The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

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Announcing our new INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY NEWSLETTER

Dear Reader,
with the first issue just published in May 2018, we are pleased to announce the launch of our INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY NEWSLETTER, a new, free four-monthly publication of *The Federalist Debate.*
The ID Newsletter is meant to keep you informed on the progress of the main actions promoted by the global civil society, the European and World Federalists, and international organizations to advance international democracy in areas of particular interest to the federalists.
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Thank you!

Trump's Wrong Policy in the Middle East and Macron's Mistake

Lucio Levi

On the night between 13 and 14 April, 2018, the armed forces of the United States, the United Kingdom and France bombed three sites in Syria connected with the production of chemical weapons, which Assad used on 7 April against the civil population in Douma near Damascus. It was a dangerous step forward in the escalation of violence underway in Syria, which could transform the conflict into a wider clash that involves the great powers. The genocide underway in Syria, which the world looks on powerless and indifferent, and the growth of tension between the United States and Russia led some observers to mention the risk of a Third World War, that Trump's silliness and Putin's cynism can fuel more.

However, the fact that the targets of the air raids were fairly restrained, without casualties and probably announced in advance and Russia's moderate verbal reaction shows the will of both contenders to keep the clash under control. The limited nature of the strike shows that it was a demonstrative action, a deterring operation against the future use of chemical weapons.

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The weakness of the military operation in Syria lies in the fact that it was disconnected from a plan for peace. Two international coalitions are clashing: on the one hand, Russia, Iran and Turkey, on the other hand, the United States, Saudi Arabia and Israel. None of them is so strong to prevail. While the United States plans a retreat from the Middle East and the Mediterranean region, Russia is filling the power vacuum left by the United States' withdrawal and by the powerlessness of Europe.

We usually assert that the world has become multipolar. In fact, a more flexible international system than that we have left behind is forming. Potentially, it is more able to prevent violence, manage disputes and deal with crises, as the figure of a mediator between the powers in conflict can assert itself.

What is lacking, for the time being, is a full awareness that the EU can play that role. Since Macron has proposed himself as the leader of the refoundation of the EU and its transformation into a "sovereign, united and democratic Europe" announced in a speech at the Sorbonne university, he has a special responsibility in pursuing that objective. Yet the Syria air strikes contradict that commitment. Instead of promoting a European initiative for peace, he tagged along with the United States. This is not the way to assert an independent international role for Europe. Macron's unilateral initiative has divided the EU, since Germany and Italy were not willing to participate in the military operation. But there is also a subordinate responsibility of both of them, as they have offered their logistic support to the military operation.

Even today the EU would have the means to play a mediating role between the United States and Russia and to promote the intervention of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons. It is to be recollected that in 2013 Putin obtained from Assad not only the submission of his chemical weapons to international control, but also their destruction according to the convention on the prohibition of those weapons. The EU could do the same thing. On the other hand, since 2006, three

EU countries (Italy, France and Spain) have successfully provided an interposition force at the border between Israel and Lebanon under the aegis of the United Nations.

Russia and Iran have obtained a double success in the war in Syria. First, with the maintenance in power of Assad whom the United States would like to remove; second, in gaining the alliance of Turkey, so far a pillar of NATO, who aims to expel and kill the Kurdish population based in northern Syria. As a matter of fact, the plan for the partition of Syria designed by Putin, Rohani and Erdogan can represent the starting point of a more ambitious plan aiming to expand their influence in the Middle East.

Two additional destabilizing elements in the turbulent situation of the region are Trump's decisions to withdraw the United States from the Iran nuclear deal – with the risk that Iran restarts the uranium enrichment – and to recognize Jerusalem as capital of Israel transferring there the US embassy from Tel Aviv – the cause of the current massacres at the border between Gaza and Israel –. With this senseless policy, tensions in the Middle East are irremediably destined to grow. The EU partners have not shared those decisions, but have rather criticized them. If we consider that there are other contentious issues between the EU and the United States, above all the conflict between protectionism and multilateralism, we can expect they will widen the gap between the two shores of the Atlantic. There is only one political actor in the world who can promote the patient search for a peaceful coexistence in the Middle East – the EU – provided that it learns to speak with one voice.

Taking into account the aversion of the United States and Russia to the creation of a European supranational power, it is high time that Brussels adapts its strategy to the current evolution of international relations.

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The other voice that is lacking is the one of the peace movement. The history of the workers' internationals shows that the peace movement is unable to stop wars. More generally, at the decisive moment of war, national solidarity and patriotism have always prevailed over the ties which unite the nongovernmental organizations at the international level. It is impossible to fight against war with organizations which are subordinate to governments, the institutions which hold the monopoly of violence in their own hands.

However, in the past century the peace movement has played a significant role in the armaments reduction policies and in the creation of international institutions, like the International Criminal Court, which pursue the goal of extending at the international level the principles of the rule of law. Its decline began with the Iraqi war, which was waged in spite of the mobilization of millions of demonstrators.

It is clear that the peace movement has been unable to answer the challenge of globalization. The social media have spread the illusion that the unprecedented possibility to communicate with everybody would mean to have a new and powerful mobilization tool available. The reality is that the potential of the global civil society movements has been lost in a thousand streamlets and has been sterilized. Moreover, the dependence of the movements on a leadership of paid officers has exposed them to the corrupting power of money owned by the great lobbies. Lastly, the states governed by authoritarian and nationalist leaders have criminalized the civil society movements and accused them to be foreign agents.

However, in a time in which the political leaders are not willing to offer to the citizens "blood, toil, tears and sweat", like Churchill did on May 1940, but are inclined to follow the guidance and direction of opinion polls in order to please their own public opinion, what can rein in Trump is the fact that people are against military interventions, as they entail casualties and waste of public money.

European Neighborhood and Marshall Plan with Africa: a Federalist Point of View

Paolo Ponzano

The federalist thought is based at the same time on the theory of *"raison d'état"* (which has its origin in Machiavelli) and on the conception of world peace expressed by Immanuel Kant. On the one hand, the State is the irreplaceable instrument for making possible the coexistence of men in the framework of the societies based on the division of labor and the market economy (as were formed in Europe since the end of the Middle Ages). The market economy allows the development of a pluralistic and open society, but at the same time produces social inequalities and marginalization (just think of the current economic situation where 1% of the world's population possess 99% of the resources). Only the state's monopoly of force allows public power not only to ensure the safety of its citizens but also to impose mechanisms of regulation and solidarity in order to avoid private violence.

However, the development of national states has produced a situation of international anarchy, as all states try to make their national interests prevail over other states (think of President Trump's "America first" slogan, or the German *"Deutschland über alles"*, or *"d'abord les Français"*, or *"prima gli Italiani"*). This spontaneous tendency has led States to exercise a power politics that often leads up ultimately to war. The Kantian conception of *peace* has made it clear that it must not be confused with the truce between one war and another, but is configured as an organization of powers that overcomes international anarchy, transforming the balance of power between states into juridical relations, and makes war structurally impossible through the extension of state sovereignty to a universal scale (see Sergio Pistone's essay on this subject: *"Federalism, Reason of State and Peace"* - Spinelli Institute).

However, Kant could not identify, in his time, the institutional system through which to achieve perpetual peace (i.e. the federal state, which is a constitutional structure capable of achieving peace among all the federated states). Naturally, it would be utopian to imagine the establishment of a world government starting from the existence of 180 or more national States, as exist at present. There shall be a previous and progressive formation of regional or continental federations to which national States voluntarily delegate part of their sovereignty for the management of problems that can only be solved at supranational level (the European Union is the first institutional model of this type, to which other regional geopolitical realities are painstakingly following). As Sergio Pistone writes in his above-cited essay, a future European federation will tend to favor the development of the less-advanced countries first, and then of regional integrations (two organically related stages), because only by progressing in this direction will it be possible to remedy increasingly dangerous situations of instability, open up extensive markets and control "biblical" migrations, which otherwise will eventually become incompatible with a democratic progress in Europe (as confirmed by the current state of the migration phenomenon).

Therefore, an unescapable choice will be in particular a great European "Marshall Plan" for the Southern Mediterranean, the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa (already proposed by Altiero Spinelli in 1978, as indicated below). This plan - on the model of the American Marshall Plan of 1947, which allowed the launch of European integration - will have to make international aid, of an adequate size on both the economic and the security aspects, conditional on an area's development of regional integration and progress in human rights matters. The Marshall Plan - launched by the US Secretary of State on 5 June 1947 in a speech at Harvard University - was proposed to all European countries, but was accepted in 1948 by 16 Western European countries and by the Scandinavian countries (to which were added later the Federal Republic of Germany and Spain), while it was rejected by the Soviet Union and the countries of the communist bloc. In the first three years, the Marshall Plan granted $12 billion (of which 5/6 as a gift and one sixth as a loan) up to a total of $17 billion over the five years of its duration. It gave a strong boost to the European unification process, cemented the solidarity of the nascent western bloc and gave birth to the first organization of European cooperation (the OECE, later to become the OECD). Although, as Monnet wrote to Bidault, "it is illusory to think that sixteen sovereign countries will actually cooperate, and that only a federation of the West will allow us to solve our problems", nevertheless the creation of the OECE paved the way to successive European organizations. The Marshall Plan confirmed a general principle already present in the Roman world, expressed in Horace's first Epistle: *"Tua res agitur, paries dum proximus ardet"* ("it's your problem, when your neighbor's wall is burning"). In fact, the Marshall plan prevented a persisting economic crisis in the European countries from producing high social tensions, that would have jeopardized the continent's economic and social rebirth (as well as the democratic system itself). As Marco Pannella said about twenty years ago,

"if Europe does not take care of Africa, it will be Africa that will take care of us". Therefore, Europe should take responsibility for contributing to the economic development of the African countries (most of which, to tell the truth, are its former colonies, abundantly exploited in the past) and for promoting the creation of regional-integration organizations.

The European Union started a neighborhood policy in 2003/2004 with its neighboring countries that do not have the vocation to become members of the EU. This policy, which was consecrated in the Lisbon Treaty (Article 8), aims to establish an area of prosperity and good neighborliness with 18 countries located at the eastern borders of the EU and in the Southern Mediterranean (from Ukraine to Algeria) through the conclusion of privileged association and partnership agreements. Association agreements have already been concluded by the European Union with most of the 18 countries, although the Union intends to intensify relations with all of the 18 countries covered by the neighborhood policy, in particular through specific action plans for each country. The Mediterranean countries covered by the neighborhood policy, with the exception of Libya, also participate in the Barcelona process, initiated by the 1995 Barcelona Declaration, which aimed to create a Euro-Mediterranean partnership (or Euro-Mediterranean union, as proposed by the then French President Sarkozy). According to the Dutch political scientist Steven Blockmans (see his essay *"The Obsolescence of the European Neighborhood Policy"*, published by the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), October 2017, Brussels), the neighborhood policy is currently in a phase of "hibernation", since the European Union chose to pursue a "realpolitik" which gives priority to its neighboring countries' security and stabilization interests, rather than to the values of democracy and protection of human rights that the Union declares to promote (Art. 2 of the Lisbon Treaty). The "Arab Springs", the conflicts in the Middle East and the spreading of terrorism have changed the attitude of the

EU towards its neighboring countries, and the special relationship foreseen by the Lisbon Treaty has been replaced by the application of the EU foreign policy's global strategy to all countries.

The European Union and its Member States are the world's leading donors of public aid to development. Together, the EU and its Member States provided aid totaling 75.5 billion euros in 2016, which is around 60% of the total amount of aid granted during the year in question. In the same year, the European Union alone earmarked the sum of about 20 billion euros to development aid, of which the least developed and lowest income countries were the main beneficiaries. In September 2017, the European Union adopted the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), a central element of the Foreign Investment Plan which has already entered into force. With the Foreign Investment Plan, the European Union will for the first time give its support to stimulate public and private investment in Sub-Saharan African countries and in the countries of the European neighborhood, particularly in countries affected by conflicts, in those without access to the sea and in the less developed countries, where needs are more acute. The aforementioned Plan aims to combat the deep-rooted socio-economic causes of migration, in particular irregular migration, and should contribute to the lasting reintegration of migrants in their own country of origin. The total European Union funding will amount to 4.1 billion euros from the European budget until 2020, a figure that should attract more than 44 billion euros of public and private investments during the period considered. If its Member States and other EU partners would contribute an equal amount, the total investment in the beneficiary countries could reach € 88 billion (aimed to support the provision of energy and water resources, and the expenditure for the training of human resources, which are the essential elements of a plan for a sustainable growth of the African economy). Of course, the sums

allocated by the European Union will not be sufficient to meet the sustainable development goals (SDGs) defined by the UN between now and 2030. Recent estimates indicate that the African continent would need an amount between 200 and 1200 billion dollars a year, for the sustainable development goals set by the UN to be achieved. The United Nations estimates that over the next 20 years 60 million young Africans will seek employment and must therefore be trained to find a job, while 75 million citizens will urbanize and will therefore need new housing. Another growth factor is the fact that Africa owns 60% of the world's arable land, though not all yet in use, and the largest reserves of mineral resources. Exploitation of this development-favoring potential is largely hampered by the non-availability of the necessary investments, in particular those to be used to bridge the infrastructural gap. 600 million Africans do not have electricity and lighting. The African Union has created an Electrification Agency, which has drawn up a plan to achieve the goal of full electrification of the continent in 10 years. The implementation of this plan would require a financial assistance from the EU of 5 billion dollars a year for the next 10 years, in order to generate a leverage effect on private investments up to the 250 billion dollars needed to realize the electrification plan. In addition, 300 million Africans do not have access to clean water, and only 5% of the arable land is properly irrigated. It should also be reminded that the acquisition of the largest oil field in Africa (over 9 billion barrels of crude oil) – placed in front of the coast of Nigeria, where 12 million slaves departed from for the Europeans' colonies in America – cost the huge sum of 1.1 billion dollars, invested by European oil and gas companies. This amount would have been sufficient to cover more than 80% of Nigeria's total health care expenditure for 2015. Yet, Nigerian citizens have not benefited from the agreement, which has benefited instead only a limited number of corrupt officials and money launderers. That

project is certainly not an isolated case. The natural resources present in most of the African countries are transferred through offshore companies that, to a large extent, are connected to companies and businessmen operating in America and in Europe. As confirmed by the documents emerging from the "Panama Papers", anonymous companies, with the connivance of local dictators and tax havens, are used as tools aimed at draining the natural wealth present in Africa and in some of the poorest countries in the world. Only by opening Europe to products made – or at least semi-finished – in Africa, while guaranteeing an equitable distribution of profits, and addressing the structural causes that undermine the development capacity of millions of people, will it be possible to implement a European development policy based on sustainable solutions.

Finally, let us not forget that the African population will increase from one billion 186 million people in 2015 to two billion 478 million in 2050, and to about four billion at the end of the century, while the demographic forecasts for the European Union see a decrease of its population starting from 2050.

Given this demographic situation, it would be illusory to think of a decrease in African migration to Europe in the coming years, and it is also illusory to say that we want to repatriate all the illegal immigrants to their countries of origin. For example, Italy has concluded re-admission agreements with only four African countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia and Nigeria), so it would be illusory to repatriate migrants to other African countries. As Emma Bonino pointed out, how could we repatriate 600,000 migrants, called illegal immigrants, from countries with which we do not have readmission agreements? Moreover, as not everybody knows, the remittances of migrants to their countries of origin amount to a global figure of about $ 31 billion a year, three times higher than the amount of aid provided to the countries in question (while the multinationals operating in the African continent

"reimport" about $ 32 billion a year of profits to their countries of origin). How can we imagine that the leaders of those countries will relinquish spontaneously and without compensation such an amount of resources? In this situation, the need for Europe to launch a development plan for and with Africa is evident. Altiero Spinelli already formulated in 1978 a visionary proposal after the monetary crisis of 1971 and the oil crisis of 1973. "The North" - wrote Spinelli - should make to the "South" the great proposal of transferring every year, free of charge or at very favorable conditions, monetary means to be used not only to meet the needs of hungry populations, but for the implementation of development plans, prepared by the countries themselves, if necessary with technical assistance provided by the advanced countries (...). The only condition that should be asked - specifies Spinelli - is that we should propose "development plans for open-type economies". The realistic nature of the proposal lies in the fact that the plan must serve to promote the development of both the countries of the South and those of the North of the world. The advanced countries should implement for themselves "austerity" policies, "so that it would be possible to allocate for many years a considerable fraction of their saved income to investments in development plans of countries of the South of the world (...).

If the operation will be successful, those countries will begin not only to increasingly consume investment goods and consumer goods, but also to create modern industries and farming practices. Their demand for goods, especially machine tools and technologies, will increase; it will be addressed to the developed countries, and the Western economy will be put in motion again, not so much because it will be decided in the abstract to increase production, but because there will be to produce more to respond to a growing demand not destined to being exhausted so soon".

In conclusion, the realization of the equivalent of a Marshall Plan for and with Africa requires

at least two basic political requirements. The first is the restoration of political stability and security conditions in those African countries from which migratory flows mainly originate (through a renewed EU foreign policy, based on the guidelines outlined in the new "Global Strategy for the EU" proposed by Federica Mogherini). In turn, to be successful, Africa's development plan will have to be managed through a regional organization, including the Mediterranean countries and the Saharan and sub-Saharan African countries; it will be responsible for elaborating the guidelines of the plan and for selecting the investments to be made, and it should act in close connection with the institutions of the European Union. To this end, it would be desirable to see the rise of a new Jean Monnet in Africa, who could launch the creation of an African Economic Community for water and renewable energies.

