The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

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The Crisis of the Realist Paradigm of Politics

Lucio Levi

The joint effect of globalization and the erosion of state sovereignty have led several scholars in international relations to denounce the crisis of the paradigm of political realism. The latter was codified with the Peace of Westphalia (1648) and the formation of the European system of powers and was supplanted in 1945 after the end of the Second World War by the system composed of two superpowers, the United State, and the Soviet Union, of macro-regional dimensions.

The realist theory of politics is based on two postulates: the subordination of civil society to the state, and the centrality of the sovereign state in international relations. Globalization has broken the two pillars on which rests the edifice of traditional political science.

The more debatable aspect of political realism is the assumption that the nature of politics cannot change. Kenneth Waltz wrote of this: "The web of international politics remains fairly constant, with recurring patterns and endlessly repeating events… The enduring anarchic character of international politics accounts for the surprising equality in the quality of life internationally through the millennia". In reality, the concepts of state, power, national interest, security have a historical character, and globalization can be interpreted as the process that feeds the tendency to go beyond the division of the world into sovereign states, and to constitutionalize international relations. If this is the basic trend of contemporary history, we can deduce that the conditions on which the normal science of politics is based, i.e. the separation between domestic politics and international politics, are falling.

The state-centric approach prevents consideration of the reciprocal relations between domestic politics and international politics, and the study of politics in its unity. This approach represents the point of view allowing the study of the political systems in a determined phase of history: that of the system of Westphalia. But today it has become an obstacle to the progress of knowledge, because it prevents understanding the change underway in political life: the overcoming of the separation between domestic and international politics. At the same time, it is an obstacle to regulate globalization, because it calls into question the dogma of state sovereignty, and therefore does not allow the consideration of forms of unity between states that go beyond international cooperation.

Those who would like to draw the conclusion from the crisis of the sovereign state that the problem of sovereignty is over and that we must get rid of this concept, would be making a tragic mistake. It would mean giving up some of the most important conquests made by the modern state. The monopoly of force is the guarantee of peace and certainty of the law within the borders of the state. The monopoly of force must of course be transferred to the United Nations. This means that the monopoly of coercive power must be exercised by the United Nations in the name and on behalf of all the peoples of the world and all the inhabitants

of the earth. It should be remembered that the UN Statute claims the power to ensure world peace, but without success, because the UN lacks the powers necessary to pursue the purposes for which it was established.

It has been frequently observed that the national state, which assigns the ultimate decision-making power to a single center, is too small for big problems and too big for small problems. In an important book on war and peace, written while the UN Statute was being drafted, Mortimer Adler remarked that the nation state is not the last form of political organization, but only the most recent (the latest). The evolution of the forms of organization of political life shows that, throughout history, the dimension of democratic communities has constantly widened from the city, to the national state, to the federation of states, and that this process is a process of pacification between larger and larger communities, which will be crowned by the world federation. Ultimately, the state is a form of legal order that has not always existed. Moreover, the process that will lead to its overcoming has already begun.

The ancients were unaware of the notion of state. They called *politeia* (the Greeks) or *civitas* (the Romans) the political institutions that governed them. It was modern scholars who introduced the expression "city-state" into the political lexicon, and extended the concept of the state to periods preceding its formation (the 16th century).

Analogously, the expression *federal state* represents the attempt to extend the notion of state to the time of the crisis of and the overcoming of the national state. Indeed, the federation is at the same time a new form of state and a new form of international organization. It has some of the institutional characteristics of the state, but not all of them, for example the concentration of competences in the hands of the central government. The novelty of federalism consists in the attempt to go beyond, firstly, the division into sovereign states of the major regions of the world, and, secondly, of the whole world. The ultimate goal is the abolition of war. While the United States, the first federation in history, belongs to the era of national states (at the time, the division of the world into sovereign states presented itself as an insurmountable reality), the objective that inspired the formation of the EU was the will to renounce power politics in Europe and build the edifice of peace. The pacification of Europe is conceived as a stage on the way to the pacification of the world.

Redistributing power to new levels of government, to be organized internationally and sub-nationally, is an inescapable imperative if we want to improve the effectiveness of political institutions and, at the same time, give back to democracy the power to decide on political issues, decisive for the future of peoples. The federal model, articulating sovereignty over several levels of government, from the local to the global level, seems the most appropriate to direct the reorganization of the state in the era of globalization. State sovereignty, eroded by the process of globalization, must become global, but at the same time must be articulated on several levels of "coordinated and independent" (Wheare) government, from the local community to the United Nations.

The end line of the peacebuilding process will not be a world state (which, as Karl Jaspers noted, would be an empire), but a federation of the major regions of the world. The world federation must therefore be conceived as a multi-level structure, a federation of the major regions of the world (European Union, African Union, ASEAN, UNASUR, etc.); the great regions of the world will be federations of states;

the states will be federations of regions, and so on. This articulation of power on several levels would make it possible to avoid the concentration of power in a single constitutional body, and combat the authoritarian degenerations which threaten freedom.

It should be emphasized that the world government will be an entirely new form of political organization, since it will have no foreign policy. It will therefore not be necessary to confer on it the powers that have traditionally enabled states to assert themselves on the international level through power politics. Need we recall that throughout history the most powerful incentive for the centralization of power, tyranny and despotism has come from the presence of an external threat? Indeed, authoritarian tendencies ripen in a climate of international tension and preparation for war that the institution of a world government would remove.

Peace in Ukraine*

Josep Borrell

This week marks one year since Russia started its illegal invasion of Ukraine. As everybody knows.

This was and remains a clear-cut case of an aggression by a permanent member of the Security Council [of the United Nations]. And this is Russia, everybody knows.

A blatant violation of international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter. The world needs peace in Ukraine and the people of Ukraine deserve peace after so much suffering. But not just any peace.

We need a peace grounded in the principles of the United Nations Charter, that is why we are [here] in this very hall.

This is what the resolution – presented by Ukraine – is about. It is about reiterating our support to Ukraine and to set out the principles for peace.

I want to stress it: this war against Ukraine is not "a European issue". It is not about "the West versus Russia".

No, this illegal war concerns everyone: the North, the South, the East, the West. The whole world.

We are here today to reiterate our support for Ukraine's sovereignty and its territorial integrity within its internationally recognised borders, as for any member of the United Nations.
Yes. Sovereignty. Territorial integrity: these are the principles that Russia is attacking in Ukraine, every day.

These are also the principles we have to uphold everywhere, every day.

If we do not condemn and stop Russia's actions in Ukraine today, this will increase the risk for any other country, elsewhere in the world, to face a similar aggression.

No one can feel safe in a world where the illegal use of force would be normalised.

And it is Article 51 of the United Nations Charter: Ukraine has the inherent right to defend itself, just like any other UN member. Ukraine has the right to defend itself and protect its population against the daily shelling by the Russian army.

The European Union has always been a peace project. We have been quite successful in bringing peace to the European continent and promoting it around the world. It is central to our DNA; it is in our origin.

And when it comes to Ukraine, the real questions today are: what kind of peace? Yes, peace, but what kind of peace? Yes, end the war: how do we end the war? How to achieve this peace?

The first obvious step for peace is for Russia to stop its attacks and [it] must end all hostilities and withdraw its forces and military equipment from Ukrainian soil. And it must do it immediately, completely and unconditionally.

Until then, the European Union will continue to give Ukraine the support it needs to defend its population. It is also in accordance with the United Nations Charter.

We will continue to provide humanitarian and financial assistance. We will work to hold Russia accountable for its actions and war crimes.

As we know from experience, that there can be no lasting peace without accountability.

At the same time, we will continue to support Ukraine's wish for a just peace, in line with the United Nations Charter through two tracks: supporting Ukraine and looking for peace. They go hand in hand. They are not "either/or". They are not incompatible. On the contrary, they go hand in hand, they are complementary.

You all know about President [of Ukraine, Volodymyr] Zelenskyy's Peace Formula.

The European Union supports it, and we will work to mobilise the broadest possible international support for it.

Indeed, all of us have a responsibility to work for a just and lasting peace – as this resolution, tabled by Ukraine, sets out.

The United Nations Secretary-General [Antonio Guterres] has offered his good offices to bring an end to this war, and we support him.
Others have also contributed to the diplomatic efforts.

The purpose of this resolution is to support and encourage their efforts to look for peace.

We – the European Union – have been working in close cooperation with Ukrainian partners throughout the whole preparatory process in a transparent and inclusive manner.

We have been as inclusive and as transparent as possible. Amendments and comments made in good faith were duly considered and taken on board to the extent possible.

We thank delegations that engaged with us. This, for sure, has strengthened the text. But, by putting forward additional amendments right now, Belarus tries to create confusion on the process. Whereas the text before the membership is a simple call for peace in line with the United Nations Charter, these amendments are not made in good faith.

They are manipulative since they do not reflect the situation on the ground, which is the unjustified and unprovoked aggression by one member state against another.

We will vote against these amendments and call on all United Nations member states to do the same and to support the draft resolution tabled by Ukraine.

The text before us today is very much in line with the United Nations Secretary-General's plea at his briefing to the General Assembly on 6 February, and even today in his speech.

As he rightly put it: "The world needs peace. But peace in line with the United Nations Charter and international law".

And for all [these] reasons – simple reasons, evident reasons –, I ask you to join us in co-sponsoring this United Nations General Assembly Resolution and vote in favour.

Because this is a moment for every member of the United Nations to stand and be counted.

Russian and Ukrainian: The Long Story of Two Languages at War

Marina Sorina

Now that Ukraine has become a matter of interest for many Europeans, questions arise that need to be answered, starting from the most basic one: why are there so many people speaking Russian in the territory of Ukraine? Besides Russians who migrated to Ukraine recently in order to escape from Putin's regime, there are native Russian speakers, born in Ukraine although not necessarily of Russian origin. Among them, there are Jews, Armenians, Georgians, Moldavians, followed by mixed families, and ethnic Ukrainians who have chosen to abandon their own language. This choice is a result of a centuries-long intentional strategy of cancellation of Ukrainian, perpetrated first by imperial Russia (and to a certain extent by the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Poland), and later by the Soviet government. Cancelling something so immaterial as a language, which actually cannot be totally controlled, and is something intrinsically free and private, is not an easy task; that's why the rulers of Ukrainian land used all means possible to achieve its disappearance.

The first level of oppression regarded the ecclesiastical sphere. Starting from the 18th century, the Tsars regularly ordered the physical destruction of religious books that contained sermons, prayers or theological works in Ukrainian, by burning them or tearing off certain pages.

The next level of persecution regarded the educational system. Gradually, all types and grades of schooling in Ukrainian were forced to choose the Russian language as the main vehicle of knowledge.

Another important strategy regarded literature: publishing books in Ukrainian was strictly censored. Moscow banned printing, importing and translating Ukrainian literature. This obviously limited the possibilities of development of Ukrainian literature, scientific research, and didactics.

Gradually the government of the Russian Empire went on to regulate even such innocent pastimes as choir folk singing, geographic societies and theatre, which were subject to bans. Even celebrating centenaries of famous Ukrainian writers was prohibited.

All these bureaucratic measures would often turn out to be inefficient, due both to corruption of the governmental officials and to the crafty ways the Ukrainians found to promote their agenda. The government realized that legal ways were not enough and started to act against persons who were creating and spreading Ukrainian culture. Therefore, during the 19th century, they arrested many of the most prominent Ukrainian writers and intellectuals and enticed those who, like Mykola Hohol' (better known as Nikolai Gogol') chose to collaborate. Economic methods of repression (for example, restricting the number of teachers employed in an academy in Kyiv, thereby pushing the unemployed teachers to move to Moscow) went along with severe personal repressions, leading to arrest and imprisonments.

The October Revolution in 1917 was supposed to have freed the nations oppressed by the Russian Empire, but very soon it turned out that these were just empty slogans.

The new ways of oppression, hidden behind international rhetoric and enforced by modern technologies of control, were ever crueler. The Soviet government allowed a generation of young Ukrainian-speaking writers and researchers to emerge, just to destroy them about ten years later when Stalinist repressions started to spread out.

Once they had exterminated most of the Ukrainian intellectuals, they proceeded to embed those who were left in the Soviet educational and cultural system, subject to strict regulation by the Communist party. From that moment on, the Soviets could act more boldly in the field of forced russification, knowing there would be no one to protest. This method was applied specifically to linguists, who used to work on the description of the norms of the Ukrainian language and the compilation of a modern dictionary of Ukrainian. Had it been completed, it would have been very helpful for the further development of the language. Unfortunately, all their endeavors were doomed to be abandoned and forgotten.

Over the 1930s, the Soviets killed and starved to death millions of Ukrainian peasants, who were the largest group of native Ukrainian speakers. Once deported or killed, their households were taken over by Russian peasants from inner provinces. Those who managed to survive preferred to move to larger towns to look for jobs. Soon they realised that it was wiser to adopt Russian as the main language, hiding their identity and blending in with the Russians.

The Russian language was perceived as the only key to career advancement, while Ukrainian became the language of uncultured peasants or eccentric protesters. This perception, that externally could be mistaken for the natural and logical result of a "community of Soviet nations", was instead a carefully and intentionally engineered process, directed at strengthening the domination of the Russian nation.

Once this division was firmly established as common sense in the Soviet population, they moved to a deeper level of influence, acting directly on the language itself. Philologists loyal to the regime issued articles which aimed at "purifying" the language from foreign influence and "archaic" forms: the thesaurus of words in their selection suspiciously resembled the Russian language. All their efforts were aimed at presenting Ukrainian as a weird local variety of Russian, just as "the Ukraine" was supposed to become barely a periphery of Mother Russia. A communication tool that had been created by generations of Ukrainians, against all odds, was going to be confined as a kind of folkloristic ornament, necessary only to prove that the "minor nationalities" are respected.

That is how in the 1950s, '60s, and '70s there were official Soviet writers who praised Lenin and Stalin in Ukrainian, double-language personal documents, folkloristic choirs with very limited repertoires, satirical magazines and cartoons for kids, along with other forms of de-potentiated existence of the Ukrainian language, which stopped being innovative or expressing national characteristics.

Soon it became self-evident (and confirmed legally): there was no sense in translating scientific research or technical documentation into Ukrainian; no need to teach it at school or to discuss doctoral theses in this language. The most brilliant Ukrainian minds dreamt of moving to Moscow. Certainly, there still existed university faculties of Ukrainian, but their aspirations were quite modest, aiming at training teachers for the countryside. If somebody who was not of peasant origin tried to enroll at a faculty of Ukrainian language and literature, they would be probably treated with suspicion; actually, not many enthusiasts were trying to study Ukrainian.

Clearly, such politics could lead to only one result: the idea of the supremacy of Russian

over Ukrainian stayed in the minds of many citizens even after the fall of the Soviet state. Officially, the independence of Ukraine was declared in 1991, and some very soft measures for the promotion of the national language were taken. In the meantime, the rules of free market took over the role that communist ideology had had. This implied that it was more advantageous for Ukrainian publishers and producers to create content in Russian, so it would be sold in more than one market. Different Ukrainian governments tried to introduce regulatory laws, which were more or less friendly to Russian, but the process of introducing Ukrainian as the first language was very slow.

For example, the number of Ukrainian schools was slowly growing, but the Russian language was still predominant both at school and university level in many regions; in most Ukrainian-speaking regions, Russian was still taught as a foreign language starting from middle school. Ukrainians often went to Russia to look for a job or for higher education, there were no clear fixed borders between the two cultures, and it continued this way even after the beginning of the war in February 2014. The activists who insisted on the need to legally protect the status of Ukrainian as the language of the state, and limit the influence of Russian by regulating percentages of books, songs, films, serials, and newspapers produced, sold or broadcast in this language on Ukrainian land, were considered as weirdos.

In 2019, President Petro Poroshenko, whose electoral program was based on "faith, language and army" lost the elections to Russian-speaking Volodymyr Zelensky who was convinced that the war could be stopped by diplomatic talks. He himself used to work in Russia as a stand-up comedian, side by side with Russian pop-stars loyal to Putin. And yet, once he became the head of the state, he carried on some of the initiatives of

the previous government and approved the language law, initiated by Poroshenko. That much debated law stated that, just as in any other European country, there would be only one language of state, while such languages as Russian, Hungarian, Polish and so on would be considered as languages of minorities, which they actually are. The Ukrainian language was to be the only one allowed in Parliament, in governmental and municipal offices.

