).

Only after the end of the Bretton Woods regime is the interest in the relationship between the state and the international market rekindled. A new discipline is born, international economic policy (IEP). The contemporary challenge is the transition from the IEP to a supranational political economy, the SPE. With the dollar standard and with the abolition of any control over the movement of capital and exchange rates, the control levers of the economy have been transferred from the States to the international financial markets (in which Wall Street is dominant), but now global institutions are needed.

2. The second part illustrates the historical and institutional aspects of two concepts, the federal principle and the supranational one, from Hamilton to Monnet-Schumann. After the financial crash of 2008, of American origin, the Keynesians, with good reasons, did not ask for an increase in spending at the European level, but a greater expenditure at national levels (methodological nationalism). In the Troika's intervention in Greece, the federal institution, the ECB, is the one that responded best to the crisis. Today, the problem presents itself on a global scale. While the American Federation's purpose was to eliminate war between the states of the continent, the European process towards a new form of multi-level governance must pursue the goal of peace in the world.
3. The third part investigates the major political and economic challenges of our time, first of all sustainable development (UN 2015), to ascertain that the attempts to manage global risks by national governments and by international cooperation are totally inadequate. If at world level there is no government that establishes the rules of

the game, these will be fixed by the market, that is, by the Multi-national Companies, as appreciated by Hayek. Instead, we need to restore the original definition of political economy (Smith). The current “survival unit” (Elias), the National State, seeks to create a false sense of security by closing its borders, but uncertainty (globalization and the environment) requires a greater level of integration, where the “survival unit” is the whole human race. The nation state can no longer be a “survival unit” if not as a part of a global unity. Contemporary financial capitalism is global, and can only be reformed on a planetary scale. The main flaws to be corrected are inequalities and unemployment. The main objectives of global governance are:

- Creating a new international monetary and financial order (IMF-BIS).
- Defending and strengthening the WTO as a body controlling international trade and global imbalances.
- Sharing the financial and technological policies to ensure sustainability.
- Regulating the relations between national and supranational powers.

I now examine the first three of the four areas of supranational governance indicated by Montani as priorities, with an eye to the “line” that the federalists could adopt in their global action. I do not dwell on the fourth one because I think that, in the short to medium term, our action cannot point to the creation of a multilevel world state, while the defence of the already existing agencies (IMF-BIS and WTO) and the creation of the missing one (for the Environment) is a priority. I will not talk about the radical transformation of NATO into the World Security Agency for several reasons: the subject has already been treated by federalists³ and Montani does not mention it in his book; my only conviction on the subject is that Europe will not be secure as long as

Russia does not feel secure, which means that the policy carried out so far, under American instructions, has worried Russia and has made Europe less secure, and that an independent Europe’s presence in the Atlantic Alliance must mark this difference.

Currency and finance

The 2008 financial crisis marks the epilogue of the Bretton Woods crisis, the end of the unlimited confidence in the dollar, the acceleration of de-dollarization in the new global multi-currency system introduced by the euro and strengthened by the renminbi (China is going from the big divergence to the new convergence), the need for a stable anchor and the victorious battle of Zhou-Xiao-Chuang for the inclusion of the renminbi in the SDR. Why should oil supplies from Saudi Arabia to China, now the first world consumer since the United States has become a competitor to producers, should be paid in the currency of a third power? An oil market in renminbi has already been launched. The renminbi reserves of oil-exporting countries can be reinvested in Chinese assets and contribute to the progressive internationalization of the renminbi itself. Tariff war and currency war intertwine. Russia reduces its dollar reserves in favour of the euro, renminbi and yen, thus tending to build a basket similar to the SDR. China, after having reduced its dollar reserves up to ranking in the second place among the dollar-holding countries after Japan, is issuing a warning to the United States by deactivating its Treasury bond purchase program for a few hours. The continuation and the tightening of the sanctions towards some countries make, in fact, the dollar not convertible in such areas. The safest way to avoid sanctions is not to use the dollar in transactions with sanctioned countries. Moreover, the dollar is the currency of the most indebted country in the world, which continues to increase its debt exponentially to finance the appalling deficits

of its current account balance of payments (which the credulous Italians consider as a great Trumpian relaunch of the American economy). Like the (dis)United Kingdom, another fallen empire finances its maintenance of high living standards and military strength by selling assets that are often overrated or toxic.