A New Narrative for Migrations*

Marie-Christine Vergiat

Migratory movements in time and in space
Population movements are an inherent part of the history of humanity and Europe has not always been a place of immigration. Our history is founded on population movements, wars and invasions. For example, France owes its name to the Francs[1] who came from the North and had nothing to do with "our ancestors the Gauls".

The largest migratory movements in modern times involved 50 million Europeans who escaped poverty and persecution, mainly between 1850 and the First World War. Both America and Australia are largely populated by these people, to the detriment of their native populations. In 1900, international[2] migrations represented 5% of the world's population, compared to 2.9% in 1990 and 3.4% today. It is therefore important to keep things in perspective. Whilst figures regarding migration are changing in absolute terms, ultimately the change is only slightly greater than that of the planet's population over the course of the last few decades, and is almost insignificant in the context of the globalisation and transformations being generated in terms of communication and transportation in particular.

However, migratory movements have changed: they have become globalised and now almost all countries throughout the world are simultaneously sending-, transit- and hosting-countries. France is an excellent example of this, since its net migratory balance is practically zero.

The reality of migration today
There are currently 244 million international migrants in the world. Eighty million are Asians, from a continent of 4.5 billion inhabitants. In recent years, they alone have added more people to the total number of international migrants than all the other continents put together. There are only 39 million African international migrants, and their migration takes place, for the most part (90%), between the different African countries.

Europeans account for 62 million for the entire continent of Europe (40 million for the EU). This means that Europeans too migrate, but no one talks about their migration in these terms and instead the preference is to refer to them as expatriates. Only 50% of their migration takes place within the continent of Europe. So, we should be asking ourselves who is invading, or who has invaded whom, particularly since south-south migratory movements have been higher than south-north movements since 2013.

We therefore need to choose our vocabulary carefully. Contaminated by the current discourse, we tend to use the word migrants solely to describe those men and women who encounter difficulties in both getting to Europe and remaining there once they have arrived. This is particularly inappropriate given that, each year, thousands of nationals from third countries outside the EU arrive legally on our shores and therefore migrate to the EU each year. Indeed, the EU Member States issued 3.4 million residence permits in 2016[3].

The most surprising aspect of this phenomenon is the nationality of the main "beneficiaries" of these permits. In 2016, the main recipients were: Ukrainians (588,900), Syrians[4] (348,000), Americans (250,900), Indians (198,300) and Chinese (195,600). This

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is the fourth consecutive year that Ukrainians have been the main beneficiaries of these permits and they continue to grow in number. Poland is the country of destination for 86% of migrants (512,000), and 81% of the permits issued to them are linked to employment. It is remarkable that nationals from this country are the greatest users of the status of posted worker, which can be considered to be a chain of social dumping.

Eighty-five per cent of the permits issued to Syrians are granted under the term of international protection, and two thirds of the Syrian recipients of these permits go to Germany. The Americans, Indians and Chinese go mostly to the United Kingdom, which is the EU country which issues by far the highest number of residence permits (865,800 or 25% of the permits issued in the EU). Brexit will therefore have a surprising effect in this area.

It is therefore important not to be misled by certain figures. There is no "migrant crisis" in the EU. Legal channels of migration certainly do exist, including those which are related to migration for economic reasons: the binary opposition between "good refugees" and other migrants, who are considered to be bad, the so called "economic migrants", makes no sense, especially since it fails to take into account those who come to Europe for family and education-related reasons, and who account for almost 44 % of the issued permits. And it is because we deny access to the legal channels to certain people, that they then have no other option than to attempt the perilous crossing of the Mediterranean, or the deserts which lead to it.

A crisis in the reception of refugees
So, what has happened between spring 2015 and spring 2016? More than one million people have crossed the Mediterranean, including 850,000 crossing from Turkey to Greece. It is strange, to say the least, that no one has really questioned this spectacular movement of people from a State such as Turkey, where the police are all-powerful, to put it mildly; especially when it is considered that this flow virtually dried up from one day to the next following the signing of the "agreement" between the EU and Turkey. It is impossible not to draw the conclusion that Recep Erdogan used migration as an instrument to place unprecedented pressure on the EU at a time when the authoritarian excesses of his regime were increasingly visible. The very least we can say is that his approach does appear to work.

However, it is also true that there has been a significant increase in the number of applications for asylum over the last few years (626,000 applications for asylum in 2014[5], 1.2 million in 2015 and in 2016). But it is worth remembering that this figure was 672,000 in 1992 in the EU composed of 15 Member States, at the time of the war in Yugoslavia.

Major differences may be observed with regard to the effective granting of international protection, according to the Member States[6] and the nationalities of the beneficiaries. Germany is currently the country which accounts for the greatest share of this increase in applications in absolute figures[7], and the decisions to grant international protection have mainly been made in favour of Syrians.

France is barely involved in this process: 58,800 first-time applicants for asylum in 2014, 70,000 in 2015 and 76,000 in 2016, and, above all, only 35,000 positive decisions[8] in 2016, compared to the 445,000 in Germany for the same year. The figures speak for themselves; the demographic issues faced in Germany are not sufficient to fully explain this situation and certainly do not explain why there is such a huge difference between the two countries, especially since Germany has been the world's second largest recipient of migrants for several years and this was certainly the case long before 2015.

The fact is that the entire world is faced with a refugee crisis which is without precedents since the Second World War: 65 million

displaced people in 2016, compared to 50 million in 2014: 22.5 million refugees in the strictest sense of the term and 40 million internally displaced people[9].

Eighty-six per cent of refugees have arrived in developing countries, whereas in the European Union, which is the world's wealthiest geographical area, with a population of more than 500 million, we are struggling to cope with the arrival of refugees who, when all the asylum applications for 2015 and 2016 are combined, represent only 0.5% of our population! Is this really a credible situation given that in Lebanon, a small country with a population of 6 million, their 1.5 million refugees represent almost one third of total population?

It is certainly not true to say that the EU, and France in particular, are taking in all of the world's poor. Indeed, they are not even taking in their fair share. On the contrary, our borders are becoming tighter because of the policies which are being implemented, and the states choose whom to let in. More than anything, the alleged "migrant crisis" has been used as a pretext to further harden the migration policies which have been in place for several years, even though the situation has stabilized since the second half of 2016 and has continued to become even more stable in 2017[10].

So what are these European policies?
Over the course of the last 25 years, the European Union has increasingly taken measures to turn itself into a bunker:
- Construction of physical walls in Spain since 1993, between Greece and Turkey in 2002, then Bulgaria in 2014 and, more recently, between Hungary and Serbia in 2016.
- Implementation of "digital walls", through increasing efforts to keep a record of third-country nationals (VIS, SIS[11], EURODAC, PNR…), which is leading to a growing intrusion into personal data (palm prints, facial imaging…)[12].

- Increasing externalisation of the controls carried out on the EU's borders to third countries (the EU's neighbouring countries, notably those of the Maghreb region, which are now becoming new lands of immigration).

This approach was accelerated under the Italian Presidency in the second half of 2014, which was before the famous "crisis", through the introduction of the Khartoum process, which is aimed at involving the countries in the Horn of Africa, a region that many of the people who risk their life to cross the Mediterranean come from, in the policies regarding the externalisation of border controls. This means that the EU and its Member States are shamelessly working with authoritarian regimes to "fight against the underlying causes of migration" but, in reality, to finance these countries so that they can prevent their nationals from leaving.

After the Valetta Summit in November 2015, a trust fund for Africa was even set up which, under the pretext of expediting the payment of funds to the countries concerned, has resulted in funds which had previously been allocated to development aid being diverted towards these security policies, to the benefit of a certain number of multinationals in the security-military sector.

In reality, the Member States are increasingly taking control of these policies and use the European Union as a scapegoat for the dysfunctions for which they are responsible. This takes us to the very heart of sovereign policies, and the more they are externalised, the truer this statement becomes: foreign affairs are the sole responsibility of the Member States. They only give to the EU what they want to give and act in the same way when it comes to the transposition of European directives. In particular, they have rejected the introduction of a genuine European asylum law, as well as a single status for foreign workers [13] and have made a very poor job of transposing the directive on family reunification, not to

mention their total refusal to express solidarity with Greece and Italy (see *Mare Nostrum*, or a relocation plan which in the end only involved 30,000 people, even though the original target had been 160,000, which still fell way short of requirements).

And the situation only continues to get worse: currently, more than 15 legislative texts which have arisen from the European Agenda on Migration, proposed by the Commission in May 2015, are being discussed by the European institutions. They continue to pursue the same obsessions:

  - To combat so-called illegal immigration,
  - To favour expulsions, regardless of the person's country of origin,
  - To prevent secondary movements and "asylum shopping", as they dare call it,
  - To use all means possible to prevent "migrants" from reaching the EU or even leaving their own country,
  - To make EU aid and partnerships systematically conditional upon the acceptance of re-admission agreements, not only for nationals of the countries concerned, but also for those of the countries they have transited (the notion of "safe third countries").

Our leaders appear to be paralysed by the discourse of the nationalists and the extreme right, and have taken ownership of a part of this discourse. Their migration policies are increasingly racist and this is making Europe the deadliest continent for migrants.

Rather than breaking up the people-smuggling system, they are making it stronger, and human trafficking has become the third largest form of trafficking in the world after the trafficking of drugs and arms. Rather than fighting against the underlying causes of migration, they refuse to acknowledge their direct or indirect responsibilities in a certain number of conflicts (notably Iraq, Libya, Syria…) and the dramatic situation related to the authoritarian and corrupt regimes in many countries. On the contrary, they support them and sell them arms, without mentioning the plundering of natural resources, principally through agreements which look to be economic partnerships and which are established, instead of cooperation and development agreements, in order to serve the interests of European multinationals. Of course, we could also add the failure to meet commitments made regarding public development aid [14].

Alternative policies are possible:
Most of our fellow citizens would be prepared to accept alternative policies, as is demonstrated by the number of solidarity-based movements which are being set up throughout Europe, especially if a political discourse were to accompany these new policies. This is even more possible given that these policies are hugely expensive and inefficient, especially in relation to the targets they set themselves (at least 15 million EUR have been spent for barricading the borders since 2000).

Equality and dignity for everyone who lives on our planet, as promoted by the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, and the international conventions related to it, must form the basis of these possible alternative policies:

  - The right to life and the law of the sea, with adequate resources provided to carry out rescues at sea,
  - The right to asylum, in compliance with the Geneva Convention: applications shall be made on EU soil and notably in the countries in which the applicants have family ties, or whose language they are able to speak,
  - Children's rights in strict compliance with the International Convention on the Rights of the Child, notably with regard to family reunification and unaccompanied minors,
  - The right to education, including education for young adults,
  - The right to healthcare for those who are

not able to access treatment in their own country or who have begun a course of treatment in the EU,

- The right to work and notably the signing and implementation of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, which has thus far been signed by some fifty States, all of which are in the South; none of the EU Member States have signed the Convention since, amongst other things, it states that all migrants have rights, regardless of their status,

- Finally, the right to mobility for all: today, only one third of the planet's population have the right, in theory, to travel without a visa. This is a fundamental battle which must be won to guarantee equal rights for all.

In an increasingly mobile world in which capital, goods and services travel more and more around the world, it is unrealistic to believe that it is possible to prevent people from moving around, just like thinking that adopting an inward-looking attitude is a solution. What is difficult for Europeans, and particularly for those that govern them, is to learn to live in a world where they will increasingly be in the minority, and will be less and less dominant. The key to universality is respect for others and otherness, rather than the imposition of a model just because it is considered to be "western".

UN Reform: Where Are We Now?

Andrea Cofelice

With the publication of *An Agenda for Peace* (1992), *An Agenda for Development* (1994) and *An Agenda for Democratisation* (1996), the then-UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali launched an ambitious program to reform the United Nations, in order to strengthen, democratise and adapt the Organisation's structure and working methods to the changed international context, marked by the end of the Cold War. What remains nowadays of that "reform afflatus"? What are the initiatives undertaken and the unresolved issues?

At institutional level, the few initiatives implemented so far date back to the Secretariat of Kofi Annan (1997-2006), who chose to focus his agenda on the reform of the peace and human rights pillar, by encouraging the creation of the Peace-building Commission and the Human Rights Council (both proposals were contained in his 2005 report *In Larger Freedom)*.

The Peace-building Commission was established in 2006 to satisfy actual needs "on the ground". Traditional UN peace-keeping missions, indeed, generally ended with the signing of peace agreements among the parties. However, empirical evidence has shown that about half of the countries involved in conflicts, especially in civil conflicts, tend to fall again into the spiral of violence within five years since the signing of these agreements.

To reduce this risk, the Peace-building Commission, a 31-member intergovernmental body, operates in post-conflict contexts with a view to mobilising the necessary resources and promoting integrated medium/long-term strategies for the reconstruction of infrastructures, institutions and social networks. The Commission currently works in six African countries: Burundi, Sierra Leone, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia and the Central African Republic.

Also in 2006, the Human Rights Council was established, replacing the former Human Rights Commission. Despite the Commission's essential function as a hub for the consolidation of the international human rights law, in the last years of its existence it had become the object of serious criticism for its excessive politicisation and the lack of effective responses to human rights violations in the world.

Without changing its mandate, the current Human Rights Council, a subsidiary body of the General Assembly made up of 47 member states, has set up new and, at least in intentions, more equitable protection mechanisms. In 2021, the UN General Assembly will assess if the Council has managed to meet these expectations.

After the Ban Ki-moon mandate (2007-2016), marked by a disappointing stasis on these issues, reform efforts have been relaunched by the current Secretary General Antonio Guterres. Few months after his election, Guterres presented, in a series of detailed reports, his proposals to strengthen the UN development system (Repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda: ensuring a better future for all, doc. A/72/124–E/2018/3); reform the peace and security pillar, by creating, within the UN Secretariat, a Department for Political and Peace-Building Affairs and a Department for Peace Operations (Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar, doc. A/72/525); and simplify the Organization

management (Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: ensuring a better future for all, doc. A/72/492).

The reform proposal of the development pillar is articulated in seven strategic points addressing the fragmentation and bureaucratization of the UN system, that cause serious operational shortcomings, duplication of work and dispersion of resources. Through the adoption of a needs – and prevention – based approach, the reform proposal also aims to create a more responsible and effective system that could offer better results on the ground and strengthen the responsiveness, planning and risk management capabilities of developing countries.

As far as the peace and security pillar is concerned, Guterres proposes the creation, within the UN Secretariat, of a Department for Political and Peace-Building Affairs and a Department for Peace Operations, in order to improve the effectiveness and coherence of peacekeeping operations and special political missions. The proposal aims to adopt a holistic approach addressing the fundamental causes of conflict and post-conflict situations, placing greater emphasis on their socio-economic aspects as well as on the need to integrate, in a more incisive way, the security, human rights and development pillars. These proposals will be negotiated by the General Assembly in 2018.

It cannot be denied that these past and current efforts to advance the cause of the UN reform are necessary and relevant; however, the elephant in the room is undoubtedly represented by the (failed) reform of Charter-based bodies, especially the Security Council. Although several intergovernmental working groups have been discussing how to reform the UN Security Council since 1993, the current debate is so polarized that member States have not even managed to prepare a draft text for negotiations. What are the main hurdles in this context?

According to an agenda of work set in 2008, the current intergovernmental negotiations on the reform of the Security Council should focus on five items: 1) categories of Council members (permanent, non-permanent or other options); 2) issue of veto; 3) regional representation; 4) size of an enlarged Council and working methods; 5) relations between the Security Council and the General Assembly.

Actually, discussions on items 3 and 4 led to a stalemate situation, due to a sharp confrontation between three main groups of states: the so-called "Group of four – G4", made up of Germany, Japan, India and Brazil, that sponsor their permanent membership to the Security Council; the African Group, which calls for two additional permanent seats to be reserved for African states; and the grouping "United for consensus"(more heterogeneous but composed, among others, of the main regional "rivals" of the G4 states, including Pakistan, Spain, Italy, Argentina, Canada, Mexico and Colombia), that opposes the expansion of permanent seats and veto power, merely requiring new non-permanent or semi-permanent seats.

Accordingly, it is not surprising that, to date, the most advanced reform proposals coming from civil society, such as the transformation of the Security Council into the Chamber of Regional Organizations, the creation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly, or the democratic reform of global economic and financial institutions (namely World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and World Trade Organization), have not (yet) entered the agenda of intergovernmental negotiations. Most of these proposals are contained in the report "Confronting the Crisis of Global Governance", launched in 2015 by the Commission on Global Security, Justice & Governance, that develops new frameworks for collective action in response to threats to global security and justice.

However, the activism demonstrated so far by the current Secretary General offers some

hope for the goal of reforming the UN to be resumed and re-launched in actual terms. After all, a clear awareness remains: although the UN political and bureaucratic structure is elephantine and anachronistic, and the current world governmental leaderships do not stand-out for their far-reaching planning skills, using Antonio Papisca's words: "as far as its principles, objectives, and (although uncomplete) architecture as a global arrangement for collective security under a 'supranational' authority, the UN Charter preserves its validity from a legal, political, moral and historical point of view".

