



The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

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Better Dead than Prisoners

Lucio Levi

Russian aggression against Ukraine marks the return of war to Europe. It is the first time since WWII that a European country has invaded another one for the purpose of territorial gain. Putin has broken a taboo: that states cannot resort to violence to shift borders. His goal is to assert the right to keep the unity of the Russian nation. For Putin the aggression in Ukraine is a domestic military operation aiming to keep control of a rebel province. This approach is a variant of the Soviet doctrine of limited sovereignty. In his vision, Ukraine does not have the right to exist. It is an illegitimate state, which, like Belarus, has always been part of the family of the Slavic peoples and the Russian nation. His design is to revive the myth of Holy Mother Russia. He uses nationalism as the political formula to keep the unity of a country of gigantic size made up of more than sixty nationalities. In fact, Russia waged this war in order to be recognized as a global actor. However, Putin's plan to conquer Ukraine in a week and to replace Zelensky with a puppet government failed. He has renounced conquering Kyiv and seems to confine his ambitions to Donbas.

It is to be noted that the enlargement of NATO to the former Warsaw Pact states is perceived by Russia as a threat to its security. This is the basic reason for the decision to invade Ukraine, an element which is largely ignored in the Western debate on war. Moreover, the support of the Ukrainian government for democracy is vitiated by ambiguity, since it includes extreme-right ministries and glorifies as heroes persons who collaborated with Nazi Germany.

What Putin fears most is the contagion of the European model of integration and interna-

tional democracy which represent the alternative to Russia's authoritarian regime. Actually, the EU is the region which has promoted the most serious attempt to replace power politics with the rule of law in international relations. Ukraine experienced two democratic revolutions, the Orange Revolution in 2004 and Euromaidan in 2014, which showed its will to get rid of the influence of Russia. Contrary to the Kremlin's expectations, the military intervention against Ukraine has strengthened the cohesion of both NATO and the EU. Just three years after Macron's declaration of the "brain death" of NATO, it is the fear of Russian imperialism that pushed Finland and Sweden to renounce neutrality and announce their application for NATO membership and Denmark to join EU's defence policy after a referendum showing support of 67% of voters. On the other hand, the EU has never been so united behind a foreign policy option like the support to Kyiv. And in fact the EU has granted Ukraine the candidate status.

The aggression in Ukraine has revealed the weakness of Russia, but the apparent success of the US strategy cannot hide the decline of American power recently brought to full light by its precipitous withdrawal from Afghanistan. Russia and the US, the former leaders of the old bipolar world order, are trying to keep their old dominant position and hamper the transition to a multipolar world order. There is a striking similarity between Putin's and Trump's neo-fascist attitudes and their common interest to undermine the rise of new protagonists in world politics and especially of the EU. In a short time span, mutual trust among the great world powers on which the Helsinki process rested has been destroyed.

In an interview given to *The Financial Times* in 2019, Putin declared that liberal democracy has become an “obsolete” idea. In other words, owing to its weak and unwarlike nature and being the expression of a decadent society, it is destined to fail. But the heroic resistance of the Ukrainian people, ready to sacrifice their lives for the defence of the independence of their country and its democratic institutions, is the living contradiction to Putin’s convictions. Moreover, the application for EU membership shows that only the EU – not a nation-state, but a regional union of democratic states – can guarantee freedom and independence to the Ukrainian people. This is the reason why Putin perceives the EU as a more serious danger in comparison with NATO. It is well known that Putin, to undermine democratic institutions, supports sovereigntist, eurosceptic, far-right political parties such as the French *Rassemblement National of Marine Le Pen*, *Salvini’s Italian League*, *Strache’s Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)*, the Hungarian *Jobbik*, the UK *Independence Party (UKIP)*, and the Greek *Golden Dawn*. To sap democracies, Putin has resorted to interference in electoral processes, disinformation, corruption, cyber criminality and assassination of political enemies. It is noteworthy to recollect that there is a common interest of Russia as well as the US to undermine the international role of the EU. In fact, in the US there are economic and political circles which, profiting from the 2007-2008 financial and economic crisis, attempted (without success) to destroy the euro.

Nonetheless, we have to recognize that the thesis of the crisis of democracy is not wrong. In November 2020 we have titled our editorial “Democracy in Danger”; in it, we pointed out a relation between the retreat of democracy all over the world and the erosion of state sovereignty due to the unregulated globalization process. The most recent data show that this trend is continuing without interruption since 2005. But the emergency of war has captured the attention of the public

and the media. Therefore, the debate on the decline of democracy has been relegated to the background. The world political scene is occupied by the escalation of violence, which does not even exclude the use of the nuclear weapon, threatened by Putin. The first problem to address is how to stop the war, taking into account that the supply of arms to Ukraine and sanctions to Russia are not sufficient. Since the EU pays every day around one billion euros for oil and gas imports, an embargo on these fuels, as requested by the European Parliament, would deprive Russia from the resources needed to continue the war. This is the necessary step to oblige Russia to sit at the negotiations table. At the same time, this decision would accelerate Europe’s transition toward renewable energy and lead it towards energy independence of Russian fossil fuels. It is senseless to help Ukraine’s resistance with weapons and economic sanctions and continue to finance Russia’s war effort. For the moment, the EU has confined itself, after exhausting negotiations with Hungary, to cut 90% of Russian oil imports by the end of the year. According to economists, a full energy embargo would cost the EU around 2-2.5% of GDP. All things considered, it is a tolerable cost in comparison with the price already paid by the Ukrainians and the price of the continuation of war for a long time, which would be higher and much higher. But the adoption of this provision has been so far prevented by the veto of the Hungarian government, which depicts a case of dictatorship by a minority. Only two solutions seem possible: the diplomatic one within the European Council, similar to that achieved with the deal on oil, or the isolation of Hungary and the decision to proceed without Orban.

In a speech delivered at the European Parliament on 9 May 2022, Macron, in his capacity of President of the rotating Presidency of the EU, proposed to summon a constitutional Convention to revise the Treaties in keeping with the recommendation of the Conference

on the Future of Europe. It is clear to the mind of the French President that the institutions which helped Europe to face the challenges met along the march towards a closer union have become inadequate to address the problems raised by the war, lacking first of all a union on defence and energy. To address these challenges, it is urgent to end the use of the veto power, which too often crippled the wheels of the EU institutions, and to generalize the qualified majority voting. Therefore, we can assert that because of the problems raised by Orban's vetoes, the knot has come to the comb.

In order for the EU to move swiftly toward a stronger union, Macron suggested the formation of a multi-speed Europe or a Europe of concentric circles. He outlined the establishment, around the hard-core of the eurozone (19 countries), the Schengen area of free movement of persons (26 countries), the EU (27 countries), and a wider constellation of states, a "European political community", a new space for political and security cooperation among democratic countries that proceeds at a slower pace. According to the formula used by Mitterrand after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the institutional nature of this group of countries (36) was defined as a confederation, which would allow Ukraine – but also Bosnia-Herzegovina, Moldova, Georgia, as well as the United Kingdom – to partially integrate into the EU without granting them full membership. It is evident that the outlines of this institution have a clear relation with the structure of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Helsinki process with its three baskets (security, economic cooperation and human rights).

Now Russia has departed from the community of democratic states and the pursuit of common security with Europe and the US. But history and geography push the EU to seek cooperation with Russia. Macron invited Ukraine's allies to avoid the temptation to humiliate Russia. The US and the EU should learn the lesson of the Versailles

Treaty's war reparations imposed on Germany after WWI, which led to an increase in nationalist sentiments, to growing international tensions and ultimately to WWII.

The future is dark and uncertain. For the moment we have disappointing news. We cannot rely upon those subjects that we were used to consider as pillars of the architecture of world peace: the UN, as shown by the failure of the mission of Secretary-General Guterres to Ukraine, and the peace movement which is so silent that it seems dead.

