Towards a European Political Space*

Pierre Jouvenat
Former UN/WTO senior official and active member of UEF-France

Introduction

The 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections campaign revealed the emergence of a transnational political space[i]: beyond national considerations, which were still dominant, political parties timidly dealt with European issues and alliances at European level. But then it was only a question of joining EP parliamentary groups after the elections. However, fostering public debate is the role of parties, not of parliamentary groups. The European debate therefore requires a trans-nationalization of political families, much beyond the current European political parties, which only consist of umbrella organizations for national parties. This note examines the present state of affairs, distinguishing between the desirable and the possible, the short- and the long-term. In the immediate future, emphasis must be placed on developing synergies between national and European parties, with the emergence of transnational parties in mind. Legal incentives are needed. In particular, the electoral law of the European Union (EU) should not only promote a European public debate, it must also encourage all political parties to take on a transnational dimension. It is therefore proposed to modify the election mode of MEPs by adopting the method of “double proportionality”. This paper is an invitation to argumentation, without any pretension to join the academic debate on party systems.

A. Role of political parties: the wrong way

It is commonplace to denounce the shortcomings of the current system of affiliations between national parties and “political parties at European level” (in official terminology, hereafter “Europarties”), which is complex and hardly visible. Occasional alliances without any effect on public debate, the Europarties are in an institutional rather than an activist logic.[ii] There is therefore a consensus on the need to “strengthen” them. But then one makes a double mistake:

• Europarties are formally recognized for the first time by the Maastricht Treaty. But the original conceptual error of giving them a specific role persists. The Lisbon Treaty states: “Political parties at European level shall contribute to forming European political awareness and to expressing the will of citizens of the Union”. As an extension of this statement, it is generally advocated that Europarties should provide direct links with European civil society; connect EU-level democracy with Union citizens; stimulate citizen mobilization on European issues; and more generally contribute to the making of a demos. Yet, this mission is not exclusive to, nor even the preferential role of, Europarties. National parties have a territorial base and are therefore best placed to provide European integration with a local foundation of citizenry participation. Thus, it is a mistake to demonize and seek to marginalize them. Instead, one has to “europeanize” national parties. This is just as important, if not more important, than strengthening Europarties.

• In our concern to strengthen Europarties, one suggests that they should evolve towards full-functioning organizations, thus becoming true laboratories of ideas and militant forces. However, in so doing, one wrongly suggests that they should exist on their own. For instance, when it is argued that Europarties should emancipate from their institutional members, the national parties, and broaden their base. There is thus an unfortunate tendency to make a clear distinction between two categories of parties, and even oppose them against each other, whereas in the perspective of trans-nationalizing politics, one must develop synergies between national and European parties, not divide them.

The insignificance of affiliations between national parties and Europarties is explained by the predominance of parliamentary groups over parties, due to the fact that the EP, whose powers have increased over time, remains the only place in the EU’s institutional system for a true political confrontation of parties. Moreover, groups have much larger human and financial resources than Europarties. Therefore, expertise and ideological thinking on European politics, or even the ability to exert influence over other EU institutions, have developed within the groups’ apparatuses, not within parties. Consequently, for a national party, what only matters is its MEPs’ membership in a group. However, parliamentary groups are not supposed to lead the public debate, let alone conduct election campaigns. That is the role of parties. This anomaly must be addressed by shifting attention towards the trans-nationalization of parties.

B. What kind of trans-nationalization is possible?

In federal states such as the USA or Germany, a limited (for now) number of parties interact with institutions at all levels of the federation, from local to federal, with the same identification. They are in a way “party federations”. In the EU, given the diversity of national political systems and the considerable ideological dilution, which resulted from successive waves of enlargement, as well as the sui generis nature of integration, such a level of homogeneity is inconceivable in the foreseeable future. Especially as in most Member States there is a trend towards fragmentation and instability of the ideological spectrum, which is constantly reshaping. In addition, there is still little incentive for parties to act collectively at European level, as there is little power to be taken (see box below).