Death Penalty in the World: Amnesty International Report 2018

In 2017, according to data collected by Amnesty International, 2591 death sentences were imposed and 993 people were executed. However, these are partial data, certainly underestimated, given that in many countries there is a lack of transparency about them and, moreover, in a country like China, the most populated in the world, the data themselves are not made public, as they are considered "state secret". Amnesty estimates that China alone carries out more death sentences than all the other countries of the world put together. According to the Amnesty Report, the highest number of executions are carried out, in descending order, in China, Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. The Report also notes that in recent years there has been a tendency to decrease in death penalties (in 2017, 4% less compared to the previous year) and that, at the end of 2017, 106 countries had abolished the death penalty for all crimes. The civilization process of the world, thanks also to the abolition of capital punishment, therefore, continues in an ambiguous and contradictory manner. It is not yet sufficiently understood by both the ruling classes and public opinions that, as the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said in October 2017, "The death penalty does little to serve victims or deter crime". In this context, and with reference to capital punishment, the area of the world that appears to be the most advanced is, with respect also to many other matters (think for example of social protection systems), the European one. In the western world, the United States still maintains the death penalty, and in 2017 there were 23 executions carried out. The United States and Japan are the only G8 countries to retain and apply the death penalty.

But death as a penalty is not only the consequence of a judicial process, which is what the Amnesty International Annual Report is dealing with. Death as a punishment has always been the "intentional point" of all wars, especially today, when the vast majority of deaths in war is increasingly composed not of the military but of civilians, women, the elderly, children. Wars condemn to death hundreds of thousands, millions of innocent people, and without any preventive procedure. It is useful to remember, among other things, that wars and death penalties resulting from judicial proceedings are nourishing one another. The civilization process can only be achieved through the definitive elimination of both. *(g.b.)*

Translated by Lionello Casalegno

The Genocide Convention: An Unused but not Forgotten Standard of World Law Relevant to Myanmar

Rene Wadlow

Adama Dieng, United Nations Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide, in a 12 March 2018 statement after a mission to Bangladesh to assess the situation of the some 700,000 Rohingya refugees, who have crossed the frontier from Myanmar to Bangladesh after violence in northern Rakhine state in October 2016 and August 2017, said:

"The scorched earth campaign carried out by the Myanmar security forces since August 2017 against the Rohingya population was predictable and preventable. Despite the numerous warnings I have made of the risk of atrocity crimes, the international community has buried its head in the sand. This has cost the Rohingya population of Myanmar their lives, their dignity and their homes.

Let us be clear: international crimes were committed in Myanmar. Rohingya Muslims have been killed, tortured, raped, burnt alive and humiliated solely because of who they are. All the information I have received indicates that the intent of the perpetrators was to cleanse northern Rakhine state of their existence, possibly even to destroy the Rohingya as such, which, if proven, would constitute the crime of genocide. However, whether or not we consider that the crimes committed amount to crimes against humanity or genocide, this should not delay our resolve to act and to act immediately."

9 December is the anniversary of the 1948 Convention on Genocide, signed at the UN General Assembly held in 1948 in Paris. The Genocide Convention was signed the day before the proclamation, on 10 December 1948, of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The two texts were much influenced by the Second World War. The crimes of Nazi Germany were uppermost in the minds of those who drafted the Genocide Convention, in order to deal with a new aspect of international law and the laws of war. The cry was "Never again!"

The protection of civilians from deliberate mass murder was already in The Hague and Geneva Conventions of international humanitarian law. However, genocide is different from mass murder. Genocide is the most extreme consequence of racial discrimination and ethnic hatred. Genocide has as its aim the destruction, wholly or in part, of a national, ethnic, racial or religious group as such. The term was proposed by the legal scholar Raphael Lemkin, drawing on the Greek *genos* (people or tribe) and the Latin *occidere* (to kill) (1)

Genocide in the sense of a desire to eliminate a people has nearly always a metaphysical aspect, as well as deep-seated racism. This was clear in the Nazi desire to eliminate Jews, first by forced emigration from Europe and, when emigration was not possible, by physical destruction.

We see a desire to destroy totally certain tribes in the Darfur conflict in Sudan, that did not exist in the much longer and more deadly North-South Sudan Civil War (1956-1972, 1982-2005). Darfur tribes are usually

defined by "blood lines" – marriage and thus procreation is limited to a certain population, either within the tribe or with certain other groups with which marriage relations have been created over a period of time. Thus children born of rape – considered 'Janjaweed babies' – after the government-sponsored Janjaweed militias – are left to die or are abandoned. The raped women are often banished or ostracized. By attacking both the aged, holders of traditional knowledge, and the young of child-bearing age, the aim of the destruction of the continuity of a tribal group is clear.

We find the same pattern in some of the fighting in the eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, where not only are women raped, but their sexual organs are destroyed so that they will not be able to reproduce.

As then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan said at UNESCO in 1998,

"Many thought, no doubt, that the horrors of the Second World War – the camps, the cruelty, the exterminations, the Holocaust – could not happen again. And yet they have, in Cambodia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in Rwanda. Our time – this decade even – has shown us that man's capacity for evil knows no limits. Genocide – the destruction of an entire people on the basis of ethnic or national origins – is now a word of our time too, a stark and haunting reminder of why our vigilance must be eternal."

Mr Nicodene Ruhashyankiko, of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination of Minorities, wrote in his study of proposed mechanisms for the study of information on genocide and genocidal practices: "A number of allegations of genocide have been made since the adoption of the 1948 Convention. In the absence of a prompt investigation of these allegations by an impartial body, it has not been possible to determine whether they were well founded. Either they have given rise to sterile controversy or, because of the political circumstances, nothing further has been heard about them."

Article VIII of the Genocide Convention provides that "Any Contracting Party may call upon the Competent Organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the UN, as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in Article III". Unfortunately, no State has ever done so.

Thus we need to heed the early warning signs of genocide. Officially-directed massacres of civilians of whatever number cannot be tolerated, for the organizers of genocide must not believe that more widespread killing will be ignored. Yet killing is not the only warning sign. The Convention drafters, recalling the radio addresses of Hitler and the constant flow of words and images, set out as punishable acts "direct and public incitement to commit genocide." The Genocide Convention, in its provisions concerning public incitement, sets the limits of political discourse. It is well documented that public incitement – whether by Governments or certain non-governmental actors – including political movements – to discriminate against, to separate forcibly, to deport or physically eliminate large categories of the population of a given State because they belong to certain racial, ethnic or religious groups, sooner or later leads to war. Therefore, the Genocide Convention is also a constant reminder of the need to moderate political discourse, especially constant and repeated accusations against a religion, ethnic and social category of persons. Had this been done in Rwanda, with regard to the radio *Mille Collines*, perhaps the premeditated and announced genocide could have been avoided or mitigated.

For the United Nations to be effective in the prevention of genocide, there needs to be an

authoritative body which can investigate and monitor a situation well in advance of the outbreak of violence. As has been noted, any Party to the Genocide Convention (and most States are Parties) can bring evidence to the UN Security Council, but none has. In the light of repeated failures and due to pressure from non-governmental organizations, the UN Secretary-General has named an individual advisor on genocide to the UN Secretariat. The current Special Advisor is the Senegalese lawyer Adama Dieng, with whom I worked closely when he was active in human rights issues in Geneva, as a representative of the International Commission of Jurists.

Therefore, a relevant existing body must be strengthened to be able to deal with the first signs of tensions, especially "direct and public incitement to commit genocide." The Committee for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), created to monitor the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, would be the appropriate body to strengthen, especially by increasing its resources and the number of UN Secretariat members which service CERD. Through its urgent procedures mechanisms, CERD has the possibility of taking early-warning measures aimed at preventing existing strife from escalating into conflicts, and to respond to problems requiring immediate attention. A stronger CERD, more able to investigate fully situations, should mark the world's commitment to the high standards of world law set out in the Genocide Convention.

Notes:
– Raphael Lemkin. *Axis Rule in Occupied Europe* (Washington: Carnegie Endowment for World Peace, 1944)
– For good overviews see: Walliman and Dobkowski (Eds). *Genocide and the Modern Age* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987); Chalk, K. Jonassohn. *The History and Sociology of Genocide* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990); G.J.Andreopoulos (Ed). Gen (Philadelphia. University.....): University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994); Samantha Power. *A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide* (New York: Basic Books, 2002); John Tirman. *The Death of Others* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); William Schabas. *Genocide in International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000)

SDR and Bitcoins: Competition or Cooperation?

Elena Flor

Christine Lagarde – the IMF Managing Director – in her recent speech[1] on the 20th anniversary of the Bank of England's independence, wondered whether virtual currencies – like the Bitcoin – pose a challenge to the current system of currencies and central banks.

The answer is that, for the time being, this is not the case, because virtual currencies are "too volatile, too risky, too energy intensive; [...] many are too opaque for regulators; and some have been hacked". Nonetheless, there is a "growing demand for new payment services" in economies "rooted in peer-to-peer transactions, in frequent, small value payment, often cross border": in these cases, virtual currencies can be competitive against traditional systems such as credit cards.

In a world of big data, with new and increasingly sophisticated technologies, capable of handling them, new models of financial intermediation will emerge: we can already see the changes experimented in the consumer credit field and in mortgages.

Bitcoin and other virtual currencies will face issues and difficulties well-known in monetary history: in the face of significant technological advantages – especially in the medium of exchange function – the store of value function could be a bitter surprise to its users that often will – unknowingly – take on expensive risks for their financial assets.

The Gresham's law, for which "bad money drives out good", i.e. the holder tends to get rid of (and pay with) "bad money" and to treasure (and keep for himself) the "good money" instead, applies also to the virtual currencies. The challenge with the systems subject to the supervision of regulators (central banks and the Bank of England itself appeared just after the collapse of the value of financial assets) will hardly be won by the virtual currencies, that will often leave dead and injured behind them, on the battlefield.

In the payment system, the challenge is more open but, as Mrs Lagarde reminds, citizens might "hold virtual currency rather than physical dollars, euros, [...] because it may one day be easier and safer than obtaining paper bills, especially in remote regions. And because virtual currencies could actually become more stable".

There is, in fact, a condition which is essential in order to have a real dissemination of such payment systems, whose use can find, especially in the international dimension, a strong incentive: they must guarantee the stability of the value of the unit of account in which they are expressed. There is only one way to achieve this: the pegging to a currency, or rather to a "stable basket of currencies". The link with gold or other real assets would not solve the problem, given the strong fluctuations registered in their prices.

Sooner or later, some virtual currency will tend to anchor to a currency or a basket of

currencies, which can promise stability in their value, and conquer – again for the Gresham's law – rising market shares to the detriment of unstable virtual currencies. The peg to the SDR is preferable compared to a link to single currencies, assuring greater stability (as the SDR is a basket of currencies), and would also be consistent with the international use of the virtual currencies.

The ability to operate on an international field has always characterized the emergence of new payment systems. This was the case for the rise of letters of credit by wool merchants in the 14th century, that made Lyon the monetary center of the time, and for the credit card, introduced in the United States last century (1950), because there was no banking system at federal level and payments between the various states were difficult, as one could not trust the checks issued by unknown banks of other states.

Citizens everywhere in the world will increasingly buy books, travels, smartphones, etc from worldwide chains, which need to have price lists expressed in stable international units of account: the virtual currency able to win the challenge will be the one able to permit these transactions and offer the stability needed.

The "digital version of the SDR" is an ideal candidate, and the IMF – as declared by its Managing Director – is open to cooperation.

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[1] "Central Banking and Fintech – A brave new world?", Christine Lagarde, IMF Managing Director, Bank of England Conference, London, September 29, 2017

Can We Unite for Peace?

Keith Best

If you are a peace activist, you have to take the long view. It is a study in perseverance with many setbacks along the road and a real test of optimism – is the glass half full or half empty? We can be tempted into thinking that real progress is made only in the wake of a disaster or major conflagration – certainly the ill-fated League of Nations emanated from the First World War and the major instruments that we cherish today mostly came out of the ashes of the Second World War – still within living memory of many. Yet there has been progress without such a draconian stimulus and we should not forget that. I take the view that there is a ratchet effect – that having established norms for behaviour and human dignity, the clock cannot fully be turned back. There will always be aberrations – the use of chemical weapons in Syria and earlier in Iraq, the genocide in Rwanda and Bosnia, and whether that is what has happened in Rakhine State in Myanmar – but these events are now judged against the established norms even if the international mechanisms and real-politik frustratingly seem powerless to prevent them. The genie of the universality of human rights is out of the bottle and cannot be forced back. The danger is not so much in the erosion of these norms but in their seeming irrelevance to real situations and to people's everyday lives. The unwitting complacency of the peace activist is to assume that they are applicable everywhere and hold equal validity in every situation – they become almost abstract ideals divorced from reality. I was with Michael Ignatieff in London recently and have just finished reading his latest book that he gave me, called *The Ordinary Virtues*. He and a small team visited different troubled parts of the world to see how communities coped with difference and living together, especially in the aftermath of major upheaval and whether those communities saw their priorities through the prism of international human rights or the practical, local, daily means of living together, i.e. the ordinary virtues. Overwhelmingly, he found that it was the latter. Further, he finds that human rights and the ordinary virtues are in tension just as law is in tension with moral feeling: we are living a genuine crisis of the universal amidst a return of the sovereign. As he states, "Everywhere sovereign states are pushing back against universal obligations, whether it be the refugee convention, the laws of war or the human rights covenants. It is not just China and Russia which insist on their sovereignty. Ordinary citizens in democratic states too, faced with the claims of refugees and desperate migrants at their borders, fearful of terror attacks, are telling their leaders: protect us from strangers. In an age of fear, the ordinary virtues can't function without security, and it is doubtful that human rights can turn back this tide. In a global age of threats from enraged fanatics, the sovereign returns and the universal loses its grip, not just on rulers but also on those they rule."

If we are to be successful in promoting peace, we must match our own, perhaps sometimes perceptively rather lofty, aspirations of universal human rights to the local condition and to the fears and aspirations of ordinary people who live out the tensions in their everyday lives. Otherwise we shall fail and be seen to be mere dreamers, as relevant as flat-earthers.

So, when we ask "can we unite for peace"

we need to be sure what it is we are being asked to unite around. There are certain global institutional mechanisms which we could support better if there were greater universality and focus among peace activists – these are issues of global governance with which I have been involved and associated for much of my adult political life through the World Federalist Movement. This year we celebrate – and that is the right word – twenty years of the International Criminal Court which, despite all its criticism and boycotting from some powerful nations such as USA, has delivered on prosecutions. I remember when the Rome Statute was signed in 1998, that many felt it would not survive. Well, it has and now, only twenty years later, no-one speaks of its abolition. As mature judgment prevails, it will become to be seen as one of the most significant advances in international law – for the first time in history the justiciability of individuals held to account for their deeds and not just states. Of even yet more recent origin, the concept of the Responsibility to Protect – adumbrated by Kofi Annan when Secretary-General in 2005: in effect, a reversal of the obligation of the citizen to the state to owe unfettered allegiance, including laying down one's life at the state's behest with its origins in feudal times, to the responsibility and obligations of the state towards its own citizens – to safeguard and care for them. This is a new dimension to the social contract. In many ways, it may be seen as a further step away from the Westphalian order, in which states were entitled to do what they wished within their own territory without external interference, to one of accepted intervention by the international community when states fail to protect their citizens or engage in genocide or act contrary to other international norms.

The nations that engaged in conflict in 1914 regarded war, adumbrated by Von Clausewitz, as an extension of foreign policy by other means, and a legitimate vehicle by which to seize or to safeguard trading rights or territory – there was nothing inherently immoral about it. It is notable how those sentiments are now so outmoded to the extent that, although not impossible, nearly all modern conflicts are within states and not between them. They are horrendous, as civil wars always are, with neighbour and family pitched against each other, and they lead to horrors such as those seen in the Balkans – they are used as proxy wars by other states such as we see played out in Syria and Yemen, with the main casualties numerically being women and children rather than armed combatants.

These are all matters worthy of global citizens coming together to support. Yet we should not forget and, indeed, should give especial support to those local initiatives in which the ordinary virtues enable peace and harmony to be maintained, and provide mechanisms where disputes or disharmony can be settled amicably. The application without fear or favour of the law is an essential element, as is giving a voice to the often voiceless in a majoritarian state, namely the safeguarding of minorities whether in Calatonia or Rakhine State, in a way that does not have as a stark alternative either revolution or secession or both. I am a world federalist for a purpose, not just to see accountable and effective global institutions but to see federalist principles applied within states as safeguards for minorities, as well as in collectives of states to ensure that none feel excluded and that their voice is drowned out by the majority. A functioning democracy can only work where such safeguards exist, otherwise it becomes the tyranny of the majority, as argued by John Stuart Mill in his famous 1859 book *On Liberty*. Such thoughts were not new and had been the subject of discussion in the Federalist Papers of the Founding Fathers. Indeed, the first ten amendments to the US Constitution

served to mandate individual and minority protections.