I wish to conclude on a note of hope. We are used to assigning our political commitment a sense and a goal, i.e., the construction of a society in which all conflicts are peacefully settled by law and violence is banned from all social relations. This society is the World Federation. Politics in the highest sense of the word is the activity that aims to improve the human condition. In other words, politics is the vehicle of the process of civilization through which, with the help of the automatic mechanisms of political institutions, man can govern his instincts and allows his second nature – the rational one – to prevail. Values are reference points that highlight history in the making. This means that reason is a faculty that orders and guides history, which has a course and a purpose. Reason, Kant argued, requires men to act in order "so to influence posterity that it becomes always better". In other words, there exists a form of uninterrupted communication and dialogue between the generations, past, present and future, whose aim is to advance towards that which is better. Kant enhanced this principle, giving it the status of a true postulate of practical reason. However, the idea of progress in history does not exclude the possibility of regression. The progress is not linear, but dialectical.

Therefore, it is reasonable to think that Russia will draw the lesson from the defeat of its imperialist adventure and choose the way of peaceful coexistence and democracy.

Pragmatic and Ideal Federalism. Italian Premier Draghi Paves the Way for the Use of the Word Federalism *

Mario Draghi

[...]The war in Ukraine is posing one of the most serious crises in the history of the European Union. A humanitarian, security, energy and economic crisis all at the same time. This crisis is happening while our countries are still dealing with the consequences of the greatest health emergency of the last century. The European response to the pandemic was united, courageous and effective.

With unprecedented speed, scientific research gave us vaccines able to curb the contagion and drastically reduce the severity of the virus. We organised the biggest vaccination campaign in recent history, allowing us to save lives, get youngsters back in school and relaunch the economy. We approved the NextGenerationEU programme, the first large-scale European reconstruction project, financed with contributions from everyone in order to meet each country's needs. The same readiness and determination, the same spirit of solidarity, must now guide us in the challenges that lie ahead.

The institutions built by our predecessors in previous decades have served European citizens well, but they are inadequate for the reality we are faced with today. The pandemic and the war have called upon EU institutions to take on responsibilities they never had before. The geopolitical situation is undergoing rapid and profound changes. We have to move, and move as quickly as possible. We must

also ensure that the management of the crises we are experiencing does not take us back to square one, but rather allows us to move towards a more just and more sustainable economic and social model.

We need pragmatic federalism, encompassing all areas affected by the ongoing transformations – from the economy to energy and security. I have spoken about pragmatic federalism, but I must also add that our European values of peace, solidarity and humanity need to be defended now more than ever. It is more difficult than ever, and indeed it will become increasingly difficult, for individual member states to defend these values. We not only need pragmatic federalism; we need a **federalism based on ideals**.

If this means embarking on a path that leads to a revision of the Treaties, then this must be embraced with courage and with confidence. If we are able to draw strength from the tragic events of the last few years to take a step forward; if we are able to imagine EU institutions functioning more efficiently, allowing us to promptly find solutions to citizens' problems; then we will be able to give them a Europe in which they can identify themselves with pride.

Russia's aggression against Ukraine has called into question the European Union's greatest achievement: peace on our continent. Peace

based on respect for territorial borders, the rule of law and democratic sovereignty; peace based on the use of diplomacy as a means to resolve crises between states; peace based on respect for human rights, which have been violated in Mariupol, in Bucha, and in all places where the Russian army's violence has been unleashed against defenseless civilians.

We must support Ukraine, its government and its people, as President Zelensky has asked us, and continues to ask us to do. In a war of aggression there can be no equivalence between the side that is invading and the side resisting the invasion. We want Ukraine to remain a free, democratic and sovereign country. Protecting Ukraine means protecting ourselves; it means protecting the project of security and democracy that we have built together over the last seventy years. Helping Ukraine is above all about working for peace. Our priority is a ceasefire to be reached as soon as possible, to save lives and to allow for humanitarian assistance to get to citizens, which is still very difficult at the moment. A ceasefire would also give new impetus to negotiations which, as yet, have not achieved the results we were hoping for. Europe can and must play a central role in supporting dialogue.

We must do so because of our geographic position, which places us next to this war and therefore on the front line in dealing with all its possible consequences. We must do so because of our history, during which we have proven our ability to build stable and lasting peace, even after bloody conflicts. As a founding member of the European Union, as a country that believes deeply in peace, Italy is ready to work, in the front line, to reach a diplomatic solution. Already today, the war is deeply affecting our countries. Since the beginning of the conflict, approximately 5.3 million people have left Ukraine for the European Union – especially women and children. That is more

than double the number of refugees who were present in the EU at the end of 2020 (around 2.5 million).

Italy believes in the European values of reception and solidarity.

We have welcomed over 105,000 Ukrainian refugees, thanks to the generosity of families, volunteers and non-governmental organisations, whom I sincerely thank.

Other countries – including Poland, Romania, Germany and Slovakia – have made even greater efforts.

Many refugees want to return home as soon as possible, and some have already begun to do so. However, we do not know how the conflict will evolve, nor how long it will last.

We must be ready to give continuity to our initial momentum, allowing Ukrainian refugees to better integrate into our societies.

[...] From an economic point of view, the conflict has led to instability in the functioning of global supply chains and volatility in raw material and energy prices. Ukrainian food supplies have collapsed due to the ravages of the war and the export blockades imposed by Russia in Black Sea and Sea of Azov ports.

[...] With regard to energy, the price of crude oil, which fluctuated between USD 70 and USD 90 a barrel between December and January, now stands at around USD 105 after peaking at USD 130 in March. The price of gas on the European market is around EUR 100 per megawatt hour - about five times what it was a year ago. These increases - which follow the price rises already recorded before the conflict began - have driven inflation to levels that have not been seen for decades. The price index in the euro area rose by 7.5% in April compared with a year ago, significantly affecting the purchasing power of households and levels of business output. The European economy

is experiencing a slowdown: in the first three months of 2022, gross domestic product in the euro area grew by 0.2% compared with the last quarter of 2021. The International Monetary Fund expects the European Union to grow by 2.9% this year, down from the 4% it had estimated until recently.

Any one of these crises would require a strong reaction from the European Union. Together, they are forcing us to significantly speed up the integration process. Over the coming months, we must show European citizens that we are able to lead a Europe that can live up to its values, its history and its role in the world. A stronger, more cohesive, sovereign Europe - capable of taking the future into its own hands, as Chancellor Merkel said some time ago. Over the past 75 years, European integration has often been the best response - practical and ideal - to common challenges. The founding fathers of the European Union understood that economic development and social progress were difficult to achieve with the resources of individual member states alone. They identified the supranational model as being the only one capable of uniting the interests of European populations and exerting influence over events that would otherwise be beyond their reach. The integration process has been a gradual one, made up of crises and relaunches, of successes achieved despite internal divisions and, sometimes, in the face of external resistance. A result built "piece by piece, sector by sector", to quote Robert Schumann, as the European Union could not be created "overnight, like an ideal city".

Europe responded to the traumas of the Second World War by creating the first institutions for economic cooperation. I am thinking of the European Payments Union, which supported a return to currency stability and the resumption of trade; or the Economic Coal and Steel Community, which abolished

customs barriers and other impediments to the free movement of goods in crucial sectors of the economy. The geopolitical tensions that arose with the Suez crisis in 1956 helped to speed up progress towards the Treaties of Rome. European countries reacted to the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in 1971 by setting up the currency snake, followed by the European Monetary System.

Their response to growing Euroscepticism in the 1980s was the targeted action programmes proposed by the Delors Commission and the Single Act in 1986. Following the end of the Soviet Union and the reunification of Germany, Europe had the signing of the Maastricht Treaty, the creation of the monetary union and, finally, the eastern enlargement of the European Union. The eurozone crisis at the start of the last decade led to institutions being strengthened and modernised, starting with the European Central Bank.