Although the euro is the only currency with wide commercial and financial diffusion to be fully convertible all around the world, not subjected to sovereign whims and with an active current account balance of payments, the “Triffin dilemma” applies to it as already to the dollar and, in future, to the renminbi. None of the five currencies that make up the SDR basket (USD 41.73%, EUR 30.93%, CNY 10.92%, JPY 8.33%, GBP 8.09%) can guarantee international-currency functions alone. There are only two possibilities left on the field, using gold for war (corresponding to Albertini’s “primitive right”) and the special drawing rights (SDR) for cooperation (Albertini’s “developed right”).

Europe should aim to strengthen the euro in its own area (which can be expanded) and encourage the anchoring to the SDR of the areas without a global reserve currency: Africa (1 Afro = 1 SDR), Russia, the Gulf, Western Asia and Latin America. Even Japan and the ASEAN countries, to escape the choice between subordination to the dollar or to the renminbi, could constitute a monetary area anchored to the SDR.

Trade

The WTO, strongly desired by the EU to give a structure to the GATT, came to a block in 2001 at the opening of the Doha Round in Seattle. The no-global demonstrations highlighted a plain fact: the new challenge consisted in the convergence of the emerging economies. The negotiations did not concern so much the customs tariffs (already reduced to a minimum) as identities and values.

Now we focus on the Trade Facilitation Agreement (TFA) because “value chains”

require minimum costs and obstacles at the borders. The goal is a 14.3% cost reduction.

We need a reform of the WTO that brings back to the fore the goals envisaged in its foundation Agreement. This means that the development of commerce is not pursued as an end in itself, but as a means for sustainable and equitable human development; that the WTO devices be consistent with those of the ILO, with the international Treaties on the environment, with the UN programs for development and with the respect for human rights.

The United States practices an “empty chair policy” to prevent any progress and even the ordinary functioning of the Dispute Settlement Body. The rest of the world should implement a “full chair policy”, face the risk of American isolation and work towards the inevitable reunion. The strength to proceed for a stretch of the road even without the United States can only derive legitimacy from a democratic WTO Parliament. In 2001, the WTO Parliamentary Conference - a joint initiative of the Inter-parliamentary Union and the European Parliament, as a response to the Seattle protests - met for the first time in Doha; it became an annual event, but with the same initial limits of the European Common Market Parliament: a second degree representation with consultative powers only. The direct election of this parliament and the extension of its powers should be included in the MFE-UEF-WFM objectives.

Sustainable Development

Achieving the objectives related to pollution, climate and biodiversity requires planetary planning and adequate resources.

The cost of maintaining carbon dioxide concentrations in the long term below a doubling with respect to the pre-industrial level is less than one percent of world annual income (Jeffrey Sachs). What is missing is a United Nations Agency (or multi-national one, in the case of isolation of the United States) that sets the goals for each country,

monitors the progress and sanctions the failure to comply with the agreements. The Agency should have its own resources coming from a share of the taxes on CO₂ emissions (carbon tax / carbon dividend), on financial and currency transactions (Tobin tax) and on the consolidated profits of Multi-national Companies. It is estimated that tax evasion through the “havens” is equal to eight percent of the world’s wealth (7.6 trillion dollars). A global register of financial activities would allow for their identification for taxation, but to do this the agreement of the main countries would be required – as it was established under the Obama Administration –, while today the foolish fiscal competition between States has begun again.

To conclude, peace is the value-aspect of federalism, and it is the *raison d’état* of Europe.