The tension between universal values and local situations to which I refer, pose an existential threat to peace, far greater than many comprehend. Throughout most of my adult life I have lived in what was called the Cold War – a stand-off between the Eastern and Western victors of the Second World War under the threat of Mutually Assured Destruction. It was uncomfortable but had certain rules and understanding. The Iron Curtain of which Churchill spoke in his Fulton, Missouri, speech, came down, quite literally in the case of the Berlin Wall, in 1989, but what has come in its place? Over the last almost thirty years we have seen a descent into a more anarchic situation. Not just the rise of terrorism perpetrated by non-state actors and those who reject all the established norms of rules of war, the Geneva Conventions, genocide, crimes against humanity especially levelled at civilians, and who are intent on destroying what have become universal civilised values as well as the physical history of monuments, ancient buildings and manuscripts – truly an attack on centuries of experiment of nations and peoples trying to live together. In such a world, the responses of the nation state acting alone are insufficient. There must be joint, preferably internationally agreed, action through credible and accountable collections of states in an institutional framework, whether at the UN or through treaty obligations such as NATO for defence, or the Paris Agreement on climate change, a deal signed in June 2017 by nearly 200 countries in an effort to curb global carbon emissions. How can, say, Britain act effectively alone without support from other countries? That is why I want to see the UK remain part of the EU, with its burgeoning collective foreign policy and its alternative defence potential if, for whatever reason, the lynchpin of NATO, the USA, were to lose interest in Europe. That is why, if the attempted

murder of Sergei Skripal and his daughter is traced to the Kremlin, then we must ask what further can Britain do, especially following Alexander Litvinenko's murder by radiation poisoning in November 2006. Meaningful sanctions have all but been exhausted further to the illegal invasion of Crimea by Russia. The only other response, already mooted, is to increase defence spending and then we start to mirror history with an arms build-up which ultimately does not secure peace, but creates a more likely climate for war.

There is also what I have described as the retreat into narrow nationalism and reliance on local sovereignty, exemplified in so many ways – talk and action of building walls to exclude rather than include people, the far right nationally introverted movements achieving electoral success in democracies in Hungary, Poland, Germany, Italy and the USA. There are the secession movements exploiting these times, expressing frustration at their failure to be given what they see as their right to self-determination. These situations are then further exploited by the new Tsar of Russia, smarting under the loss of territory and influence since the liberation of the Stans and Eastern European states from its hegemony. Despite the international criticism and draconian sanctions, the invasion of Crimea and the armed intervention in Ukraine remain unresolved. However one may see the desire to regain a global influence from the Russian point of view, this does not make for a safer world. Finally, if you throw into the mix the toxic ingredient of protectionism as mouthed by the American President, and the prospect of a retaliatory trade war, we now have a situation in which one act of miscalculation or misunderstanding can lead more probably to nuclear, biological and chemical war than at few times during the Cold War, such as the Cuban Missile Crisis. The analogy with what led to the First World War is chilling. Yet always

the mistake of security forces throughout the world is to think that future wars will be fought along the same lines as their predecessors. Terrorism, covert state action in other states and cyber warfare, which can cripple a country's means of survival more effectively than any blockade, coupled with control of the media and sources of information now pose a far greater threat.

We in the peace movement, therefore, have our work cut out. International NGOs are finding their funding jeopardised by public sentiment, as well as less finance available. Governments are cutting back on their donations for this work. Yet we must persevere. Being a peace activist is often unglamorous work – it is not all speeches and being chained to fences in high profile demonstrations. It is the constant lobbying, organising, influencing, the backroom work which pays off the best. That is our experience in WFM-IGP with the Coalitions for the International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect – getting agreement among different NGO and state actors for a common strategy and then pursuing it over many years, before benefits are seen. Another example is our work as the coordinator for the NGO Working Group on the Security Council, an informal network of organizations that meets regularly with Security Council members and others to provide feedback and input on issues related to peace and security at the UN. There is no common agreed solution to reform of the Council, as that would divide those organisations, but the monitoring provides a valuable backdrop to finding common ground. These are just some of the programmes which we pursue in combination with other NGOs and states. We had input into greater transparency and accountability over the selection of the current Secretary-General of the UN, leading to the hustings and greater openness than ever seen previously – part of the 1 for 7 Billion global campaign supported by organisations and individuals from all corners of the globe committed to getting the best UN Secretary-General: over 750 organisations have signed up to the campaign, with a combined reach of more than 170 million people worldwide supported by eminent personalities like Kofi Annan and of which WFM-IGP is an informal steering committee member.

If you do not already do so, I urge you to support the work of the World Federalist Movement either directly or through its UK member organisation Federal Union.

Perhaps surprisingly from what I have said, my conclusion is not pessimistic. The human rights advances that have been and continue to be made cannot be wholly reversed – they are now part of the human story. Likewise with the emphasis on climate change and the environment and the advance of the status of women. What we seek to avoid, therefore, is not the elimination of these advances, which are well established, but an aberration which could cause a major interruption, such as a greater conflict as we saw twice in the last century. We have enough examples of recent history to be fully alive to the dangers and to know the solutions. We can speak not just out of aspiration but of experience. That is why the voice of the peace movement will remain relevant and why, especially working together, we can continue to demonstrate the famous dictum of Margaret Mead "Never doubt that a small group of thoughtful, committed citizens can change the world. Indeed, it is the only thing that ever has."

The Gender Provisions of the Rome Statute as a Tool to Promote Women's Rights and Women's Leadership in International Justice

Jelena Pia-Comella

As we enter the year commemorating the 20th anniversary of the Rome Statute, it reminds us of the paramount impact that the Rome Statute System has on women's rights and women's leadership in international justice. As I will elaborate further in this article, the Rome Statute has created a new standard for international justice when it comes to investigate and prosecute sexual and gender-based violence as mass atrocity crimes. It also ensures gender balance at the International Criminal Court: recently last year, the five out of the six newly elected judges were female judges.

As March is the month celebrating women's international day, let us remember victims and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence in conflicts. Let us call on the need for universal ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute and in particular its gender provisions. First and foremost because the Rome Statute (RS) is so far the only international treaty that criminalizes and explicitly defines sexual and gender-based violence as crimes against humanity (article 7g) beyond the act of rape; as war crimes (article 8.2xxii) and to a certain extent as genocide (article 6d). To this regard, the Rome Statute is not only ensuring that women who are victims of the gravest crimes under international law have access to justice, but also sets new standards for national legal systems. I

think that the Rome Statute offers three main improvements in the fight against impunity for sexual and gender-based violence and therefore promoting women's rights overall:
- firstly by explicitly "defining" and criminalizing sexual and gender-based violence;
- secondly by ensuring victims' protection, participation and reparations;
- thirdly by recognizing sexual and gender-based violence as war crimes and crimes against humanity, not as acts collateral to war.

Indeed, the Geneva Conventions did not mention rape or other sexual and gender-based violence; they are mentioned as "violations to human dignity" and this has proven to be a huge gap in addressing the causes of sexual and gender-based violence and therefore in ending impunity for these crimes, especially in conflict and post-conflict situations, where the most vulnerable, particularly women and girls, are left with little or no protection. With no proper definition there cannot be proper action. It is in that sense, the Rome Statute is progressive, innovative as it recognizes sexual and gender-based violence in all its forms. More specifically, the Rome Statute recognizes rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced sterilization as crimes against humanity and war crimes.

The second improvement is in the specific provisions of the Rome Statute to ensure that witnesses may testify in closed hearings or through special means to protect their privacy; the confidentiality of victims will be protected throughout the proceedings and in published court documents; the Victims and Witnesses Unit of the International Criminal Court include experts on trauma related to sexual and gender-based violence and psycho-social care. Also, the Court cannot admit evidence of a victim or witness's prior or subsequent sexual conduct, or require corroboration of testimony concerning sexual violence, and requires special procedures for presenting evidence of consent to acts of sexual violence. Through the groundbreaking provisions of victims' participation in proceedings, well known in civil law jurisdictions but new to the international criminal sphere, women's voices can be heard in the courtroom, voices often overlooked in prosecutions.

The third advancement from the Rome Statute is that it recognizes sexual and gender-based violence as mass atrocities – mainly as war crimes and crimes against humanity, and not as a collateral act of war. This definitely sets a new tone in the fight of impunity for these crimes and reinforces the Women Peace and Security agenda.

As we just entered the 20th anniversary of the adoption of this landmark treaty, we would like to encourage all members of WFM-IGP to join our efforts in:

- Coordinating and reinforcing the support towards the universal ratification and implementation of the Rome Statute;
- Raising awareness and training on the gender provisions of the Rome Statute, as well as the United Nations Security Council's resolutions on Women, Peace and Security, in particular resolutions 1820 and 1889;
- Coordinating and reinforcing the support towards universal ratification and implementation of the Convention on the elimination of all forms of discrimination against women (CEDAW);
- Carrying-out an awareness-raising campaign on gender justice, and recognizing that sexual and gender-based violence is not a collateral act of war but crimes of war;
- Strengthening the working methods of the UN Security Council (UNSC) so to be more consistent and coherent on addressing and preventing mass atrocities;
- Mainstreaming the 1325 and RtoP agendas throughout all the decisions and resolutions of the UNSC.

The United States and Its Foreign Policy: Searching for the Lost Federalism

Michele Ballerin

There's a feature in the USA cultural life which has always amazed me, particularly in the way Americans perceive themselves and their own history: they are considerably proud of the first chapter of their adventure – the independence war against Great Britain –, while they pay a far weaker enthusiasm to the second – the Philadelphia Convention and the birth of the first federation in history, in 1787. Having conquered their independence by defeating the strongest army of that time with a scratch militia is one of the decisive elements which have contributed to found their common identity, and it's definitely not hard to understand the reason. Far paler is the representation that Americans have about themselves as the inventors of federalism. And that is what sounds weird.

Despite the American constitution has been taken as a model for a remarkable number of successive experiences, first in Latin America and Europe and then anywhere in the world, the value – quite universal – of the paradigm that it establishes seems to escape the US citizens, its trait as the best formula for what is, on balance, the most serious issue humanity has to deal with today: the cohabitation of seven billion people on a planet which is getting smaller and smaller (also known as "globalization"). I don't remember exactly when I was touched by this paradoxical thought for the first time: the inventors of federalism are not aware of the gift they've given to the world; they probably have never read Kant's *Perpetual peace*, or it hasn't awakened in them the slightest interest.

It might be simply the umpteenth excess of pragmatism in a people not loving to indulge in abstractions. But it is not all. Indeed, some macroscopic consequences originate from that, and nobody, among those above-mentioned seven billions, can escape: I'm referring to the American foreign policy.

There was no need of the Trump administration to realize that American foreign policy is without a compass, and, since many decades now, it has been proceeding gropingly in the darkness, like a truck with no brakes in a thick mist. The result of such a confusion is discouraging and it's under everybody's eyes. It's the show of the US pendulum incessantly oscillating between two options which are, at the same time, extreme and equally impossible: the claim to oversee the world order and that to opt out from it. Hegemony and isolationism are the two opposite utopias between which the American foreign policy makes a perpetual, inconclusive and sometimes ruinous coming and going, and the result is glaring: the United States hasn't found yet its role in the world, its specific vocation and, consequently, its mission. Briefly, it doesn't know yet what it is going to do as an adult.

Still, a third alternative does exist, and it is the Philadelphia experience itself to suggest it. The United States was born to teach the other nations on earth the technique of political integration among sovereign states, and, by that, of a durable peace among peoples. But it's not enough. The invention of federalism

is just half the work: the other half consists in applying it wherever is needed. The task the United States is called to accomplish is the construction, reinforcement and democratization of supranational institutions.

The topic is clear enough, and we can believe that when Americans will admit it they will also regain their proverbial ability to get enthusiastic, and the self-confidence they can't think themselves without. Their foreign policy will be put on two solid tracks and every American between New York and San Francisco will know why his flag is waving. It will be their big chance to get back being a beacon and a guide – as well as the *a posteriori* justification for so much Hollywood-dispensed rhetoric.

Since this option is the only rational one among the possible three, we should resist any temptation to consider it as utopian: sooner or later the United States will be forced to embrace it, because there is nothing else it can do, given that it can't rule the world and, on the other hand, it can't even step down.

But what would such a policy concretely mean? There are several directions in which this recovered goodwill could be canalized.

Just to start, the US foreign policy should abandon every reservation with regard to the European integration process. The attitude of the United States towards this phenomenon has always been ambivalent: favourable at the beginning, when there was to accompany the European continent in the phase of its post-war reconstruction and give to unification, with the Marshall Plan, the first powerful boost; seesawing in the following decades, when on the other shore of the Atlantic Ocean Europe was perceived, in turn, like a necessary partner, a useful vassal or an insidious competitor.

This ambivalence has been clearly embodied in the growing antagonism between the dollar and the euro, with the first feeling threatened in its role of international currency by the strength and the prestige of the second. Here again we can't see a wiser solution than a reform of the world monetary order, with a view to establish a reserve currency disjointed from the sovereignty of any nation, like Robert Triffin taught in the sixties relaunching Keynes' unheeded suggestion. And that would be another precise direction to move on, another cardinal point that the US foreign policy could assign to itself.

Today, Americans should have no more doubts that a strong and united Europe is the indispensable complement to any influence they aspire to exercise. And the same attitude is required towards every other attempt of political and economic integration in the world, be it in South America, Africa or Asia. All these processes should be stimulated and favoured.

Beside and above that, obviously, stands the United Nations, as the hub of any desirable balance in a stable and peaceful world, to which the creative energies of whoever dreams, for the future of humanity, peace and wellness, instead of war and misery, should be directed. There is no need to repeat here the list of reforms that should be worked on: the federalists have been doing it for decades, and the World Federalist Movement also exists to remind it. The road to go, as gradual as we want but clear, is the same that the Americans discovered in Philadelphia and that the Europeans have been trying to follow since 1950: the transfer of sovereignty from the national to the supranational dimension.

We can't deny that it's a grand scenario, although still hypothetical. Only one actor is still required: the American intellectuals. What are they busy with, what are they intent on, the

protagonists of the American culture? Which issue is being debated in the United States? It is a kind of mistery for us Europeans.

Some precedents do exist in the stars-and-stripes historiography: among these, the Spencerian John Fiske with his *American Political Ideas Viewed from the Standpoint of Universal History* and Benjamin Franklin Trueblood, translator of Kant and author of *The Federation of the World*. But we are talking about the 19th century. What about today?

I think that federalists should address a frank plea to the American *intelligentsia*, so that it starts a reflection about the only issue which is truly capital to it: the role of the United States in the 21st century. Going back to the source of national history, restarting from Philadelphia with the eye turned beyond their own borders, combining their original idealism with the only realism that is possible at present – world federalism: it seems to me that there are the conditions to start in the United States a new, great cultural season, which could culminate – with some luck – in the birth of an opinion movement able to influence the government. For the American nation it would be the definitive passage from adolescence to maturity: the true discovery of itself. Isn't the United States itself the country where the presence of a vast, influential federalist movement is required? This is the question, closed in a bottle, that we want to throw into the waves of the Atlantic Ocean.

I'm conscious that this message can sound a little too paradoxical in the time of Trump and Kim Jong Un, when the geopolitical balances seem to depend on who has got the bigger button… But, as we said, there's a limit to the will of nations, and it's the one which is imposed, ultimately, by their own interests in the medium and long run. No one wants to be in the shoes of the captain who steers the *Titanic* straight against the iceberg. No one wants to live in a world where any dictator, *raìs* or gang leader keeps his own nuclear weapon in his pocket, or in a world where climate keeps deteriorating until the point of no return. *Ergo*, the moment will come when the United States will have to take the responsibility upon itself. The good news is that, by then, there will be a user's handbook (the federalist thought), a specific project to be concretely realized (the world federation) and a reliable partner to do it with (the European Union) awaiting.

Tribute to Bernard Abel Lesfargues

Jean-Francis Billion

Bernard Lesfargues was born in 1924 at Bergerac in the Périgord region of southern France. He died at Mussidan, few kilometers away, on the 23rd of February, and even nearer to the house of his maternal grand-parents at Église Neuve d'Issac, where he decided to live after his retirement as *Professeur Agrégé* in Spanish at Lyons, at the beginning of the eighties. He died almost a year and some days after the death of his close friend from his youth, Jean-Pierre Gouzy, whom he had met in Paris where he had settled to follow the courses in *Khagne*. It was soon after, in 1945, that he adhered to the Institute of Occitanist Studies which had just been created after the Liberation. There he got acquainted with the future writer, linguist, University Professor and Occitan autonomist Robert Lafont. On the other hand, it was Gouzy who introduced him at the same time to Federalism, and together they founded a Federalist Action Committee before joining the French section of the European Union of Federalists (UEF Europe, founded in Paris, December 1946).

That period was also, for Bernard, the time of the first attempt to launch a Poetic Review and a Publishing Company, *The Notebooks of the blue Triton*, and Jean-Pierre would also be one of the contributors. It was also in this endeavor that, with Lafont, Bernard co-published an *Anthology of the young Occitan poetry*. Without this first venture which ended due to a lack of funds, the Éditions *Fédérop* would probably not have been founded in Lyons in 1975.

