Year XXXIX, Number 1, July 2026

Fabio Maina

PhD Student in "Risk, Security and Vulnerability", curriculum "Security and Strategic Studies" at the University of Genoa, Italy. Visiting PhD Student at the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

Alexander Duleba

Professor of Political Science at the Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Arts of the University in Prešov, Slovakia. Senior Fellow at the Research Center of the Slovak Foreign Policy Association.

At the beginning of May 2026, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico made unexpected remarks about peace in Ukraine. His comments were noteworthy for a couple of reasons. First, Fico's government has been ambiguous at best regarding its support for Ukraine and in maintaining its position as a reliable EU and NATO partner. Second, the timing of this "rhetorical switch" is curious: just three weeks earlier, Hungarian elections had marked the end of Viktor Orbán's sixteen years' rule.

Slovakia's foreign policy under Fico: unrewarding ambivalence.

Following the 2023 elections, Robert Fico's party, Smer, formed a government with the center-left Hlas, which holds more moderate views than Smer, and the Slovak National Party (SNS), a small, hard-right party led by Andrej Danko. The government manifesto presented a vision for a "sovereign foreign policy" directed at "all four corners" of the world. In practice, Slovakia has politically aligned more closely with Moscow but also Beijing, as demonstrated by multiple visits to both capitals. Fico has praised the illiberal governance of China and Vietnam, as, unlike defective democracies, these countries "make plans and actually carry them out"¹. Fico has often accused partners of being "warmongers", has depicted the EU as a doomed project, has denied the existence of war in Kyiv, visited Moscow during the yearly 9th May victory parades, and threatened multiple times to block EU sanctions against Russia.

This "sovereign foreign policy" risks undermining Slovakia's relations with its main allies. Slovakia's geopolitical framework is the EU and NATO architecture, a point acknowledged even within the government manifesto itself. EU partners remain Slovakia's main trading partners. NATO guarantees Slovak security. Moreover this depreciation of the "Western" corner is not compensated for by big political and economic gains from the increased emphasis on the "Eastern" one. Despite numerous symbolic gestures, the rapprochement with Russia and China has generated little, if any, positive economic impact. The principal aim of this foreign policy therefore appears to be the consolidation of domestic support, achieved by appealing to a West-skeptic demographic through inflammatory rhetoric and symbolic actions.

Enter Magyar: What is the Future for Fico after Orbán's Defeat?

It is no secret that Viktor Orbán has served as an inspiration for Fico in both his domestic and foreign policy. Although Fico's "Eastern" foreign policy is rooted in Vladimir Mečiar's idea of making Slovakia "a bridge between East and West" in the 1990s, a far more recent source of inspiration is Orbán's "Eastern Opening" foreign policy launched in the 2010s. However, the April 12th election ended with Orbán's clear defeat.

In foreign policy, Fico has now lost his "partner in crime" when it comes to challenging the EU (and NATO). Both Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš and Bulgaria's new Prime Minister Rumen Radev appear unwilling to undermine EU and NATO unity, despite some "pro-Russian" and "Eurosceptic" rhetorical posturing. If Fico chose to "take Orbán's baton," he would be alone, and potentially face further diplomatic isolation. Orbán's defeat also has domestic implications. It showed that the "Orbán-like" type of populist conservatism that Fico also seems to espouse is not at all unbeatable. Furthermore, neither Russian influence nor support from the MAGA movement proved sufficient to secure Orbán win: on the contrary, the Hungarian government's quasi-subordination to Russia turned out to be political poison for Fidesz. The MAGA endorsement, culminating in JD Vance's visit to Budapest, had much the same effect, with public approval for Orbán visibly declining further after the event.