It became obligatory to use it in private companies, and if there was any contact with clients involved, it was mandatory to initiate the interaction in Ukrainian, which could then be changed to another language on request of the client. For example, a sales-person in McDonalds is supposed to address the client in Ukrainian, and only in the case that the client declares that they do not understand it, is it possible to reply in English, French, German or Russian, which become equal foreign, external languages, without any privilege for Russian.

This measure might seem strange for people outside Ukraine, as it is obvious that, at first, staff in public-facing roles in France will speak French, in Greece they will speak Greek, and once they realise you are a foreigner, they will try to find a common language. It's hardly possible to imagine an immigrant who opens a shop in a country, but refuses to serve clients who speak that country's main language, and is moreover rude with them! Strange as it may sound, such situations were quite common in Ukraine. Service personnel often insisted on speaking Russian and pretended not to be able to understand a Ukrainian-speaking client. All this was still happening 30 years after the declaration of independence! Some people even dared say that they were unable to learn Ukrainian because their jaw is anatomically different, which is quite absurd considering that phonetically there's no radical difference between the two languages. For sure, what can be expressed in one can be said just as well in the other.

Yet after all these years, the Ukrainian government tried to be realistic. They knew that there are millions of people who are not used to speaking Ukrainian. In order to help Russian-speaking citizens in this transition, they offered free-of-charge Ukrainian language courses or speaking clubs, in order to allow anyone to learn. They have also limited broadcasts, arriving from the neighbour countries, and bringing in poisonous imperialistic ideology along with musical shows and serials. For the politicians from Moscow, all this was too much: they considered that the interests of Russian-speaking citizens of Ukraine are a matter for their concern and a sufficient reason for military intervention.

What happened next? At dawn on 24 February 2022, the Ukrainians were able to witness the expressions of "brotherly love" that the Russian people have shown with missiles and tanks on peaceful streets. It was the fastest language learning course ever: blood on the streets and bombs on their roofs pushed the Russian-speaking Ukrainians to wake up and realise that somehow Russian does not feel like their "mother tongue" anymore. It became the language of the enemy, the language of the aggressor, or rather, it has always been, but no one dared to notice, save for a few dissidents. This simple fact was quite difficult to realize for the majority of citizens, who were induced into a desire to speak perfect Russian by centuries of deliberate strategies of discriminating against any alternative. After the full-scale invasion, the Russian language, so dear and so much connected with their identity, childhood memories and life-long habits, became bitter-sour. In times of distress, studying a new language is barely feasible, but Ukrainian was actually not totally new to anyone, not even to Russian-speaking families who immigrated to Ukraine from putinist Russia in the search for freedom and democracy. They all learned Ukrainian with ease, just like any well-motivated immigrant looking for integration does.

Even easier was the return to the state language for those Ukrainians who had shunned Ukrainian, the language they had heard their mothers and grandmothers talk, but were discouraged from carrying on speaking. The barriers that withheld them were mainly psychological and not linguistic, and the return to the mother tongue was somehow liberatory. It was more difficult for those who belonged to other nationalities, and had long forgotten their ancestral tongue, as happened to me. Being Jewish, hypothetically I am supposed to speak Hebrew or Yiddish, but my first language is Russian, followed by Italian and English. Diving into school-time memories and dragging my Ukrainian to the surface was not easy, and shame and fear of imperfections were among the main hindrances. Thanks to the refugees that I happened to interact with, I somehow managed to overcome my inner barriers. Listening to Ukrainian-speaking bloggers, taking classes, reading and translating modern poetry helped me to improve, and now this language does not feel strange or complicated, although I'm very far from being at a good level in my speaking habits. The same path is being followed right now by many of my fellow Russian-speaking friends who chose to stand by Ukraine in this fight for democracy.

In the moment when the social status of the two languages radically changed, to the detriment of Russian, the communicative habits of the Ukrainians have dramatically changed. Clearly, in private conversations the old habit prevails, but in new contacts or in official situations people tend to use Ukrainian as a marker that puts a barrier between "our people" and the enemy. The side-effect of the military invasion that was meant to protect Russian speakers has led to the fact that the very same category of speakers has become averse to their own language, seen now as a tool of vile propaganda and blind violence.

Gandhi's Idea of "One World" to Usher in World Peace

James W. Arputharaj

This article would focus on the context of war and the relevance of Gandhi today. The world today is in a difficult period, not only because of climate change and financial crisis, but in the midst of one armed conflict after another which affect the whole world, as seen from the Russia-Ukraine war. There are really no world statesmen today with the caliber of Mahatma Gandhi and Nelson Mandela to provide leadership in the backdrop of occupation of Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya and Ukraine. There have been more wars fought since the creation of the United Nations and more lives lost since the World Wars. Arms trade is the most profitable business and wars are created or supported for profiting multinational arms producing transnational companies (TNCs) and the countries from where they operate from. According to SIPRI (2023), in the year 2020, 2.1 trillion dollars were spent globally on arms export. In 2018, US military expenditure was 36% of the global military expenditure. There are more than one billion firearms produced in the world today. As per the Geneva Convention, arms exports are banned in conflict zones enabling parties to the conflict to dialogue to reach a solution to the conflict. The war in Ukraine is nowhere near its end unless, according to Russia, its strategic objectives are achieved. Like the Afghan war, many would like to prolong this war, as war is business, while the people suffer.

We need to take effective steps on arms control, otherwise the world would not be at peace. In 2001, there was the first UN international conference to prevent proliferation of small arms and weapons in New York. Until then, there was no effort at creating a legally binding agreement on arms export controls and markings on the weapon. It was easy for example to find South African cluster bombs in Jaffna without any marking on them. Governments which export such banned weapons cannot be punished, as there is no evidence with markings on the weapons. In the 2001 conference, a program of action was developed to address illegal proliferation of light weapons and small arms. My research in this area, published as a book in 2003, shows that even in India we had illegal factories manufacturing guns. For example, Bihar alone had 1500 gun-manufacturing units, according to Ajay Darshan Behera. In 2014, we were successful in finally adopting at the UN the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) which incorporates mandatory export documentation, stockpile management, marking and tracing on the weapons. This was a great milestone, as members of the UN Security Council contribute to 90% of global arms sales. Currently Gandhi's India also is a big manufacturer and exporter of small arms and light weapons.

We need to reflect on how Gandhi's thoughts are relevant today. Gandhi-Nehruvian Foreign Policy guided the non-alignment movement with the idea to promote "One World". Unfortunately, currently there is no strong non-aligned movement, nor the Group of 77. Elaborating the One World concept, there should be a world federal government at the UN. Right now, there is democratic deficit at the UN with veto power and only the international

civil servants occupy the chairs of the UN General Assembly. Similar to the European Parliament, if there is a Parliament at the UN, then it could effectively address climate change and economic crises and prevent the wars. This was the vision of Gandhi and Nehru, who incorporated the One World concept in the resolution passed in 1942 regarding the Quit India movement.

The One World idea found its match with the allied powers trying to create a new world security organization which resulted in the founding of the UN.

According to Manu Bhagavan, Nehru said, "In One world, state power would be checked, the freedom of individuals and groups expanded. Questions of minorities, migrant peoples and endemic poverty would all be addressed, and Gandhi's legacy would go global". Madam Vijayalakshmi Pandit, one of the most admired women in the world (at that time), led the fight in and through the United Nations. The One World idea was initially conceived by an American, Wendell Willkie, in 1943, through his book "One World". He envisioned a grand world alliance as the way forward to a permanent and lasting just peace. It found its way into Nehru's prison's cell and he was greatly impressed, as it resonated with many features of the Quit India resolution.

Albert Einstein in 1946 wrote a contribution to a pamphlet, published in a book titled "One world or none". His conceptualization of one world resembled the structure Nehru and Gandhi had envisioned in the Quit India resolution. India had communicated the total acceptance of the UN Charter.

Madam Pandit linked the need for freedom to India from the British and the need for the UN. In her speech to the UN delegates at San Francisco in 1947, she said, "The recognition of India's independence now will be a proclamation and an assurance to the world that the statesmen of the UN assembled here in this solemn conclave in San Francisco, have in truth and in honor heralded the dawn of a new and better day for an all but crucified humanity".

When India attained Independence, Nehru's speech on "Tryst with destiny"did not condemn the British for their occupation, but called for One world. With Madam Pandit on his side to travel around the world to promote this policy, India campaigned against the apartheid in South Africa at the UN. India adopted people-friendly policy and welcomed with open arms people from China, Prussia, Israel, Tibet among others, and provided support. India never hesitated to vote at the UN General Assembly or the UNHRC. Many consider India's positive and inclusive foreign policy based on Gandhi-Nehru thought on One World during 1947-1974 as the golden period.

Gandhi was against the systems and structures that promote oppression and not against any individual. Madam Pandit was successful in condemning the apartheid in South Africa with a majority vote at the UN General Assembly, though South Africa argued that the UN was prohibited from interfering in the internal affairs of the member states as per Article 2(7). Madam Pandit had argued that Human Rights are universal. Gandhi was not happy that she was not kind to South Africa's President Smuts when she won the vote. For Gandhi, means were just as important as the ends, and wanted Smuts to be treated with dignity and respect. While the cold war between Soviet Union and USA was at its peak, India advocated the doctrine of foreign policy called the non-aligned movement. This was one element in the vision for one world. In January. 1947, Nehru provided the roadmap for the country's leadership when he spoke at the constituent assembly in India.

"The only possible real objective that we, in common with other nations, can have is in the objective of cooperating in building up some kind of world structure, call it "One World". Nehru in his later years outlined 'Panchsheel' which was meant to serve as the foundation for peaceful coexistence between all people. Panchsheel incorporates: 1. Territorial integrity & sovereignty, 2. Non-aggression, 3. Non-interference in internal affairs, 4. Equality and mutual benefit, 5. Peaceful coexistence. In his speech at the UN titled "Towards a world community", that approach would create a "climate of peace". In 1961, the Soviet Union introduced a resolution in the UN-GA that adopted Nehru's 'Panchsheel' platform to help to promote the peaceful coexistence of states.

In the 1940s, the world saw the fascism of Hitler and Mussolini; also, the Japanese imperialism. Conflicts continue to rage even though the Treaty of Versailles was adopted to end "the war to end all wars". The World expected something from the "apostle of non-violence". Gandhi realized that the principle of non-violence had to go global.

According to Manu Bhagavan, *"Nehru and Gandhi ...proposed creating a world federation in which all people would be equally represented and to which they would contribute fairly for the purpose of defense and finance".*

In Gandhi's words: *"I would have a World Government. I claim to be a practical idealist. I believe in compromise so long as it does not involve the sacrifice of principles. I may not get a World Government that I want just now; but it is a Government that would just touch my ideal, and I would accept it as a compromise. Therefore I am not enamored of a World Federation, I shall be prepared to accept it if it is built on an essentially non-violent basis."*

We do hope and pray that we would see one world by supporting the campaign for UN Parliamentary Assembly as a reality in our lifetime. As of now, 1846 Members of Parliament from around 137 countries have endorsed the campaign for a Parliament at the UN. In India alone, 44 former and 22 current MPs have endorsed the UNPA (www.unpacampaign.org).

Many of us adhere to the principle "Think globally and work locally". Gandhi's idea of *Gram swaraj* advocated self-reliant-villages. Similar to his principles of non-violence, peaceful coexistence also went viral and contributed to developing community-based peace building measures by the UN Development Program and many other NGOs. During the war in Sri Lanka, the author promoted and trained Peace and Reconciliation committees in 100 villages with induction on non-violent communication, human rights and international humanitarian laws. These village committees will not allow the parties in conflict to use the weapons inside the village, thus gun-free villages. Oscar Arias won the Nobel Prize for keeping his country Costa Rica gun-free by making a peace treaty with all his neighbours. When I went there in 2004, I could see guns only in the museum.

If countries reduce their military spending, such funds could be invested in eradicating poverty and in education and health. What we need today is not military security, but human security.

One Year of War – The UEF remains a strong supporter of Ukraine

24 February marks the first year of the Russian aggression on Ukraine. On this important date for Europe and the besieged country, the European federalists want to reiterate their support to Ukraine and its people. The Union of European Federalists (UEF) remains committed to seeing a victorious Ukraine join the European Union.

Since the start of the conflict, the UEF stood beside Ukraine. On the day of the aggression, the UEF condemned *"in the strongest possible terms the aggression* [...] *against Ukraine, a free and sovereign country in the heart of Europe."* On 4 March, the UEF partnered in the Europe-wide gathering in support of Ukraine organised by its German section of Europa-Union Frankfurt. On this occasion, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy gave a moving speech and thanked the Europeans for their solidarity, while thousands of people gathered, at the same time, on major European city squares, such as in Frankfurt, Prague, Tbilisi, or Paris.

On many occasions throughout the last 12 months, the UEF reiterated its support to Ukraine. On 5 March, the UEF organised the first Europe-wide online demonstration on the video platform Twitch. On 29 March, our Political Commission on Common Foreign and Security Policy debated the implication of the war for the future of Europe. In April, a statement from the UEF renewed its support to *"Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which are currently confronted with continuous attacks and threats by Russia,"* and recommended *"the Commission* [to] *expedite its opinion on the granting of the candidate country status to Ukraine."* In June, the UEF welcomed Ukraine and Moldova as candidates for the European Union. In December, the Federal Committee endorsed the appeal "An airlift to save Ukraine" from its Italian section, the Movimento Federalista Europeo.

At the UEF's Federal Committee meeting of the 11 and 12 February 2023, Sandro Gozi, President of the UEF, called for the European Union to reform and welcome a victorious Ukraine: *"Our generation must assume its political responsibilities – like the generation of Adenauer or Schuman did with its own. It is not the Ukrainians who should pay the price of our disagreements and reluctance in reshaping the European project. It is an existential duty to reform the European Union."*

The European federalists will never forget that the fight of the Ukrainians for freedom is ours, and it is that of all of Europe.

Building Humane Advances and Institutions post COVID-19: the Need for a Global Federation

Arvind Ashta

COVID-19 gave us time to think about creating a new world. We saw that money was available or could be made available to reduce human suffering. If it could be done then, surely it can also be done in good times. Many started reflecting on how we can improve society, build a better world, a more humane world, which better takes into account the needs of individuals, society, and the planet. Sometimes they called it the Great Resignation, millions of people considered altering their lifestyle from a work centred one to something more balanced, more useful, and more pleasureful. In this article, we take a look at some of the major challenges today and how we can create a more equitable, more humane society.

The major challenges since COVID-19
When we think of global challenges today, we consider immediately the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) adopted by the United Nations Member States in 2015, focused on the economy, society, and environment. However, in recent times other priorities have come up which are taking away our long-term focus and need immediate reparation.

The first is geopolitical. Under this heading, we can list the Ukraine-Russia crisis, the US-China rivalry, the mercenaries from Russia replacing the old colonial powers in Africa, and many others. All this is leading to protectionism and de-globalization. The Ukraine-Russian conflict has led to mass migration, unemployment, inflation, reduced purchasing power, reduced access to basic necessities. At a more global level, the conflict has led to financial sanctions, increase of commodity prices and supply chain disruptions. While it may eventually lead to more concentration on renewable energies, the immediate impact has been to continue use of fossil-fuels and nuclear generation. It has disrupted years of internationalization of firms, both Russian firms in Europe and European firms in Russia, thus leading to hardship for their employees. Research shows that the 2014 Russian-Ukraine conflict reduced trust and trade even with regions not directly affected by the conflict. The second is absorbing technological change. One example is artificial intelligence, which often improves predictive power and therefore improves opportunities. There have been many other incredible breakthroughs in recent years in many areas, such as digital transformation and health services. Much of the conflict between China and the USA can be attributed to this race to be the leader in the technologies of the future. The use of these technologies means that productivity will go up and we may need less labour. This then will create unemployment for those who do not adjust fast to changes. Feeding and accommodating all these people will create strains on the existing social security systems. In addition, the users of artificial intelligence often don't understand the logic hidden in a black box and they need explanations. As a result, there is a lack of trust between humans and AI which may lead to misuse or disuse. In short, we need to consider whether technological advances can be humane and beneficial to society and social integration, rather than divisive and confusing.

The third, often a consequence of the first two, is economic. Under this heading, we can regroup events such as the supply chain crisis arising from COVID, but exacerbated by the wars and economic sanctions. This required firms to rapidly find other sources of supply in other countries, leading to shortages and long delivery times. Other fallouts have been inflation and high interest rates that no longer reflect sound economics. Economies such as Egypt, which were highly dependent on Ukrainian and Russian grains, have witnessed high inflation, currency depreciation, and increased debt. We can also consider increased poverty, because of COVID-19. This poverty then reduces aggregate demand and stifles development. If technology leads to more unemployment, economic problems will increase.

