Year XXXIX, Number 1, July 2026

Lubomira Popova

Assistant Professor at Sofia University "St. Kliment Ohridski" and Head of the MA Programme "Politics and Policies of the European Union".

On 19th April 2026, Bulgaria held a parliamentary election that seemed to put an end to a long-lasting political crisis. The Progressive Bulgaria Movement, led by former president Rumen Radev, won an absolute majority. The result was also symbolically significant: for the first time in exactly 29 years – since 19th April 1997, when Bulgarian voters entrusted Ivan Kostov's United Democratic Forces with a parliamentary majority – a single electoral formation was able to govern without coalition partners.

Radev's electoral victory brought Bulgaria an unusual degree of international attention. For a brief moment, the country gained visibility in the European media space. Yet what was striking was not only the attention itself, but also the conflicting signals the result seemed to send.

International coverage described the election through very different and sometimes contradictory frames: as a possible source of "stability", but also as bringing to power a left-leaning populist, an Eurosceptic, a Kremlin-friendly politician, even a "new Orbán." Strikingly, some interpretations placed Radev simultaneously in the company of Viktor Orbán and Péter Magyar – two figures who represent very different political meanings in today's Europe.

This ambiguity was not accidental. It reflected the peculiar character of Radev's electoral campaign, which seemed designed to appeal to almost everyone at once. His programme document was based on broad promises, while offering hardly any clearly structured priorities, let alone instruments for achieving them. Voters were addressed through broad appeals targeted at very different segments of Bulgarian society: from left to right, from Euro-Atlantic voters to pro-Russian constituencies, from nationalists and Eurosceptics to citizens who still broadly support Bulgaria's place in the EU. This inevitably creates uncertainty about the political meaning of Radev's mandate. Did he win because of pro-European expectations, Eurosceptic dissatisfaction, anti-corruption anger, or simply the desire for order after years of instability? And which of these constituencies will he try hardest to satisfy once in office? If one looks strictly at his programme, the EU occupies a surprisingly marginal place. If one looks instead at his broader pre-election and presidential rhetoric, the picture looks rather different.

The major question troubling Bulgaria's EU partners is what Radev's victory means for the country's role in the Union. Is Bulgaria about to become a new veto player on the EU scene, replacing Hungary as the most difficult member state? Yet these concerns also reveal something about the EU itself: its unresolved institutional weaknesses, and its limited capacity to respond to member states that remain formally aligned with the Union while producing democratic uncertainty at home.

Before assessing the country's future EU trajectory, we need to understand how Bulgaria has exercised its role as a member state until now. Bulgaria consistently followed a strategy of superficial pro-Europeanism abroad, through which the political elite effectively secured a high degree of EU non-interference in domestic politics. For a long time, this strategy proved successful. EU institutions and member states were willing to overlook problematic domestic practices in exchange for Bulgaria's open support for the Union and its demonstrative pro-EU positioning.

The ambiguity of Radev's campaign makes it useful to distinguish between four possible ways in which Bulgaria may position itself within the EU.

Destructive alignment

The first scenario is continuity. Bulgaria may continue the familiar strategy of superficial pro-Europeanism: expressing clear pro-EU positions abroad, while using this external alignment to conceal domestic institutional deficiencies. In this case, Bulgaria would remain formally loyal and rhetorically cooperative, but without contributing substantively to a stronger or more democratic Union. This would be a continuation of the old pattern: European loyalty as a shield against scrutiny at home.

Constructive alignment

A second, more optimistic scenario would be a genuinely constructive pro-European position. Bulgaria could begin to project a clear and consistent voice within the EU, one that defines Bulgarian interests in relation to the broader EU ones. This would mean actively seeking coalitions, negotiating and making compromises across different lines of interest. At least rhetorically, this seems to correspond to the official claim of Radev's movement for a more active, respected and effective Bulgaria within the EU.

Constructive disagreement

A third possibility is a shift toward constructive disagreement. Bulgaria could become more assertive in defining and pursuing its national interests, both domestically and at the EU level. This would involve setting clearer priorities, engaging in stronger bargaining, and showing a willingness to challenge its partners. Yet such disagreement would remain constructive if it took place within the framework of common EU values, legal commitments and shared strategic priorities. This scenario also fits important elements of Radev's campaign, especially its emphasis on sovereignty, dignity and a more active defence of national interests.

Destructive disagreement

The fourth scenario is the most worrying. Bulgaria could turn into a destructive veto player in EU decision-making, obstructing common positions along key ideological and geopolitical lines. This concern is linked to some of Radev's emblematic statements during his presidential mandate and electoral campaigns, especially those that raised doubts about Bulgaria's position on Ukraine and his calls for a referendum on the timing of the country's euro adoption. In this scenario, national interest would no longer be articulated as part of a European debate, but used as justification for blocking common EU action.

Only time will tell which of these paths the new Bulgarian government will choose in its EU policy. The initial signals, however, do not point towards a radical shift in Bulgaria's role within the EU. Moreover, the first days after the election suggest that the EU will not be a central topic in Bulgarian political life. On the contrary, the debate seems likely to be absorbed by domestic issues.

For Bulgaria's EU partners, this may look like a reason for relief, at least for now. Yet the deeper question remains: what does this mean for the functioning of the EU itself? Can the EU celebrate another narrow escape – another case in which a potentially difficult member state remains formally aligned with the Union – while ignoring the deeper democratic weaknesses behind that alignment? Or is it time for the EU to seriously discuss the legitimacy, accountability and consequences of the forms of stability it tolerates, both inside and outside the Union?