Translated by Lionello Casalegno

¹ Mario Albertini (1919-1997) taught Philosophy of Politics at the University of Pavia. He was President of the European Federalist Movement and the European Union of Federalists.

² Guido Montani, *The European Union as Stabilizer of the World Order. The Lessons of the Twenty Years’ Crisis*, International Workshop Jean Monnet Chair, Department of Political Sciences, University of Roma Tre, Thursday, June 6, 2019.

³ Domenico Moro, *Verso la difesa europea. L’Europa e il nuovo ordine mondiale*, Il Mulino, Bologna, 2018. With a foreword by Federica Mogherini and presentation by Vincenzo Camporini. Pasquale Preziosa e Dario Velo, *La difesa dell’Europa. La nuova difesa europea per le grandi sfide europee*, Cacucci Editore, Bari, 2019.

Highlights and Achievements of the World Federalist Movement during the Last 25 Years. An interview with Bill Pace

Fergus Watt

In May 2019, Mondial asked Bill Pace to look back and recall some of the highlights and achievements during his 25-year career as Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement – Institute for Global Policy, most of which also included his serving as the Convenor of the NGO Coalition for the International Criminal Court. Excerpts from the interview are re-printed below.

Can you describe for us the nature of the World Federalist Movement when you started your work as Executive Director?

The World Federalist Movement was an old peace movement based on preventing World War III by trying to reform the charter to get enforcement of law over use of military force and extreme nationalism. There were many people in 1946 that lived through two of the largest international wars in history, and many scholars, including Einstein, believed that the post-World War II community had 5 or 10 years to prevent World War III. So, when there are enough weapons to destroy the planet a thousand times over, the question was: how do we deal with it? And that was the essential cause of WFM.

I started as Secretary General of the organization, and then in April 1994 became the Executive Director. At that time, we had only a small office in Amsterdam, which organized governing meetings for the Executive Committee and Council but had no real programmatic staff. The organization had a few thousand members mostly in the

US and Europe. There was no South America, Africa or Asia participation. Now, between its various programs (including the ICC Coalition and the R2P Coalition), we have been able to expand that network to over 2,500 member organizations from over 150 countries.

I'm retiring at a time when these questions of "Why war?" are more intense than they have probably been in the last 30 or 40 years.

What was your motivation for pursuing a career in the field of human rights and international justice?

I resisted the draft to Vietnam and became obsessed with understanding the institution of war. I vividly remember being at a library in Denver and coming across the book, *Einstein on Peace*, a 500-page biography about Einstein's struggle to understand the question "Why war?". He believed that the path towards dealing with war was the world federalists. Nothing in the last 48 years has deterred me from the vision of a legal democratic federation of countries being the best hope for achieving nuclear disarmament.

Could you share some of your first experiences working in the field?

My first real job was working out west in the Rocky Mountains on environmental and disarmament issues at the local level. My first international experience was in 1988, when I was hired by Amnesty International USA to assist on an initiative called Human Rights Now, which was a Rock and Roll

tour promoting the 40th anniversary of the Declaration of Human Rights. It was an extraordinary experience to see how relatively few people could organize something that could move hundreds of thousands of people in a politically important inspiration of human rights. This idea really played a key role in the activation of WFM, showing that just a few organizations could really make a difference. Years later, WFM has played a pivotal role in the 1 for 7 billion campaign, the Hague Appeal for peace, the UN2020 campaign on the 75th anniversary of the charter.

Who are three people you have worked with that you most admire?

Although it's controversial, Kofi Annan was a very important Secretary-General, whom I was fortunate enough to develop both a professional and personal relationship with. Though his legacy is still being debated, I think he was committed to standing up against the big powers and corruption of the principles set out in the charter.

Working with **Silvia Fernández de Gurmendi** over the past 25 years has been incredibly rewarding. First as a leader in the process to the Rome Statute, then as part of the advanced team for the Court, then President and then a judge of the Court.