The fourth, perhaps a consequence of the other three, is social, even sociological. Under this heading, we can group inequalities between countries and within countries. These inequalities have risen sharply as a result of COVID, when millions got displaced. Such displacements are also a result of the wars, and we can see that today Germany has more Ukrainian immigrants than Syrian. This then brings us to the important sociological problem of aging, exacerbated by the improved technologies, and the need for immigrants. If both Germany and Japan are now open to immigration, it is with strong reluctance. In many European countries, nationalism is rising in consequence. This then creates a feedback loop with de-globalization. It has long been recognized that there is a two-way relationship between economic institutions and social institutions. However, technological change can add to the social problems not only through the mediation of economic change but even directly.

Many of these social challenges are included in the SDGs, but since COVID-19 we have lost a lot of progress in meeting these goals. In addition, we have lost the focus on environmental goals, a fifth major challenge. Some of this is coming back

as the US seeks to become the leader in green investments, as much for ideological reasons as for economic and geopolitical dominance.

Factors to be Considered in a Humane Response to the post-COVID Global Challenges

Responding to these challenges requires understanding the complex interlinkages of some of the challenges that have been summarized above. Moreover, a humane response to these challenges would require prioritizing fairness, altruism, and caring, according to the GLOBE study of 62 societies. A humane leader, according to this study, shows compassion and generosity. This caring needs to focus on inclusivity, diversity, and environmental impact in scrutinizing technological advances. This would then require creating institutions that oversee and control technological advances.

These institutional responses cannot function if they cannot respond to geopolitical tensions, economic fallout, or social repercussions. The social repercussions include problems of divergent ethics, biases, and continuing stereotypes that may disproportionately impact certain sections.

The inclusion that we need is political, economic, and social. Political inclusion means that people from all backgrounds are represented and may participate in discussions that impact them. Thus, diversity in governance will become increasingly important. At a global level, we need institutions that have a multilateral outlook. Economic inclusion means that everybody can contribute to economic activity. It also means that technological advances are diffused in a way that everybody can access and afford them, even those who are marginalized or disabled. Social inclusion means that different parts of society are all given equal opportunities to develop their competencies and capabilities.

For considering the environmental aspects, we need to understand the impact of the technologies on the resources and energy used in the development and implementation of

the new technologies. This can also be linked to geopolitical tensions. The Ukraine-Russia conflict has caused a lot of human loss of lives as well as material damage. Reconstruction will again create environmental damage. The recent earthquake in Turkey has demonstrated that public governance and certifications have failed to ensure that the buildings were capable of resisting earthquakes. The same would be true of environmentally friendly certification.

Ultimately, building humane advances and institutions requires ethical, responsible, inclusive, and impact-oriented decision-making, as well as appropriate controls. By considering the needs and experiences of all individuals and environmental impact, we can create a more equitable and sustainable world. With the rapid evolution of myriads of technologies, it means creating a multitude of institutions that examine these issues of inclusivity and accessibility for each change. Besides being representative of diversity, these institutions need to be transparent and accountable. They need to be honest and open about the procedure of approval for the diffusion of technology and be able to show that they are not influenced by special interest groups. A major problem is taking responsibility for the unforeseeable negative consequences of technological advances. These unintended consequences can include harmful or addictive behavior. Finally, the technology should be able to enhance the quality of labor, rather than reduce it.

While it would be easy to suggest that the technology be designed in this manner, it is unreasonable to expect that creativity can be controlled. Rather, it is how technology is applied and diffused that needs to be controlled to reduce barriers to social inclusion. Responsible technological advances and institutions require a commitment to continuous education. This means requiring people, including the disabled and the marginalized, to stay up to date on the latest innovations and be willing to adapt themselves to the change. For many people,

this means instituting a cultural change of experimenting.

Meeting Global Challenges: the Case for a Global Federation

Having set the tone on what we consider humane, I would now like to argue the case for a global federation. It is not being suggested that this is the only way to resolve all problems nor that other solutions will not be useful for addressing specific problems. For example, the humane entrepreneurship theory claims that a proliferation of humane small and medium enterprises could solve the world's employment problems by creating 40 million jobs. Educators feel that this can be done by imparting education where we can cultivate the potential of students and provide them with a connection to their self, humanity and the planet, through the inclusion of meditation and inter-subjectivity in the education curricula. All such initiatives are welcomed, but in this essay I stick to this one suggestion of a global federation. Many of the advantages of federalism have been discussed two centuries ago in the *Federalist Papers*, and more recently elsewhere, but the recent global challenges make it even more necessary. I will argue how a global federation would help to face the post-COVID challenges: reduce geopolitical tensions, technological exclusion, economic inequalities, social injustices, and environmental degradation.

The estimates of casualties in the Ukraine-Russia war differ, but all sources agree that at least a hundred thousand lives have been lost and that several million people have been displaced. All of this is thoroughly inhumane, and would be unnecessary if the world were organized in a global federation with the military falling under the exclusive competence of the federal level. Certainly, civil strife may continue, but at least war between States would be reduced. Thus, in this respect, the world would become more humane.

Large geopolitical issues such as economic dominance often create races to bring about

new technology. This can lead to unsafe technology. Worse, it can stifle the creation of new technology as one country blocks the imports from and exports to the other country. Of course, the other country is forced to reciprocate. Other countries would then decide which superpower country they would align themselves with. All this would be unnecessary in a federation where the gains of technological change are shared through appropriate mechanisms. Moreover, control of technology and its appropriate diffusion would also be cheaper since a single body could study this instead of several institutions in each country. The essential requirement of such a federation is to be democratic and have diverse participation at the global level to ensure a multilateral perspective to solving problems.

Economic inequalities have risen after COVID. Clearly, there is a huge difference in the average income per day of the lower-income countries ($5.55 in ppp terms) and that of the high-income countries ($151.05 in ppp terms). The average income per day in Burundi ($ 2.14 in ppp terms) is lower than 2% of the average in the higher income countries. Not fixing these inequalities, where such information is now public, would be inhumane.

A global federation is glued together if there is a mechanism of fiscal federalism where everyone gains. Economic inequalities between countries would reduce if there is a mechanism of redistribution from rich countries to poorer countries. Moreover, if corporate taxation is uniform, there would be no need for complex transfer mechanisms to shift profits. Some formula of unitary taxation could also ensure that profits are shared with resource-rich developing countries instead of transferring all the profit abroad. With higher tax revenues in developing countries, public officials could be better paid, reducing their tendency to corruption.

If minimum wages were set equitably all over the world, social divisions would reduce.

Similarly, fair labour practices would be set all over the world, based on best cases. If there is only one currency, with repatriation allowed automatically, capital would flow based on productivity and resource availability. Sovereign risk would reduce. Environmental dumping would reduce. Thus, it would no longer make sense to move factories from one State to another if environmental laws were the same with the same penalties for environmental damage.

Concluding remarks

We have argued that the major challenges in this post-COVID period are geopolitical, technological, economic, social, and environmental. We need to build a response to these challenges that is humane, and good for individuals as well as for society. We have argued that a global federation would help to ameliorate the situation. The necessity of such a federation was highlighted by COVID-19, where people in developed countries received many vaccinations, but significant percentages of the population in poor countries received no vaccination at all. The Ukraine-Russia conflict has made it even more urgent. Knowledge of federalism, its ability to reduce strife and create a more humane world is lacking. We need more researchers to engage in this field and more universities to offer courses in this field to diffuse this knowledge. Business schools should introduce a study of federalism as part of a course on geopolitics and show that it would reduce corporate risks coming from war, increase global aggregate demand by transferring money to people who need to consume more, and increase the mobility of capital by increasing the resilience of firms.

It would be good if the role of the United Nations can be enhanced in this direction by removing the veto powers of the five permanent members of the Security Council. This is the biggest obstacle to its efficacy. Many other modifications are surely required, and future research could look into this.

Democracy's Global Decline Is Slowing Down, Says Freedom House Report

Andreas Bummel

In its recent annual report[1] on the state of freedom and democracy in the world, Freedom House concludes that "the global struggle for democracy approached a possible turning point in 2022". According to the think tank based in Washington D.C., "the gap between the number of countries that registered overall improvements in political rights and civil liberties and those that registered overall declines was the narrowest it has ever been through 17 consecutive years of deterioration."

In a comment published[2] by the Washington Post, Michael J. Abramowitz, president of Freedom House, and Arch Puddington, the organization's "senior scholar emeritus", commented that the report "offers hope" that the world could be standing "on the threshold of a democratic comeback".

In many countries, though, the situation was harsh and suppression intensified.

In specific terms, the report finds that a total of 34 countries showed improvements in political rights and civil liberties in 2022, compared with 35 that lost ground. Two countries suffered downgrades in their freedom status according to this assessment. Peru moved from "free" to "partly free", and Burkina Faso moved from "partly free" to "not free". Two countries, Colombia and Lesotho, earned upgrades in their freedom status, moving from "partly free" to "free". Overall, out of 195 countries and territories covered in the report, there are now 84 rated as free (2022: 83), 54 as partly free (2022: 56) and 57 not free (2022: 56).

Freedom House notes that the "most serious setbacks for freedom and democracy were the result of war, coups, and attacks on democratic institutions by illiberal incumbents". The Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine is seen as an effort "to scuttle that country's hard-won democratic progress".

Charting 17 Years of Democratic Decline
Countries with aggregate score declines in *Freedom in the World* have outnumbered those with gains every year for the past 17 years. However, events in 2022 generated the smallest margin—and the smallest number of countries with declines—since the negative pattern began.

As the report points out, "in his desire to destroy democracy in Ukraine", Russian President Putin has caused thousands of deaths and injuries of Ukrainian civilians, as well as soldiers on both sides, destroyed critical infrastructure, displaced millions of people and intensified "already harsh repression within Russia".

Another case of "the worst excesses of unchecked power" the report refers to, is the Taliban's rule in Afghanistan. In terms of overall ratings, Freedom House places China and Myanmar near the absolute bottom, taking into consideration, among other things, the suppression of minority groups in Xinjiang, Tibet, and Inner Mongolia, in the case of China, and of the Rohingya, in the case of Myanmar. According to the report, events in 2022 provided "fresh evidence of the limits of authoritarian power". In the assessment of Freedom House, the influence of authoritarian governments at the United Nations and other international organizations "faltered", and democratic countries helped the Ukraine to "beat back" the Russian aggression. Among other things, the report refers to Russia's suspension from the Human Rights Council in April, and Iran's removal from the UN Commission on the Status of Women in December, due to the Iranian government's brutal and deadly suppression of protests.

Based on a different methodology and different data, another annual assessment[3] presented recently by V-Dem concluded that a record number of 42 countries is currently autocratizing, while only 14 democratize, offering a bleaker picture. *The Economist Intelligence Unit's* report[4], presented in February, which again uses a different approach, registered, after years of democratic regression since 2015, a "point of stagnation" in 2022.

[1]https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2023/marking-50-years
[2]https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2023/03/09/freedom-house-authoritarianism-democracy-resilience/
[3]https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/26647/v-dem-report-global-democracy-has-fallen-to-1986-level/
[4]https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/26249/economist-2022-democracy-report-stagnation-war-and-no-post-covid-revival/

How the EU Can Promote a New World Order

Alfonso Iozzo and Domenico Moro

As Indian political analyst Shivshankar Menon puts it, 'nobody wants the current world order' (Foreign Affairs, 3 August 2022). But the fact is that the major players in world politics promote policies that aggravate it, increasingly weakening multilateral institutions, rather than seeking common solutions to the major world problems.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine is the most tragic of the policies that challenge the current world order. But the fact that, at the United Nations, many African, Asian and Latin American countries, which also have solid ties to the West, have refused to sanction Russia is, at the same time, a sign that they do not recognise Western leadership of the current world order and an indication of the uncertainty about the future shape of the world order. China, for its part, has ongoing territorial disputes with Japan, Vietnam, India and other Asian countries. The United States, which is historically credited with creating multilateral institutions, is now challenging them. The Biden Administration implements policies that, with the passage of the Inflation Reduction Act, not only question the rules of the WTO, but refuse to abide by them when the US is condemned for the steel and aluminium tariffs introduced by the Trump Administration.

The world order following the fall of the USSR has been described by many analysts as a *unipolar* order. But the US has not used its power to promote the strengthening of multilateral institutions, believing rather that it could impose a specific political-economic model, unilaterally and with military force, if necessary. The failure of the Iraqi, Afghan and – with the primary responsibility of some European countries – Libyan experiences, prove that there are no shortcuts to the affirmation of the universal values of freedom and democracy, if this effort is not supported by a global consensus and part of a long-term plan.

The fact remains that the main antagonists of the American leadership, be they China, Russia or India, have not been able, at least so far, to offer the rest of the world a convincing alternative political model to those which, during the Cold War, the United States on the one hand and the USSR on the other, had been able to propose; the former to the western world and the latter to developing countries. If this is true, however, we must avoid the mistake of thinking of a world order modelled on the proposal of *a single* country. If a new world order emerges, it can only be the result of a choice shared by *all* the players in the world, or at least by the main ones, and it can only be based on the autonomous functioning of multilateral institutions and not on the benevolence of one or a few world powers. The point is that a new world order cannot emerge spontaneously, but requires some country to take the initiative and, above all, be credible.

The hypothesis advanced here is that this 'country' can only be the European Union (EU). As has been pointed out recently, the

EU has an existential interest in defending a world that functions on the basis of shared rules, precisely because it has thrived and strengthened on the basis of rules shared by its members and can only survive in a world that functions on the basis of global rules. Thinking that the world's major problems, from security, to environmental protection, to defence against pandemics, to the management of the immense public debt of developing countries, can be tackled on the basis of the 19th century policy of balance between the major powers, is simply unrealistic.

However, if the EU is to be plausible in this endeavour, it must be able to take the initiative in an area where, more than any other, the greatest dangers for the future of mankind lurk, and this area is that of security. Indeed, growing global political instability is at the root of the highest level of military spending (around $2 trillion in 2021) that the world has ever seen. This high military spending coincided with a global health emergency that, if anything, should have prompted an increased investment in the health sector.

What step can the EU take to be credible, besides the fact that it is becoming urgent to strengthen and integrate its foreign and defence policies? This step can only be taken from its history, which is a history of two world wars and is the reason why, in order to avoid other wars, some European countries have introduced an important principle into their constitutions. In the years following the end of the Second World War, France, Germany and Italy, in their respective Constitutions, recognised the need for effective international organisations to prevent new wars. Therefore, provision is made in each of these Constitutions for the introduction of limits to national sovereignty, or the transfer of part of sovereign powers, to global institutions. In the case of France, it is the Preamble to the Constitution of the Fourth Republic, reiterated in that of the 1958 Constitution; in the case of Germany, it is Article 24 of the Basic Law; and in the case of Italy, it is Article 11 of the Constitution. These constitutional provisions were the basis for the success of the European unification project.

The proposal is therefore that the EU should include in its 'constitution' an article which, modelled on, for example, the Italian constitution, states that: "*The EU shall repudiate war as an instrument of offence against the freedom of other peoples and as a means of settling international disputes; it shall permit, on equal terms with other States, such limitations of sovereignty as may be necessary for an orderly and just peace among Nations; it shall promote and foster international organisations directed to that end.*" An attempt in this direction had already been made during the work of the European Convention chaired by Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, but it was unsuccessful. Russian aggression against Ukraine and the consequences it could have for peace in Europe and in the world, if this trend is not corrected, may give new impetus to this proposal.

Federalism: Re-Imagining the Future and Overcoming Presentism

Gabriele Casano

Today's world is crisscrossed by a multiplicity of contradictions that are being addressed in a scattered way and through inadequate instruments, be they political, economic or technological. While on the last issue it seems that research and the development of innovative techniques can indeed offer adequate solutions to the challenges in not very long term, if we look at political action and economic trajectories it is evident that time is running inexorably short for human society to act. The latest IPCC reports reveal an increasingly alarming situation and push, for the umpteenth time, for decisive and cohesive political action at the international level to reduce emissions, protect biodiversity, and stop deforestation and other activities heavily disrupting ecosystem balances. At the same time, the world economy, which is extremely vulnerable due to its highly interdependent nature, does not stop proceeding along the same path; it is even pressed by the growing political instability in many world regions towards global development scenarios that imply greater risks and vulnerabilities for human societies and the planet as a whole. We are used to living in a context of crises, often permanent or repeated. Uncertainty too often becomes a tacit and inescapable brake on ambitions and change, although they are perceived as necessary.