___________________________________________________________________________

A “transnational party system” within the EU?

The creation of transnational parties is made difficult by the many non-concordant cleavages that characterize European politics: the recurrent double left/right and more/less integration cleavage, to which are added different visions on the EU's borders (issues of enlargement and multi-circle Europe), acceptance or rejection of globalization, and also specific issues such as immigration (East-West cleavage).

Yet, academic research (Mair, Bardi, Hix, Bartolini, Sartori...) mainly focused on the feasibility of a transnational system. A study commissioned by the EP[iii] concluded that “while it is possible to conceive the emergence of transnational parties, the emergence of a transnational party system is more problematical”. This requires more than simply the presence of transnational parties. There must also be a European structure of political competition, in particular for the control of a transnational political executive. This structure exists today only in an embryonic stage. The problem is therefore institutional rather than political.

The Spitzenkandidaten process for the Presidency of the Commission is a first step towards a transnational partisan system. The Commission, if politicised, may become the expression of a political majority. But the other key positions (the EP President set apart) remain intergovernmental in nature, outside the party game.

__________________________________________________________________________

However, any integration process implies a change of scale and a trans-nationalization of political parties’ activities. Parties must adapt their modus operandi accordingly. Within the context of the EU, although the constitution of relatively homogeneous political families at European level remains the ultimate objective, this trans-nationalization will happen through a dynamic process where partisan structures will be evolutionary and of “variable-geometry”, due to several factors:

• Evolution of the degree of integration of the EU and the ensuing transfer of political power from national to Community level: decision-making level and party action level go hand in hand;

• Diverging views, despite ideological proximity, on thematic priorities and programmatic choices, which are constantly evolving;

• Ranking of issues over time (environmental protection, social policies, migration challenges, etc.), according to the parties’ perception of the most appropriate level of action[iv];

• Reshaping of national political systems, inevitably leading to adjustments in transnational alliances.

However, at all times and particularly ahead of a European election, each political family must have a transnational structure that is visible, credible (from the point of view of both the parties concerned and the citizens’) and operational to deliver messages on European issues. Currently, the addition of hundreds of national party programs makes European issues totally invisible. Hence the importance, in the immediate future, and in the absence of genuine transnational parties, of promoting synergies between all parties in the same political family, both vertically and horizontally

__________________________________________________________________________

Transnational parties: top-down or bottom-up approach?

Denouncing the opportunist alliances of national parties without a coherent agenda for Europe and arguing that it is inappropriate to transpose to the European level what does not work at the national level, new political parties which claim to be “transnational” have been created ex-nihilo with the sole aim of talking more about Europe, or doing it differently, emphasizing their ideological and programmatic cohesion.[v] Experience shows however that these parties are (still) inaudible, for lack of the necessary territorial base. Indeed, to be “transnational” a party must compete at all levels of the Union, from municipal to European. While these initiatives have the merit of providing a stimulus for politics to take a transnational dimension, in the long term, however, it will not be possible to create a European civil society, unless marginal, without transforming major traditional political parties, even though these will increasingly be subject to upheavals.

Halfway through is the status of “individual member” of Europarties, some of them wishing to broaden their democratic base beyond their institutional members. This status can be justified insofar as national parties are still neglecting the European political debate. There too, it has to do with the stimulus role. But it is an additional risk to oppose European and national parties against each other. In any partisan system, activism is first exercised at the local level and membership in a local chapter of a transnational party gives the activist, ipso facto, membership status of that party without any territorial considerations. The distinction between institutional and individual members is no longer relevant.

___________________________________________________________________________

C. European elections: The problem of confusion of stakes

The confusion of issues is a recurrent feature of European elections. There is a double problem:

• In the absence of an organized and structured debate at European level, national parties conduct electoral campaigns in isolation, with the result that national political considerations inevitably take precedence over European issues. At best, when the latter are discussed, each party insinuates that its sole views will prevail in the EP[vi] (see box below).