Lastly, as the non-governmental individual, **Mr. Ben Ferencz**, the last surviving prosecutor of the Nuremberg tribunal, who has tirelessly fought for the principles of world federalism, outlawing war and recognition of the crime of aggression. It's hard to only come with three because there are so many, but those are three who were very inspiring.

You came to the organization having played a key role in civil society preparations for the 1992 Earth Summit. What were the main milestones on the organization's growth between then and now?

I was doing work for the Earth Summit as

a part of the Center for Development of international law (CDIL), which was later folded into WFM as a parallel supporting organization when I became Executive Director. I was asked to chair a working group on legal and institutional issues, which was focused on the implementation aspect of the outcomes from the Earth Summit. We wanted to see the UN environmental program become a UN environmental organization. The view was that two thirds of the earth didn't belong to any nation state, so strengthening international governance would come from the environmental world.

Since then, I believe the main milestone of the organization has been in strengthening the peace and human rights architecture of the international legal order, particularly as it pertains to war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide and steps forward on the crime of aggression. We have been able to do so by creating relationships and developing synergy with various human rights groups and environmental groups.

You were present at the signing of the Rome Statute, the treaty that established the International Criminal Court 20 years ago. What was that like?

I think the *Times of India* called it "international law-making of historic proportions." It was one of the greatest advancements of international law and the greatest hope for peace in that time. When the decision to adopt, and reject the efforts of India and the US to stall the treaty, was made known, there was a thunderous and emotional applause for about 25 minutes. Those who were there were a part of making history. While the legacy of what we have achieved with the Rome Statute is still being determined, I think it's been one of the stronger treaties agreed by governments in the General Assembly, and one I believe to have extraordinary potential for promoting world peace.

What are some key successes you can highlight during your Directorship at WFM? What are some failures the organization has faced?

The greatest success was being able to build an organization with 3 employees and a budget of \$100,000 into an organization with multiple regional offices, a staff of 40 people, hundreds of interns and volunteers and a budget that peaked out at \$ 4.5 million. When I became Executive Director, I was keen on developing strategic networks and campaigns, that focused on various aspects that were included in world federalism. WFM was able to accomplish that through building its network and establishing its various campaigns, including the *Hague Appeal for Peace and 1 for 7 billion* campaign, and through its various programs, including the *Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect* and *The Coalition for the International Criminal Court*, that collectively work on strengthening international law and human rights. The unfortunate failure is that WFM hasn't been able to sustain its various programs. A combination of the 2008 financial collapse and withdrawal of political support for many of our projects has resulted in WFM having to do more and more with less and less.

What was the hardest decision you had to make during your Directorship at the movement?

The hardest decisions have come in the last two years, with the transition of new leadership both within our organization and within the political sphere. It's a very bittersweet time to be stepping back from my position in a world where the US government and so many other governments are abandoning the most progressive elements of the post-World War II legal order in favor of autocratic leadership. But I am hopeful that WFM will be able to make it through the various transitions and come out stronger. The organization has welcomed a new Executive Director that brings unique

skills that no director of WFM has ever had. I think another strength of this transition period will be the strong women who were elected to leadership positions in the organization.

Looking ahead, what are the main challenges for the organization?

The truth is that we have had more proposals for reforming the UN charter than we had members. We had more proposals for what world federalism looks like and many of them cancel each other out. A major challenge for the organization has been developing a clear vision of what we want and how we want it, which is more important now than ever before. Going forward it will be vital to have a clear strategic plan, and continue building support for our vision of international democracy and democracy principles. I have to hope that we can survive the storms of political regression. The John Boltons of the world know that we are a threat to everything that extreme nationalism stands for.

As a long-time insider, what are the issues within the field of international law and global peace that are not acknowledged in mainstream media or taught in academia?

The "how" is more important than the "what." It's important to have what goals you want the UN and international community to embrace, but it's how you get to those goals that determines everything else. I think the media and academia have failed miserably in understanding how international organizations function, and how international democracy can be achieved.