It was in the mid-1950s that Bernard went to set himself up in Lyons. There, he took a large part in Spinelli's Campaign for the European People Congress, and he got in touch more and more with the Italian Federalists, Altiero Spinelli and then Mario Albertini. With them, he spent himself without counting the cost for the Supranational European Federalist Movement (after the UEF Europe split in the mid 1950's), where progressively he met locally Bernard Barthalay (about 1963), Jean-Luc Prevel (about 1965) and myself (Autumn 1968), to speak of his youngest friends. During those years, according to the testimony of our Italian friend from Pavia Elio Cannillo, systematically he took up the Presidency at Basel (Switzerland) of the international meetings of the fraction (Federalist Autonomy) founded by Mario Albertini within the supranational MFE, after the end of the European People Congress. Bernard was also in charge of the editing of the Political Review founded by Albertini, *Il Federalista*, when it was published exclusively in French and under his responsibility from 1962 to 1974 (there would be another attempt for a French edition of the Review from 1984 to 1988, when he was progressively assisted by Prevel). In the summer of 1958 Bernard was also one of the founders of the House of Europe in Lyons, and probably he was his first Treasurer. Bernard was also one of the six candidates presented by the *Comité Lyonnais du CPE* (Lyonese EPC Committee) to the legislative elections for the *Assemblée nationale* (lower Chamber of the French Parliament) of 1958 in the constituencies of Lyons and nearby Villeurbanne. In the sixties, he played an important part in bringing closer the two regional branches of the Federalist Movement – the *Mouvement Fédéraliste Français – La Fédération* and the *Mouvement Fédéraliste Européen*, and he became one of the four signatories of the agreements after the events of May 1968, signed their re-unification in the *Union Européenne des Fédéralistes Rhône-Alpes* at

the beginning of the seventies, preceding and announcing the re-unification, at the European level, of the Young Federalists in the JEF, and then of the adults movements in the new UEF.

We may remember that Bernard was an excellent and sought after translator in many languages, also into Catalan and Italian. Quite recently we discovered that he was interested in Yiddish, and years before my wife Denise and myself were fascinated by his knowledge of Amerindian languages of Central America, when we went together to an exhibition about Mexico in the *Petit Palais* in Paris.

So it was in 1968, I was a young and still inactive member of the MFE since 1967, following my parents, that I met Bernard for the first time. On the advice of my Spanish friend, Jean-Paul Cortada, I took the direction of the *Rue des trois Maries* in Old Lyons, and there, an autumn evening, he appeared to me at the top of a stepladder, disheveled and covered with dust plaster; he was repainting the ceiling of the room that a few weeks later would become the *Librairie Fédérop* (a bookshop). Bernard was the President of the regional branch of MFE, but also the responsible of the South of France's (*Occitania*) Autonomist movement *Lutte Occitane*, and some of us were marked for life by his double engagement, Jean-Luc Prevel and myself especially.

From then on, we never left you, not even after your departure from Lyons at your retirement. You gave me too few lessons of Occitan reading, but you autographed to me your collection of poems *Ni Cort ni Costier* (published in Nîmes in 1974 by 4 Vertats) with a beautiful sentence "*Per Jean-Francis Billion, que non seria Occitan se non voleva l'estre*" ("For J.-F.B., who would not be Occitan if he didn't wanted to be").

I remembered you this quotation at one of our last meetings in early 2018. After the bookshop, the literary and cultural adventure went on, since with Pierre-Gilles Flacsu, an ex-federalist activist who by chance had to become your brother in law, I was with you one of the three co-founders of the Éditions *Fédérop*, even if,

as you recalled in an interview published in *Fédéchoses* some years ago, the foundation of the editions was first of all a personal adventure on the line of the foundation of the *Triton bleu*. The name *Fédérop*, which was difficult to accept at the beginning for some non-federalists friends, was not hiding our opinions!

Dear Bernard, I have deliberately insisted on our first meetings that preceded so many others, and more especially our weeks of holidays that with our children we regularly shared with Michelle and you at Église Neuve d'Issac, a few kilometers only from Montagnac-la-Cremps, where from now on we shall stay more and more often and for longer periods of time. Unfortunately, we shall arrive there late, too late, and it will be a long lasting reproach for me…

I found it impossible to recall your life as a militant federalist without presenting and insisting at the same time on your life as an author in Occitan and French, as a multilingual and first quality translator, and finally as an editor and a publisher, which for twenty years, due to the geographic distance, kept you away from the life of the tireless federalist you had been in the past. But you had not lost anything of your convictions, as we could see thanks to all the texts you have been sending us from time to time.

Dear Bernard, we shall not forget you and will do our best to go on with your fights and keep in touch with your family with all our affection. Thank you once more for the joy you have given me less than a month ago, when we went to visit you at your home before our last visits at Mussidan, when you expressed your regret because you had not been able to work with me at the revision of the volume about Albert Camus that the *Presse Fédéraliste* had just published last October; I would have liked so much to read you some extracts, as you had expressed the desire.

Bernard, rest in peace in that Occitan land that you have loved and celebrated so much.

A Change of Mentality: from Confrontation to Cooperation*

Federica Mogherini

I will get to the State of the European Union in a minute, but let me first spend a few words on the state of the world today, also because the two are clearly interconnected.

The state of the world today is a state of chaos, a confused proliferation of crises, where conflictuality and confrontation seem to prevail over rationality. And where patient, difficult, sometimes frustrating but vital work of building a common ground among players that have different views and different interests, seems to be an exercise of naïveté – in these confused, chaotic times.

And yet, it is exactly when things do not go well, that rationality, calm, predictability, respect, dialogue are most needed to avoid the worst case scenarios; to prevent conflicts to spiral out of control; to contain tensions; to preserve what is still working and delivering – as we are determined to do with the Iran Nuclear Deal.

I know that this is not the mood of our times. It seems that screaming, shouting, insulting and bullying, systematically destroying and dismantling everything that is already in place, is the mood of our times. While the secret of change – and we need change – is to put all energies not in destroying the old, but rather in building the new.

I have the impression that this impulse to destroy is not leading us anywhere good. It is not solving even one of the problems we need to face, and they are many. On the contrary, it is adding conflictuality to conflictuality.

What leads to solutions is the patient, respectful, rational, humble art of compromise, of building win-win solutions, where everybody's interests can find their own place; where you know that if something is good for your counterpart, it must not necessarily be bad for you.

This is, by the way, the history of our Union: when we found out that our neighbour is better off, it is also good for us. On the opposite, we need to move from the "I win/you lose" approach, to the common search for common solutions, because we do have common problems to face. We are – each of us - as strong as the weakest of our neighbours and partners is. The chain is as strong as the weakest of its rings is. And in this global world, there is no doubt that we are one, interconnected, global chain.

This change of attitude – from confrontation to cooperation – requires a strong, confident European Union. No other global player can work for this change of mentality. The European Union is today the point of reference for all those that are investing in peace, multilateralism, free and fair trade, sustainable development, fight against climate change, human rights and democracy, social economy – in a rules based global order.

This gives us a huge opportunity, probably much bigger than in all recent decades, as Europeans. But it also gives us a huge responsibility. So the question is, are we able, as Europeans, to fulfil these expectations that both of our citizens and our partners have of us?

What is the State of our European Union? I will be very clear and very frank: I believe the State of our Union is as strong as Europeans want it to be. "Europeans" means all of us: governments of Member States, National

Parliaments, local authorities, the business sector and trade unions, universities and media - all European citizens together. Because the EU is not a building in Brussels. It is the Union of all of us, and it is as good as we want to make it. I would say the state of the Union is as good as the state of Europeans is.

So the question is, do we want to invest in our Union? Then it works and delivers. Do we not want to invest in it? Then it turns into a dysfunctional labyrinth of far-away institutions. And when that happens, when we let the state of our Union be weak, it is the most absurd waste we make of the most powerful tool we have in our hands: our Union. Its state of health depends on all of us.

Go back with your memories to a couple of years ago. We were all discussing the end of the European Union. Many were saying that after the UK, others would have left the European Union. Our Union was, this time exactly two years ago, in a state of deep crisis. Then, last year, during the celebration for the 60th anniversary of our Treaties in Rome, 27 Heads of States and Governments recommitted in quite a solemn and at the same time profoundly true way to the relaunch of our Union. Because they knew, I believe, the only way to effectively serve their respective national interests, in today's world, was and is through our Union. They knew that it is not giving up sovereignty, but the only way to regain sovereignty in today's world. No country is big or strong enough to face the world of today alone: we can do it only together if we want to do it effectively.

And in this last year, the State of our Union has grown stronger – much stronger. Starting from the economy to our capacity to act together to manage with our external action the migratory flows, I give you just one example: in partnership with countries of origin and transit, and together with UN agencies, we have assisted more migrants to return voluntarily to their countries in the course of 2017 than in all previous years together.

But let me mention one other aspect where the state of our Union has grown much stronger in the last year: security and defence. Security and defence are probably the best example of the state of our Union today – at least if you want to see the glass half full. The idea of a European Defence Community dates back to the Fifties, as I know all of you here in this room know very well. But for over sixty years it was impossible to achieve, failure after failure, frustration after frustration and veto after veto. I remember very well in 2014 I was doing my confirmation hearing at the European Parliament. I said then that I believed that it was high time to fulfil the potential of our Treaties on defence. But back then most people told me that it was completely impossible, that the conditions were not there and the political will was not there. But political will depends on us, and us only. It is not an external factor. It comes from us. In fact, we made it. We took the most significant step ever to build the European Defence after sixty years of failures.

We started with a single command centre for our military training missions, in Brussels. It has been operational for one year now.

Then, with the Commission we launched the European Defence Fund, that will allow us by 2020 to invest one-and-a-half billion euros every year on defence research, and on our defence industry, to help Member States spend better, by spending together.

And for the first time ever in European history – I know that President Juncker mentioned it here this morning – with the Commission we have proposed to dedicate part of the next EU budget, in the Multiannual Financial Framework, to the European Defence, to support European Defence Industry and Research.

But it is not only this that we have done. We have, together with the Council, launched the Permanent Structured Cooperation on defence, using for the first time ever the provision of the Treaty that allows us to go with different

levels of engagement among Member States – testing somehow two speeds in the field of security and defence among Member States. And it worked.

Twenty-five European countries have committed to join forces on common projects, to provide troops and assets for our common missions, but also to speed-up their national decision-making and to share information among them.

We are now implementing 17 projects that are very concrete, from a new system for maritime surveillance, to a European training centre for our troops who intervene in case of a natural disaster in Europe, in our neighbourhood or abroad.

The range of security issues we face today is incredibly broad and only together can we develop all the capabilities we need, to protect our citizens and also to build peace. As we built, in these last 2 years, the first elements of the European Defence, we have also strengthened as never before our partnerships with NATO and with the United Nations. Because we see our strength as complementary to the strength of others.

The instruments we have set up in the field of security and defence have an immense potential. But, obviously, it is now up to us all to make full use of this potential. And again, it is a matter of political will, particularly from Member States. The work is a collective one – I would say a teamwork and it has been working exactly for this reason – and it is going on.

We are now focusing in particular on our civilian capabilities, and I have proposed to set up a new European financial instrument, the European Peace Facility, that would give us predictability to finance our civilian and military missions, but also to support our international partners in a much more efficient manner than the one we are having today.

All these initiatives that I have mentioned, taken together, make the European Union of security and defence real. It is a beginning, but it is a very good beginning. Something that two years ago was considered by everybody impossible to achieve, even in part.

Why did we manage? We managed, because there was political will, there was a sense of shared purpose, there was teamwork and there was a sense of responsibility. Everbody, every institution, every Member State, and every European institution contributed with its own part.

And so after decades, finally, today we can innovate together, we can buy together, we can plan and act together in the field of defence as Europeans.

Because, today, the European way has become the only effective way to peace and security. In a world where military means are sometimes needed, but never sufficient alone. Where security is never just a matter of traditional defence.

The European way to peace and security is something we have learnt in our daily work around the world; in Africa: where security needs the economy to flourish, and the economy works only if it is not threatened by criminal groups, terrorism or instability.

The European way to peace and security is something we have learnt in Afghanistan, in the Sahel or in Iraq: where we have learnt that if you want to build a strong, resilient, democratic, inclusive state, you need a professional army, but the professional army is just as important as professional judges, doctors and police.

The European way to peace and security is something we have learnt, as I said, in our daily work around the world when we have seen that security only comes with reconciliation. In Europe, we have a certain experience with reconciliation and overcoming old conflicts and wounds. A reconciliation process requires diplomacy, local development, and sometimes also a strong peacekeeping force.

Soft and hard power together, smartly and carefully mixed, with local ownership as the compass for any decision.

So, there is a lot we can be proud of. But I am not living on the moon and the state of our Union is clearly not only about security and defence.

President [of Italy, Sergio] Mattarella said it perfectly well yesterday "*Solidarity on the security plane, military integration, cannot be separated from the civil and political solidarity objectives*". Let me stress this: more common work on defence must be coupled with more common work on other issues, from migration to job creation. Not just out of solidarity, which is good in itself, but of self-interest, because the best way of serving our own interest is investing in our Union.

With the work we have done on defence, we have shown that with strong political will, with determination, with a certain stubbornness and a visionary approach and with, most of all, hard, patient and collective work, it is possible to make full and good use of our European Union. It is the demonstration that we can aim high, dream big and deliver beyond expectations. The state of our Union has become stronger in these last two years. And yet, it is challenged. Probably today more than ever before. I believe it is important that we and every single European citizen realise what we risk to lose and, on the other side, what we can achieve and the distance between what we risk and what we can. There is a very beautiful song that says "You only miss the sun when it starts to snow" – I am afraid we are getting to that point.

I believe that the decision is only ours. A collective responsibility, that calls on each and every of us, citizens of Europe, to invest in the most powerful tool we have to exercise our sovereignty: our Union.

President Macron's Call for a «Sovereign Europe »

Dusan Sidjanski

In the light of the EU's existential crisis, President Macron, a truly committed European, has proposed his vision for a "sovereign Europe". The bottom line is that the Union is not, or rather is insufficiently equipped with sovereign powers. Yet it is these very sovereign powers which are needed in order to effectively respond to the considerable threats hanging over the EU and the Eurozone. Particularly with regard to currency, foreign, defence and security policy, as well as migration. In our democracies all of these areas are subject to a political authority and parliamentary control. Especially the army and security forces. As the reform of the 27-member Union will be a more or less lengthy process, one could envisage taking immediate action by using "enhanced cooperation" in order to create a federative political core capable of giving a new impetus to all 27 Members States.

I   How can we overcome the global crisis?

1. The Eurozone and beyond

The European Union is experiencing a multifarious existential crisis. With a few slight variations and to differing degrees, there is a consensus regarding the threats and the main challenges with which the EU is confronted. On the other hand, there is no agreement on how to tackle these threats. Take for example the Eurozone: the question of its reform, of an ultimate way out of the crisis and of austerity measures which have taken a heavy toll on certain Eurozone Member States. For instance, the austerity imposed by Germany provoked a psychological war between the Greek and German media.

The issue of poverty and mounting inequalities, high unemployment and the public debt have undermined social cohesion and weakened democracy, not only in Greece but mainly in the Southern Eurozone countries. An essential question comes to mind: how were the United States able to rapidly overcome the crisis which they brought about, whereas the Eurozone in particular is struggling to attain the same economic level which it enjoyed before the crisis? And yet Merkel and Hollande both agreed that the failure of the euro would spell the end for the Union.

2. Internal threats

The resurgence of National Populism, of Euroscepticism and anti-Europeanism is often accompanied by a rise of far-left and far-right movements. Austerity has paved the way for an authoritarian drift in Central Europe (Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic). This surge has also taken hold in Austria, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and even in France where for a long time the National Front has been casting a shadow over the Union. History is repeating itself in the wake of the break-up of Yugoslavia and the growing divide within the Union between North and South, as well as between those Member States who respect democratic values and principles and those who have recently gone off course. Brexit has confirmed this tendency as does the separatist upsurge in Catalonia and Scotland.

The Union seems to have lost its way in the whirlwind of globalisation, faced with the influx of

migrants which has fuelled the Visegrad Group's sense of protectionism in refusing to admit those migrants passing through central Europe.

For a long time, the flood of migrants into Italy was considered to be Italy's responsibility whereas Greece was receiving aid from the Union. However, the lack of any European Asylum and Immigration policy is playing into the hands of the far-right parties. Apart from Germany, the 450 million European citizens are reluctant to host refugees and migrants despite the fact that their population is declining all over Europe, France being the exception. At the same time, the threat of islamist terrorism hovers over us, increasing the sense of insecurity. The fall of Raqqa cannot be seen to herald the end of the terror attacks. The Union is up against an ideological, religious and security war, which is being waged by fanatical groups and even individuals.

Simultaneously, the challenges are mounting in the form of organised crime and the threat posed by GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon) which abuse their monopoly to flout the rules of the game, while digital technology and the problems of cyber security are invading Europe and the world. Then there is America's international disengagement under Trump, the regional conflicts in the Middle East and the nuclear threat posed by North Korea, which are all generating a mood of suppressed fear and triggering a move towards a return of the Nation-State. On top of these threats there are the challenges linked to climate control, energy and unfair competition which all go towards creating an atmosphere of international disorder.

The spillover effect of the global crisis
These multiple threats point towards the absence or lack of sovereign powers within the Union, as well as the absence of a global vision, all the more essential since these crises, threats and challenges are increasingly interconnected

and interactive. By tackling one problem, this creates a ripple effect in other sectors, thereby causing a global crisis. On the other hand, apart from the case of the European Defence Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC), all the crises before "the great financial crisis" of 2008 were characterised by their sectoral nature. This is true for "the empty chair crisis" regarding agricultural policy and voting by qualified majority. Contrary to the idea that such ordeals make Europe stronger, I have observed a weakening of the Community spirit and commitment. In the current crisis Jean Monnet's strategy of integration sector by sector, which was to lead step by step to a political Union, has reached its limits. Hence the current dilemma: either take a "political leap" or accept the decline of the Union.