As I mentioned earlier, the pandemic united us and led to the creation of the NextGenerationEU programme. This long path towards integration has changed our lives for the better, bringing us peace, prosperity and a social model to be proud of. The single market not only relaunched the European economy at a time of difficulty, but it has also ensured protection for consumers and workers and forms of social security that are unique in the world.

We have built shared democratic institutions, such as this Parliament, where we can make joint decisions and which we can use to ensure that basic rights are respected. We have made the European Union not just an economic area, but also one where rights and human dignity are defended. This is a legacy that we must not squander; this is why we cannot go backwards. Now is the time to move this process forward. [...] In a geopolitical context that has suddenly

become much more dangerous and uncertain, we must tackle the economic and social emergency and guarantee the security of our citizens.

Investments in defence must be made with a view to improving our collective capacity – as the European Union and as NATO. During the last European Council meeting, the important decision was made to approve the ‘Strategic Compass’, which we must now implement quickly. However, we must also move quickly beyond these initial steps and build an efficient coordination of defence systems. We spend approximately three times the amount that Russia spends on security, but this expenditure is spread across 146 defence systems. The United States has only 34. Resources are therefore distributed very inefficiently indeed, and this hinders the development of a real common defence at EU level. To achieve strategic autonomy in the field of defence, we first need greater efficiency in terms of military expenditure in Europe. A conference should be held to streamline and optimise our investments in military spending. Furthermore, building a common defence must be accompanied by a united foreign policy, and effective decision-making mechanisms.

We must move beyond the principle of unanimity, which gives rise to an intergovernmental approach based on mutual vetoes, and we must head towards qualified majority decision-making. A Europe able to make prompt decisions is more credible in the eyes of its citizens and in the eyes of the world.

One of the first areas where we must speed up is the enlargement process. The full integration of countries that express aspirations to join the EU does not represent a threat to the stability of the European project; it is part of achieving that goal. Italy supports the immediate opening

of accession negotiations with Albania and North Macedonia, in line with the European Council’s decision in March 2020. We want to give new impetus to the negotiations with Serbia and Montenegro, and to ensure the utmost attention is paid to the legitimate expectations of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. We are in favour of all these countries joining and we want Ukraine in the European Union. The membership process we have designed must be followed, but we must also proceed as quickly as possible.

The solidarity shown towards Ukrainian refugees must also push us towards a truly European management also of those migrants arriving from other situations of war and exploitation. More generally, we must define an effective European mechanism for the management of migratory flows, that goes beyond the approach of the Dublin Treaty. We must strengthen repatriation agreements and make them truly effective, but we must also strengthen legal channels for entry into the EU. In particular, we must pay greater attention to the Mediterranean, given its strategic position as a bridge towards Africa and the Middle East. We cannot look at the Mediterranean as only a border area, a place where to erect barriers. Many ‘young’ countries overlook the Mediterranean, and they are ready to inject their enthusiasm into their relations with Europe.

The European Union must build a real partnership with these countries, not only in economic terms but also from a political and social point of view. The Mediterranean must be an axis of peace, prosperity and progress. Energy policy is an area in which Mediterranean countries can and must play a fundamental role for the future of Europe. Europe is facing a profound geopolitical shift, which is bound to move its strategic axis increasingly towards the South. The war in Ukraine has shown the deep vulnerability of many of our countries to Moscow.

[...] Reducing fossil fuel imports from Russia inevitably means Europe looking to the Mediterranean to satisfy its needs. I am referring to deposits of gas as a transition fuel, but above all to the huge opportunities offered by renewable energy in Africa and the Middle East. Southern European countries, and Italy in particular, are strategically positioned to pool this energy production and act as a bridge to countries in the North. Our central role tomorrow will depend on the investments we make today.

At the same time, we must immediately find solutions to protect households and businesses against the rising cost of energy. Curbing bills and fuel prices is also a way of making any sanctions more bearable over time. Since the very beginning of the crisis, Italy has been calling for a European cap on the price of gas imported from Russia. Russia sells almost two thirds of its natural gas exports to Europe – largely through gas pipelines that cannot be redirected to other buyers. Our proposal would allow us to use our bargaining power to reduce the excessive costs that are currently burdening our economies. At the same time, this measure would also allow us to reduce the amounts we are paying to President Putin on a daily basis, and that are inevitably financing his military campaign.

[...] The various crises arising from the conflict in Ukraine come at a time when Europe was already facing huge spending needs. Both the ecological transition and the digital transition involve investments that we cannot postpone. In addition to these, there are the costs of the war, which we must deal with immediately in order to avoid our continent sinking into recession. In both cases, these are asymmetric costs that affect different segments of the population and different production sectors in different ways, and that therefore require different offsetting measures.

No national budget is able to bear such efforts alone. No country can be left behind. The social harmony of our continent and our ability to support sanctions, which is especially the case for countries that are historically more dependent on Russia, are at stake. The European Union has already devised a number of useful tools to deal with these challenges. I am referring to the responses we put in place during the pandemic, which ensured rapid and widespread economic recovery in the European Union. We must build on this success, and adapt these tools to the circumstances we are now facing.

The European Instrument for Temporary Support to Mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency (SURE) has granted loans to Member States to support the labour market. The European Union should broaden the scope of this instrument, providing countries that request it with new funding in order to mitigate the effects of rising energy costs. I am referring to measures to curb bills, but also to temporary support for the lowest earners, for example by introducing detaxation measures for the lowest wages, as we did yesterday. These have the advantage of defending the purchasing power of households, especially the most vulnerable.

Opting for a lending mechanism such as SURE would avoid the use of non-repayable grants to pay for national current expenditure measures. At the same time, when interest rates are on the rise, it would provide those Member States with more fragile public finances with a less expensive alternative to borrowing on the market. In this way, we could broaden the scope of support measures at the same time as limiting the risk of financial instability. This measure should be implemented very quickly – as we have been in this situation for eight, nine, ten months now – to allow governments to take immediate action to support the economy. With regard to long-term investments in

areas such as defence, energy and food, and industrial security, the NextGenerationEU programme is the model to be used.

The system of scheduled payments, linked to specific checks into whether milestones and targets have been reached, offers a virtuous mechanism to ensure quality spending. Spending the resources allocated to us well is crucial for our credibility in the eyes of our citizens and of our other EU partners, who, as I have said many times before, have agreed to tax their citizens to be able to help Italy and the other countries that have used these

grants. Good governance is not about dealing only with the crises of the moment. It is about moving immediately to pre-empt those yet to come. The fathers of Europe showed us how to make democracy effective on our continent as it gradually transforms.

European integration is our best ally for tackling the challenges that history places before us. Today, as indeed has been the case at all decisive turning points since the end of the Second World War, we need determination and vision, but above all unity. I am sure we will be able to find them once again, together.

*Excerpt from the Address to the European Parliament delivered on 3 May 2022

Challenges and New Hopes for the Government of Globalization

Mariasophia Falcone

With the beginning of 2022 we enter another year marked by the Covid-19 pandemic, but fortunately it will also see the continuation of the vaccination campaign around the world. In richer countries, craving for vaccines, this is proceeding relatively well despite the paradoxical resistance of the No-Vax movement. At the same time, attempts are being made to prevent the development of new variants of the virus in those parts of the world where the vaccination campaign still lags behind, which unfortunately coincide with the less developed areas of the planet. In this sense, we can already see how, also for 2022, we will see a dog biting its tail.

The WHO hopes to reach 70% of people vaccinated by mid-2022, and, in fact, in some European countries (Portugal), 90% of people have already received at least one dose of the vaccine. It is also true, however, that the percentages, more or less encouraging, mean little if they are not contextualized and, the deeper you go, the more you cross the data, the more you see the image of a world hit by the pandemic divided into two, the rich countries and the less developed countries.

What is full of contrasts is not only the simple geographical spread of the vaccination campaign, but also the distribution of the various vaccines and the price trend of these in different areas of the world. Beyond the rhetoric on “big pharma”, we can observe that in some areas of the world only Asian vaccines (Sinovac, Sinopharm, etc.) or the Russian one (Sputnik) are distributed, and that

for the “Western” vaccines themselves (Pfizer, Moderna and AstraZeneca) the US citizens are paying the highest price.