What advice would you give to younger generations pursuing a career in this field?

I would read *Einstein on Peace* by Albert Einstein and *The Anatomy of Peace* by Emery Reves. But I believe the best way to learn about the field is to be in it. Serve as an intern, volunteer in the field so you can learn about the work of

international organizations and the great work that they do to better our world. I'll finish by sharing a short mantra: *"The human race has to make peace with itself, with the rest of life on this planet, for this planet."* I believe our peace movement shares the principles of federalism, that give us the legal tools of how to do this.

Anything else to add?

All the great achievements come from a few people working together and that is something that lies at the heart of our organization. I hope we can use this momentum to achieve the first preamble goal of the UN Charter, and "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war".

Bill Pace has served as Executive Director of the World Federalist Movement-Institute for Global Policy (WFM-IGP) since 1994. He has been the Convenor of the Coalition for an International Criminal Court since its founding in 1995 and is

a co-founder and steering committee member of the International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect. He has been engaged in international justice, rule of law, environmental law, and human rights for the past 30 years. He previously served as the Secretary-General of the Hague Appeal for Peace, the Director of the Center for the Development of International Law, and the Director of Section Relations of the Concerts for Human Rights Foundation at Amnesty International, among other positions. He is the President of the Board of the Center for United Nations Reform Education and an Advisory Board member of the One Earth Foundation, as well as the co-founder of the NGO Steering Committee for the United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development and the NGO Working Group on the United Nations Security Council. He is the recipient of the William J. Butler Human Rights Medal from the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights and currently serves as an Ashoka Foundation Fellow.

Contributors

W. JAMES ARPUTHARAJ

President of South Asian Federalists; Executive member of WFM; Coordinator for India for the UN Parliamentary Assembly Campaign

ENRIQUE BARÓN CRESPO

Member of the Spanish Congreso de los Diputados (1977-87), Constitutional Father, Former President of the European Parliament (1989-1992) and member of it (1986-2008) President of UEF-Spain

LEONARDO BOFF

Eco-Theologian-Philosopher and member of the Earth Charter Commission

GIAMPIERO BORDINO

Professor in Contemporary History and Political Analyst. President of the Einstein Center for International Studies

ALESSANDRO CAVALLI

Professor of Sociology at the University of Pavia, Italy

ANDREA COFELICE

Research Fellow at the Centre for Studies on Federalism, Torino, Italy

JEAN-GUY GIRAUD

Former clerk of the European Court of Justice, Former Director of the European Parliament, Former President of the UEF-France

PIERRE JOUVENAT

Former UN/WTO senior official and active member of UEF-France

MARIO LEONE

Deputy Director of the Spinelli Institute, Regional Secretary in Lazio of UEF-Italy

LUCIO LEVI

Member of UEF Federal Committee, Former President of UEF Italy

ANTONIO LONGO

Editor of the bi-monthly journal *L'Unità europea*

IVO MAES

Senior Advisor for Historical Studies, Research Department, National Bank of Belgium. Member of Robert Triffin International

ALBERTO MAJOCCHI

Emeritus Professor of Finance at the University of Pavia and Vice President of the Centre for Studies on Federalism

DOMENICO MORO

Board member of the Centre for Studies on Federalism

ANTONIO MOSCONI

Research Department, Robert Triffin International

ANTONIO PADOA SCHIOPPA

Emeritus Professor of History of Law at the University of Milan, Italy. Former President of the Centre for Studies on Federalism.

ALFONSO SABATINO

Member of the Central Committee of UEF-Italy

GIULIO SAPUTO

Chief Editor of the online journal *Eurobull*

CLARA SUBIRACHS

Active member of Democracia Global

RENE WADLOW

President, Association of World Citizens

FERGUS WATT

Executive Director of WFM-Canada and Chairperson of the WFM-IGP Executive Committee. He is also a member of the UN2020 Initiative's Coordination Group