The effects of the Ukrainian conflict on global food security and on the international energy market, in particular the European one, are a more topical example than ever before; as are the risks associated with military and nuclear escalation; as are the environmentally unsustainable growth trajectories of the great Asian nations, India and China in particular; or the continuation and escalation of internal and international conflicts in Africa and the Middle East. All these phenomena contribute decisively to large-scale displacements, regional and intercontinental migrations. The announced suspension of Russia's participation in the New START treaty aggravates the precarious international political equilibrium. Not only the extremely fragile one between the Cold War main players, but also those between other nuclear powers. The doomsday clock seems to tick increasingly loudly. The combined effects of these phenomena and the inability to decisively limit the externalities caused by globalisation and international anarchy place global communities, both human and non-human, at ever-increasing risk.

The vulnerabilities inherent in socio-environmental systems are likely to become more severe, and with them the impacts and consequences in psychological and social terms. Numerous studies on the youngest members of the wealthiest societies show that levels of eco-anxiety – i.e. chronic fear of environmental collapse – are on the rise. While, on the one hand, this phenomenon can induce individuals to take action to change the status quo, on the other hand excessive levels can lead to counterproductive behaviour in terms of proactivity and extremely negative effects on the individual himself. In

fact, '*presentism*' is the condition that most characterises social action in our time, and it is increasingly so for the youngest, who find themselves crushed by the weight of the contradictions of globalisation and its externalities in socio-economic, environmental and even personal terms. It is necessary to return to imagining the future, to sow the grains of hope in a world capable of remedying, over time, the injustices and aporias of a global economic-political system incapable of offering concrete answers to new generations.

Global federalism, with its universal vision, constitutes a concrete example of a socio-environmental and political structure capable of offering long-term solutions, capable of considering all levels and dimensions of current and future challenges. Being federalists must no longer be a mere act of faith, or a personal awareness, but must aim to constitute the renewing thrust capable of generating the change and vision of a possible future that we need now more than ever, especially among the youngest.

The principle of subsidiarity, the primacy of law over the law of the strongest, the recognition of differences in identity in the awareness of the unity of human society, the consideration of nature as a whole and not as a part clearly separated from the human sphere are the pillars of a federalist thought enlightened by the goal of global peace and justice. These principles – which we must proudly affirm to be values – also constitute the cornerstone on which to build a time horizon of hope and radical transformation of life on our planet. Federalism can – and I believe it has to – be that concrete narrative capable of bringing young people closer to a politics of action and to a concrete thought of a possible future.

Suspension of the New START Treaty: Are We Speeding Up the Doomsday Clock?*

Francesca Bergeretti

On Tuesday 21 February, the ticking of the Doomsday clock – the clock of the apocalypse, as the Doomsday scientists are used to depict it – has progressively become louder. The suspension of Russia's involvement in the New START Treaty (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) has been announced on the occasion of the State of Union speech held by Russian president Vladimir Putin. A decision that comes a few days before the one-year anniversary of the beginning of the Russian invasion in Ukraine, and does not seem to give any indication of possible *détente* between the parties.

The New START Treaty, which entered in force in 2011 and was last renewed in 2021, was signed by presidents Barack Obama and Dmitri Medvedev, and required a commitment by Russia and the US to reduce strategic nuclear warheads, and prescribed a mutual monitoring of nuclear weapons sites too. The adherence to the agreement had, however, weakened and, given the ongoing health emergency, inspections had been previously interrupted in 2019. The formal suspension of the New START represents a further symbolic sign of the rupture towards the West, since the treaty was, to this day, the last bilateral document in existence between Washington and Moscow regarding the control and the restriction of nuclear weapons.

Throughout the years, especially following the Cuban crisis in 1961, the two nuclear powers, USA and URSS, had shown themselves willing to establish a climate of cooperation through the so-called SALT (Strategic Arms Limitation Talks), since, being aware of the destructive capacity of this new equipment, their main concern was to stem the risk of a nuclear war. Nevertheless, a first symptom of the worsening of the relationship between the two forces, in the nuclear field, had been the withdrawal of the USA from the INF Treaty (Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty), which had led to a vicious downward spiral involving other non-proliferation programs, for instance the JCPOA (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action) signed with Iran.

The risk of a new arms race, as many scholars point out, seems therefore to be re-emerging and throwing the political scenario into a balance of terror. This balance brings back the Cold War's approaches by replicating the argument of the security dilemma, which conceives an international system in which any increase in the power of one player is perceived as an act of aggression and, thus, affects the safety of other countries. By applying this discourse to recent events, a reasoning arises and leads to the question of how we can tackle a violent escalation without trusting the powers involved and their foresight, which, it is to be hoped, aims at turning away from a conflictual outcome and at restoring a constructive relationship. Currently, this path seems quite complicated, if not impractical.

As a result, it is, furthermore, necessary to highlight the implications following the

suspension of Russia's contribution to the treaty, and not its full withdrawal. Despite a few cases in which a treaty's suspension has been restored to the pre-existing agreement, the decision taken by Moscow, albeit intimidating, is not yet definitive and several attempts have been made to delay the alarming course of events. The intervention of ICAN (International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons) is extremely relevant. ICAN judges the Kremlin's decision as dangerous and reckless and calls for a repeal of its statement.

Nonetheless, by investigating the reasons that led Russia to suspend its nuclear engagement, there is an accusation by Moscow of the USA's non-cooperation in the implementation of the treaty. The Russian choice would not be entirely irreversible, if there were, as Putin claims, a de-escalation and an actual willingness to resume the treaty on the part of Washington. Again, if one relies on strategic analysis studies, it is possible to interpret Putin's behaviour by referring to Game Theory and highlighting how the Russian president puts the burden of choice on the adversary, recommending the US to demonstrate a political will to cooperate, and in the meantime, refraining from denying a hypothetical deployment of nuclear weapons to defend his country's integrity.

The setback of the bilateral treaty undoubtedly has consequences not only confined to the two countries but, if we take into account the technological advances in the whole world, a relaxation of nuclear safeguards will meet the approval of other regional nuclear powers, such as Iran, Israel, North Korea, India and Pakistan, who aspire to bridge the gap with Moscow and Washington. Given the non-adhesion of these regional powers, with the exception of Iran, to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the nuclear threat is not to be underestimated, and considering the lack of rationality in such a conflict, the consequences could be irreversible.

Consequently, questions arise with regard to which attitudes will prevail in the society towards the threat of a nuclear war and whether we should expect a scenario marked by simplifying optimists, namely rationalists who minimize the effects of the atomic weapon, or, as Norberto Bobbio would define them, by "fatalists" and "nihilists". In a system characterised by a climate of deterrence by punishment, which entrusts the peaceful outcome of international relations to reciprocal awareness of mutually assured destruction, concerns about the world falling back into a climate of uncertainty in the field of nuclear weapons resurface. It would appear, therefore, that the Doomsday Clock has resumed running at an accelerated pace.

Moving Forward to Protect the Oceans

René Wadlow

On 4 March 2023, at the United Nations in New York, an important step toward the protection of the oceans was taken with the presentation of the Treaty on the High Seas. The aim of the treaty is the protection of the biodiversity of the oceans beyond the national territorial limits. These negotiations began in 2004. Their length is an indication of some of the difficulties of the issues.

The new Treaty on the High Seas concerns the bulk of the oceans beyond national jurisdiction and the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The new treaty is a reflection of the concerns on the consequences of global warming, the protection of biodiversity, efforts to counter land-based pollution, and the consequences of over-fishing. The protection of biodiversity is now high on the political agenda of many States.

The new treaty builds upon the negotiations during the 1970s which led to the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. The decade-long negotiations, in which non-governmental organizations such as the Association of World Citizens played an active role, dealt primarily with the extension of national jurisdiction to include an "exclusive economic zone" under the control of the State holding the 12 nautical-mile jurisdiction. The State in question could make financial arrangements with other States on fishing or other activities within the exclusive economic zone.

The 1982 Law of the Sea Convention was an effort to give legal structure to what had been largely customary international law by drafting a comprehensive legal treaty. The Law of the Sea Convention also led to the creation of a legal dispute settlement procedure.

Some of the non-governmental representatives who participated in the 1970s negotiations warned of the difficulties arising from overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones, especially the EEZs around small national islands. Practice has shown that our concerns were justified. The situation in the Mediterranean is complicated by the close contact or overlapping Exclusive Economic Zones of Greece and Turkey, as well as those of Cyprus, Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Israel, all States with deep political tensions.

The current policy of the Chinese government and the number of war ships moving around in the South China Sea goes beyond anything that I feared in the 1970s. The irresponsibility of great powers, their self-serving approach to international law, and the limited capacity of legal institutions to contain State behavior makes one worry. However, there is a 2002 Phnom Penh Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea, which calls for trust, restraint, and dispute settlement by juridical means, so we can hope that "cooler heads" will win out.

Non-governmental organization representatives again played an important role in the creation of the new Treaty on the High Seas, even if there are still issues, such as mining on the ocean bed, left out of the treaty. It is encouraging that there was cooperation among major governments – the USA, China, the European Union. There is still work ahead, and governmental efforts must be watched closely. However, 2023 is off to a good start for the protection and wise use of the oceans.

The Silicon Valley Bank Failure: a Fragile Market that Has Not Understood the Lehman's Lesson

Mario Calvo-Platero

Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) failure gains historical significance not so much with regard to a possible systemic reaction – which is of concern today – that could ensue, but because it is the first financial failure of a digital nature. The striking aspects of this financial failure are not only the speed with which deposits evaporated and the size of the fluctuations in value, typical of a digital economy; but also the bank's client portfolio: mostly companies and venture capital funds, which are financially sophisticated and very reactive.

It is also striking how the age-old, often irrational emotional response that leads to bank runs persists even in this age dominated by unfailing algorithms and risk-taking entrepreneurs with nerves of steel. In this affair – which could easily have been avoided – there are three basic elements to worry about. The first concerns the possible systemic impact of SVB's failure. The second is regulation, especially in a post-2008 context from which the banks wanted to exit. The third is on the macroeconomic and political outlook: are we facing the first recessionary tailspin? And how will Joe Biden react if the country descends into recession between October 2023 and November 2024? At the system level, the risk is always present. For small regional banks, which are more vulnerable in a psychological bank run environment; for bank customers – such as USD Coin, which had USD 3.3 billion in uncollected cash with SVB and went below watch values; for First Republic,

a major bank, identified as vulnerable by investors, whose stock lost 34% in a few days. That said, given the particularity of SVB's model, the risk of a broader systemic failure seems far for now.

The bank's business model seemed prudent: most deposits were invested in US Treasury bonds. But with an average yield of 1.7% on Treasury bonds purchased in the magical era of zero interest rates, the bank began to suffer when yields on treasuries rose in reaction to restrictive monetary policy. And here three vulnerabilities that could have been avoided jump to the eye: the bank never engaged in hedging transactions to protect itself against a possible rise in rates; since it had long-term maturities, it did not have to do the normal mark-to-market reporting. This did not allow the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) to have a complete picture of the situation, although its oversight has been questioned.

And finally, although the crisis was foreseen, timing was poor: it was already known that the sale of some $20 billion of bonds, half of the total assets, would generate a loss of $1.8 billion. A capital increase by Atlantic Investors, mediated by Goldman Sachs, was ready to be put in place. The bank however added the sale of convertible shares, which required an extra day, blocking the overnight capital increase. So, in the real-time era, the Tsunami effect started: in the morning companies withdrew funds

instantly (another vulnerability, thousands of retail customers would have taken longer) and in a couple of days the bank failed with digital-age speed.

Due to these structural peculiarities of SVB, hopefully its failure will not have a systemic impact. With regard to laws, it is unlikely that the banks' pressure to remove post-2008-crisis rigidities will be heeded; indeed, in light of the fragilities that have emerged with SVB, new rules could be introduced. Finally, the macroeconomic side: could this failure be a recessionary wake-up call in the more general context of the impact of rising rates on the US economy? Possibly. History tells us that under conditions of obstinate inflation, central banks' restrictive reactions lead to a recessionary transition.

In this case, however, there is a counterweight to consider: the long wave of extraordinary post-Covid expansionary fiscal policy, unprecedented in history. The Fed is tightening now, and perhaps will accelerate the tightening (in Jay Powell's word), aiming for a coincidence of timing between the exhaustion of the fiscal stimulus, the containment of inflation, and the end of monetary tightening by 2023. A perfect coincidence could thus avert recession. But we know that perfect timing – and the SVB case teaches – does not exist.

On January 27ᵗʰ, the International Day of Commemoration in Memory of the Victims of the Holocaust

Alessandro Cavalli

We all need to reflect on the 'Jewish question', not only for its relevance in European and world's history, but also because it has to do with the horizon of the goals of the present and the future. Let me say first that I am not Jewish and I am not a believer, but I am not trivially an 'atheist'. I think that religions are human constructions, that is, of a species that makes man aware of his own mortality and therefore wonders if there is a 'beyond', a world beyond death, that is, an eternity, something that has no temporal or spatial boundaries.

All human societies have developed some form of religious thought. Of the many forms, the one that is closest to us is monotheism, and the first monotheistic religion is the Jewish religion. It is not excluded that other religions may also boast this characteristic, but as far as our history is concerned, the Jewish people is the first to have postulated the existence of one God, after their expulsion by the pharaohs from Egypt (the dating of the event is controversial).

A people (i.e. a population that recognises his own leader, in this case Moses) that believes in the existence of a single God, if surrounded by other populations that believe in multiple gods, tends to consider itself the 'chosen' one, if only because of the irresistible fascination exerted by the idea of 'unity' and 'oneness'. On the meaning of 'chosen people', i.e. chosen by God, even in the Jewish tradition there are many interpretations. There is no doubt, however, that the 'Jewish question' stems from the claim of each population believing in one God that their own is the 'true one', while that of the others is a 'false' deity. This explains how the fiercest religious wars have been fought between peoples of monotheistic religions. The Jewish question arose from the clash of different monotheisms, that nevertheless found their *common* origin in the Jewish religion.

The Jewish question has outlived its religious origin, and concerns not only believers, but also all atheists and agnostics, both Jewish and non-Jewish. How much anti-Semitism has contributed to the survival of the Jewish identity is a question that deserves to be taken up again (I suggest re-reading illuminating pages by Marx, Sartre, up to Edgar Morin).

There is no need to emphasise the contribution of Jews (religious and otherwise) to European and world culture. However, it should not be forgotten that anti-Semitism has been an essentially European phenomenon, stretching from the Urals to Portugal, and reaching its extreme manifestation in Germany, in the Shoah and National Socialism. The 'blame', if one can speak of blame, lies not only with Germany, but with the whole of Europe. Anti-Semitism reached its peak when nationalism reached its peak, and in a sense forced a people belonging to many nationalities to construct a nationality of their own. Zionism and the creation of a state of Israel in the land

of Palestine is hardly conceivable without the anti-Semitism fueled by nationalism. The nationalism of European states fueled the nationalism of the Jewish state, that would have probably never come into being.

European Jews had enjoyed (so to speak) the uncertain 'privilege' of maintaining their own identity as one people despite belonging to many 'homelands'; they were at the same time 'citizens' but also 'foreigners', Italians, Germans, French, Spaniards, Poles, Russians, etc., but also 'Jews'. In a way, we can say that the Jews could have formed an original nucleus of a European people in the making, if the European nationalism had not forced them to become nationalists themselves.

Until the Shoah, the vast majority of Jews lived in Europe. After the Shoah, they scattered all over the world. Today 45% live in Israel, almost as many in the USA and Canada, the rest in Latin America; in Europe there is a small minority left, mainly in France and Britain, a few communities resist in North Africa, Iran and Turkey. We can hope that Jews, who could have become the vanguard of the European people in the making, can now become, following the example of Albert Einstein, the vanguard of a global citizenship.

On the Promises of the East African Federation

Wangari wa Ngai

Why we need federalism to tackle global challenges

A federation is a structure of governance that distributes power among two interdependent levels of government. The first level is the federal government, and the second level is the state. The federal government has centralized control of key sectors of a nation, such as taxation, external defence, foreign policy, fiscal and monetary policy, and other aspects of governance stipulated in the national constitution. The state governments, on the other hand, deal with the provision of social services, such as health, education and public infrastructure, and other responsibilities allocated to them by the national constitution.