The data of the vaccination campaign in the world make evident all the paradoxes of the world, globalized but lacking a government of globalization: increasingly connected, but nevertheless not more equitable, in which the nation states, even in the face of an enemy that makes no distinction, tend to entrench themselves in their own borders, in competitive nationalism, and in the purchasing power for buying vaccines.

If, as Kant said in his *Perpetual Peace*, we will arrive at a moment in which “the violation of law in one point of the Earth will be felt in all points”, the current situation is still more complex. In a moment of crisis like the one we are experiencing, in which being worried for one’s health is legitimate, the rule of “everyone for himself” is predominant, and although all violations of the law and injustices are deplored, this does not mean that one feels obliged to act to stop them, like in the case of accumulating vaccines two or three times over the need, or rejecting them like the No-Vax’ do.

Perhaps it is true that we are anesthetized in front of crises, but it could not be otherwise when we have lived through a decade of crises to the full: the economic one with the poverty and inequalities it has produced, the humanitarian one of the migrants that has transformed the Mediterranean into a cemetery, the environmental one of which we

still do not know the most catastrophic effects, and the pandemic one that now occupies our thoughts and our actions, both as individuals and as communities.

In the face of global crises, global solutions are needed. However, at the global level, in the current state of things, nation states, international institutions, superpowers or continental states have no suitable tools to face the challenges of the globalized world, despite the macho-nationalist narrative and the war metaphors that have made us company during the lockdowns. Such global solutions can only be provided by federal-type institutions which, at the same time, should implement them in a coordinated manner at the lower levels, according to the principle of subsidiarity. The objectives of a world integration that shall govern globalization must be clear: orienting in a cohesive way development and international dynamics in a more peaceful direction, making the political processes more democratic and less intergovernmental, creating a more ecologically – and socially – sustainable society.

It is emblematic and discouraging how much in the European Union, the most integrated area in the planet where, thanks to a transfer of sovereignty, it is possible to have the highest standards of life quality, the procedures to make timely and effective decisions to respond to the systemic crises of the last decade are still obstructed by the stumbling block of unanimous vote. Outside the European Union, on the other hand, more and more regions of the world are following the example of the *acquis communautaire*, such as Mercosur and the African Union, aware that only with a transfer of sovereignty will it be possible to meet the current challenges and move forward towards more cohesive development models.

In such a scenario, amidst stalemates and transfers of sovereignty, the UN remains the

only international organization that can act as a guarantor of peace (in a more or less Kantian sense), but it continues to go through a profound crisis of legitimacy, and a reform of its Security Council (abolition of the right of veto and enlargement to include international organizations, such as the EU) and of its Assembly are urgently needed.

If every crisis represents an opportunity, we must also admit the possibility that not so much the great crisis theorized so far will come, but several systemic crises, not necessarily growing at a regular pace (as the climate one, for example), which will offer us different opportunities and more viable roads ahead.

Consequently, the process of European unification cannot be “disconnected” from that of the governance of globalization. However distant the idea of world federation may seem – perhaps due to the very nature of this expression –, the project of a world-level integration aiming to govern the challenges of globalization may appear instead much clearer through a reflection on the very concept of crisis if we take into consideration the current ones, and the concepts of security, peace and war. To confirm this, it would be enough to look at small cells, call them of pre-integration, such as the global digital tax or the creation of a global community about climate.

In fact, among all the others, the battle for climate is the most urgent and, precisely due to the nature of this crisis, we cannot wait until it will become a great crisis, because this could imply the end of mankind on the planet, or so dramatic consequences for the planet that we cannot yet imagine. The battle for the climate, however, also showed an encouraging sign on one of those cells mentioned earlier. In the young people who mobilized all over the world for climate protection and in the movements that have derived from it, we can see a cell of the

world people, that should rethink the world order for the future of human communities. These are citizens who see them-selves as a global people responsible for the protection of the planet and, perhaps even more important, by virtue of having spent most of 2020 in their own little bedrooms, people who feel these crises as part of their own life experience.

All this can represent opportunities, and

perhaps hopes, for a future governance of globalization: a clear path for the key battles of the next few years, of which the European citizens in the first place can become promoters. In fact, the battle for integration at the European level cannot be a parallel line that never meets the global one, but they must be pursued together in order to never lose sight of the goal of achieving peace through the political integration of mankind.

World in Crisis. The Self-Destructive Contradictions of Ungoverned Globalization

Giampiero Bordino

With increasing frequency in recent times, considerations about the crisis (or, more radically, the end) of the globalization process have emerged in the international public debate.

Wars, trade disputes, economic and trading sanctions resulting from political and military conflicts, isolationist and neo-nationalist policies, the development of illiberal democracies and authoritarian regimes, environmental crises and pandemics have, in fact, increasingly led to obstacles and disruptions in the management of global value-chains. Let us remember that these chains underpin production processes worldwide. The aforementioned phenomena and dynamics have tended to reduce trade volumes. More generally, and in many ways, it has fueled the often conflicting 'shattering' of economies, societies and cultures themselves.

However, these considerations and announcements about the crisis or the end of the globalization process, which are certainly verifiable and well-argued, have a fundamental limit, which makes them somewhat insignificant and of little use in building the future. The limit is that the globalization that is being referred to, and whose demise is being announced, is not globalization in general, but more specifically this ongoing globalization, 'not properly governed' by anyone. If all this is not said and made clear, one is definitely unable to explain what is happening, why it is happening, how one might get out of

it and where shall we go to. This is, therefore, an essential and decisive clarification both from an analytical and cognitive standpoint and from a political-planning standpoint, on which we need to reflect.

The ungoverned globalization, the offspring of the liberalist myth of the 'self-regulated market', which lacks adequate institutions and procedures to guarantee its human and rational orientation, produces increasingly visible and significant self-destructive contradictions. These are the contradictions that jeopardize globalization, first and foremost in its positive and progressive aspects, and produce conflictual processes, shattering closures and identity-related oppositions, which in turn, in a sort of uncontrollable 'vicious circle', feed the self-destructive character of the ongoing globalization.

At least four fundamental types of self-destructive contradictions of this nature exist and operate at every level, from the local to the global, which are empirically verifiable and verified and certainly now at the core of the public debate, but certainly not of most of the decision-making processes of institutional and political actors.

The first contradiction is that of the political and military wars and conflicts of various nature that crisscross and devastate the world. As of March 2022, according to an authoritative international estimate (ACLED, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project), while the conflict in Ukraine

brought about by the Russian invasion had just started, there were 59 open conflicts in the world, many of them long or very long-lasting. To give but a few examples: Afghanistan, Syria, Ethiopia, Israel/Palestine, Yemen, Mali, Myanmar, Nagorno Karabakh, Nigeria, Sudan, etc. In fact, all these conflicts mean deaths, health crises, destruction of infrastructure and education systems, disruption of production processes and trade, multiplication and militarization of borders, shattering of territories and societies, etc. In essence, a form of forced, bloody and pervasive de-globalization.

The second self-destructive contradiction is the growth of inequality, both between and within societies and states. According to the Oxfam 2022 Report, 10 super-rich individuals now possess six times more wealth than 3.1 billion people, i.e., the poorest 40% of the world's population. The World Inequality Report 2022 also indicates that since the mid-1990s, the top 1 per cent of the world's population has acquired 38 per cent of the additional wealth accumulated over the period, while the poorest 50 per cent have acquired only 2 per cent. Thus, inequalities in recent decades are still and increasingly on the rise, fueled by the economic development associated with globalization. Inequality, income and wealth asymmetries have reached levels that are no longer sustainable from the standpoint of social cohesion and coexistence, and also from the standpoint of economic development itself. This is a self-destructive contradiction of ungoverned globalization because the asymmetries in question are almost inevitably followed by conflicts (armed or not), the push towards closures and identity-related conflicts ('us' against 'them', everyone for himself locked in his own house), the collapse of 'social capital' (the level of mutual trust between citizens, the relational networks), the physical and mental shattering of the social fabric that tends to undermine economies and ultimately dissolve human communities. Thus, another pervasive form of de-globalization.

