Year XXXVIII, Number 3, November 2025

Alina Cherri 
PhD Candidate in “Security, Risk and Vulnerability” at the University of Genoa, Italy.

The European Union is currently facing a convergence of crises, both external and internal. The war in Ukraine, the protracted conflict in the Gaza Strip, the brief but intense confrontation between Israel and Iran, and the ongoing civil war in Sudan are among the many international developments demanding the attention of Brussels. Yet the domestic landscape within the Union is far from stable. The ongoing conflict in Ukraine, coupled with a heightened sense of insecurity among neighbouring states and the partial disengagement of the United States, has prompted European countries to reconsider the continent’s security architecture. Moreover, nationalism emerges as particularly salient. Over the past year, there has been a notable rise in support for nationalist and far-right parties across Europe. In 2022, Brothers of Italy secured electoral victory. Although they did not win the 2024 elections, both the National Rally in France1 and the Freedom Party in Austria2 achieved historic results, largely due to their anti-immigration and anti-EU rhetoric. Most recently, the early elections of February 2025 delivered a record-breaking performance for Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)3, whose popularity has continued to grow in the post-election period. Once peripheral actors, nationalist parties have become central protagonists in European political arenas. This raises critical questions regarding the origins of this phenomenon and the broader implications of its resurgence. The momentum of nationalist movements is unmistakable: even Germany – a state where nationalism has long been considered taboo since the end of the Second World War – now finds itself at the epicentre of this political shift. AfD, initially established as a Eurosceptic party, is increasingly positioning itself as a viable contender for leadership at the heart of Europe. Given its populist and xenophobic rhetoric, the AfD may be regarded as a threat to democracy and European integration.

Leaving European values behind? The far-right turn
Nationalism is commonly defined as an ideology that prioritises the interests of a homogeneous group, united by shared origins and/or characteristics such as history, language, and culture – often to the detriment of those outside the group. Historically, there is ample evidence of a recurring pattern whereby nationalism tends to gain traction in the aftermath of various crises – financial, social, or otherwise. Nationalist and far-right parties frequently exploit such crises to build support, typically identifying scapegoats – such as migrants – as the root cause of the turmoil or public discontent. The recurring themes found in the manifestos of these parties include anti-immigration stances, Euroscepticism, an emphasis on national sovereignty, the promotion of traditional values, and cultural conservatism.

When defined in exclusionary and ethnically based terms, nationalism poses a clear threat to democratic principles and values – the very foundations upon which the European Union was established. For instance, far-right parties, when in power – as exemplified by prominent cases such as Hungary and Poland – have challenged the rule of law, notably by undermining judicial independence and weakening systems of checks and balances. Moreover, executive authorities have sought to assert control over the media, thereby restricting freedom of expression. One of the most visible manifestations of nationalism within European borders is its tendency to exclude segments of the population on the basis of ethnicity, religion, or language. A concrete example of this phenomenon occurred during the German federal election of February 2025, when AfD distributed so-called “deportation leaflets” targeting immigrants. These flyers, styled as airline tickets, suggested plans for the remigration – effectively, the deportation – of thousands of immigrants to their “safe countries of origin”.

Among the most frequently cited positions of nationalist political leaders are vehemently anti-Islamic rhetoric and strong opposition to immigration. Such parties characterise immigration, globalisation, Islam, LGBTQI+ rights, atheism, and alternative family models as existential threats to what they perceive as the traditional European society shaped in the twentieth century. Migration – particularly when associated with the growing visibility of Islam – is often depicted as the principal threat to European stability. In far-right discourse, migrants are portrayed as doubly culpable: first, for allegedly refusing to integrate into host societies, and second, for “polluting” Western culture with their values and beliefs4. These parties routinely disseminate a generalised narrative linking migration to rising crime rates. Such discourses serve to undermine the rights of minorities and immigrants and pose a significant challenge to pluralism – one of the cornerstones of the European project.

Nationalist parties exhibit a pronounced anti- EU sentiment – an attitude that warrants a more nuanced analysis on two distinct levels. Ideologically, these parties tend to endorse a centralisation of power at the national level, a stance that fundamentally clashes with the principles of the European Union. They are typically opposed to the notion that member states should cede aspects of their sovereignty to supranational institutions. This opposition is often rooted in a deep-seated suspicion of federalism; whereby even minimal transfers of authority are perceived as existential threats to the integrity of the nation-state5. This ideological stance translates into significant operational consequences. Nationalist parties consistently prioritise national interests, advocating for stringent border controls and rejecting cooperative approaches to transnational challenges such as migration and climate change. They typically oppose the principle of burden-sharing and resist joint frameworks designed to address refugee resettlement or asylum distribution. In the economic realm, they frequently call for monetary autonomy, voicing strong opposition to redistribution mechanisms – such as EU structural funds – which aim to support less affluent regions within the Union.