Federalism is the advocacy of forms of governance that decentralize power among two or more levels of government. Federalism may include other forms of decentralized structures, such as devolution and confederations or leagues. Devolution is the form of governance where central authority is distributed to local levels, but the central government remains the locus of governance. Confederation is a system in which the central government is weak enough to be subservient to the interests of its constituent states. A league is a loose association of states with a common goal. A federal government is unique because it subsumes the constituent states that form it, while allowing the member states to retain their autonomy and identity.

Some key global issues that are contemporary include global pandemics, climate change, transnational terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and economic crises.

Contextualizing an ideal federation

A federation ought to have three branches at the federal level – an executive, a legislature and a judiciary. These levels should be independent, so that they can check each other and create accountability. Under the federal level are the constituent states, or counties or cantons. The states also have their own constitutions, legislatures, executives and judiciary. The federal government should make and enforce laws on all citizens. The states also make and enforce legislation that is applicable within their state, and that does not contradict federal law.

The federation applies the principles of solidarity at the federal level, and the principle of subsidiarity at the state level. The federal government works for the common good, unites all the citizens, and takes up responsibilities that are best handled at that level, such as foreign policy, external defence, and creating a level playing field for its constituent parts in terms of trade and development. The state level protects ethnic and other minorities, ensures efficient delivery of basic services such as health and education at the local level, and addresses the particular needs of their local communities.

The aspirations of East African nations for political unity

The East African countries of Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda were administered by one power (Great Britain), albeit with different statuses. Kenya was a colony, Tanganyika (before it joined with Zanzibar to form Tanzania) was a territory, and Uganda was a protectorate. When these

countries gained independence, they shied away from creating a political federation, due to ideological and development differences. They instead opted for a confederation between 1967 and 1977, that was called the East African Community.

The East African Community was revived in 1999 after it had collapsed in 1977, with a goal of ultimately achieving a political federation.

The goal of political unification is aided by the geographical continuity of their territory, the presence of a common language (Swahili) that is widely spoken in the region, shared colonial experiences, common challenges such as terrorism, climate change and poverty, and somewhat similar development statuses.

The aspirations to political unity in the East African Community will be further aided by an increase in intra-regional trade with the adoption of the Protocol of the EAC Customs Union (2005) and the EAC Protocol on the Common Market (2010), which guarantee free movement of persons, labour, capital, services, and commodity, and remove tariffs, import quotas and non-tariff barriers to trade. Additionally, the EAC has plans to roll out a common East African Shilling, which will further facilitate cross-border capital transfers and trade.

The role of the proposed East African Federation in tackling common challenges
A politically unified East African Community will be better placed to tackle the common challenges that we face in the region, which include, insecurity, climate change, water management, pandemics and poverty.

A federation of East African countries will have a more effective East African Standby Force (EASF) to intervene in hotspots of insecurity, such as the Eastern provinces of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In comparison to the current situation where the contribution of troops is the prerogative of member states, a federation will have its own resources and powers to conscript troops. This will make the federation an ideal institution for rapid deployment of security forces where they are needed. The federal government will also be best placed to solve inter-state disputes when they arise, and to intervene in any member state when human rights abuses are being committed, to protect innocent and vulnerable citizens from arbitrary use of state power.

A federation will also have the resources to implement climate change adaptation and mitigation measures. The federation will have the resources to provide grants, cheap loans and incentives such as subsidies to their constituent states which do not have enough resources. The federation will also distribute resources in a fair manner to ensure equity in development among the constituent states, and lift the bottom 40 percent out of extreme poverty, hence cushioning them from the most drastic effects of climate impacts.

A federation will be able to take appropriate action against a member state that is lenient on companies and entities that destroy the ecosystems. The federal government will have the coercive power to establish and execute policies that will protect water catchment areas. In particular, it will be able to make sure that members states comply with the principles of the Protocol for the Sustainable Development of Lake Victoria Basin. Besides, the federation can complement this protocol with additional environmental laws that are binding to all member states, giving the federal government a veto on how states utilize water resources within their territory. A harmonized policy that allows equitable and reasonable utilization of water resources will give all the riparian states equitable allocation of the waters of the Nile. The federal government will provide for

rights and obligations on all peripheral states and there will be a clear referee (the Federal government) to look and enforce that law.

Apart from the above benefits, a federal government will be able to set high standards for the sports sector, and facilitate deeper commercialization of sports. This is in line with the joint-bid by Kenya with Uganda and Tanzania to host the 2027 AFCON football tournament. A federal government of East Africa will have more resources and diplomatic strength to bid to host regional and global tournaments such as AFCON and the World Cup.

Conclusion

A federal government is a governance system that combines the principles of solidarity and subsidiarity. If implemented in the East African Community, a federation will enable the region to harness its development potential and become an African powerhouse. Most importantly, the federation will have the powers, prerogatives, potential and resources to effectively manage common challenges such as security, climate change and underdevelopment, and spur progress in social and cultural sectors, such as social justice, sports and diplomacy.

EU Foreign Ministries Launch the Group of Friends on Qualified Majority Voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy

On 4 May 2023, nine EU member states created an "inclusive group of friends" for Qualified Majority Voting on Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters.

This is what is announced in a press release of the German Foreign Ministry, according to which, in addition to Germany, the group includes Italy, Belgium, Finland, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia and Spain. Romania took part in the first informal meeting of the ministers of foreign affairs in Brussels, on 22 May, as an additional member of the Group of friends.

The objective of the Group of friends is to improve effectiveness and speed in foreign-policy decision-making.

Against the backdrop of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine and the growing international challenges facing the EU, the member countries of the group of friends are convinced that decision-making processes in EU foreign policy must be adapted in order to strengthen the Union as a global actor. Improving the decision-making process is also essential in view of other future objectives of the EU.

The group of friends intends to make concrete progress in matters of foreign and security policy on the basis of the norms already contained in the EU Treaty.

Group members will regularly take stock of and work closely with all EU member states and coordinate with EU institutions. Membership of the group is open to all member states that have an interest in improving decision-making processes in EU foreign policy, in particular through the increased use of qualified majority voting.

The group will transparently share the results of its deliberations with all member states.

Europe in the Midst of a War of Influence: the Informational Strategy of Russia's Political Revisionism

Jean-Marie Reure

More than one year has passed since Russia's decision to launch a full-scale offensive against Ukraine. The so-called "special operation" decided by the Kremlin, turned into a war of attrition between two sovereign states, as a result, has challenged numerous assumptions held by both scholars and practitioners. The first was that inter-state conflicts were a phenomenon of the past, whilst major threats to the international community were to be found in underdeveloped areas, plagued by instability and internal strife. The second belief was that economic interdependence and globalization were the remedies against political revisionism. The third assumption painted Europe as a heaven of peace. Keagan's 2003 seminal book *Of Paradise and Power* uses a colourful metaphor in this regard, describing the Americans as coming from Mars, whereas Europeans come from Venus, in reference to the different understanding of the world held by the decision-makers in the two continents. Whilst US policymakers had a more martial, confrontational understanding of inter-state relations, EU leaders supposedly held a more peaceful, trade-oriented view of these same connections. This illusion has crumbled, once more, after February 24, 2022. The EU now sees itself, somehow forcibly, as a geopolitical entity and a security provider. The Union's "strategic awakening" comes however with a significant delay, lagging behind long-consolidated strategic policies such as those of the US, the UK and France, one of its Member States. A

truly European strategic policy thus has much potential, but also faces many challenges. One of them, largely overlooked by the war in Ukraine, is that of influence.

Russia's influence in the world and its informational ecosystem

The term influence, in the context of International Relations (IR), currently lacks a proper definition. It is a term generally employed with reference to Russia's hybrid threats against Western interests in the world. One could think of influence as a sort of soft power, although it bears a more confrontational stance. According to Joseph Nye, the originator of the concept, a country's "soft power" relies on the attractiveness of its culture to others, on the political values a country lives up to and on the perceived legitimacy (and moral authority) of its foreign policies. Russia, a revisionist state, is currently using its influence not only to undermine western soft power, but also to advance its interests. It does so mainly using two means: official channels and supposedly private, non-state actors. Russia's influence is thus bicephalous. On one hand, it relies on its diplomacy, which essentially takes the form of military/security agreements and arms deals with partner countries. Moscow's foreign policy initiatives are then amplified by state-affiliated media, such as *Russia Today* and *Sputnik*, which have an international audience. On the other, Russia employs pseudo Private Military and Security Contractors (PMSCs)

– best epitomized by the infamous Wagner Group –, local media and news websites it indirectly controls, and troll farms. Whilst military cooperation treaties and PMSCs belong more to the "hard power" side of the coin, Russia's informational ecosystem bears a crucial role in its influence strategy.

Russian decision-makers see information as a domain of perpetual confrontation with their perceived adversaries, both in peacetime and in conflict. Accordingly, the Kremlin has developed a collection of official, proxy, and unattributed communication channels and platforms to create, spread and amplify disinformation and propaganda. The term ecosystem underlines the fact that there is no uniformity or coherence in the information Moscow controls directly or indirectly: this conception of purpose-driven information allows greater flexibility and dynamism, in that different and sometimes overlapping messages end-up reinforcing each other, even when they appear contradictory. Russia has thus been investing heavily in this ecosystem to tarnish the image of western countries, undermining their international legitimacy by spreading false and misleading narratives. Although these malicious efforts might seem abstract and distant from "real-world" issues, they do bear practical consequences.

The tangible consequences of Russia's influence
To understand the impact of Russian propaganda and disinformation one could take examples from Central Asia, the Middle East, the Americas, Europe or Africa. Such is the reach of Russia's informational ecosystem. Focusing on Africa seems however to suit better the aims of this article, not only because the Kremlin's propaganda has been more effective – and visible – in this continent, but also due to the current "war of influence" waged by Russian proxies against France and other

western actors in the Sahel region. The tipping point of Moscow's "Africa policy" was reached during the 2019 *Russia-Africa Forum*, held in the coastal city of Sochi. The forum officially ended a two decades-long disinterest in African issues, that had characterized Russia's foreign policy after the end of the Cold War. The crucial role in the organization of the Sochi Forum played by two oligarchs linked to Russia's informational ecosystem, Konstatin Malofeev and Evgeny Prigozhin, already signaled one of the core characteristics of the Kremlin's involvement in Africa: the privatization of its foreign policy. The first, successful "hard test" for Moscow's African policy had already begun two years before the Sochi Forum, in the Central African Republic (CAR). It is a former French colony, a small, landlocked country plagued by internal conflicts and instability. Like other African countries, its wealth consists mainly of natural resources, especially diamonds, located in the north of the country. Russians first enter the country in late 2017, with a large shipment of weapons delivered in derogation of a UN arms embargo. In 2018, Russian military instructors and advisors make their first appearance in CAR: most of them, if not all, belong to the Prighozin-controlled Wagner PMSC. Soon thereafter, a former FSB official (Russia's Federal Security Service, formerly known under the acronym of KGB), Valery Zakharov, becomes National Security Advisor to CAR's President, Faustin-Archange Touadéra. At the time CAR's operational environment is already quite dense: MINUSCA (the UN mission in CAR) troops along with the French military are tasked with stabilizing the country, while the European Training Mission (EUTM-CAR) provides strategic advice and training to CAR's armed forces (FACA). In such a crowded context for Russia's African policy, it is essential to show effectiveness in quelling CAR's armed insurgency for two reasons. First, because for the Kremlin is essential to show that Russian forces are capable of conducting

a full-fledged stabilization mission. Second, because, in doing so, they will also undermine western credibility to deliver effective results in conducting this kind of operation. For these reasons, Wagner "instructors" soon take on active combat roles, fighting rebels along with FACA forces. In a few months, after a harsh counterinsurgency campaign without much attention being paid to human rights, Russian forces have routed insurgents out of CAR borders. Military actions alone, although successful, are not enough to enshrine Russia's influence in CAR. Through Lobaye Invest, a Russian-owned company operating in CAR's mining sector, Bangui's Radio Lenga Songo receives important funding. A thorough analysis of the radio's content shows that, upon receiving Russian funds, articles, interviews, and speeches gradually become more critical of the French engagement in CAR. MINUSCA is strongly criticized as being ineffective, whilst Russian forces' operations are eulogized. At the time of writing, reports suggest that several FACA battalions trained by EUTM are under the direct control of Russian contractors, while French troops have completely withdrawn from the country. A strong anti-French sentiment has spread across the country, partly fueled by Radio Lenga Songo.

Radio Lenga Songo has a limited, local audience. However, somehow surprisingly, some of the articles it produces have been re-published by *Russia Today* and *Sputnik*, two Russia-affiliated international media outlets that have a far broader audience. At the same time, Radio Lenga Songo's content is very similar to that produced by Radio Revolution Panafricaine or Afrique Media TV, two alternative pan-Africanists voices in Africa's media landscape. Panafrican outlets are among the most effective actors in Russia's informational ecosystem in Africa: not only do they have a transnational audience without showing any formal affiliation with Russia,

but they also have ideological positions that resonate with Russian propaganda. Anticolonialism, critique of the EU presence in Africa, rejection of "colonial monies", such as the Franc CFA, defence of traditional values and criticism towards Western "moral degradation" are arguments shared by both Panafricanists and Russian propagandists. In this regard, Afrique Media TV has hosted on its platforms one of the most virulent Pan-African activists, the Franco-Beninese Kémi Séba. Mr Séba, together with another Pan-African activist, Mrs Nathlie Yamb, also known as "the lady of Sochi" due to her participation in the 2019 Russia-Africa forum, are considered to be African "*entrepreneurs of influence*"[1] working on Moscow's behalf. The definition of entrepreneurs reflects the fact that these activists assume the inherent risks of their malicious activities. They use their influence as well as their financial and social capital to "invest in a sector" (in this case information) hoping for some kind of reward – be it financial and/or political – by the Kremlin's decision-makers. This system also guarantees "plausible deniability" for Russia: in case of failure these entrepreneurs could be easily disavowed by Russian authorities, which would thus avoid getting directly involved. Entrepreneurs of influence, therefore, create news outlets and websites, organize influence campaigns on social media and engage in hostile "trolling" to advance Russian interests. Mr. Séba and Mrs. Yamb are thus an integral part of Russia's informational ecosystem, which actively contributes to fueling anti-West and anti-French sentiments in francophone Africa. This popular resentment, in turn, has caused concrete operational issues: for example, in 2021 a French army convoy transporting weapons from the Ivory Coast to Niger has been blocked for days in Burkina's northern city of Kaya, because the local population was convinced that the French army intended to deliver weapons to terrorists.

Comments

Our values are our strength: a toolbox to protect them

In this context, the EU cannot be a passive spectator. It needs to be able to defend and protect proactively such authority, on its soil and in the outside world, without compromising it. This is possible only if we think about defence as a collective endeavour. Europeans must collectively learn to speak the language of power to continue to favour dialogue over conflict, diplomacy over coercion, and multilateralism over unilateralism. The Union's values are the fruits of a common enterprise, borne out of the blood spilt on Europe's battlefields and thus cannot be an excuse for inaction. The 2022 EU Strategic Compass institutes the creation of an "EU hybrid toolbox" aimed at providing a common framework for a coordinated response against hybrid threats, foreign information manipulation and interference. This is an important step in the EU's "strategic awakening": its strength resides in European values, that collectively constitute its moral authority. EU moral authority is currently threatened by revisionist actors, that leverage propaganda and false information to increase their influence to the detriment of the EU's. African countries are indeed strategic partners for the EU, not only because of their importance as trading partners, but also because they play an instrumental role in the security of Europe's southern borders. Europe therefore cannot afford to lose its influence in Africa, because the stakes are too high. To preserve it, the EU must act in two directions. First, it needs to be able to counter proactively foreign – malicious – influence, and in this regard the "EU hybrid toolbox" is a necessary instrument. Second, it also needs to rethink its African relationships, developing new opportunities for dialogue and cooperation with African states and regional organizations. Much attention has been given to the security side of EU-Africa relationships, whilst the long-term political objectives of EU's Africa policy have been neglected. This could be just the right time to do so. We, Europeans, might have landed on Venus, but not before exploring what living on Mars really implies. And that we should not forget.

[1]The definition of entrepreneurs of influence is taken from Marlene Laruelle & Kevin Limonier (2021) Beyond "hybrid warfare": a digital exploration of Russia's entrepreneurs of influence, *Post-Soviet Affairs*, 37:4, 318-335, DOI: 10.1080/1060586X.2021.1936409

William Pace. Personification of Peace

Daniel K. White

Hailing from the Rocky Mountains of Colorado, William Pace grew up in the post WWII era that brought about an unprecedented economic boom in America and witnessed a dynamic change in civil society with the emergence of a counterculture when Pace graduated from the University of Denver. Like so many other young Americans, Pace was faced with the possibility of being conscripted during the height of the Vietnam War. As his university's student body president, he opposed the war and secured conscientious objector classification. In his moral and intellectual struggle with war, Pace stumbled upon Albert Einstein's largely unknown but intriguing biography *Einstein on Peace* and his struggle with "war" by Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden. Einstein's thoughts on peace resonated deeply with Pace and it would become one of Pace's greatest inspirations in pursuing a life devoted to protecting the environment, international justice, rule of law, human rights, and world peace.