The third self-destructive contradiction is found in the ongoing environmental crises, from climate change to those related to the uncontrolled consumption of non-renewable natural resources. According to data from the UNDRR (United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction), the global economic losses caused by environmental and climate disasters increased 151% between 1998 and 2017, compared to the previous two decades, from USD 1313 billion to USD 2908 billion. This contradiction also tends to fuel forms of de-globalization, because it differentiates and divides territories and communities, and actually pits their interests against each other. Even a single but relevant example can highlight this process. Africa, with a population of 1.4 billion people and a strong demographic expansion (it is estimated that by 2050 it will be home to 23% of the world's population), is responsible for less than one-third of global greenhouse gas emissions. An obvious paradox, which cannot remain without conflictual outcomes for long and which, once again, may fuel de-globalization processes.

Finally, a fourth form of self-destructive contradiction is represented by the increasingly pervasive but perhaps still inadequately perceived and explored phenomenon of digitalization. As is well-known, there is a close link between digitalization and the globalization process, since it is precisely these technologies and the related platforms of the large digital companies (Big Tech), Google, Facebook, Apple, Amazon, and Microsoft, that have made possible and fueled the growing flows of capital, goods, people, information, images, sounds, and values that daily traverse the world and, in fact, globalize it. But this digitalization, despite some more recent initiatives (e.g., in particular, the 'Declaration for the Future of the Internet' presented in April 2022 by the European Commission in cooperation with numerous international partners, including the United

States), is still neither regulated nor governed by public authorities. Here again, the liberalist myth of the 'self-regulated market' still prevails. As Jonas Pentzien, a researcher at the Institute for Ecological Economy Research in Berlin, observed, "large digital companies set the rules of their markets themselves, buy out competitors, undermine regulation, and can limit access to information in terms of time and space. In this way, they create a centralization of power that is unparalleled".

Secondly, and in an apparently opposite direction to the one indicated above, it should also be noted that in recent years, in various parts of the world, starting with China in particular, digital technologies have been and are being used by the public authorities themselves to put in place increasingly pervasive forms of surveillance and social control over the population, justifying them with reasons of security (with respect to real or presumed external and internal enemies) or, as in the case of the Covid-19 pandemic, with health-protection requirements. This has given rise to, and is now beginning to be proposed even in Europe and to some extent in other liberal democracies, the so-called 'social-credit system', which is based on the one hand on the digital, analytical and daily detection of citizens' attitudes and behavior (almost always beyond any respect for personal freedoms and privacy), and on the other hand, on the dispensing of rewards or punishments, mainly in terms of exclusions and prohibitions, with serious effects on people's living conditions (as in the case of the prohibition of access to bank accounts or to many types of essential public services) in relation to their behaviors. All this also makes possible, as is evident and verified especially in the case of China, but not only there, the political use of these technologies for the purpose of repressing dissent. Digitalization, in this way, determines the division of society, its shattering between 'good guys' and 'bad guys' (in multiple senses and directions), and the breakdown of

relational networks both within societies and transnationally. In other words, a new type of capillary and creeping de-globalization, of which, moreover, there is still little individual or collective and social perception.

In conclusion, the contradiction produced by digitalization appears obvious: on the one hand, it globalizes because it allows to connect, to network, to integrate different phenomena and actors; on the other hand, and at the same time, it de-globalizes because it allows, with the same technological tools, to divide, close and separate.

Ungoverned globalization, the real globalization in which we live, therefore produces, as we have seen, self-destructive contradictions of various kinds that no one, as yet, is able to control. It is therefore not a generic globalization that has come to an end or is declining, as is usually said, but this ungoverned globalization that inevitably contradicts and self-destructs.

What is needed to reverse this trend, to guarantee a human direction and meaning to globalization, to make it positive and sustainable? What is needed, as is obvious to anyone who wants to see it, are *institutions* that are legitimised by consensus, and at the same time adequately effective in the implementation of policies to control and regulate this process, at the various levels at which it takes place: from the local to the global level, through all the intermediate levels, and well beyond the dimension of nation states. These institutions, as can easily be verified, do not yet exist. What is missing, in other words, is a multilevel democratic statehood that corresponds to the global complexity of the world in which we live. This is the real 'knot to untie' of the world in crisis, with respect to which we must have a horizon, a project, a strategy. Without it, self-destruction is bound to prevail.

Liechtenstein Resolution Provides a Mechanism to Hold the P-5 Accountable

Hemachandra Basappa

A remarkable and logical question was recently posed by the Permanent Mission of Liechtenstein via a Resolution broached for discussion at the 77th session of the General Assembly (GA), which is scheduled to begin on the 13th of September 2022. The Liechtenstein Resolution calls for the President of the GA to invite the permanent member/s of the UN Security Council (P-5) to come before the GA and explain their stand within ten days of applying a veto. The resolution asks that these P-5 members submit a special report at least 72 hours before the relevant discussions in the GA.

The Charter of the UN is very clear in outlining the organization's mission of saving "succeeding generations from the scourge of war", whereby the Security Council (SC) has been granted the power to act on the GA's behalf in achieving this aim through Article 24 of the UN Charter. Ironically, the veto power granted to P-5 members has been superfluously applied to block various peace-keeping initiatives. By their continued use of the Veto, the P-5 have continued to let the peoples of the world down and have left the Nations of the world in paralysis of sorts. In such instances, the P-5 have abdicated their responsibility under Article 24-1, and have failed to maintain peace and security, as entrusted to them by the member states. The proposed Liechtenstein resolution provides an opportunity to finally hold the P-5 somewhat accountable for betraying their obligations, as they would have to explain their decision to use the veto to the GA.

All in all, the resolution highlights the need for UN reform; at the time that the UN came into being following the discussions in San Francisco in 1945, there were just 40 Nations, with Poland joining as the 41st Nation. However, we have all emerged from the domination of our colonial past, with the People's Republic of China finally joining the Security Council in Oct 1971. Today, the membership of the UN has risen to 193 Nations; with this in mind, should the same criteria, parameters or priorities that existed in 1945 be still applied today?

As we speak, the world is confronted with new dangers that were largely unconceivable in 1945, e.g., climate change. Considering the great and unprecedented challenges that now face us, shouldn't we expect greater responsibility and leadership from the P-5?

The Liechtenstein resolution is a first step towards pushing for greater responsibility and accountability from those we have entrusted. Even so, the resolution has left out a salient point in failing to suggest that the P-5 members should hand over their chairing responsibility to a non-P-5 member of the SC during times when they have used or intend to use their veto power. This may have made a difference in the flow of discussion at the Security Council earlier this year, as Russia chaired a discussion on its own involvement in the war in Ukraine. It is worth noting that aside from the resolution, there are many other existing initiatives geared towards reforms of the Security Council, and the UN at large, including, but not limited to,

those proposed by the World Citizen's Initiative for a UN Parliamentary Assembly. One thing is certain: change and reforms are required; as such, advocacy for these initiatives requires widespread support and attention.

The WFM-IGP and its membership (MOs, AOs and IMO) should discuss this

resolution and should acknowledge key concerns with a view to strengthening it. Thereafter, the organization should work towards endorsing the resolution, and should call on their respective governments to support the initiative. This is a positive step towards change that is long overdue.

Death Sentences and Executions in 2021

Anne Parry

Amnesty International's latest report on death sentences and executions for 2021 makes for mixed reading. It is depressing to read that there has been a rise in the number of known death sentences of almost 40% since the last report in 2020, and a 20% increase in global executions, but if we look at the figures over the last decade there has been a slight fall in the number of executions overall and a rise in the number of countries that have abolished the death penalty since 2010. Part of the recent rise in the number of executions may be due to factors related to the pandemic, which have slowed down procedures in courts throughout the world; it is to be hoped that the trend towards fewer executions will be confirmed in future years.

