Year XXXVIII, Number 3, November 2025

Imane Lahrich 
Independent Consultant on Policy Development and Political & Security Risk Assessment.

In an era where digital norms are becoming a central terrain of geopolitical influence, the partnership between the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) on digital rights reveals both the promise of cooperation and the persistence of structural imbalance. The EU presents itself as a global norm entrepreneur, showing its vision of digital rights through instruments, as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the broader “Brussels Effect¹.”Meanwhile, African actors increasingly emphasize digital sovereignty, technological self-determination and decolonial justice. This divergence is more than rhetorical: it reflects a deeper misalignment in strategic priorities, normative frameworks and political economies. This article argues that the AU–EU digital rights agenda cannot evolve without a clear reckoning with three critical challenges: normative asymmetry, the politics of conditionality, and the securitization of digital cooperation.

Normative Asymmetry and the Limits of “Partnership”
European digital policy exports operate under the assumption of universality. The GDPR², particularly, has globally become a benchmark for privacy and data protection . Its extraterritorial reach affects trade agreements, investment flows, and international development programs. However, when this normative model is extended to AU–EU cooperation, it too often bypasses mutual negotiation in favor of regulatory convergence. Rather than co-defining digital rights, the AU is expected to align with pre-established standards, despite vast contextual differences in infrastructure, institutional capacity, and legal systems.

This asymmetry is institutionalized in frameworks. One of the most relevant is AU–EU Digital Economy Task Force, where strategic language around “shared values” conceals the one-directional nature of norm diffusion. African contributions are frequently reduced to inputs rather than co-authored frameworks. The result is a hollowed-out model of dialogue, where local priorities such as data localization, infrastructure ownership, or indigenous digital innovation are subordinated to compliance metrics anchored in European legal doctrine. While the AU’s Digital Transformation Strategy (2020–2030)³ provides a continental vision rooted in local realities, it struggles to assert parity within interregional forums shaped by donor logic and technocratic expertise⁴.

Conditionality, Funding Architecture, and the Erosion of Agency
Much of the AU–EU cooperation on digital development is embedded in asymmetrical funding mechanisms. Under the banner of “capacity-building,” European institutions provide financial and technical assistance tied to performance indicators that reflect EU priorities. Whether in cybersecurity, e-governance, or data infrastructure, the architecture of support remains anchored in conditionality. This is visible in initiatives such as the Global Gateway, where digital investments are often contingent on regulatory alignment and favorable market access for European technology firms⁵.

This model amplifies structural dependencies rather than enabling sovereign development. African states, already grappling with fiscal constraints and uneven digital infrastructure, face limited room to deviate from EU-defined trajectories. Regulatory harmonization becomes less a matter of consensus and more a prerequisite for accessing funds, advisory support, or participation in pilot programs. The political consequence is the narrowing of policy space. African governments and regional organizations are constrained in experimenting with alternative models of data governance, public-private partnerships, or localized technological innovation.

Moreover, the funding flows rarely empower civil society, local innovators, or regional institutions with equal agency. While the discourse of inclusion is pervasive, the decision-making power remains skewed toward European institutions and their implementing partners. A recalibrated digital partnership requires a fundamental rethinking of how resources are distributed, who sets the terms of engagement, and how African institutions are empowered to lead rather than follow⁶.

Securitization, Surveillance, and the Authoritarian Risk
The securitization of digital cooperation represents one of the most underexamined yet consequential dynamics in the AU–EU agenda. In the name of cybersecurity and countering online  threats,  several  European-funded initiatives have facilitated the expansion of surveillance capabilities and digital identification systems across African states. On the hand these technologies are framed as neutral tools for public administration or crime prevention, on the other they also carry the risk of enabling digital authoritarianism.

In practice, investments in biometric databases, centralized citizen registries, and AI-based monitoring systems often proceed without adequate legal safeguards, human rights assessments, or democratic oversight. In countries with histories of repression or weak judicial institutions, such systems can be easily to repurpose silence dissent, monitor activists, or suppress opposition. The EU’s role in financing or advising on such projects is rarely interrogated, and accountability mechanisms remain weak.

This securitized approach risks undermining the very digital rights the EU claims to promote. While the EU has made some efforts to include human rights impact assessments in its external action instruments, these are often post hoc, formalistic, and insufficiently tailored to fragile political contexts. The prioritization of stability, interoperability, and state-centric efficiency over democratic safeguards reflects a deeper tension between security and rights in the EU’s external digital engagements.

Africa is not without alternatives. Legal instruments such as the Malabo Convention (2014) establish a continental framework for cybersecurity and data protection. Regional data protection authorities and civic tech ecosystems are advancing critical debates around transparency, accountability, and ethical AI. However, these initiatives remain marginalized within the AU–EU cooperation architecture, which privileges technical assistance over normative co-production.

Conclusion: Toward a New Grammar of Digital Cooperation
AU–EU cooperation on digital rights cannot continue to operate on the logic of one- sided norm diffusion and asymmetrical power dynamics. The global digital order is in flux, and Africa’s place within it must not be determined by inherited models or external prescriptions. What is needed is a new grammar of partnership;one that moves beyond rhetorical alignment and confronts the material and political conditions under which norms are produced, shared, and contested.
Such a recalibration demands institutional reform: co-governance structures with equal African  representation,  funding  models that prioritize local ownership, and rigorous safeguards to prevent the instrumentalization of digital tools for repression. It also requires an ideological shift, one in which digital sovereignty is not seen as a threat to “open” systems, but as a legitimate expression of agency in an unequal global order.

If the EU is sincere in its commitment to a human-centered digital future, it must be prepared to share not only resources but also normative power. And if the AU is to shape the contours of its digital destiny, it must assert its role not only as a stakeholder, but also a standard-setter. Anything less will only reinforce the very hierarchies that the language of partnership claims to dismantle.

1. Anu Bradford, The Brussels Effect: How the European Union Rules the World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), https://global.oup.com/academic/ product/the-brussels-effect-9780190088583.
2. European Union,“General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),”Regulation (EU) 2016/679, April 27, 2016, https://eur-europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/oj.
3. African Union, Digital Transformation Strategy for Africa (2020–2030), May 2020, https://au.int/en/documents/20200518/digital-transformation-strategy- africa-2020-2030.
4. European Commission,“Global Gateway,”2021, https://international-partnerships.ec.europa.eu/policies/global-
5. Privacy International, “Africa and the Global Surveillance Industry,” August 10, 2022, https://privacyinternational.org/report/4887/africa-and-global- surveillance-industry.
6. African Union, African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection (Malabo Convention), June 27, 2014, https://au.int/en/treaties/ african-union-convention-cyber-security-and-personal-data-protection