Pace's discovery of Einstein's soul searching for world peace gave Pace the impetus to find out more about Einstein's significant involvement in the World Federalist Movement (WFM). The campaign for world federalism began in the 1930s in direct response to the failed attempt by the League of Nations to prevent the outbreak of another world war with the idea and concept becoming popularized in 1937 by two influential pacifists and feminists Rosika Schwimmer and Lola Maverick Lloyd.

After the movement gained momentum through the likes of Rosika Schwimmer, Lola Maverick Lloyd and others, similar groups with the same objectives aimed at preventing and abolishing war through peaceful means began

to flourish. The movement for world federalism continued to grow with several publications such as *The Anatomy of Peace* by Emery Reves in 1945 and early notable figures like Albert Einstein, Oscar Hammerstein II (Rodgers & Hammerstein) and Bette Davis were well-known advocates for world federalism and instrumental in promulgating the movement.

The WFM founded in 1947 is today a non-profit, non-partisan organisation committed to the realisation of global peace and justice through the development of democratic institutions and the application of international and world law. The ongoing success of this historic movement can be attributed to many individuals, and owing to the foresight and initial efforts by Rosika Schwimmer and Lola Maverick Lloyd who envisioned world federalism, members of WFM-IGP today continue to gather from around the globe to collaborate and work effectively and tirelessly with one another in harmony towards preventing World War and establishing peace.

In 1983 the Institute for Global Policy (IGP) was implemented as an educational arm of the WFM and continues to this day to improve and better understand the United Nations (UN) and other international organizations. Its primary function is to research and form policies aimed at promoting human security, international justice, the prevention of armed conflict and the protection of civilians. Given the gravity of work WFM-IGP is involved with, the movement has attracted influential and charismatic personalities even in contemporary times such as Martin Sheen and the late Sir Peter Ustinov who was well known for his humanitarian and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) efforts and served as International President of the WFM-IGP from 1994-2004.

Pace gained extensive experience working for many years for peace and disarmament causes, as well as working for Amnesty International and for preparations for the UN Decade of International Law and the Earth Summit (UN Conference on Environment and Development). Pace became acting Secretary-General of WFM in 1988 and began full-time service at the UN office of the WFM in 1994. During Pace's tenure while he was Executive Director for the WFM-IGP (1994-2019) and since then, Pace has had a propitious career and tangible success with international justice, the rule of law, environmental law, and human rights.

It was a seminal moment in July 1998 for international law and justice when by a vote of 120-7, the world's governments adopted the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court (ICC) and four years later, in July 2002, 66 nations ratified the treaty establishing the ICC (now 123 nations ratified). Pace and the Coalition for the ICC comprising 2500 organizations worldwide, organized and hosted by WFM-IGP, were widely recognized as fundamental to the creation of the ICC both being nominated numerous times for the Nobel Peace Prize. Pace and WFM-IGP were asked by the government of Canada to organize a global coalition for another major new norm – the Responsibility to Protect – endorsed by more than a hundred nations. Thus, two monumental achievements were implemented and continue to serve the international community in preventing and ceasing aggression, genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing. In acknowledgement of Pace's immeasurable contributions, he was awarded the William J Butler Human Rights Award 2002 from the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights and was nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on the ICC.

Despite the hurdles and challenges presented globally by various governments from all corners around the world, Pace has consistently been unabated in his pursuit of global peace and even

served as the Secretary-General of the Hague Appeal for Peace (1996-1999) and chaired what has been called the largest peace conference in history, marking the 100th anniversary of the first Hague Peace Conference that involved more than 8,000 nongovernmental organizations, international institutions, and government representatives. When reflecting on the efficacy and ongoing role of the United Nations, in an article published by Pace in 2016 he stated the following "Let me state that I believe it is highly likely that the UN has prevented WW III – that is a war between P5 governments (Permanent Members: China, France, Russia, USA, UK and other states) using nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction." Given Pace's expertise, he has been widely featured in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, the BBC, CNN, Der Spiegel and while Pace's overall achievements may not be widely known, his actions speak volumes of what can be accomplished through a life pursuing peace.

Today, Pace continues to devote his time to numerous transnational committees and leads the Center for Development of International Law, where Pace has served as President since 1989. His contribution to justice, law, the environment, and humanity over the past 30 years is nothing short of remarkable. The old peace movement (WFM-IGP) which Pace has been a pivotal member of, has not only managed to keep with the zeitgeist of the times, it offers everyone to be a part of a worldwide community who share the same honorable ideals for justice, law, environmental protection and human rights, and values.

With devastating natural disasters, wars, and civil conflicts around the world today, Einstein could not have been more insightful and profound in his quote for peace: "Peace cannot be kept by force; it can only be achieved by understanding."
Pace is the embodiment and exemplification of what Einstein envisaged; long may he endure.

18 Points to Restart Global Multilateralism Strengthening Regional Integration: the Case for Economic and Monetary Integration in Latina America

Alfonso Iozzo and Fabio Masini

1. Since the end of the Bretton Woods regime in 1971 the dollar, that ceased being *de jure* the pivotal currency in the International Monetary System (IMS), acquired a *de facto* hegemony in international payments and reserves.

2. After the financial crisis triggered by the subprime mortgage bubble in the USA a revision of the global financial regulatory framework was gathering momentum, and a call for a Bretton Woods 2 conference was largely put forward to revise the IMS. The UN Stiglitz Commission in 2009 made some interesting suggestions that aimed at a more equitable, regulated, and multilateral governance of the IMS.

3. Before the weaponization of the dollar after the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, an increasing trend towards multilateralism in the IMS was manifest. The issue of €650bn SDRs, as a multicurrency reserve asset, in August 2021 was a testimony of this.

4. The world is called to tackle common challenges that require the provision of global public goods; thus, it cannot surrender to the logic of bilateral confrontation between East and West, with again a marginalization of the role of other regions, such as Africa and Latina America.

5. A renewed effort towards multilateralism and a new global system constructed upon regional integrations is urgent.

6. The strengthening of the regional integration processes in areas where this is lagging behind is crucial for the sustainability of the global economy and the emergence of global collective choices.

7. Multilateralism is also crucial to stabilize the international economy, which relies only on US deficits to provide the liquidity required to support trade, development, and catch-up processes, thus making the IMS inherently unstable.

8. Latina America is the continent where the regional integration processes are most promising, assisted also by some embryonic common institutions.

9. The proposal for a common, parallel currency – the *sur* – to be adopted first between Argentina and Brazil, open to other regional currencies, goes in the right direction and should be further encouraged.

10. The experience of the European Monetary System might provide guidance to avoid mistakes and profit from successes that that experience showed.

11. Country-specific macroeconomic performances are relevant in designing regional integration, but any such process is eminently political and requires being supported by a strong political commitment.

12. In turn, such political commitment cannot simply rest on solemn declarations, but must be assisted by institutions and rules for collective choice and by a strong interest of private actors.

13. Political commitment requires binding norms and institutions that allow a systematic dialogue and macroeconomic convergence, to avoid stress on regional exchange rates and allow for a smooth reduction of inflation gaps; and to provide some legitimacy to collective decisions.

14. The revitalizing and further strengthening of the UNASUR system might provide a venue for further steps in this direction.

15. Once political commitment is ensured, market agents must be enabled to show their preferences and a private market for *sur* should be established, thanks to issues of *sur*-denominated bonds, by both private and public institutions.

16. The anchor problem for regional monetary integration cannot be solved in Latin America with the use of any national currency, as there is no manifestly hegemonic economy in the region. A solution might be therefore explored to anchor the *sur* to the SDR, as a very stable multicurrency reserve asset under the IMF management, instead of making it a regional basket currency.

17. The Bank for International Settlements may be entitled to help build and monitor the infrastructure required for regional clearing and financial transactions among the members.

18. Imported credibility and macroeconomic stabilization are the most evident *pros* of regional monetary integration, accompanied by *costs* related to the loss of freedom on exchange rate policy. This might pose problems of international competitiveness that require costly industrial conversion and greater systemic efficiency. Although such costs are country-specific and should be borne by each country, a regional financial institution (such as an existing or ad-hoc created Multilateral Development Bank or Fund), might assist such a process with issues of *sur*-denominated bonds on the international financial markets.

The Common Argentine-Brazilian Currency: a Great Opportunity

Fernando A. Iglesias

An episode of enormous relevance, but forgotten: the governments of Brazil and Argentina were a few hours away from announcing the creation of a common currency, the peso-real.

In mid-2019, in the midst of exchange-rate instability, the Economy Ministers Nicolás Dujovne and Paulo Guedes, and Presidents Macri and Bolsonaro, had decided to jointly launch this common initiative. A few hours before the announcement, however, everything failed due to the opposition of the president of the Central Bank of Brazil, Roberto Campos Neto, fearful that the chronic Argentine monetary instability would end up infecting his country.

Lula da Silva's recent statements in favor of the creation of a South American currency put the issue back on the table.

This is a question of enormous importance for Argentina, a country in which inflation has been responsible for all the exponential increases in poverty: from 6.2% to 31.2% between 1974 and 1976; from 9.1% to 34.5% between 1980 and 1983; from 21.2% to 47.3% between 1986 and 1989, and from 35.4% to 54.3% between 2001 and 2002; in all cases, with inflationary indices of three or four digits.

A country, moreover, whose only momentarily successful attempt to reduce inflation consisted, basically, in controlling the monetary issue by tying it to an external anchor: fixing one dollar = one peso.

Today, faced with the government's suicidal insistence that the issue does not generate inflation and the galloping inflation that is its consequence, there are two solution proposals on the part of the opposition: that of guaranteeing by law the independence of the Central Bank, and that of dollarizing. A single currency with Brazil combines the virtues and reduces the related problems of both proposals.

In any of its variants: bilateral, South American or Mercosur, a single currency with Brazil would subordinate the monetary issue to a foreign Central Bank and to an agreement with a country, Brazil, whose dimensions make Argentina a minor partner, which seems to have learned from its previous inflationary processes. So the Real – which had the same value as the peso in the 1 to 1 rule of the '90s – is worth 25 times more today.

In this sense, with a common currency, the Brazilian real would play a role similar to that of the German mark in Europe, which generated the Euro and put an end to inflation and systematic devaluations in countries like Italy and Spain.

The fact that the value of the Argentine currency is tied to a supranational bank, responsible for controlling its issuance, similar to the European Central Bank, and not simply to a law, would give monetary stability in a long-term perspective, much longer than the four years management by the same government that would enable the mere reform of the Argentine Central Bank charter, always subject

to the whim of parliamentary majorities and a law that modifies it.

Furthermore, it would end the sad habit of competitive devaluations, those "beggar-thy-neighbor policies", as defined by John M. Keynes, that were crucial to the collapse of Convertibility a few years after the Brazilian devaluation.

The monetary association with Brazil also has several advantages over dollarization.

First of all, since Brazil is our main trading partner (13% of our exports and imports), monetary stability and the simplification of calculations and procedures would facilitate the integration of production chains and long-term investment planning.

Secondly, an Argentine-Brazilian currency would associate two similar economies, exporters of commodities and importers of raw materials and industrial equipment, and will tend to synchronize their monetary needs. Quite the opposite of what happened in the 1990s with the United States, whose completely different productive structure generated opposite needs and created enormous problems of monetary synchronization.

Thirdly, future productivity gains for Brazil and Argentina are expected to be similar, while an association with the US dollar would tie the Argentine economy to another one with notable productivity differences,

generating a progressive exchange rate lag and competitiveness problems.

A single Argentine-Brazilian currency would also favor the development of Mercosur, currently paralyzed, and regional economic integration, generating an economic space of the scale necessary to stimulate investment and promote the integration of international value chains.

Not less important, it would greatly favor another crucial point for the modernization of both countries: the final entry into force of the agreement between the European Union and Mercosur will generate the largest common economic space in the world, governed by only two currencies.

Finally, a single currency with Brazil would have the advantage of anchoring our monetary policy to an external factor, avoiding the inconvenience of the dollar being the currency that performs this function; which makes it politically more viable. Some will see in it the possibility of ending inflation; others will see it as a favorable instrument for regional integration. In any case, its political viability and, therefore, its prospect of approval and long-term duration, is greater.

There are not many reasons still for economic optimism at this end of the cycle. But perhaps in this aspect, the monetary one, the planets have magically aligned. Hopefully, we will not let this extraordinary opportunity pass by.

Towards a Latin American Monetary Integration? Opportunities and Threats

Fabio Masini

As is now well known, Argentina and Brazil are thinking of starting an embryonic monetary integration in Latin America, with a common currency called "sur", open to the participation of other countries on the continent. This is not the first time this has been discussed: remember the somewhat improvised idea of Raul Alfonsin (Argentine president) and Jose Sarney (Brazilian president), who proposed a common currency called "gaucho" in 1987. It had no follow-up.

Chavez, in his own way, had also tried to move in a similar direction when he proposed the creation of a Banco del Sur to free Latin America from the economic subservience and political influences of the US and the international institutions it controls. The question is whether and why this time the attempt should be more successful. More importantly, what should be the steps to follow.

The announcement was reminiscent of what was decided at the EEC summit in Bremen in July 1978 by Schmidt and Giscard d'Estaing, when the launch of the European Monetary System and the ecu was decided. The European experience may indeed provide a useful reference point for understanding how South American monetary integration might evolve.

It was, however, an experience, the European one, that stemmed from afar, well before 1978: from discussions in the 1960s to reform the international monetary system and get out of the hegemony – the "exorbitant privilege" (as

Charles de Gaulle, Raymond Barre and Barry Eichengreen have repeatedly called it) – of the dollar; from the (weak) attempt at a European monetary snake in 1972, which followed the end of the Bretton Woods regime (August 1971). At that time, European countries decided to create a European unit of account (ecu) de facto still pegged to the dollar (it had the same gold content as a US dollar). Until they eventually arrived at the European Monetary System and the ecu became the basket currency of national currencies.

But the ecu, when it came to finally disengage from the dollar, had a strong and credible reference point: the German mark. A similar role could be played, in the case of Latin America, only by the SDR, itself a basket currency used by the International Monetary Fund; toward which interest and attention have grown in recent years. And it is precisely this attention, also with a view to reviving multilateralism, jeopardized by the recent upheaval of the world order, that could breathe new life into the prospects of regional currencies. The sur could find itself in the company of unexpected allies, outside Latin America as well.

What would be needed, however, would be the development of a private sur market; with bonds of large corporations and sovereign states issued in SDRs and/or the new currency. So as to create the preconditions and incentives for its increasing use. Indeed, it was the creation of a growing private market for the ecu that enabled it to evolve from a common currency

to the single European currency, the euro, when geopolitical conditions made it realistic and feasible with the end of the bipolar equilibrium.

Concerns with respect to economic gaps between countries, on the other hand, while not to be ignored, should be of lesser concern, as the European case has once again shown. Of course, it is still necessary to embark on paths of macroeconomic convergence among Latin American economies (an arduous task, due to the even less homogeneous starting conditions than there were in Europe), in order to revive their economies and the credibility of their public finances. But the European experience has shown how political will can trigger virtuous mechanisms that, if well exploited, can help convergence, and make regional economic and monetary integration increasingly solid.

While the optimality criteria of a currency area are not automatically met once the political decision is made, it is nevertheless undeniable that, for example, the dividend of the euro – i.e., the fall in interest rates (and thus the cost of servicing debt), due to the expectation of the entry into the single currency – allowed Italy in the 1990s to enjoy hundreds of billions of additional resources that could have been directed to promote growth, investment, and increase the potential of the Italian economy. It did not happen: the dividend of the euro ended up almost entirely in current spending. But that is another story, all Italian. One that we hope will not be repeated in Latin American countries.

In addition to learning from the successes of the European monetary integration experience, it would indeed be useful for South American countries to learn from European mistakes as well. We Italians, in this sense, have much to teach.

24 February, European Resistance Day

Antonio Longo

There is a clear connection between the Ukrainian Resistance and the process of European unification, which was born during the Resistance to Nazi-fascism in order to ensure peace among the European peoples through the sharing of sovereignty in different areas, through the creation of common institutions and policies.