In their report, Amnesty divides the world into 5 regions: the Americas, Asia-Pacific, Europe and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. The report is only as accurate as the information Amnesty has been able to obtain, and we must be careful to remember that it does not include the thousands of executions and death sentences that were carried out in countries where secrecy prevails, particularly in China.

Methods of execution, included hanging, shooting, lethal injection, and beheading

In 2021 there were no records of executions by electrocution or stoning.

Use of the death penalty in violation of international law

Amnesty recorded many cases of violation of international law, including public executions (Yemen), executions for crimes committed by

people under the age of 18 (Iran and Yemen), execution of people with disabilities, unfair trials, 'confessions' extracted through torture, and death sentences imposed in absentia.

Women executed and sentenced to death

24 women were among the 579 people known to have been executed in 2021 (4%), but the figure is likely to be higher. There is an active movement to ban the death penalty in Tunisia, where women make up 6% of those sentenced to death. Their crimes are more often acts of self-defence from domestic abuse and sexual violence than men's, and they are more frequently subject to unfair trials. But even for those countries where figures were available, in most cases it was not possible to obtain a breakdown by gender. Amnesty International confirmed that of the 67 women they know who have been sentenced to death, 48 are in the USA.

Regional reports

Americas

In the USA, the number of executions continued to decline in 2021, reaching the lowest number on record since 1988. The federal administration under President Biden established a temporary moratorium on executions in July. However, the Trump administration put three people to death in four days, just before leaving office on 20 January. Mississippi and Oklahoma executed people for the first time in 2012 and 2015 respectively, and in Alabama the state built a method for nitrogen gas execution, and officials wrangled over the fate of prisoners on death row affected by Covid-19, in one case seeking to make the man being executed wear

a mask to prevent the spread of the disease. The rest of the Americas region remained execution-free for the 13th consecutive year.

Asia Pacific

Secrecy in China, North Korea and Viet Nam made it impossible to assess the true number of state killings in the region, which Amnesty believes to be in the thousands. It was not possible to confirm information relating to the judicial use of the death penalty after the Taliban took control of Afghanistan in August 2021.

Europe and Central Asia

As expected, there were no executions in Europe in 2021 (apart from the case of Viktor Paulau in Belarus).

Middle East and North Africa

Iran accounted for 60% of the executions recorded in the region, and recorded executions also rose sharply in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, while they dropped in Iraq.

The number of people executed in Egypt in 2021 fell slightly, but the number of people sentenced to death by Egyptian courts in 2021 was much higher than in the report for 2020 and was the highest number of death sentences that Amnesty International recorded worldwide in 2021.

In Iran, the number of executions recorded by Amnesty rose by 28% compared to the previous year, largely due to an increase in executions for drug-related offences, but the overall figure is believed to be higher.

The parliament in Sierra Leone unanimously passed the Abolition of the Death Penalty Act

on 23 July 2021.

Sub Saharan Africa

The overall number of recorded executions more than doubled as a result of rising numbers in two countries: Somalia and South Sudan.

There was progress towards the abolition of the death penalty in several countries, including Sierra Leone, Ghana and the Central African Republic.

The role of Europe and the EU in the abolition of the death penalty worldwide

The death penalty was abolished by the European Convention on Human Rights Protocol No. 6 introduced in 1983 and signed by all 47 members of the Council of Europe, and ratified by all but one (Russia).

The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union echoes the ECHR in underlining the inalienable right to life in Article 2 - Right to life:

- Everyone has the right to life.
- No one shall be condemned to the death penalty, or executed.

The EU is actively engaged in pursuing the abolition of the death penalty in the world using a range of strategies described in the article *The death penalty and the EU's fight against it*¹. The latest Amnesty report is a stimulus to continue this work with the aim of bringing to an end this cruel punishment. Apart from the risk of judicial errors, any form of execution involves torture and as such is unacceptable, but above all the death penalty denies the values that abolitionists hold dear: the right to life, the value of life, and the dignity of human beings.

¹ [https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/635516/EPRS_ATA\(2019\)635516_EN.pdf](https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2019/635516/EPRS_ATA(2019)635516_EN.pdf)

Southeast Asia's Democratic Backsliding and China's Authoritarian Appeal*

Andrea Chloe Wong

The democratic backsliding prevalent across South-east Asia underscores the gradual decline in the quality of democracy in several countries. With the exception of those in Laos and Vietnam (both communist one-party regimes), most governments in Southeast Asia have found themselves halting the growth in democracy they previously pursued and even reversed their political course. And as governments display autocratic tendencies, their geostrategic balancing efforts at a time of heightened great power rivalry will likely tilt towards China's authoritarian charm and away from US democratic influence.

Such democratic backsliding has become rampant in most countries in Southeast Asia – a kind of diffusion effect in reverse, in contrast to the waves of democratization that occurred in previous decades. This phenomenon is reinforced by the current generation of Southeast Asian leaders, who show minimal interest in democracy other than at the ballot box. These autocrats emphasize the electoral aspect of democracy, but, once elected, they slowly undermine their country's democratic values and constitutional norms. In Thailand, the military junta led by Prayut Chan-o-cha toppled a democratically elected government in a coup in 2014 and was able to engineer a parliamentary election in 2019 that instated him as prime minister to prolong his rule. In Indonesia, President Joko Widodo's second election victory instigated the country's democratic decline. This became more pronounced under his administration with the legitimization of a conservative and anti-

pluralistic brand of Islam, partisan manipulation of law enforcement, and government efforts to suppress political opposition.

While these democratic setbacks were apparent long before the spread of COVID-19, they became more evident during the health crisis as governments solidified their grip on power. In Malaysia's case, an eight-month nationwide state of emergency was declared last January: it suspended elections until 1 August and granted authority to the current government to introduce new laws on its own. And in Myanmar, a military coup was staged last February even amidst the pandemic, which overthrew a civilian-led government in its quasi-democracy. The alarming military takeover eventually made Myanmar the frontrunner in the region's 'authoritarian race to the bottom'.

This political trend has geostrategic implications that may see countries in Southeast Asia gravitating towards China while moving away from the US. For most leaders belonging to the 'ASEAN dictators' club', their lack of transparency, desire to extend power and propensity to use force dovetail with China's principle of non-interference. Unlike the US, with its proclivity to condemn their political rule, these leaders view China more appreciatively for its neutral and non-judgemental stance in their countries' domestic affairs.

However, China's 'non-interference' paradoxically makes it an implicit supporter

of autocratic leaders in Southeast Asia. In the case of Myanmar's recent coup, the Chinese government provided diplomatic cover for the military junta led by Min Aung Hlaing after it blocked a UN Security Council statement condemning the incident, and warned against imposing international sanctions against the country. For Cambodia's Hun Sen, who, after thirty-six years in power, is the world's longest-serving prime minister, China represents a reliable external ally and an important financier for his regime's survival. Thus, Cambodia has since chosen to bandwagon with China and has embraced it almost exclusively as its main patron, with Hun Sen describing China as an 'ironclad friend'.

Moreover, China provides financial assistance without any preconditions requiring the advancement of human rights or the promotion of transparency and accountability. This is in contrast to the US, which in many cases requires political reforms to be undertaken or elections to be held before aid is disbursed to the recipient country. With no strings attached, countries in the region are capitalizing on the opportunities brought about by the "China wave" to boost their economic development, according to Philippines-based economic analyst George Siy. Moreover, China also has a flexible approach to aid allocation that creates substantial leeway for leaders to fund projects that best serve their political agenda.