• Electoral competition does not acknowledge the fact that one may assess parties’ sectoral policies and thematic priorities differently depending upon what is considered being the most appropriate level of action, national or European. Different level means different programmatic approach. Thus, in a context of increasing volatility of the electorate, where fewer voters are loyal to a party, it is not abnormal that someone supports a different political family depending on whether the elections are municipal, national or European.

___________________________________________________________________________

The instrumentalization of European elections for national political agendas

Some examples of drifts which mislead voters on what is at stake:

  • Call for a sanction vote against the government in place, without bringing attention to the fact that European elections are for the election of MEPs who will have no competence in national governance.
  • Recurrent criticisms of national policy components that are outside EP competences.
    • Call to form national “coalitions” and common lists to have more weight in the electoral competition (such as the failed attempts to unite left-wing forces in France, or the “European coalition” in Poland), without bringing attention to the fact that elected candidates would then inevitably join different groups in the EP, after having given an illusion of unity.
      • Competition centered on the objective of improving the party's position on the national scene
        (which can lead to resignations in the event of failure), whereas only power relations at European level matter.

        _________________________________________________________________________

        Given that issues, programs and decision-making mechanisms are different at national and European level, the message to the electorate must be conveyed in a different way. The europeanization of national parties in this sense is of course a priority. In mature federations, the debate on federal issues is led by local sections of parties (themselves organized along the federal model). Within the EU, the europeanization of politics, particularly the clarification of stakes, must find an institutional translation that corresponds to the sui generis nature of integration. In the absence of genuine transnational parties and given the regrettable distinction between Europarties and national parties (condemned to last), we have no choice but to give Europarties more visibility.

         

        * This article is published in two parts. The second part, to be published in the next issue, deals with specific proposals for reform of the European electoral law.

         


        [i] We are referring here to a “political” space because this paper only deals with the role and organization of political parties, thus excluding other actors in the public debate such as medias, think tanks and NGOs. This analysis puts aside the controversy over the loss of credibility of political parties, taking for granted representative democracy within the Union's institutions. Also taken for granted is the perspective of the “ever closer Union” envisaged by the Treaties.

        [ii] They are in line with the intergovernmental logic of the EU: bringing together decision-makers of their political family ahead of European summits or Council meetings; coordinating action by party members within EU institutions and peripheral organizations, and shaping agendas; facilitating exchange of information; and organizing congresses where electoral programs and manifestos are adopted by consensus on the lowest common denominator.

        [iii] European Union Democracy Observatory (EUDO) - European University Institute, How to Create a Transnational Party System, San Domenico di Fiesole (Italy), 2010 (directed by Luciano Bardi and Peter Mair).

        [iv] Two opposed parties at national level may have the same European affiliation or two parties forming a national coalition may join different formations at European level. These situations are often considered to be inconsistent while they are justified in the absence of genuine transnational parties.

        [v] Without seeking to be exhaustive, one can mention relatively old initiatives such as the EFP and PACE, and more recent ones such as Volt and European Spring, the latter being an emanation of the DiEM25 Movement which has brought together under this label both DiEM25 electoral antennas and existing national parties, thus combining top-down and bottom-up approaches.

        [vi] Paradoxically, at the 2019 European elections, the only major transnational meeting widely advertised by medias brought together neo-nationalist parties in Milan. Debates between Spitzenkandidaten had very limited impact on the electorate.

        CESI
        Centro Studi sul Federalismo

        © 2001 - 2023 - Centro Studi sul Federalismo - Codice Fiscale 94067130016

        About  |  Contacts  |  Privacy Policy  |  Cookies
        Fondazione Compagnia San Paolo
        The activities of the Centre for Studies on Federalism are  accomplished thanks to the support of Fondazione Compagnia di San Paolo
        Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto
        Our thanks to Fondazione Collegio Carlo Alberto