For years now Ukraine has chosen to be part of this process.

The Resistance of Ukraine to Putin's war, which is a war to divide Europe, has therefore become that of all Europeans who no longer want to go back to a time when resorting to war was an option for states.

Our call for European institutions to proclaim 24 February "European Resistance Day" has therefore a highly symbolic and political value: it brings together the Ukrainian Resistance and the fight for freedom, democracy and peace born in Europe in the dark years of the Resistance against Nazi-fascism.

To the European Parliament
To the European Commission
To the European Council

February 24, 2022, is the date that marks the return to a Europe of power politics, of war as a means of resolving disputes between states, of the Great-Russian nationalism as an ideology that seeks to justify the use of imperialism as a means to rule the World.

It is a war against the principle of European unity, a peaceful revolution that has made it possible for Europeans to live together with shared values and political institutions for 70 years.

The European Union, winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, is the area of 'achieved peace' between peoples who have decided to share a common destiny.

Ukraine, a country under attack, has decided to join the European family.

Her struggle for independence, freedom and democracy is our struggle for European independence, freedom and democracy.

Her Resistance is our Resistance, her dead are our dead.

This is why we call on the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council to proclaim

24 February, the European Resistance Day
Long live Ukrainian Resistance!
Long live European Unity!

In Memory of Benjamin Ferencz

World Court of Human Rights Updates

At 103 years old, Benjamin Ferencz was the last living prosecutor from the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal. He died on 7 April 2023.

He collected the evidence of Nazi genocide, in particular the crimes perpetrated by the special "action groups," or Einsatzgruppen. Twenty-two defendants were charged with murdering over a million people. He was only twenty-seven years old. It was his first case.

Ferencz was a life-long advocate of the global rule of law and world government. He co-wrote the book *Planethood* with Ken Keyes, an inspiring book where he says: "Nuremberg taught me that creating a world of tolerance and compassion would be a long and arduous task. And I also learned that if we did not devote ourselves to developing effective world law, the same cruel mentality that made the Holocaust possible might one day destroy the entire human race". Asked by David Gallup, President of World Service Authority (founded by Garry Davis in 1954), about his thoughts about the creation of a World Court of Human Rights, he replied: "Dear David, I appreciate your letter asking for my brief comments regarding the creation of a World Court of Human Rights. My views are similar to those you cite from my friend Judge Tom Buergenthal. As the last surviving Nuremberg war crimes Prosecutor, of course it would be desirable to have a World Court of Human Rights. Most of my life I have campaigned for "Law Not War". I am now in my 102nd year and I have worked with many of those who sought a world government. The closest we have come to the desired goal has been to create the new International Criminal Court in The Hague. The Rome Statute that laid the foundation for the court not only punishes war crimes but also Crimes against Humanity. Certainly, this newborn babe has difficulties, but the main difficulty which a proposed world court would surely encounter is the fact that many States are not prepared to accept the jurisdiction of any foreign court. Those who dream of a world court should join me, and many others, in screaming against this attempt to subvert the rule of law".

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Civil Society Forum Considers Proposals for Global Change

Andreas Bummel

More than one hundred civil society representatives and experts met in New York and online last week at the Global Futures Forum[1] to consider what policies and changes are needed to better address the world's major challenges. From March 20-21 they deliberated on around three dozen proposals related to the global economic and financial architecture, human rights and participation, development, a global digital compact, environmental governance, peace and security, as well as innovating the UN and global governance. In one of the final sessions, the outcomes were presented to diplomats and UN officials.

Opening the forum, Maria Fernanda Espinosa, Co-Chair of the *Coalition for the UN - We Need*, said that "in spite of the diversity of backgrounds and interests among participants, there is a common denominator that unites us: we want the UN and the multilateral architecture to deliver more and better, and to respond to the global governance challenges of today's world."

The other Co-Chair of the coalition, Daniel Perell, stressed[2] that "while constructive proposals within the current system were discussed and proposed, there is also a growing recognition that the underlying assumptions upon which the international order is built should be questioned, as well."

According to documents circulated[3] at the forum, summarized here[4], which resulted from prior online consultations, shortlisted proposals include the creation of an International Anti-Corruption Court and a "global tax system" to address inequality and help fund global public goods; "doubling the resources" of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and "redefine" how civil society relates to the UN; the creation of a Global Resilience Council and determining an indicator for development, different from gross domestic product; guaranteeing an open and secure internet, as well as closing the digital divide; setting up an "Earth Governance Regulatory Body" and expanding the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to the crime of ecocide; strengthening mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts as well as implementing plans for disarmament; the creation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly and putting a review of the UN Charter on the agenda.

The forum's proceedings further included "interconnection round tables" investigating the interlinkages of the thematic fields, an intergenerational plenary, storytelling dialogues, reports from regional consultations, as well as a youth-hosted reception, among other things. The gathering was held in order to build a common platform of civil society that can serve as an input to the UN's preparations of a Summit of the Future[5] scheduled to take place in September 2024. As announced by the organizers at the conference, by mid-April an "interim" People's Pact of the Future has been drafted[6], based on the forum's discussions. This is "an evolving vehicle for feeding diverse civil society ideas and insights into official

discussions" on the Summit of the Future, they noted. Plans are being made for additional civil society fora to be held in September 2023 and in early 2024.

The Executive Director of Democracy Without Borders, Andreas Bummel, who was one of the facilitators of the thematic track on UN and global governance innovation, emphasized the broad support of proposals aimed at making the UN "more democratic, representative, participatory and inclusive". He highlighted, in particular, the creation of a citizen-elected UN Parliamentary Assembly, the participatory instrument of a UN World Citizens' Initiative, and a UN Civil Society Envoy which are pursued by the "We The Peoples"[7] civil society campaign.

According to Bummel, these proposals have an important cross-cutting nature. "Once implemented, they can serve as engines that help build momentum for further changes put forward by civil society and others", he said. In one of the track's sessions a discussion was held on the role a UN Parliamentary Assembly could play in providing democratic legitimacy and accountability of global taxation and the use of global revenues.

"There are high ambitions and expectations on the part of civil society, but only little appetite on the part of a number of UN member states to take on major proposals. Bridging this gap is one of the major challenges ahead of the Summit of the Future", he noted.

[1] https://c4unwn.org/global-futures-forum/
[2] https://www.bic.org/news/bic-and-c4un-host-hundreds-global-futures-forum
[3] https://c4unwn.org/global-futures-forum/global-futures-forum-thematic-tracks/global-futures-forum-thematic-tracks-fact-sheets/
[4] https://c4unwn.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/GFF-Closing-Session-Handout-18-March.pdf
[5] https://www.democracywithoutborders.org/23575/as-global-progress-declines-un-moves-summit-of-the-future-to-2024/
[6] https://c4unwn.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/Interim-Peoples-Pact-for-the-Future-Compressed.pdf
[7] https://www.wethepeoples.org/

A Novel Canadian Avenue Towards a World Parliament

Eric Boucher

Last March 20 to 22 in New York, Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) from around the world conducted live and virtual consultations on seven themes to inspire discussion at the *United Nations Summit for the Future*, next September 2023, where UN member states will negotiate the *Pact for the Future*.

For the theme "The UN and the transformation of global governance institutions", the participating CSOs agreed on 5 proposals for changes to the UN structure to be submitted to the international community:

1. The UN Secretary General to be elected independently by the UN General Assembly (not under the mandatory recommendation (and pressure) of the UN Security Council)

2. Creation of a second chamber of the UN: an elected UN Parliamentary Assembly

3. Creation of a mechanism for relevant citizens' initiatives to be presented to the UN Assembly

4. Calling for a UN Charter Review Conference per Article 109 of the Charter, which allows for this, with a 2/3 vote of the General Assembly.

5. Creation of a civil society delegation at the United Nations

While fair and noble, these are, as you can see, very modest demands for UN reform, and yet there is no indication that they will be accepted by the Assembly of the world's governments. The inauspicious times for cosmocratic activism of the last few decades explain this type of unambitious demands, but the current times of global crises are completely changing the situation and the federalist movement must review its strategies.

Planet Republyk[1] believes that what we should have expected in terms of reform of our international institutions from the *Pact for the Future* only three years ago, is very different from what we could expect today. The growing tensions between the governments of China, Russia and their allies, on the one hand, and NATO and its allies, on the other; the resulting resurgence of the nuclear threat; the present and future pandemics; the growing crises of biodiversity; climate; food and water supply; migrants; and runaway global inflation: all of these make it urgent for civil society to be bold.

Milton Friedman wrote that : "Only a crisis – actual or perceived – produces real change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying around. That, I believe, is our basic function: to develop alternatives to existing policies, to keep them alive and available until the politically impossible becomes the politically inevitable."

We believe that too at *Planet Republyk*, and this is why we are part of a growing group of organizations advocating for a much more audacious project than just the reform of the United Nations. Here are 5 points on which these organizations seem to agree:

1. The establishment of a *new level of representation* for the globe as equitist, autonomous, legitimate and as close to the democratic ideal (one human = one vote) as possible, in order to ensure the management of issues that affect the whole of humanity and the biosphere.

2. That this project be developed from a blank page and *not from an existing organization* like the UN.

3. At the initiative of this project there should be the *citizens of the world*, not the countries and their governments. The governments of the world have never wished, do not wish, and will never wish this to happen. They would maximize the obstacles to the realization of the world parliament, as well as to the obtaining by the latter of some competences that could erode some of their sovereignties.

As the republic of humanity must necessarily be, at some point, a federation of the world's states, the proponents of the planetarist movement advocate a strategy of "end-of-the-pipe federalism". So, eventually the governments of the world will have to sit down together with the elected representatives of the new global democratic level to agree on the exact powers they will delegate to this new global parliament. The *Planet Republyk's* method, among others, would thus allow the First Republic of Mankind not to sit at the negotiating table in the humiliating position of a beggar (as is currently the case for the UN, its organs and all the international organizations that beg for subsidies and fear to bite the hand of the great powers that feed them).

4. The representation of the citizens *shall be done according to supranational zones.*

5. The final characteristic that this proposal must have (unlike many proposals submitted by intellectuals over the last few decades) is that it *must be simple* enough for the common people to easily grasp and adhere to, share and even promote it without feeling that they are being conned once again.

Planet Republyk proposes, for this ideal world parliament to be conceived, that the representation of the citizens be made through supranational electoral districts created along the parallels on the entire surface of the globe.

If each district were to have almost the same number of voters (e.g. 50 million people in order to have a parliament of 160 members (one per district) at the projected world population of eight billion people), the latitude range of each district will vary according to the actual distribution of world population[2]. Many more data, references and arguments can be found in the longer version of this article, that can be found in this review's website.

Planet Republyk hopes that exceptional candidates will run for office in their respective latitudes. Role models, enjoying international recognition for their commitment, courage, self-sacrifice, virtues. To give just three examples, let's think of the Congolese Denis Mukwege, the Indian Vandana Shiva, or the young Sweden Greta Thunberg.

Moreover, *Planet Republyk* wants to believe that this type of candidacy can vibrate the cosmopolitan fiber of the voters and incite to give their vote to them, rather than to candidates of their same nationality, certainly, but nevertheless less inspiring.

A timetable will have to be set for various considerations, including the motivation of the troops. The year 2045, the hundredth anniversary of the United Nations, seems to be a coherent objective for the establishment

of a permanent structure of world parliament. This advent would constitute the year 0 of the calendar of the new era. The date could very well be the equinox day of March, which in 2007 was declared "World Citizens Day and World Unity Day" by the Peoples Congress.

Eventually, billions of people will have to vote: a complex and expensive exercise. A nine-year, non-renewable parliamentary and presidential term would make the exercise of power more manageable. Half of the members of parliament would be elected every 54 months (4.5 years). The citizens could also ratify or repeal by referendum the measures and legislation adopted by the chamber if a request to do so received the assent of a minimum number, to be determined, of world citizens.

The parliamentary deputation should have an equal number of women and men at all times.

One way to achieve this would be to make it mandatory to alternate the gender of candidates in each district. In the first world election, from north to south, the world's districts would alternate female and male candidates. At the next election, the candidates would be of the opposite gender. Gender alternation should be written into the constitution for the presidency as well.

The first election could be held in 2027, on October 24 (the anniversary of the entry into force of the United Nations Charter). At the beginning, the representation will of course be only symbolic, but given the slow but undeniable progress of democracy in the world, there will come a time when more than 50% of the populations in parallel areas will be able to vote according to standards inspired by those of the UN electoral division. Then we will be able to speak, more and more, of a legitimate representation.

[1] *Planet Republyk* is a non-profit, international civil society advocacy organization based in Quebec City, Canada, whose mission is to promote the establishment of the most democratic, equitist, legitimate and sovereign global parliament possible to oversee the management of issues that affect all of humanity and the biosphere. *Planet Republyk* is also a book, a multilingual website *https://planetrepublyk.org/*, a blog, a conference program and a podcast.

[2] Engaging Data website, Map section, World Population Distribution by Latitude and Longitude, *https://engaging-data.com/population-latitude-longitude/*. Accessed March 24, 2022.

Europe's Indispensable Green and Global Roadmap

Flavio Brugnoli

Nathalie Tocci
A Green and Global Europe
Polity, 2022

The pandemic crisis and the Russian aggression against Ukraine have shown how interdependent and fragile the current global (dis)order is. But no crisis is more global and "existential" than the climate crisis. The European Union (EU) has always been at the forefront in the fight against climate change. It can now play a global role thanks to the European Green Deal (EGD), the backbone of the European "green transition", launched by the von der Leyen Commission at the end of 2019. A new book by Nathalie Tocci, *A Green and Global Europe*, gives us an excellent overview of the opportunities and the risks ahead.

Nathalie Tocci is ideally placed to master this complex and multifaceted topic. She is the current Director of Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) in Rome, one of the leading European think-tanks, and Honorary Professor at the University of Tübingen. She has been Advisor to the High Representatives, Federica Mogherini and later Josep Borrell – with the former she drafted the European Global Strategy, launched in 2016. She also has an insider's knowledge of the energy sector,

having been an independent non-executive Board Member of Edison, Eni and (currently) Acea. The book was partly written during her time as the Pierre Keller Visiting Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School.

The author places the EGD at the centre of the EU's relaunch, as it is considered the best lever for the EU to effectively assume a global role. The EGD as a "normative, strategic, economic and political project" covers multiple dimensions of a "green Europe". For a European Union that has "progressively lost its narrative", with its lack of coherent responses to the economic and financial crises and the migration crisis, its decarbonisation strategy presents a unique opportunity to improve its image, above all in the eyes of the younger generations.

Tocci's analysis focuses on three levels, as it covers the challenges and the impact of a green Europe: within the Union, in the context of a reflection on "the future of liberal democracy"; at a regional level, "in a troubled neighborhood" (east and south); globally, "amidst global rivalry". At all levels we should be aware that the green/energy transition is bound to have (indeed, it is already having) massive social, economic, political and geopolitical consequences, both for millions of citizens and for different territories.

EU Member States have long been concerned with energy policies at their national level, with EU institutions playing only a marginal role. We have also seen a growing dependence of some countries (notably, Germany and Italy) on Russian fossil fuels, even after the Russian invasion of Crimea in 2014: a shortsighted choice, as has been made clear by Putin's criminal aggression towards Ukraine, in February 2022. We are now aware that energy policies and climate polices should proceed side-by-side. But the regressive impact that the green/energy transition could have on a

social and territorial level can be overcome – in a political context in which populism and Euroscepticism have flourished – only by putting in place substantial redistribution strategies. In that sense, Next Generation EU and the Just Transition Fund are steps in the right direction.

At the "regional" level, the European green agenda faces multiple dilemmas. Looking south, we have countries that will be hit hard by the shift away from fossil fuels (e.g. Algeria, Libya, Nigeria) and areas already dealing with the dramatic impact of the climate crisis (the Sahel). A forward-looking Europe should be able to address the fragile situation of our neighbours, with both public and private investments, not least because measures like the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism, albeit necessary, may be negatively received in countries that still heavily rely on "brown" energies, with – according to Tocci – Turkey probably the most affected.

The global level is now driven by the US-China rivalry, focused on economy and technology, which embodies a broader confrontation between democracies and autocracies. At the same time, we are experiencing a redefinition of the globalisation process. Here lies the fundamental concept of Europe's "(open) strategic autonomy", in which the EU's "twin transitions" (green and digital) are deeply interconnected. The sensitivity of the EU-China relationship can hardly be overstated: while we must avoid the risk of new dependencies (particularly on critical raw materials), we cannot imagine an American-style "decoupling" of our interdependent economies. We will need to maintain a careful balance between cooperation (especially on climate change) and competition.