This availability and attractiveness of Chinese aid has essentially led to a decline in US's economic leverage. This is evident in President Rodrigo Duterte's controversial war on drugs in the Philippines. While the US has sought to suspend aid to the Philippine national police for their alleged involvement in human rights violations and extrajudicial killings, China has granted financial support for drug rehabilitation and law enforcement in the country. Amidst international condemnation

of his drug war, Duterte regards China as 'the only country to come out freely ... [with] a firm statement that they are supporting the fight against drugs in my country'.

In addition, China's model of prosperity without democracy is becoming more appealing in Southeast Asia. Its autocratic leaders look at China as an exemplar of an alternative developmental model that has managed to produce unprecedented economic growth and maintain the legitimacy of its government, while effectively thwarting the growth of democracy in the country. According to American legal scholar Bradley Klein, this phenomenon is a form of Chinese authoritarianism, which suggests that 'state legitimacy need not be founded upon a democratic relationship between the government and the governed, but may rest instead on rising standards of living'. This emphasis forms a new narrative to counter the ideas of liberal democracy.

The political allure of this new narrative is significant in some countries in Southeast Asia, which have been increasingly disillusioned with the chaotic process of democratization and its adverse implications for their economies and societies. While they have sustained economic growth in recent decades, most states continue to suffer from high levels of inequality, widespread corruption, fragile institutions and weak rule of law. The current rise of populist leaders, with their autocratic governments, essentially reveals the discontent with democracy and the fascination with authoritarianism among the people in the region.

These political developments reinforce the ideological tension and great power competition between China and the US in Southeast Asia. China's rising political influence will increasingly undermine the foundation of other fragile democracies in the region. Although China is not yet able to reshape the global

order in its own image, the country's growing economic leverage and role in determining rules and norms are set to grow, especially if the US further retreats from being a global advocate of liberal democracy.

The growing admiration for China's authoritarian regime and economic growth essentially puts it at an advantage, especially given the US retrenchment in the region. This was evident in the Trump administration's 'America First' foreign policy, which puts

sovereignty and national interests at its core. Although it is still too early to determine whether the current Biden administration will cut back on American democratic rhetoric in Southeast Asia, the chaos during the recent US government transition and its tarnished democratic credentials make Washington even less relevant for countries experiencing democratic backsliding. And as they descend into autocratic rule, these states are implicitly leaving the field wide open for Beijing to take further steps towards regional dominance.

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The Disappearing Islands and Climate Change Refugees

Suchismita Pattanaik

In a true sense, all continents in the world are Islands. However, big and developed nations being part of a large continent are reasonably safe during climatic hazards and natural calamities. Conventionally, small land areas surrounded by seas and oceans are referred to as islands that occupy only 5.3% of the global terrestrial area. Nevertheless, they have wide biodiversity hosting around 19% of bird species, 17% of rodents, 17% of flowering plants, and 27% of human languages. The endemism of the Islands is far more than continents. Out of 35 biodiversity hotspots in the world, ten are based on islands. The climate changes not only threaten the existence of these islands but also the diversity on islands is threatened. Many of them started disappearing either in whole or in parts in the last century. A recent study of 4500 islands in ten biodiversity hotspots found that with a 1 to 6 meter rise in sea level, 6 to 19 percent of these islands might be completely inundated, endangering the extinction of over 300 endemic species. The principal cause is rising sea levels as a result of climate change.

Climate change and its impacts on the ecosystem are going to be severe in the forthcoming days. The oceans are getting warmer and the corresponding increase in the volume of water leads to sea-level rise. The other phenomena that are adding to the sea level rise are the rapid melting of ice sheets and glaciers over the past century. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, some islands and coastal districts will be drowned in due course due to the predicted rise in sea level induced by rising CO₂ levels

in the atmosphere (IPCC). There is sufficient evidence that the global sea level has risen gradually in the latter half of the twentieth century, owing mostly to human activity. Prior to the 19th century, the sea level has not altered considerably for 2 to 3 thousand years, according to the IPCC assessment. In comparison, the worldwide average sea level rose at a rate of roughly 1.7 millimeters per year over the twentieth century. The IPCC's First through Fourth Assessment Reports estimated potential sea-level rises of 31-110 cm, 13-94 cm, 9-88 cm, and 18-59 cm, respectively, by 2100. Different climate models and scenarios for greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions were used to compute these expected rises. According to tidal gauges, the worldwide sea level has risen by around 7 inches. Satellite data show that this number has increased about twice as rapidly in the last 20 years as it has in the previous century, growing at a pace of 3mm/year. So, during the next century, how much will the sea level rise? It's a difficult question to accurately answer. Although we have worldwide sea-level rise data, they vary based on offshore oceanographic conditions and whether the land is rising or sinking owing to tectonic activity. For example, the land is rising near San Diego, California, due to tectonic plate movement, thus negating sea level rise. Nevertheless, a large offshore earthquake might produce quick subsidence of the landmass, resulting in an immediate rise in sea level. Climate change and sea-level rise observations and predictions show that the sea level will continue to rise significantly in the future. However, there exist uncertainties,

which make precise forecasts impossible. The further we proceed in time, the more are the uncertainties.

The impact of the sea-level rise shall have a disastrous consequence on certain coastal and low-land areas of the world. Many west coast communities already experienced coastal erosion, flooding, inundation, and loss of wetlands due to elevated sea level. Millions of people living in the low-lying areas are going to be the “climate change refugees” as their residences would be under the sea. Near about 13-94 million people residing in coastal areas are going to be homeless and landless by the end of the 21st century due to a possible 40 cm sea-level rise. Most parts of South- and Southeast Asia could be submerged under seawater. The major land area of Bangladesh, along with the major cities of India such as Mumbai, Kolkata and Chennai, is likely to be submerged. The atoll islands are subjected to increasing environmental stressors, and the coral reef being the most sensitive species, may not withstand these adverse environmental conditions. Global climate change is pushing for greater floods, coastal erosion, and salinity intrusion, which is weakening the resilience and viability of tiny island ecosystems, causing migration and reducing the ability of islands to maintain human habitations. Islands like Kiribati, Tuvalu, the Marshall Islands, and the Maldives may eventually be completely submerged. The Maldives is inviting tourists with the marketing slogan, “come to Maldives before we disappear”. The inundation of such highly populated areas worldwide would cause a massive displacement of people (climate refugees) from low-lying areas. Climate change displacements have already happened but have not grabbed the necessary attention of the common people. According to the World Vision International study, the islanders have given up their hope and consented to be among the world’s first “climate change refugees” after a fight against the ocean for more than twenty years (building sea walls and

planting mangroves). The islanders are victims of something that they are neither responsible for nor have committed. These islands belong to them and their future generations. They are not enjoying the privileged status of industrialized countries whereas they are taking the toll. The islands are experiencing and suffering from the brunt of these greenhouse gases. The climate change that is caused by us is taking away the sovereignty of the people. It may happen that the words ‘island’ and the ‘islanders’ shall migrate from the Oxford dictionary and take refuge in the storybooks of our grandchildren.

The future policy, developmental goal, and research should be concentrated on better understanding and predicting the rise in sea-level and impacts of climatic shifts at both the organismal and ecosystem levels on islands. More so, islands should be considered as the priority areas for integrated conservation efforts because they have 14 times greater density of critically endangered terrestrial species and six times greater density of critically endangered languages than continental areas. Invasive species and habitat loss are the most significant threats to island terrestrial species diversity. Further, the outcome of the research should be rapidly integrated into the planning and prioritizations to combat the adverse effects of climate change. The assessment also focused on the island’s species that are most likely to be at risk from future climate change and the options for preventing their extinction. Proven management actions can reduce the threats, benefiting both local peoples and species diversity on islands. The nations should collectively and cumulatively involve in coastal management and policymaking with an objective for future robust coastal-management planning. There should be binding agreements and mainstreaming of policies incorporating both national and international agencies for the islanders to save their lives, livelihood, their lands, their rights and their sovereignty.