Going back to these different examples of a combination of crises, of changes to the political and environmental climate, and of innovation in digital technology, the only effective response is President Macron's proposal for a "sovereign Europe". Immediate action needs to be taken to provide Europeans with renewed hope and reverse the harmful "spilldown". This is a precondition for a general reform of the Union to be envisaged in the medium or long term and explains why several proposals advocate recourse to "enhanced cooperation" with a view to setting up a core group equipped with sovereign powers. The long-term survival of the euro is contingent upon the creation of a political authority. Whereas, to quote Brugman's expression, the euro today is a product of Europe's "back to front federalism".

II The new strategy

1. The Union is in urgent need of a political core
The future political Union is the key to the success of the monetary Union. This is what the Bundesbank maintained in 1992[1], followed in 1994 by the project of Lamers and Schäuble

calling for a "hard core" equipped with a government and a legislature. Personally I prefer the term "federative core" and I will never tire of reiterating the watchword: no single currency has ever existed without sovereign power. Yet the euro is incorporated within an economic mechanism deprived of a political framework. The study of numerous cases by Karl W. Deutsch's team concluded that successful federations were formed at the instigation of a federative core.[2]

The shelving of the "Schäuble plan" in the 1990s, followed by the rejection of the European Constitution by referendum in France and the Netherlands marked the beginning of a series of grave crises: the financial crisis imported from the United States in 2008, which morphed into an economic, social and even political crisis, eroding societal cohesion. The drift toward authoritarianism in Hungary and Poland is evidence of this as well as the rising influence of national populist and far-right parties in European democracies.

Moreover, the threats are mounting: the effects of austerity measures, the surge of nationalism, a wave of populist, even extremist and anti-European movements, as well as the fears aroused by the mass influx of migrants, by islamist terror attacks and neighbourhood conflicts. So many Damoclean swords hanging over the European Union. At the same time, globalisation combined with the rise of superpowers such as China and India, Russia's revival under Putin, as well as the destabilisation of the world order by President Trump and Brexit and even the wars in the Middle East are raising deep concerns, which are a wake-up call for the Union.

Some, including Macron, are calling for the reconstruction of the EU, whereas Merkel's meeting with the Polish government has confirmed the latter's desire to recover powers transferred to the Union. "European democratic conventions" will only be able to have a positive impact once confidence and renewed hope have been restored.

2. The Union in a state of emergency

It's time to admit that the EU is in urgent need of a dynamic federative core equipped with sovereign powers if it is to be revitalised, with other Members who so desire following the same path. In this respect, the Lisbon treaty provides for "enhanced cooperation", allowing for the creation of a vanguard political core group capable of responding to the accumulation of threats and ensuring the survival of the euro.

Incorporated within the Union, this core group would have at its disposal the same structures reduced in size to the number of its members: a European Council, a Council of Ministers and most importantly, an Executive and the ECB, the European Parliament composed of the 19[3] Eurozone members and a special Chamber of the Court of Justice. The core would have sovereign powers and its decisions would be taken according to the community method by qualified majority regarding monetary and economic affairs, but also in relation to external relations, security and defence, foreign military intervention or migration flows. This decisive move would ensure the survival of the euro, the definition of common strategies and the assignment of the means to implement them due to a specific budget. The details still need to be fine-tuned but the essential idea is to strengthen collaboration in a democratic structure incorporated within the Union.

As a result, the driving force inspired by this federative core would provide impetus to all 27 members by intensifying their "unity in diversity" in accordance with a federal outlook. It's up to France and Germany, together with Italy and other Eurozone States brave enough to do so to take such an initiative, thereby motivating all 27

Member States to follow their lead. It's time to cure the infantile disease from which the Union is suffering; ever since the failure of the EDC it has not been able to equip itself with a political project whereas today politics has replaced pure economics. This revival is what is needed for the European Union to recover its role as a beacon of democracy in our globally destabilized world. I am convinced that the very survival of our civilization depends on this. The creation of this core group within the Eurozone is a top priority faced with the disintegration of the European Union. President Macron's call for a "sovereign Europe" is a logical consequence of this sad reality.

With this in mind, we propose a two-step approach: 1) immediate action undertaken by a federative core within the Eurozone capable of breathing new life into the European Union; 2) a move towards reforming the Union in the medium term. The ultimate aim of these two initiatives is to establish a "sovereign Europe".

Moreover, confronted with the current wave of technological and digital innovation, of artificial intelligence, the Union is more than ever in need of a "High Ethics Council". Democratic values and principles, human rights and solidarity are called upon to find

their rightful place amongst all the activities carried out by the European Union. After a long period during which the Union's founding values have been marginalised by its economic and above all financial functions, the time has come to reunify these two complementary elements which constitute the originality of our European identity.

The political core would possess a holistic view, sovereign powers and the means required not only to ensure economic revival but also to effectively implement foreign, defence and security policy, particularly in the fight against terrorism, against the GAFA tech giants and tax evasion. By revitalising all 27 Member States, this dynamic core group will rekindle hope for a united Europe whose citizens are supportive of one another in a destabilised world in the grip of nationalist and populist extremist movements. Indeed, the economic crises, increasing inequality and poverty, are a breeding ground for authoritarian regimes in Europe, as well as throughout the world. Europe, a bastion of democracy and human rights, urgently needs to regain momentum and assert itself in the dialogue between cultures. The time has come to choose between allowing our European civilisation to either thrive or decline.

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[1] *Monthly Report of the Deutsche Bundesbank*, Princeton, February 1992
[2] K.W. Deutsch et al., *Political Community and North Atlantic Area*, Princeton University Press, 1957.
[3] The idea of a separate Parliament composed of the 19 Eurozone members would not only run the risk of reinforcing the East-West divide but, worst of all, might also bring about a split within the European Union.

Towards a New Architecture of the Euro Area

Alberto Majocchi

The paper "A Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform"[1] prepared by 14 Franco-German economists represents a major step forward in the debate on the problems and reform of the euro area – after the various contributions of the European Commission – and has strong political significance, in particular thanks to the contribution of Jean Pisani-Ferry, who was responsible for the programme during Emmanuel Macron's presidential campaign.

This paper addresses various issues related to the euro area, starting from proposals to complete the banking union aimed at breaking the vicious circle between the banking sector and public debt, such as introducing a limit to the concentration of national bonds in banks and the creation of a common deposit insurance. The authors are aware that this hypothesis must be handled with care, to prevent the proposal announcement from having devastating consequences, as happened in October 2010 when Sarkozy and Merkel announced their intention to involve the private sector in the resolution of the debt crisis.

However, the analysis and novelties of this paper focus mainly on fiscal architecture. The current fiscal rules are considered important but questionable in many respects. The deficit-reduction target has clear pro-cyclical effects. It is true that the deficit should be adjusted to take into account cyclical developments, but doing so is notoriously difficult and imprecise. The application of the rules is mainly linked to the imposition of fines, which are actually never used and which would aggravate an already difficult fiscal situation. However, rules are necessary not only to promote sound public finances at the national level, but also to prevent negative effects on the other members of the monetary union.

The first proposal put forward by the Franco-German economists is to replace the deficit limit with a ceiling on public-expenditure increases. Public expenditure should not increase faster, in monetary terms, than the long-term nominal income-growth rate, while it should remain below this rate in countries that need to significantly reduce their debt stock. Each year, in every country, an independent fiscal body should set a medium-term debt-reduction target, and a projection of the nominal income growth rate. The same body should define a growth path for the nominal net public expenditure, calculated by subtracting interest payments, unemployment benefits spending and discretionary measures aimed to change the tax structure (to avoid, for example, tax cuts that are not offset by compensatory expenditure-reduction measures).

Any expenditure exceeding the preset level must be financed by issuing *junior bonds*, i.e. securities that will be the first to be restructured in the event of debt reduction, to ensure their sustainability and that will have an automatic clause to extend their maturity if the country in question receives a loan from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM - the bailout fund). In addition, junior bonds will be less attractive as they will not benefit of a zero-risk rating, like the senior bonds held in banks' portfolios. Ultimately, this hypothesis will make the financing of excessive debt more expensive, thereby discouraging conducts that are not in line with the objective of deficit- and debt-stock reduction. An escape clause would anyway

allow countries to deviate from this rule under "exceptional circumstances". A hypothesis similar to the one outlined in the paper may be found in the draft Directive presented by the Commission on 6 December 2017.

The second important point in the paper by the Franco-German economists concerns the proposal to create an intervention instrument aimed at stabilising the economic cycle, which exceeds the provided limits on the use of EMS funds, available only in exceptional cases. What it essentially proposes is creating a stabilisation scheme that provides for extraordinary transfers – through a line in the EU budget or an EMS subsidiary – in the event of a recession affecting one or several euro area countries.

This is a reinsurance fund, which implies that the "first loss" deriving from an exogenous shock is to be borne by the country that has suffered it. Fiscal stabilisation is linked to the use of employment-based indicators, which are more directly ascertainable. In addition, the instrument should provide for an automatic transfer, equal to a fixed percentage of national GDP for every percentage point increase in the unemployment rate, or decline in employment or in the wage bill. Finally, the system should be financed by member countries through contributions based on GDP, the level of which will vary according to the likelihood of that country using transfers from the common reinsurance fund. These measures must serve as a disincentive to non-virtuous behaviors by Eurozone countries.

The third important proposal in the paper concerns the creation of a "Euro-area safe asset", backed by sovereign bonds. One significant contribution in this regard has already been made in a paper by the European Systemic Risk Board. The proposal provides the purchase by financial intermediaries of a diversified portfolio of sovereign bonds, excluding junior securities, and the use of these bonds as collateral for a security issued on the market in diversified, calibrated tranches, in the case of junior and mezzanine debt, so that the expected loss of the senior tranche – i.e. of the European Senior Bond (ESB) - is equal to that of a sovereign bond with an AAA rating. These ESBs would be very reliable instruments for banks, replacing sovereign bonds, and would reduce the volatility of the most vulnerable countries' bonds.

All these proposals are accompanied by a support for the idea put forward by Juncker, and taken up by Macron, to create a euro-area Finance Minister, who would be part of the Commission, chair the Eurogroup, oversee the application of tax rules, define the appropriate fiscal stance for the euro area as a whole, and represent it internationally.

What this excellent paper lacks is a development perspective, in particular the definition of an investment policy to facilitate the transition to a carbon-free economy. The Juncker Plan is a first step in this direction, but it must be accompanied by the funding of the External Investment Plan and the new Social Infrastructure Plan of the Task Force co-chaired by Romano Prodi.

An efficient investment plan for the production of European public goods, needed to carry out the Union's new tasks (internal and external security, environmental protection, renewable energy, cultural heritage, research and development), requires however adequate own resources at the Eurozone level. It is a matter of introducing, as proposed by Macron, a carbon tax – with an equivalent border tax on imported goods – and, in perspective, a web tax and a tax on financial transactions. These measures would ensure both the financing of an enlarged budget – controlled by the European Parliament –, with a specific line for the Eurozone countries, and the funding of Eurobonds issues to finance investments. In this way, an effective policy could be launched, making also use at last of the euro-area's enormous trade surplus.

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[1] "Reconciling Risk Sharing with Market Discipline: A Constructive Approach to Euro Area Reform", CEPR, *Policy Insight* No. 91, January 2018

For a Europe of the Regions

Henri Malosse

*"Someday this small island will surprise Europe",
said Jean-Jacques Rousseau, speaking of Corsica in
Le Contrat social.*

A verdict without appeal in favour of "the nationalists"

In spite of the high number of non-voters, the more than 56% of votes for the nationalist coalition in the elections in Corsica on December 10, 2017, indicate a support for their ideas and not a rejection of the local political class as it is wrongly believed in Paris. In that coalition, there is a cohabitation of several trends of Corsica's national movements, from the most radical to the most moderate, but all of them start from the postulate that there is indeed a Corsican people and nation who have a right to be recognized and exercise certain forms of sovereignty, from full autonomy to independence.

Europe, willy-nilly, is invited to take part in the debate

We must also underline that the nationalist coalition, in power at the Corsican Collectivity Executive since December 2015, has shown to be more active and interested in taking its place in Europe than the traditional political forces of the past. On this point, it is noticeable that permanent links have been woven with neighboring Sardinia, the Balearic Islands, Tuscany, Catalonia, the Basque country, but also with the Republic of Malta when the archipelago was presiding over the European Union. The President of Corsica's Executive Council, Gilles Simeoni, was rewarded for his European engagement with his election, at the beginning of 2017, to the Presidency of the Commission of the islands of the European Union's very influential Conference of Peripheral and Maritime Regions (CPMR).

The contacts and visits with Brussels have also multiplied. These commitments are worth being consolidated with operational and concrete links because today the Corsican economy and society are still turned exclusively towards Paris, though in fact they belong much more to the Mediterranean environment, and Rome is three times nearer.

Paradoxically, on his visit to Corsica on the 6th and 7th February, President Emmanuel Macron took the opportunity to underline this belonging to the Mediterranean world, even though he stressed it as an asset for France and he skipped over Europe during his visit, that is rather surprising since we know his commitment to Brussels. In fact, he only mentioned the European aids, thus resuming the tendency of the islanders and many others to consider the Union only for the grants that it can provide, forgetting its political role.

In fact, as in the case of Catalonia, the irruption of the European dimension in internal questions of the nations is not self-evident. The timid and frightened reactions of the European institutions on the Catalan question have shown it. It is necessary to understand that even today the European Union is, first of all, a coalition of States, in spite of Jean Monnet's famous sentence: "We do not unite States in a coalition, we unite peoples". In any case, the experience shows that today the better governed territories are those who allow the exercise of democracy at the local and regional level. Ever since the Cities of Plato up to the

Swiss Cantons it is not necessary to prove it any more.

The national level, especially in large countries such as France, is too far from the local realities. Although centralism may have its good points in times of crisis or conflicts, very often it appears heavy, inflexible and especially today unable to take into account the diversity of realities and the speed necessary in our society, which on the other hand with the use of the new information technologies allows the citizen to be informed and react in real time. This observation is even truer for a Europe that I wish to be federal, I mean endowed with the powers transferred from the States in domains such as foreign policy, defense, economy; however, it could not function correctly and be efficient but in the framework of a very large decentralization and autonomy of the territories.

Is the Europe of Regions a myth?

Even at the risk to offend or surprise somebody, I challenge those who, women or men, especially in the capitals of Jacobin countries such as France, brush aside the concept of the Europe of Regions. For example, Jean Claude Juncker made a mistake when on his visit to French Guyana, at the top of the Catalan crisis, he declared in a peremptory way, probably to please his French host, "How could we govern a Europe made of 350 entities?"He was forgetting the size of his own country, which is more similar to a small region than to a large country.

The Europe of Regions already exists

It has a constitutional form with the Committee of Regions, a consultative authority composed of 350 representatives of regions and local communities. Of course, it is a consultative body, but, since the Lisbon Treaty, it has been endowed with a right to "control subsidiarity", that gives it a statute similar to the one of a

genuine institution. In fact, the Committee of Regions may act in the name of a region belonging to a EU country which already has a full autonomy: if an autonomous region estimates that the EU, by its laws or acts, oversteps its prerogatives by acting in the region's competency domains, the Court of Justice may be appealed by the Committee of Regions acting in the name of this or these regions.

When the Parliament of Wallonia very nearly blocked up an EU international treaty

In 2016, when Wallonia opposed for several weeks the signing of the treaty between the European Union and Canada (Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement - CETA) and in this way delayed the signing of the agreement (and the coming of the Canadian Prime Minister Trudeau to Brussels), it was interesting to read the stunned commentaries of the French media, who were utterly bewildered: "How can 3,5 millions of francophone Belgians paralyze, alone, a treaty concerning more than 535 millions of Europeans! Europe 1 (the radio) was astonished, forgetting that the agreement to sign this treaty needed the unanimity of the 28, and that, for example, Malta and its 420.000 inhabitants could also have blocked the signature! They had forgotten that in Belgium, a Federal State with Regions and autonomous linguistic Communities in full exercise, the Prime Minister must get their agreement before engaging the federal government when the treaties concern the competencies of the Regions and Communities, as it is the case with the environment. The opposition of the Walloon Parliament was lifted only on October 30th , 2016, when the European Commission negotiated with Canada some declarations that somewhat cleared the questions of the environment and the labor rights, thus partly satisfying the demands of the Walloon deputies. In fact, we can thank the Walloon Parliament for underlining a certain number

of dangers connected with this agreement, that national governments had not identified. The ratification of the CETA Treaty by all the national parliaments (today 27) will be perilous, in spite of the improvements obtained by the Walloons.

In fact, the autonomous Regions can already be fully-qualified actors. This fact is little known, for it depends on national legislations, that are variable according to the degree of autonomy of the entities. If Belgium today is probably the country which is the most strict on the respect of regional and community competences, there are other examples too. The German federal government always associates the Länder to the debates of the Council of European Ministers on the matters of their competence, such as transportation, education, the environment. They, organized in "Conferences of Länder", represent Germany in turn, for example on matters of education. All German Länder have at their disposal delegations to Brussels at the European Union, which function as "mini-embassies".

One can also mention the autonomous Regions of the Azores and Madeira in Portugal, which are allowed to directly implement European laws in their own legislations, without going through the Parliament of their national State when they concern matters of their own competence.

Tomorrow a Europe that will allow the emancipation of the most autonomous territories?
Today it is the question posed by the case of Catalonia, and that could be a way to solve it, as well as, further on, it might be a rough draft for the discussions which are going to start between Paris and Corsica.