In a multipolar world, a third player has emerged: the "Global South", an overly simplified concept that puts very different countries into one basket, but which helps to frame new trends and challenges. In this respect, the EU can play a proactive role, with the Green Deal as a compass. Tocci supports the idea of "Green Partnerships" and "Green Trade Agreements"– above all to strengthen the transatlantic partnership, despite the tensions raised by the US Inflation Reduction Act. Africa is the other significant partner for Europe, with mutual benefits for their development and for our needs for renewable energy. But the Global South suffers from a wider "global (in) justice", as it suffers the costs of climate change without the benefits of the economic growth. Pragmatic strategies are needed, combining climate adaptation and climate mitigation, with the EU expected to make the most of its Global Gateway project – the (not sufficiently known) European response to China's Belt and Road Initiative.

In conclusion, Nathalie Tocci has given us a timely and impressive book, in which she combines wide-ranging scenarios and an ambitious political agenda. Sometimes it is difficult to avoid the pessimistic sensation that that agenda is urgent and necessary, but that it is too complex and requires too many consistent decisions from multiple actors, while time is desperately short. We will see how many of those ideas and proposals make their way into the debate heading into the 2024 European elections. Both policy makers and public opinion should be aware that we need a "political and policy-driven" green/energy transition, for the EU to be a credible global climate leader. As the author sums it up, "a green and global Europe must become two sides of the same coin". If not now, when?

Piketty on the European Union

Joseph Preston Baratta

Thomas Piketty
Capital and Ideology
Belknap Press of Harvard University,
Cambridge MA, 2020

Thomas Piketty is a French political economist whose books since 2015 have attracted worldwide attention. US Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman calls *Capital and Ideology* "the most important economics book of the year and maybe of the decade." It is well over 1,000 pages long, but it covers economic history since feudal times through the period of industrial capitalism, and continues into the future. At the end, he boldly envisions a world of "democratic socialism, participatory and federalist, ecological and multicultural." A shorter work of 2022, *A Brief History of Equality*, may be more accessible to readers who distrust economics, but the book under review offers full exposition of new evidence and makes timely arguments for a more equitable economic life shared by all humanity.

Piketty begins with the rise of inequality around the world since 1980. The share of national income of the top decile (that is, the top 10 percent of the population) in the United States, Europe, Russia, India, and China has grown from 17-35 percent to 34-55 percent, while that of the bottom 50 percent (generally the working class) has fallen to 15-20 percent by 2018 [Fig. I-3, p. 21]. The middle class (50-90 percent of the population) have not grown like the top decile. The result has been that the decile (the top 10 percent) have acquired most

of the gains of income since 1980, as has been widely perceived in struggles of the 90 percent versus the 10 percent in recent years. The situation is even worse for the top 1 percent (the "centile") - the new billionaires and majority shareholders of great international corporations. This situation can be contrasted with the period after the Second World War (1950–1980) when the five major regions of the world enjoyed a relatively egalitarian phase, maintained by progressive income and inheritance taxes, some for years as high as 70 percent.

Another display of inequality is that of the capture of economic growth in 1980-2018. The bottom 50 percent captured 12 percent of the growth, especially in developing countries, but the top 1 percent captured 27 percent. The lower and middle classes in wealthy countries (90 percent of the population) declined in their rate of capture, while the top centile (1 percent) grew very rich (Fig. I.5, p. 25). These graphs are typical of Piketty's presentation of the data. He avoids the Gini coefficient, which measures inequality by averages, 0 to 1, masking the distribution of wealth over time. Moreover, the very data are unfamiliar, compiled from income tax returns, reports of inheritance taxes, national accounts, surveys, fiscal and estate data, in the World Inequality Database (*WID. world*). That represents the combined efforts of more than 100 researchers around the world associated with the Paris School of Economics, where Piketty is based. Other economists will have to judge the accuracy of his data or join in the effort to improve them, which Piketty encourages. I tended to trust in the accuracy of his figures, which are novel and significant.

Piketty argues that "ideology" justifies inequality in every society. Today, the justifying ideologies have names like property, entrepreneurship, meritocracy (what he calls "proprietarian" and meritocratic ideology),

typical of the 19th century. By the 21st century, such ideology has become, he observes, "fragile." Do billionaires, hedge fund managers, lavishly paid corporate managers really exhibit hard work and wise management of their money, compared to the lack of talent virtue, and diligence of the immense majority (90 percent)? Have they not acquired their wealth by capitalizing on the legal and social institutions that the whole society supports? Wealth is "socially constructed," allowed to accumulate in accordance with each society's sense of justice. Piketty steadily disentangles such ideologies by presentation of the data, which gives him a basis for arguing in favor of a return to the ideology of social democracy as of the 1950-1980 period. He never argues from necessity ("determinism"). All follows from debate, controversy, backsliding, experimentation, and establishment. He is, as all economists really are, a political economist.

His large method may be exhibited in his treatment of the European Union, now in crisis because of the threat of Russia's war in Ukraine. Piketty finds that the EU has evolved as a "place of competition of all against all, of benefit primarily to the upper classes." The liberalization of capital flows since the 1980s, without common fiscal regulation or sharing of cross-border financial holdings, has contributed to escalating fiscal competition to the advantage of the more mobile upper classes. The lower and even the middle classes perceive this injustice and tend to vote against the European project, as evident by the close vote on the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and the rejection of the draft European Constitution in 2005. The view that the socially disadvantaged are spontaneously and irrationally nationalist or racist, "which conveniently allows 'progressive' elites to justify their civilizing mission", does not stand against the facts of worker solidarity with rebellions against French colonial rule in Algeria and West Africa. "Until the European

Union is clearly and visibly seen to serve the cause of social and fiscal justice (for instance by imposing a European tax on high incomes and large fortunes)," Piketty observes, "it is difficult to imagine an end to the bitter divorce that has alienated the disadvantaged classes from the European project" [pp. 799-802].

Piketty sees the EU as a project aimed only at competition between countries and individuals, based on the free circulation of capital, goods, services, and labor – not on social and fiscal justice. He compares it to federal states like the United States of America and the Indian Union, where progressive taxes permit budgets of 15-20 percent of GDP, unlike the EU, which has no federal taxes and whose budget is limited to 1 percent of GDP. "By contrast, the European Union is a regional political organization in which virtually the only common bond is the principle of pure and perfect competition" [pp. 857-861].

The danger is not only of further withdrawals like Brexit, but also a turning away of the disadvantaged classes to nationalist and "identitarian" politics, that promise them prosperity and even "greatness." Piketty outlines an alternative ideology – "social federalism in the European context." Reform of the unanimity rule in the Council of Ministers on any matters touching common fiscal, budgetary, or social policy is needed, as is reform of representation in the Council from one country, one vote. The logic points to vesting taxing power in the popularly elective European Parliament, following the example of the American and French revolutions. "Since at least the eighteenth century and the age of the Atlantic Revolutions," Piketty argues, "we have known that the power to levy taxes is the quintessential parliamentary power". He concludes with modifications for a similar solution in Europe, where national parliaments do have strong traditions of voting on fiscal matters and on ratification of international treaties [pp. 892-898].

How Old Foes Have Reconciled

Michel Herland

Raymond Krakovitch
La Réconciliation franco-allemande, 1945-1950,
La Presse fédéraliste, Lyon, 2022

In a phase where the Franco-German tandem is experiencing some grumbling, this little book, which tells the story of the birth of the special relationship between two former enemies, is a timely contribution to the debate. This relationship was far from being self-evident at the end of the Second World War for all French politicians (since this is the angle of attack chosen by the author).

After preambles that briefly recall the state of affairs during and immediately after the war, the book is organised in three chapters reviewing the main political forces of the time, i.e. de Gaulle and his troops (15 pages), the Mouvement Républicain Populaire (MRP) (15 pages) and finally the 'socialists' (5 pages). The brevity of the last chapter is explained by its title: "European socialists without power"; it considers both the attitude of the communists, who did not move an inch in their rejection of any reconciliation, and the hesitant attitude of the socialists, since, while they were immediately hostile to any dismemberment of Germany, they were divided with regard to the future European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

The MRP, on the other hand, will change course completely. Initially in favour of the "ablation" of Germany, which would mainly consist in depriving it of its economic wealth (whatever the precise ways will be) in the form of war repa-rations and in order to prevent it from preparing for a new war, the appointment of Robert Schuman to the Quai d'Orsay in the summer of 1948 would result, willingly or not, because of the pressure from the United States, in its recognition of the Federal Republic encompassing the three zones occupied by the Western Allies. And on 9 May of the following year (a date that will become the foundation of the European Union) Schuman gave the speech announcing the ECSC project, conceived by Jean Monnet.

By far the most interesting chapter is the one devoted to de Gaulle, since he was able to defend opposite and often paradoxical positions for a man who is still known as the defender of national sovereignty. In October 1945, when he was in power, he stated:"France's security requires that certain western regions of the Reich be definitively withdrawn from German sovereignty". In February 1947, now in the opposition, he repeated that France had to stand firm on "the economic separation of the Ruhr and the repossession of the Rhine's left bank". In October 1948, he predicted the birth of a "West German federation that will join the European Union". The following month, he defended the idea of a "European army which would essentially be a Franco-German army"! If we remember that the Gaullists, allied with the Communists, scuppered the European Defence Community (EDC) project, we can realize the extent of the turnaround. At the beginning of 1949, he proclaimed that "Europe must be built on the basis of an agreement between the French and the Germans" and, at the end of that year, he proposed a referendum in all interested countries to decide on the creation of a confederation. In March, he even spoke of a federation... Raymond Krakovitch also unearthed in the archives of the Charles de Gaulle Institute a motion presented during a session of the *Rassemblement du Peuple Français* (RPF, the Gaullist party) in September, also in 1949, foreseeing, in the face of the growing danger from the USSR, that the European

states should "pool their defence, their economic organisation, their currency...". Obviously, de Gaulle only envisaged a "French" Europe: "Europe will not be made if France does not take the lead, I mean a France standing upright and without borders". It should be pointed out here that such a conception was incompatible with the reality of a confederation, a fortiori of a federation, and the vote on the EDC will show what the Gaullist position really was.

The first chapter provides interesting information on the state of French public opinion at the end of the war. In October 1944, 76% of those polled were in favour of the dismemberment of Germany and, two months later, 91% answered yes to the question "Should German industry be placed under Allied control after the war?".

In short, this clearly written little book is a useful and timely contribution to the political history of France in the post-war years.

Translated by Gabriele Casano

Anti-German Memory in France

Giampiero Bordino

> **Robert Belot**
> *La mémoire anti-allemande en France. Henri Frenay et l'affaire Speidel (1957)*
> La Presse Fédéraliste, Lyon, 2022

It is well known that historical memory, sedimented over time, is a fundamental variable in the cultural and political debate across all countries in Europe and around the world.

Memory, even if contested, biased and in some cases even repressed, inevitably emerges from the past. Albeit in different forms and measures, it conditions the orientations and choices of all actors in the public debate. "Coming to terms" with memory is, in short, inevitable.

In the book by Robert Belot, professor of European history at the Jean Monnet University of Saint-Etienne, the "case" observed and analyzed is that of anti-German memory in France in the years following World War II, with specific reference to the story of a senior German officer, Hans Speidel. While he had been one of Hitler's army generals, after the war he was later proposed and appointed in 1957 as supreme commander of NATO ground forces in Central Europe. Speidel was the first German to hold such a senior position in the Western military organization, only twelve years after Germany's surrender and the end of the conflict. In France a debate, which is amply and analytically documented in Belot's book, over the appropriateness of his appointment ensued and widespread opposition to this choice emerged. This opposition was fueled precisely by the anti-German memory that is still present and alive in French society. In particular, unsurprisingly, Resistance and Jewish organizations lead the protests against the proposed appointment of Speidel to a top position inside NATO.

In this context, the figure of Henri Frenay, former protagonist of the anti-Nazi and anti-fascist struggle, founder of the *Combat* movement during the Resistance, minister in General De Gaulle's government and emblematic figure of the European Union of Federalists (UEF), stands in stark contrast to the widespread anti-German orientation. Frenay, building on the legitimacy he acquired due to his past as a fighter against Nazism, was an advocate of the path of reconciliation with Germany, even of its inclusion in the European (then the

European Defense Community, EDC, which, however, will not come into being due to the opposition of the French National Assembly in 1954) and the western (NATO) military organizations. For reconciliation's sake, he believed Speidel's appointment may represent an important and significant step. Freney sees reconciliation with Germany from the perspective of building the political unity of Europe. France's victory is "an illusion," whereas in fact only Europe can win. "Nationalism and sovereignism," Frenay argues, "are roads that cannot lead anywhere". In essence, reconciliation and the legitimization of Germany's role, including its military role, are the necessary conditions for achieving the unification of Europe, without which no European country, no matter how large and powerful, as France is, really has a future.

Memory, therefore, cannot and must not be erased, but at the same time cannot and must not paralyze the path toward a new arrangement in Europe, which on the one hand would make new wars between Europeans impossible and, on the other hand, would allow Europe to really "weigh" in the world affairs, projecting its interests and values. No "ontological" view of historical experiences and identities, seen as immutable and permanent in time, is compatible with the project of building Europe and, further on, the cosmopolitan project of building the unity of the world, which needs to be achieved at some point, unless humanity wants to commit suicide sooner or later.

Frenay understood this, and his commitment to a historical memory that is to be no longer divisive in the specific French case, is an important contribution in this direction, which can still guide and inspire our reflections and choices today.

Translated by Jean-Marie Reure

On the Political System of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Aleksa Nikolić

Damir Banović, Saša Gavrić, Marina Barreiro Marino
The Political System of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Institutions, Actors, Processes
Springer, Cham, 2021.

"Lands of great discoveries are also lands of great injustices"
Ivo Andrić, in *Signs by the Roadside*

The Political System of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Institutions, Actors, Processes is a short, concise and informative book, written by Damir Banović, Saša Gavrić and Marina Barreiro Marino. The book, published by Springer in 2021, provides an in-depth analysis of the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). By the way, the Springer edition is an updated version of the previously published book by the mentioned authors (Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, in 2010 and Sarajevo Open Center, Sarajevo, in 2012).

The book is organized into six chapters, each of which delves into a different aspect of the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The first chapter provides an overview of the historical background and constitutional framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The authors explain the complex power-sharing arrangement that was established following the 1995 Dayton Agreement. The second chapter examines the institutional framework of the

including its collective Head of State, bicameral Parliament, Government (Council of Ministers) and Judicial System. Therefore, the authors provide a short historical background to the founding and development of the institutions, providing some context to the complexity to its current structure, and afterwards explain how the institutions are elected or appointed and how do they work in practice. The third chapter deals with the complex territorial organization of the country – its asymmetric, consociational federal structure with the two federal units (entities): 1) Federation of BiH and 2) Republika Srpska, and the Brčko District. The fourth chapter discusses the electoral system and the role of elections in the political process, while the fifth chapter focuses on the four main actors of the BiH's political system, such as political parties, civil society, media and the international community. Finally, the sixth chapter analyzes BiH's International Politics (regional relations and the integration into the European Union) and the challenges facing the political system of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the prospects for future development.

One of the strengths of this book is its clear and concise writing style. Banović, Gavrić and Barreiro Marino do an excellent job of explaining complex political concepts in a way that is accessible to readers who may not have a background in political science. The book is also well-organized and easy to navigate, with clear headings and subheadings that make it easy to find specific information. Another strength of the book is its ability to shed light on the complexities and challenges of BiH's political system. The country's unique constitutional arrangement, which divides power between the Federation of BiH and the Republika Srpska, presents significant challenges for policymaking and governance. The authors' analysis of these challenges provides valuable insights into the country's political dynamics. However, one of the drawbacks of this book is its brevity. At just 122 pages, it can only provide a broad overview of the political system. While this is useful for readers who are new to the subject, those looking for a more in-depth analysis may need to look elsewhere. In addition, it seems to us that the authors criticize the current BiH's federalism too much. While it has its drawbacks, it has proven to be a successful model for maintaining peace and stability in a divided society, and it continues to be an important factor in the country's political landscape.

Overall, *The Political System of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Institutions, Actors, Processes* is an informative and accessible book that provides a useful introduction to the country's complex political system. It will be of interest to scholars, policymakers, and anyone interested in understanding the challenges of governance in divided societies.

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