Paradoxically, nationalist parties have also greatly benefitted from their participation in the European Union. They may thus be characterised as both critics and beneficiaries of the EU. While they often denounce supranational integration, they nonetheless support European cooperation insofar as it is framed as collaboration among culturally and historically similar nations. However, as noted above, they reject cooperation in domains that challenge national sovereignty or require solidarity beyond perceived cultural affinities.

Nationalist parties can, in a certain sense, be regarded as champions of Europe, particularly in light of recent European Parliament elections, in which they secured more seats than in previous years. These electoral gains at the European level have translated into increased legitimacy and visibility within their domestic political landscapes6. While vocally critical of the EU and dismissive of its core values, these parties remain, in many respects, indebted to Brussels. Indeed, without their success in European institutions – facilitated through access to EU funds and symbolic capital – it is unlikely they would have achieved such prominence at home.

This success also poses a significant threat, as it tends to place pressure on centrist governments and contributes to the consolidation of far- right coalitions. Consequently, the impact of nationalist parties is felt not only at the domestic level but also across the European sphere. Their growing influence enables them to shape political agendas, both nationally and transnationally, while also fostering networks among ideologically aligned parties throughout Europe.

The (Not So) Surprising Case of the AfD: The Rise of the Far Right in Germany
From the early 2010s, far-right parties began to achieve significant electoral success across Western Europe, although – for a brief period – Germany appeared largely immune to this trend. However, this changed with the rise AfD. In its first national election, the party narrowly failed to cross the electoral threshold. Yet by the 2017 federal election, it secured 12.6 per cent of the vote, becoming the third-largest party in the Bundestag. At the outset of this political ascent, analysts and scholars engaged in intense debate over the party’s ideological positioning, as well as the motivations and characteristics of its electorate. It is worth noting that the AfD is not the first far-right party in post-war Germany to attempt to gain representation in the Bundestag; however, it is by far the most successful. Originally founded as a single-issue party opposing the Eurozone’s structure and policies, the AfD gradually expanded its platform to encompass a broader range of issues and adopted strategies that were absent at the time of its inception. The 2015 refugee crisis – an event that dominated the German political agenda – presented the AfD with a critical opportunity to broaden its appeal. Party leaders capitalised on the situation by placing migration and asylum at the centre of their political campaigns and public discourse. During this period, the AfD adopted increasingly populist and radical rhetoric, while also building transnational networks with like-minded nationalist parties across Western Europe7. Although its support base was initially concentrated in eastern Germany, the party has since expanded its reach across the country. The East remains its stronghold – where it often emerges as the leading political force – but the AfD has now become the second-largest party nationally and, in several recent polls, has even surpassed the CDU in some regions. The AfD can no longer be dismissed as a mere protest party. Its growing support reflects a deliberate and ideologically driven alignment with radical right-wing positions among segments of the German electorate. The rise of nationalism tends to erode democratic values among the electorate, which increasingly supports radical migration policies – often more severe than those advocated by the ruling CDU. The threat posed by the AfD’s positions has not gone unnoticed. The Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz – Germany’s domestic intelligence agency responsible for monitoring ideological extremism and assessing threats to the constitutional order – has formally classified the party as engaging in extremist activity. According to the agency, the AfD exhibits erwiesen extremistische Bestrebung, meaning it is involved in proven extremist endeavours. According to the agency, the AfD undermines human dignity by privileging certain segments of the population while targeting specific groups, thereby fomenting hatred– aparticularly against migrants, refugees, and Muslim communities. In conclusion, the AfD represents not only a threat to Germany’s democratic order but, given its broad domestic appeal, growing influence at the European level, and capacity to disseminate nationalist and hateful rhetoric, it also poses a serious challenge to European values and the broader project of integration.

1. For further discussion of this topic, see the article published by Le Monde (2024): https://www.lemonde.fr/en/politics/article/2024/06/09/2024-european- elections-far-right-rassemblement-national-achieves-historic-success_6674319_5.html.
2. For further discussion of this topic, see the article published by BBC (2024): https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c8rdygy5888o
3. For further discussion of this topic, see James Downes,‘The 2025 German Election: Far-Right Surge and Coalition Collapse’, The Loop, European Consortium for Political Research, March 4th 2025 (accessed 15 July 2025)
4. Iason Kazazis, The Creeping Ascent of the Far-Right in Mainstream European Politics and How to Stop it, The London School of Economics and Political Science, February 6th, 2024, (accessed 20.07.2025)
5. Marta Lorimer, Pro-European, anti-EU? The National Rally and European integration, in The Right-Wing Critique of Europe, 2022, Routledge
6. Catherine Fieschi, ‘European Institutions: The Far-Right and Illiberal Politics in a Liberal Context’, (2000), 53, Parliamentary Affairs, 517, 521
7. Carl C. Berning, 2017, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) – Germany’s New Radical Right-wing Populist Party, ifo DICE Report, ifo Institute - Leibniz Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich, 15(04), pages 16-19, December.