In fact, in a reformed European Union with a federal or confederal character one could well conceive that in the framework of a more substantial subsidiarity there may be space for autonomous territories endowed with broadened competences, as is the case today for the Regions and Communities of Belgium, the Portuguese territories of the Azores and Madeira, the German Länder, some Italian Regions… Although "trivialized", the strengthening of the autonomy of Corsica or Catalonia would no longer appear as a "casus belli" with the Nation-States, but a salutary and beneficial evolution toward a governance closer to the citizens. Of course, different national approaches may freely express themselves according to the history, geography and also identity of the peoples. Without hurry or forced marches, this evolution could in fact concern almost all the countries of the Union. For example, in this way even the small island of Gozo in the Maltese archipelago could get more autonomy according to the wishes of some of its representatives.
So, one could imagine that some particular fields such as the environment, education, transports, a part of the tax system, healthcare, regional development may be recognized as territorial competences in the Union.

With a reappraisal of their regal powers (justice, police, social solidarity), could not the Nation-States, rather than becoming weaker, regain efficiency and legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens?
This way a part of the activities of the Union in the fields of energy, transports, the organization of healthcare, the support to enterprises and innovation would be insured by the cooperation of entities which could be the States, the Regions and the actors of civil society.

The institutional architecture of such a Europe could leave room for choice to fully autonomous Regions. With a European Parliament with

wider powers, a European Executive elected by that Parliament and unified (fusion of the posts of President of the Commission and that of the Council, as suggested by Jean Claude Juncker) would exist as an authority of co-decision, a Senate replacing the Council of Ministers, that would be either only a representation of the States, or enlarged to the representatives of the territories on the fields of their competences. One could imagine, in this case, that the Committee of the Regions would delegate in it representatives with a right to vote.

Then let us make a positive reading of the events in Catalonia and Corsica. We should not consider them as dangers for a breakup, but as a stage in the building of a Europe that will be nearer to its citizens, respectful of the various identities which compose it, and at the same time stronger for concentrating on the problems of the planet.

Translated by Joseph Montchamp

Multi-Level-Federalism as a Principle to Solve Problems in Europe and to Increase the Acceptance of European Integration

Otto Schmuck

I. The advantages of federalism

Since the Second World War, people like Altiero Spinelli were strongly committed to the idea of European unification based on the principle of federalism, and the arguments are still convincing:

- First of all, peace keeping: The concept of independent nation states has failed, European integration paved the way for more than 70 years without war;
- Economic advantages: The positive effects of the internal market with open borders, the Euro and the free movement of persons, goods, money and services are obvious;
- Friendship and good neighborhood: The people in Europe want to communicate, to travel, and to learn and to use different languages.

But those advantages can only be fully obtained when Europe is organized in a federal way. The general advantages of federalism compared to a centralized political system are well known:

- decentralization of power ("checks and balances")
- policy making close to the citizens, and at the same time the possibility to set common rules where and when necessary
- more identification with the political system, due to the fact that voters who are in opposition to the government at the upper level may support a governing party at the lower level
- possibility to try out and to test new political solutions and concepts, and as a result a competition of the best solutions
- chance for the formation and recruiting of political personnel with solid political and administrative experience at the lower levels.

II: Federalism as a general rule and principle for all political levels

Federal systems, generally, are characterized by a democratic decision making with strong parliaments, majority voting, and the rule of law. Moreover, they need accepted common values and solidarity.

Federalism is a general principle which can rule at all political levels – from the local and the regional up to the European level; in a long term vision, it can even be applied to the world level. The question is deciding at what level problems can be tackled best: for example, local and regional planning, culture and education could be managed at the local and regional level, social welfare at the national, and trade policy at the European level. In an ideal world, peacekeeping as a global problem would be the task of the United Nations. But as we are far from a world federation, security, in the European case, will remain for the foreseeable future the task of the member-States and of the EU.

III. Multi-level federalism - The relationship EU - member states - regions

The strengthened cooperation of all political levels has become an important feature of the European Union. The reasons of this are manifold: the EU and the nation-states alone do not have the power and the effectiveness to solve important political problems. At the same time, there is an increase in international interdependencies and direct contacts of actors at various political levels.

As a result, the European Union is often characterized as a system of multi-level governance, with a clear predominance of the nation state. But this predominance has diminished, and today we can see a colourful picture of territorially variable, functionally specific, overlapping, non-hierarchical networks. The decision-making process evolving in the EU gives a key role to national governments, with a certain influence of subnational governments in selected areas.

Those features demonstrate that the European Union today is not a well-structured multi-level federation, but it shows nearly all the elements of a federation. The EU-Treaties refer primarily to the relationship between the member-states and the Union. At the same time, they include a multitude of provisions that make clear that the European political system is not limited to that relationship. In many policy fields – like the protection of the environment – only shared competences between the EU and the member-states are suitable to the existing problems, and the regions and the municipalities have to be included in order to implement the decisions taken. Moreover, subsidiarity and the idea that decisions should be taken as close as possible to the citizens, are guiding principles of the EU.

Important political aims – like those of the Europe-2020 strategy (increasing the employment rate, increasing combined public and private investment in R&D, climate change and energy targets, reducing school drop-out rates, increasing the share of the population having completed tertiary education, lifting at least 20 million people out of the risk of poverty and social exclusion) - can only be achieved if they are supported and implemented by all political levels – European, national, regional and local.

In the founding Treaties of the EU, the regions were only mentioned as objects of politics (see the Preamble of the Treaty on the functioning of the European Union: *"….anxious to strengthen the unity of their economies and to ensure their harmonious development by reducing the differences existing between the various regions and the backwardness of the less favoured regions …").* But linked to the completion of the internal market in 1992 - with far reaching spill-over effects to many other political fields, like social and environmental policy and even education and culture –, regions successfully made demands to have a say in those fields of European politics where they are directly affected in a certain way. And they had good arguments for doing so: the regions and the local authorities are directly influenced by European decisions, and moreover they are to a large degree responsible for the implementation of those decisions.

The Treaty of Maastricht (1992) was a breakthrough for regional influence: the Committee of the Regions was established, the principle of subsidiarity was introduced with a reference to the regional and local level (*"…the Union shall act only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, either at central level or at regional and local level …."*) and the provision *"decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen…"* include - from a regional perspective - all levels of policy making.

Today there are several means and instruments for the regions to influence EU policy making:
- Committee of the Regions
- regional Ministers in the Council
- subsidiarity control

- right to take action before the Court of Justice
- the regional offices in Brussels.

Due to their closeness to the citizens, the regions may act as antennas and transmission belts for the European level. This can positively contribute to the acceptance of European decisions. Moreover, regions and in some member countries local authorities are responsible for schools and universities. They can actively promote European topics in class rooms and curricula, and they can support exchange activities of citizens, especially of young people.

IV. Regionalization as a tool to decrease regional conflicts

Regionalization is one of the continuous features in all EU-member-states. From the citizen's perspective, European integration and regionalization can be viewed as complementary processes: on the one hand, power goes further away from the lower level, on the other hand power comes closer to the citizens.

The EU, rightly, has not the competence to interfere into the internal structure of the member states. Of special importance are the provisions of Art. 4 of the Treaty on European Union: *"The Union shall respect the equality of Member States before the Treaties, as well as their national identities, inherent in their fundamental structures, political and constitutional, inclusive of regional and local self-government"*.

The internal structure of the member states is quite different. Some of them are federations with quite powerful regions, with legislative power and state quality. In other member states, the regions have only administrative tasks. Moreover, in some member states there are autonomous regions as special cases. Normally their status was negotiated as a result of serious conflicts with the central state. As a result, there is a multitude of sizes, difference in competences and administrative

capacity at the regional level. Besides strong regions with legislative powers, there are purely administrative regions and very small "regional" Member-States, like Malta, Cyprus and Luxemburg.

It is true that the EU has not the right to interfere into the internal structure of the member-states, but at the same time the structure and the politics of the EU affect directly and indirectly the regions: the EU's regional policy strengthened the administrative and financial capacities of the regions, even in centralized member states. European integration offers regions a possibility to play an active role at the European level. Regional and local representatives are members of the Committee of the Regions, and many regions have established liaison offices in Brussels.

Moreover, the EU may prevent the coming up of regional conflicts and may contribute to their solution. History shows that the internal market, with its aim to open the borders between the Member States, contributed to resolving regional conflicts especially in cases where regions have been divided by national borders, like in the Tyrolean, the Basque or the Irish case. Moreover, the European Union guarantees fundamental rights based on shared values. This regime gives the regions a stable framework and gives protection against possible attacks of national governments.

V. Regionalism does not mean separatism

Separatism is not and cannot be the aim of regionalism in Europe. One of the predominant aims of European integration after WWII was – and still is – to frame the influence of independent nation states and to draw back the dangers of an exaggerated nationalism. The creation of new member states in the context of European integration would be a perversion of the founding ideas.

Especially in bigger member states, the existence of powerful regions can contribute to peace, conflict solving, good governance and to

a better implementation of the taken decisions. Moreover, their active participation can contribute to a higher degree of acceptance of European integration as such. Therefore, regionalism is positive, especially if it is organized within the member states in a federal form, with regions with equal rights. Unbalanced regionalism with differentiated sets of competences and rules in various autonomous models may create conflicts and rivalry.

The nation states could have a strong position in a federal Europe, but their capacity to act would be limited according to the accepted rules and procedures. At the same time, the status of the regions, including their right for self-government, is accepted by the EU, and the EU procedures offer a certain influence for the regions in the European decision making, and gives opportunities to act at the European level. It is neither the aim nor a promising concept to create a multitude of small new nation states within the EU. This would be ineffective and costly and it would have serious negative consequences on the EU.

Transnational Lists: a False Good Idea

Pierre Jouvenat

It is generally thought that only transnational lists can give elections to the European Parliament a real European dimension. However, there exists another alternative which is more likely to be approved by the Council and which corresponds to the long-term federalist vision. This would be attributing all of the votes to European political parties while maintaining national quotas, national and regional constituencies.

The dangers and limits of transnational lists
Beyond the arguments invoked by the opponents of the idea (two-level Parliament, MEPs without any real constituents, the potential favouring of large member states), the system of two votes results in a coexistence of European and national-level constituencies that is in no manner comparable to the prevailing electoral system in German Bundestag elections.

This system would present a remarkable risk of misinterpretation by the voters. A voter could think he would vote "European" (for candidates presumed to have a European vision) in the transnational constituency only, and "national" (for candidates presumed to defend national interests in Brussels) for the vast majority of seats that are determined in the national constituencies. This could only reinforce the national character of the election, in direct contrast to the objective pursued. One has to admit that only a limited number of MEPs could be elected through transnational lists, rather than all of them. Would we want closed party lists comprising hundreds of names?
Moreover, having two lists, one featuring European and the other national parties, would perpetuate the lamentable distinction between the two. Indeed it could present them as opposites, while we should instead develop synergies and facilitate the emergence of transnational parties.

For a long-term vision of a European electoral system
No federal state has a national-level constituency, not even the tiny Switzerland. The reason is simple: a political family is normally represented by a single party, present at all levels of the federation. In accordance with the federal institutions, the parties themselves are also organised according to federal principles. The level of decision-making and the actions of the parties go hand in hand.

In a federation, no matter what the level of decision-making, all electoral activities are undertaken in local constituencies by the corresponding organs of the parties. If we believe that the EU should also, in the long term, have its own transnational partisan system, all electoral reforms should aim towards that objective, rather than doing it disservice by risking further divisions between the existing levels of the parties, as transnational lists would undoubtedly do. In the short term, to the extent that the distinction between European and national-level parties exists, in European elections it should be the European-level parties that are in the frontline throughout the entire process.

Put the European parties in the frontline for all seats
In the current party system, it would be preferable to attribute all seats to European parties, for at least seven good reasons:

1. The whole electoral process becomes a joint undertaking of the European party and its national-level partners. Europe-wide campaigns are conceived and coordinated at the European level, but implemented in a decentralised manner by national-level parties which take care of the logistics. This would reinforce synergy within political families.

2. This way, electoral campaigning would inevitably be centred around European issues and platforms. Campaign materials and voting ballots, issued under the aegis of the European parties, would inform voters about which national party or parties have their support. This would be opposite of the system that has prevailed thus far.

3. A German citizen, for example, would not vote for CDU, but for EPP. This would be guaranteed to have a psychological effect. An excellent way to stop voting on the national governments in place, even with national-level constituencies. The voters would finally realise which issues are at stake in the election, and that for the elections to all seats.

4. The voters would vote for candidates based nearby, whom they are likely to know. Even if an MEP represented the entirety of EU citizens, as an elected official they would have to be accountable to their electorates, which could only happen in a local constituency. A limited number of well-known candidates would render preferential voting, or even a closed list system, possible. Within the system of national-level constituencies, one could explore the possibility of voting for a candidate living in another country.

5. The seats in the Parliament would be allocated according to the electoral performance of European, not national-level, parties, according to the method of "double proportionality". This

would reduce, to the extent that it's feasible, the dependence of MEPs on their national-level organisations. The MEPs would henceforth be associated with a given European party rather than a multitude of national-level parties. The Parliament would gain legitimacy from this.

6. The same electoral procedure would apply to all MEPs. The homogeneity of the Parliament would be preserved.

7. Lastly, this alternative to transnational lists should meet with less resistance in the Council. National quotas are preserved and the states retain their prerogatives related to the electoral process, in the absence of the much-awaited "uniform procedure" provided for by the Treaties. Indeed, how could the member states refuse, in the context of European elections, the idea that the European-level parties should be in the frontline?

What about Spitzenkandidaten?
Of the objectives of transnational lists, only one could not be reached: the institutionalisation of the Spitzenkandidaten system. However, in the light of the position taken by the Council's legal service, we should consider this question separately and explicitly. Before that, the candidates for Commission presidency could profile themselves like they did in 2014 with known success.

In summary, making the European elections more European isn't a matter of constituency. Rather, it depends on who sends which message to the voters. The ultimate objective being the establishment of transnational federal parties, the immediate priority has to be the Europeanisation of national-level parties, which remain best placed to provide a basis for local and citizen representation in Europe: a bottom-up rather than a top-down approach.

Translated by Juuso Järviniemi

Launch at ICC of Civil Society Forum to Commemorate the 20th Anniversary of the Rome Statute

On February 15, 2018, the International Criminal Court (ICC) (www.ICC-CPI.int) hosted the launch of the Coalition for the ICC's commemoration (www.CoalitionForTheICC.org) of the 20th anniversary of the Rome Statute (https://goo.gl/TkmP61) – the Court's founding treaty – with an Open Forum at the Court's seat in The Hague, The Netherlands. More than 280 persons attended the event, including protagonists of the Rome Statute's adoption, ICC officials, representatives of states, regional and international organizations, and civil society.
"It is a great pleasure for me to receive at the ICC so many of those very same people who worked so hard to make this Court possible", said the President of the ICC, Judge Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, calling the adoption of the Rome Statute "one of the biggest achievements of recent decades to advance the rule of law, a "revolution" according to some".
This event recognizes the role of the variety of stakeholders involved in the adoption of the Rome Statute – states, regional and international organizations, and civil society, and aims to spur a global dialog on advancing justice for atrocities", said the Convenor of the Coalition for the ICC, William R. Pace. "We call on all actors in the international system, organizations and individuals to organize 20th anniversary events throughout 2018 to raise awareness of this historic treaty and organization, and commit to taking strides towards universal ratification and cooperation with ICC decisions, such as arresting wanted persons. Let us eliminate war and impunity for mass violence and repression". (*j.p.c.*)

The 20th Anniversary of the ICC Commemorated in Buenos Aires

On April 9th, the Conference "The International Criminal Court: twenty years of the adoption of the Rome Statute" took place in the Salón Libertador in the San Martin Palace, in Buenos Aires, Argentina. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, Jorge Faurie, introduced the event and mentioned Argentina's role as one of the first countries to ratify the Rome Statute, claiming that the Court constitutes an essential tool in order to fight impunity against the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole. The Minister of Justice, Germán Garavano, discussed the importance of institutionalizing the Court, in order to avoid immunity from the law and stressed the threats that the region is facing. The system of the Rome Statute represents a remarkable improvement for the international criminal justice, aimed to bring justice to the victims, punish the perpetrators and contribute to guarantee more stable and pacific societies. He also mentioned the initiative of creating a Latin American and Caribbean Criminal Court Against Transnational Organized Crime as one of the projects that aims to fight organized crime on a regional level.
Subsequently, some influential personalities gave lectures: Fatou Bensouda, Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC); Fabricio Guariglia, Director of the Prosecutions Division of the ICC; Felipe Michelini, Member of the Executive Board of the Trust Fund for Victims, and Silvia Fernandez de Gurmendi, former President of the ICC.
Important members of COPLA also attended the event: Fernando Iglesias, Argentine Deputy; Camila Lopez Badra, Executive Director of Democracia Global; Clara Subirachs and Martina Shearer, COPLA Department of the Ministry of Security. The event was also attended by judges, prosecuting attorneys, deputies and consular representatives as well as other officials. (*c.l.b.*)

A World Parliament: Governance and Democracy in the 21ˢᵗ Century

Nicola Vallinoto

"A World Parliament: Governance and Democracy in the 21ˢᵗ Century", authored by Jo Leinen, MEP, and Andreas Bummel, director of UNPA Campaign, has been published by Democracy Without Borders on 11 April 2018. In 400 pages, the book describes the history, today's relevance and future implementation of the idea of a democratic world parliament as centerpiece of a peaceful, just and sustainable world community. For the first time, there is a detailed account of the efforts for the creation of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. As William Pace underlines, 'In a time of dangerous and regressive political forces, Leinen and Bummel have given us an outstanding atlas of hope – and a roadmap for the survival of humanity and democracy.'