In this context, Fico seems to have decided to (partially) recalibrate his stance towards the EU and Ukraine. Thus, he stated that any peace deal regarding Ukraine must have Kyiv's consent, and held talks with Zelensky in Yerevan. To be fair, Fico said that he and Zelensky "still do not like each other", although they "want good relations". However, the slight change in tone is being noticed. SNS felt it necessary to reiterate its staunch opposition to Ukraine's EU membership, demanding guarantees that the Prime Minister will never vote in favor of it and threatening the stability of the coalition. In the past, Danko called for Slovakia's withdrawal from the EU, which he called a "prison of nations"³.

Together with SNS, Republika – which remains outside both the government coalition and Parliament – represents the other major far-right, Eurosceptic, and NATO-sceptic force in Slovak politics. The party advocates transforming the EU into a purely economic and fully intergovernmental institution and has pledged to withdraw Slovakia from the Union should its proposed "reforms" fail. These parties may attract Smer voters who have grown frustrated with Robert Fico for "talking the talk" without "walking the walk". However, SNS is currently polling at around 3 percent, while Republika fluctuates between 10 and 13 percent⁴. Over the past three years in government, both Smer and Hlas have experienced a decline in public support, while the leading party in the polls is now Progressive Slovakia. In addition, several smaller centrist and centre-right parties are polling at approximately 7 percent. Were elections to be held today, Fico would likely lose. His position is further complicated by his decision to criminalize criticism of the Beneš Decrees after Progressive Slovakia stated its commitment to resolving the issue⁵. These decrees were issued during the Second World War and remained in effect after its end. They targeted Hungarians living in Slovakia at the time and still facilitated the seizure of their property by the government. This move by Fico led Slovak Hungarians to move closer to the opposition. It is also impacting relations between Budapest and Bratislava: while Orbán has been mostly silent on the issue, Magyar has conditioned future Hungarian-Slovak cooperation on addressing the Beneš Decrees⁶.

Orbán's electoral defeat has, in essence, placed the Slovak government between a rock and a hard place. For now, Fico continues to do what he has done best throughout these three years in office: play both sides, albeit in a considerably less confrontational manner. He states that no peace can be made without Ukraine's consent and meets Zelensky during the EPC summit in Yerevan, while taking care to reiterate that he still does not like him. He attended the annual "Victory Day" parade in Moscow, but he downplayed the extent of his participation. However, as domestic pressures mount and Magyar's victory has changed the regional context, this ambivalence has become less of an asset and more of a liability.

1 Dlhopolec P. 2025. “Fico Praises China and Vietnam as Models, Says Liberal Democracy Has Failed”. The Slovak Spectator. May 19th, 2025. https://spectator.sme.
sk/politics-and-society/c/fico-praises-china-and-vietnam-as-models-says-liberal-democracy-has-failed.
2 Dlhopolec P. “News digest: In Yerevan, Fico and Zelensky talk. Danko pushes back.” The Slovak Spectator, May 4th, 2026. https://spectator.sme.sk/politics-and-
society/c/news-digest-in-yerevan-fico-and-zelensky-talk-danko-pushes-back.
3 Pravda, “Danko pripustil vystúpenie Slovenska z EÚ. Kritizoval misiu ˆc eského europoslanca, poslal ho naspät’ do Bruselu.” May 28th, 2025. https://spravy.pravda.
sk/domace/clanok/753681-danko-pripustil-vystupenie-slovenska-z-eu-kritizoval-misiu-ceskeho-europoslanca-poslal-ho-naspat-do-bruselu/.
4 Politico, “Slovakia – National parliament voting intention.” https://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/slovakia/.
5 Mesežnikov G. “Beneš Decrees: Persistent Ghosts in Bratislava and Budapest.” Heinrich-Böll-Stiftung Prague, February 25th, 2026. https://cz.boell.org/
en/2026/02/25/benes-decrees-persistent-ghosts-bratislava-and-budapest.
6 Reuters, “Minority rights resurface in Slovak-Hungarian relations after Magyar’s win.” April 21st, 2026. https://www.reuters.com/world/minority-rights-resurface-
slovak-hungarian-relations-after-magyars-win-2026-04-21/.