In the introduction, the authors declare that "The direct and complex interconnections mean that the actions of every individual, no matter how apparently insignificant,

impact on everyone else. Humanity, taken in aggregate, now shares a common fate. We have the means to destroy our highly developed human civilization." And further on they remember the reader that "All people are part of a global community and if our civilization is to survive, all of mankind must unite". The same conclusion emerging by the American disaster movie "Geostorm", whose final quote is «One planet, one people. As long as we remember that we share one figure, we will survive.»

This book is the outcome of the authors' longstanding concern with the topic of a world parliament and is based on intensive research work over many years. As they stated, it is not a neutral consideration of the issue, but rather a passionate plea. Bummel and Leinen are convinced of the necessity of a democratic world parliament. To write a neutral book was not their intention, nor would it even have been possible for them because in 2007 they were co-founders of the international campaign for a parliamentary assembly at the United Nations, which is now endorsed by thousands of politicians, former UN officials, distinguished scholars, cultural innovators, representatives of civil society organizations, and many committed citizens from over 150 countries.

The book is divided into 3 parts: past, present and future of the idea of a world parliament; "its history and pioneers", "governance and democracy in the 21st century", and "shaping the future: the design and realization of world democracy".

In the first part, you can learn the first steps of the idea of a world parliament. "One of the founding principles on which the idea of a world parliament is based is that the entire Earth must be comprehended as the home of all human beings. The history of

cosmopolitanism is usually traced back to the Greek philosopher Diogenes of Sinope (ca. 400 to 323 BCE), who, when asked about his home city, is supposed to have answered that he was a *'kosmopolitês'* – a citizen of the world. Cosmopolitan thought is also found, and from very early on, beyond the cultural borders of ancient Greece, in India and in China. For example, in the collection of Old Tamil poetry 'Puṟanāṉūṟu', which is part of Sangam literature from the period between 100 BCE and the fifth century, it is said in a poem by Kaṇiyaṉ Pūṅkuṉṟaṉ that 'every country is my country, every man is my kinsman'. The Hindu Upanishads, which are in part much older, and other ancient Indian Sanskrit texts contain the philosophical concept 'Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam', which in Sanskrit means 'the whole world is one family'. In the 'Book of Rites', one of the five classics of the Confucian canon, which are derived from the teachings of the Chinese philosopher Confucius (551 to 470 BCE), can be found the idea of the 'Great Unity', according to which the world should be shared equally and harmoniously by all.

Cosmopolitan thinking reached a highpoint in the philosophical work of Immanuel Kant. In the essay 'Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Point of View', published in 1784, Kant outlined, following social contract theory, how world history was leading to 'the civic union of the human race' under a 'lawful constitution'. It is in Kant's philosophy that the idea of a world parliament is implied for the first time.

In the course of the Enlightenment, from the middle of the 18th century onwards, an 'unprecedented enthusiasm for cosmopolitanism' spread across Europe and North America, as Coulmas writes. Diogenes' claim that he was a citizen of the world became a programmatic statement of the era, repeated by Thomas Paine, David Hume, Voltaire and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing among others. Benjamin Franklin, for example, expressed the idea in 1787 already that the new American federal constitution might function as a model for a 'federal union' in Europe.

It was an expression of the cosmopolitan revolutionary spirit of the time when, on 26 August 1792, the National Assembly awarded French citizenship to seventeen foreigners who had rendered outstanding service to the Revolution, including Jeremy Bentham, Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, Thomas Paine, Johann Heinrich Pestalozzi, Friedrich Schiller and George Washington. Among those honoured was Anacharsis Cloots, born in Kleve in Prussia but with Dutch family roots. Like Paine, Cloots lived in Paris, and had been an active member of the Jacobin Club since 1789. In September 1792, again like Paine, he was elected to the National Assembly, and was called on from time to time to help draft the Constitution. It is remarkable that Cloots, the first person to explicitly formulate the idea of a world parliament, was not a philosopher but a revolutionary.

Under the slogan 'Peace through arbitration', the 'Inter-Parliamentary Union' was founded in 1889 in Paris, initially with the name 'inter-parliamentary conference on arbitration'. It was the first international union of national parliamentary delegates. Very soon it was working on models for a standing international tribunal of arbitration. An early highpoint was the annual conference in Budapest in 1896, when 250 parliamentarians took part and approved proposals for submission to the European governments by the administrative office of the organization.

At the first Hague Peace Conference, it was

agreed that a court of arbitration should be established for the voluntary resolution of international disputes, and the Hague Convention with respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land was issued. This document stipulates, among other things, that in the event of war, civilians and civilian establishments are to be spared to the greatest extent possible; and in an annex it forbids the use of chemical weapons. The court of arbitration is not a standing court for the judgement of cases, but an administrative bureaucracy which is available when needed to enable temporary tribunals or investigative commissions to be set up quickly and easily. Overall, the Hague Peace Conference and its outcome were judged a success by the inter-parliamentary movement.

In the 1939 book 'Union Now', Clarence Streit, originally from the German Palatinate but an emigrant to the USA in 1911, bemoaned the lack of cooperation between the democratic countries, who in the international political sphere behaved like autocracies, and proposed a political union of democracies as a counterweight to the fascist dictatorships. This would begin with the USA, Great Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, and with the gradual accession of new members would ultimately grow to a universal world organization. Streit's book became a bestseller, translated into many languages, which gave new impetus to the idea of a supra-national federal union. In many free countries, new groups were established to press for the idea of supranational integration. In 1939, the organization 'Federal Union' was founded in the USA, with Streit as its chair; it advocated as a first step a union between the western democracies, and it is still active today under the name 'Streit Council for a Union of Democracies'.

The issue of federalism had long played an important role in some resistance movements. In Italy, there had been a tradition of federalist thinking since the First World War. In the '*Ventotene Manifesto*' of 1941 the Italian anti-fascists Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi set out the goal and ideal of a federal European state. They denounced the 'ideology of national independence' as the root of the formation of totalitarian states and the outbreak of wars. The principle of non-intervention as adopted by the League of Nations had proved absurd, leaving each nation 'free to choose the despotic government it thought best'. And they were already looking beyond Europe. 'Once the horizon of the Old Continent is passed beyond,' runs the text of the Manifesto, written during their imprisonment, 'and all the peoples who make up humanity embrace in a grand vision of their common participation, it will have to be recognized that the European Federation is the single conceivable guarantee that relationships with American and Asiatic peoples can exist on the basis of peace cooperation; this while awaiting a more distant future, when the political unity of the entire globe becomes a possibility.'

Looking ahead to the post-war order, the founder of the Ford Motor Company, Henry Ford, called for the creation of a world parliament directly elected by worldwide vote 'to put the world on a peace basis'.

Twenty prominent figures, including the Nobel Prize winners Albert Einstein and Thomas Mann, the philosopher and author Mortimer J. Adler, the former US Supreme Court Judge Owen J. Roberts and US Senator William Fulbright, published a joint statement on 10 October 1945 making the same point. 'The first atomic bomb destroyed more than the city of Hiroshima,' they wrote. 'It also exploded our inherited, outdated political ideas.' Since the San Francisco

Charter upheld the absolute sovereignty of rival nation states, it was similar in spirit to the Articles of Confederation of the thirteen original American republics. 'How long will the United Nations Charter endure? With luck, a generation? A century?', they asked. But it was not enough to rely on luck. 'We must aim at a Federal Constitution of the world, a working world-wide legal order, if we hope to prevent an atomic war.

After a long and articulate overview on the evolution of the idea of a world parliament, in the final chapter the authors tried to show that global democracy is not only necessary but possible. But it will not come about by itself, but only as a result of a global movement's political action. The process of structural transformation into a world democracy will take a long time. Meanwhile there are countless acute problems that require immediate attention. Nevertheless, it would be a fatal error – Bummel and Leinen underline – not to put our energies into the necessary long-term transformation for that reason. Short-term thinking will not bring about an evolutionary leap forward, and will lead us further down a blind alley. A fulfilling future for humankind in harmony with nature is possible. Humankind will finally be able to develop and deploy to the full creativity and energy, and in a productive way, for the optimal benefit of all people and of all life on earth. This dream can become reality. It must become reality – the authors stress –, if humankind is to have a future.

Concluding we can say that this book is an extraordinary and valuable contribution to push activists and scholars of international democracy to work for implementing a global democratic constitution able to manage the big issues facing humanity, such as war, climate change, poverty, injustice, migration, terrorism and rule of law.

Regional Integration and Democracy in Africa

Lucio Levi

K. G. Adar, G. Finizio, A. Meyer
Building Regionalism from Below. The Role of Parliaments and Civil Society in Regional Integration in Africa
Bruxelles, Peter Lang, 2018

This book is part of a line of research dedicated to the democratization of international institutions and specifically it studies the process of democratization of regional and sub-regional organizations formed on the African continent after decolonization, and especially after the end of the Cold War. The work is made up of contributions from subject specialists, almost all of them from Africa, who therefore have first-hand knowledge of the region's reality. The aim of the research is to offer the most exhaustive overview of the ongoing democratization processes. An appreciable goal has been reached: to describe the achievements and to illustrate their limits. The results are meager, because the governments hold firmly in their hands the control of the processes of regional integration, and leave very little space to the international parliamentary assemblies. The latter have exclusively advisory powers, and where the treaties have recognized their legislative powers (as in the case of the EALA, the East African Legislative Assembly),

they are weakened by the veto power of the Council, the intergovernmental body in which the Heads of Government sit. At the same time, governments oppose a structural resistance to recognizing the proactive role of civil society organizations, which have also become increasingly important players in the international post-Cold War and globalization context. Furthermore, none of these assemblies is elected by direct universal suffrage, such as the European Parliament, although this objective was indicated in the founding treaties of the African Union, CEMAC and ECOWAS. Finally, the operational capabilities of these assemblies are limited by the lack of financial resources.

Faced with such poor results, a question is to be asked: why invest intelligence, time and resources in a project of this nature? One answer can only come from a comparative view, which allows to situate the process of democratization of African regional organizations in the global context and takes the EU as the institution that has gone further than any other in the realization of the goal of international democracy. Enlightened by this perspective, research can reveal its usefulness (and the authors should highlight it), because it can show that:

a) the process of democratization of international institutions has global dimensions and has begun to affect Africa, even though it is the most backward continent in the world;

b) the African parliamentary assemblies are an expression of a first stage of development of the processes of democratization of international institutions, the second stage being the direct election of such assemblies and the third the conquest of legislative powers, as shown by the experience of the European Parliament.

In the same comparative perspective, one might ask (another question that is not answered in the book in question) whether it is not in place what, according to Huntington's theory (*The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century*), could be called a "phase of reflux" of the third wave of development of democracy, which would also affect international institutions and international democracy. According to the 2018 Freedom House report, 2018 is the twelfth consecutive year in which there is a retreat of democracy in the world. Unfortunately, the analysis of the processes of integration and democratization in Africa is not framed in a long-term historical horizon or in a broad theoretical perspective.

As well known, the third wave, which began in the '70s with the fall of the fascist regimes in southern Europe, was followed by the fall of the communist regimes of the Soviet Union and those of Central and Eastern Europe, and the fascist ones in Latin America and Asia. The retreat of democracy in recent years at national level in Russia, Turkey, Hungary and Poland, but also in an international democratic organization such as the EU - highlighted by Brexit (it is the first time, after an uninterrupted series of enlargements, that a Member State has decided to leave the EU), the suspension of the Schengen agreements, the steady decline in voting participation in the European elections (61.99% in 1979 and 42.54% in 2014) and the spectacular increase in votes obtained by populist, nationalistic or openly anti-European parties – confirm the hypothesis of a reflux. The fact that the process of European unification has stopped and shows clear signs of regression has had a negative influence on the processes of unification in other regions of the world. The direct election of Parlasur, scheduled for 2014, was postponed until 2020, and that of the three African parliaments mentioned above was postponed sine die.

The fact is that the processes of democratization are a variable dependent on factors of a systemic nature, which can favour or hinder these processes. The first report on international

democracy promoted by the International Democracy Watch (*The Democratization of International Institutions*, London-New York, Routledge, 2014) proposed the fundamental elements of a new paradigm for the study of international institutions based on the concept of mode of production, borrowed from the materialistic conception of history, and on the concept of international order, borrowed from the theory of raison d'état.

Schematically, we can say that the long wave that, beyond the regressive phases, has determined the constant extension of the number of democratic regimes, has its driving force in the process of industrialization, and more recently in the scientific revolution of material production. It is a process that has integrated individuals into large national spaces, and made them active first in economic-social life and then in political life; the process of urbanization has plucked large numbers of workers from the isolation in which they were in the countryside; mass schooling has allowed to raise the level of political consciousness and of the conscious participation of the popular masses in the formation of political decisions. Africa's economic and political backwardness, which is reflected in the limits of the process of democratization, must be interpreted in this context.

Changes in the international order, instead, contribute to explaining changes in trends and discontinuities. In fact, democracy can develop in the presence of favourable international conditions. It is not just the fact that, when a state is at war, constitutional guarantees are suspended. More generally, in the presence of international tensions, centralism and militarism prevail. In other words, when security needs demand it, democracy is sacrificed to the salvation of the nation. On the other hand, international detente should be seen as a factor that promotes democracy, while the opening of markets, especially in the era of globalization, favours the development of the industrialization process, which in turn is a contributing factor for democracy.

It can therefore be said that at the base of the first wave is the extraordinary international political stability determined by the functioning of the European concert, which produced the "Hundred Years' Peace" (K. Polanyi, "*The Great Transformation*") between the Vienna Congress (1815) and the First World War (1914).

Instead, the reflux of the period between the two world wars must be attributed to the end of the European balance of powers, to the contradiction between the organization of Europe in national states and the internationalization of the production process, and to the fragmentation of Europe because of the disintegration of multinational empires.

The second wave is the consequence of the affirmation of the bipolar world order and, more specifically, of the international influence of the United States, which has promoted democracy within its sphere of influence.

The second reflux is connected to the crisis of the bipolar system, that is, the relative weakening of the two superpowers with respect to the small and medium states subjected to the respective spheres of influence, which opens the way to centrifugal thrusts and to the use of force, in a direct or indirect way, by the superpowers, aimed to restore order within the respective blocks. I recall, by way of example, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union in 1968, to stifle the "Prague Spring" and overthrow the government of Dubcek, and the military coup d'état of Pinochet in Chile in 1974, supported by the United States, overthrowing Allende's socialist government.

The third wave is the consequence of the affirmation of a new world order based on

the tendency towards the unification of the world, which has its roots in the scientific revolution of material production and in the process of globalization. The first positive effects are seen in Europe, where the international influence of the European Union is increasingly felt; it plays a decisive role in determining the fall of the fascist regimes in southern Europe and of the communist ones in central Europe, and in integrating these countries through the enlargement of the borders of the Union towards the South and the East. In turn, the fall of communism in the Soviet Union is the determining factor of the Russian-American reconciliation and the start of the reduction of armaments, which have had positive effects on the process of democratization all over the world.

The rebirth of nationalism and international terrorism have made the world more unstable and insecure, have slowed down the process of globalization and halted the expansion of democracy.

On the one hand, most of the new democracies, precisely because they are organized into many national states, too small to ensure the development of productive forces and torn by acute international conflicts, do not have the strength to prevent the authoritarian degeneration of their institutions.

On the other hand, the limitation of individual liberties, the habeas corpus violation of hundreds of prisoners detained for years in American prisons and military bases, represents the reaction of the US government to the danger of terrorism. They are not isolated measures. Other countries in the Western world have also moved in the same direction, especially Great Britain, which for centuries has represented a model of free government.

The end of the old bipolar order and the slowness of the transition to a multipolar order without hegemonies define an international political context that opens the way to a third phase of reflux in the process of democratization. The fact is that a new world order cannot simply come from the states that have adopted representative democracy and the market economy. Ultimately, in an international context characterized by increasing instability, democracy is destined to a progressive decline.

Despite the gaps reported, which concern the interpretation and explanation of the facts and not their description, the book is a useful contribution to outline the lights and shadows of the processes of democratization under way in Africa.

A New French Edition of the Ventotene Manifesto

Michel Theys

A. Spinelli and E. Rossi,
Le Manifeste de Ventotene. Projet d'un Manifeste et autres textes (1941-1947),
ed. by J.-F. Billion and J.-L. Prevel, Presse fédéraliste, 'Textes fédéralistes' series, No. 14, Lyon, 2017, 343 pp.

Longstanding French federalists with unwavering enthusiasm, Jean-Francis Billion and Jean-Luc Prevel examine in these pages the Manifesto drawn up by Altiero Spinelli

and Ernesto Rossi when, in 1941, they were relegated to the island of Ventotene by the Italian fascist regime. As far as the authors are concerned, this is not simply an act of remembrance, because the best-known document of the Resistance *'illustrates the gap between the political values of liberalism, socialism and democracy and the strategic choices made by national political classes.'* In this epoch in which nationalist posturing is flourishing again along with calls for a return to national sovereignty, it is highly topical and gives good reasons for standing up to the old demons. To this historical appeal for a *'free and united Europe,'* the compilers add other enlightening documents, such as the preface by Eugenio Colorni to the 1944 edition of the Manifesto, an introduction to Altiero Spinelli by Lucio Levi, and various documents written by Spinelli himself between 1942 and 1947. (*m. t.*)

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