Robert M. Hutchins: Building on Earlier Foundations

Rene Wadlow

Much of our current work for a more just and peaceful world builds on the thinking and efforts of earlier foundations. An important foundation is the leading role of Robert M. Hutchins, long-time President of the University of Chicago (1929 -1951) whose birth anniversary we mark on 17 January.

Hutchins' father, William, was President of Berea, a small but important liberal arts college, so Robert Hutchins (1899-1977) was set to follow the family pattern. He went to Yale Law School and stayed on to teach. He quickly became the Dean of the Law School and was spotted as a rising star of US education. When he was 30 years old, he was asked to become President of the University of Chicago, a leading institution. Hutchins was then the youngest president of a US university.

In the first decade of his presidency, the 1930s, his ideas concerning undergraduate education – compulsory survey courses, early admission after two years of secondary school for bright and motivated students, a concentration on “Great Books” – an examination of seminal works of philosophy, in particular Plato and Aristotle, – divided the University of Chicago faculty. There were strong and outspoken pro and anti-Hutchins faculty groups. Moreover, Hutchins' abolition of varsity football and the ending of the University's participation in the “Big Ten” university football league distressed some alumni whose link to the university was largely limited to attending football games.

For Hutchins, a university was for learning and discussion, not for playing sports. As he famously said “When I feel like exercising, I sit down until the feeling goes away.”

It is Hutchins' creation and leadership of the Committee to Frame a World Constitution in 1945 which makes him one of the intellectual founders of the movement for world federation and world citizenship. After the coming to power of Hitler in Germany in 1933 and his quick decision to ban Jewish professors from teaching in German universities, many Jewish scientists and professors left Germany and came to the USA. Some of the leading natural scientists joined the University of Chicago. Thus began the “Metallurgy Project” as the work on atomic research was officially called. The University of Chicago team did much of the theoretical research which led to the Atom Bomb. While Hutchins was not directly involved in the atomic project, he understood quickly the nature of atomic energy and its military uses. He saw that the world would never return to a “pre-atomic” condition and that new forms of world organization were needed.

On 12 August 1945, a few days after the use of the atom bombs, Hutchins made a radio address “Atomic Force: Its Meaning for Mankind” in which he outlined the need for strong world institutions, stronger than the UN Charter, whose drafters earlier in the year did not know of the destructive power of atomic energy.

Several professors of the University of Chicago were already active in peace work such as Mortimer Adler, G.A. Borgese, and Richard McKeon, Dean of the undergraduate college. The three approached Hutchins saying that as the University of Chicago had taken a lead in the development of atomic research, so likewise, the university should take the lead in research on adequate world institutions. By November 1945, a 12-person Committee to Frame a World Constitution was created under Hutchins' chairmanship. The Committee drew largely on existing faculty of the University of Chicago – Wilber Katz, Dean of the Law School and Rexford Tugwell who taught political science but who had been a leading administrator of the Roosevelt New Deal and Governor of Puerto Rico. Two retired professors from outside Chicago were added – Charles McIlwain of Harvard, a specialist on constitutions, and Albert Guerard of Stanford, a French refugee who was concerned about the structure of post-war Europe.

From 1947 to 1951, the Committee published a monthly journal *Common Cause* many of whose articles still merit reading today as fundamental questions concerning the philosophical basis of government, human rights, distribution of power, and the role of regions are discussed. The Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution was published in 1948 and reprinted in the *Saturday Review of Literature* edited by Norman Cousins and in the *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* some of whom were in the original "Metallurgy Project". The Preliminary Draft raised a good deal of discussion, reflected in the issues of *Common Cause*. There was no second draft. The Preliminary Draft was as G.A. Borgese said, quoting Dante "...of the True City at least the Tower."

In 1951, Hutchins retired from the presidency of the University of Chicago for the Ford

Foundation and then created the Ford Foundation-funded Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions where he gathered together some of his co-workers from the University of Chicago.

Two ideas from The Preliminary Draft are still part of intellectual and political life for those concerned with a stronger UN. The first is the strong role of regional organizations. When The Preliminary Draft was written the European Union was still just an idea and most of the States now part of the African Union were European colonies. The Preliminary Draft saw that regional groups were institutions of the future and should be integrated as such into the world institution. Today, the representatives of States belonging to regional groupings meet together at the UN to try to reach a common position, but regional groups are not part of the official UN structure. However, they may be in the future.

The other lasting aspect of The Preliminary Draft is the crucial role that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) should play. The then recently drafted UN Charter had created a "consultative status" for NGOs, but few of the UN Charter drafters foresaw the important role that NGOs would play as the UN developed. The Preliminary Draft had envisaged a Syndical Senate to represent occupational associations on the lines of the International Labour Organization where trade unions and employer associations have equal standing with government delegates. In 1946, few people saw the important role that the NGOs would later play in UN activities. While there is no "Syndical Se-nate", today NGOs represent an important part of the UN process.

Hutchins, however, was also a reflection of his time. There were no women as members of the

Comments

Committee to Frame a World Constitution, and when he created the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions with a large number of “fellows”, consultants, and staff, women are also largely absent.

The effort to envisage the structures and processes among the different structures was an innovative contribution to global institution building at the time, and many of the debates and reflections are still crucial for today.

Notes

For an understanding of the thinking of those involved in writing The Preliminary Draft see:

Mortimer Adler. *How to think about War and Peace* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1944)

Rexford Tugwell. *Chronicle of Jeopardy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1955)

G.A. Borgese. *Foundations of the World Republic* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953)

Scott Buchanan. *Essay in Politics* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953)

For a life of Hutchens written by a co-worker in the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions:

Harry Ashmore. *Unreasonable Truths: the Life of Robert Maynard Hutchens* (Boston: Little, Brown and Co, 1989)

To What Extent has the European Court of Human Rights Encouraged the De-velopment of Transgender Rights in Europe?

Lucrezia Nicosia

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) is a human rights instrument aimed at upholding the rule of law and promoting democracy in Europe among the 47 members of the Council of Europe (CoE). It was formally drafted on the 4th of November 1948 in the aftermath of the atrocities of the Second World War. Indeed, the rationale behind it was to ensure that governments would never again dehumanise and violate people's rights without repercussions.

The wording of the ECHR provisions is a reflection of a specific historical understanding of human rights, which was shaped by the experiences of the war. However, over time this perception has evolved to respond to the changing needs of society. This article will focus on how transgender rights have progressed in Europe and how this evolution is reflected in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).

When the Convention was drafted, the issues of gender identity – and LGBTQ+ rights in general – were hardly considered in the social and political discourse. For this reason, especially Article 8 ECHR (right to respect for private life and family life), Article 12 ECHR (right to marry), and Article 14 ECHR (prohibition of discrimination) were only accessible to the cisgender and heterosexual community. As time

has progressed, and the issues of gender and sexual diversity have become more prominent in society, the European Court of Human Rights has begun to take a more progressive stance on LGBTQ+ rights.

As it has been stated by the Court itself in the case *Christine Goodwin vs the United Kingdom*, the ECHR is a “living instrument” that changes over time and which should be interpreted in the light of “present-day conditions”. Nevertheless, because the provisions themselves are unchanged, this progression is only possible through a process of interpretation of the rights set out in the Convention according to the overall situation in Europe. In this concern, it is important to define the role that European consensus played in shaping the interpretation of the ECHR.

European consensus is formally defined as a means of interpretation of the Convention deployed by the Court in instances of complex human rights issues, when supported by the majority of the 47 Contracting Parties. It consists of a rebuttable presumption that favours the solution adopted by the majority of the Contracting States and which can be disputed only if there are sufficient and valid reasons against its compliance. This typically applies when there are historical, political and moral issues at play in the respondent State. These

are often more sensitive and controversial topics, such as same-sex marriages, abortion, euthanasia, and transgender identity.

Furthermore, European consensus plays a significant role in relation to other tools of interpretation of the ECHR: the margin of appreciation of the Contracting States and the evolutive interpretation of the Convention. The former is defined as the space for manoeuvre that the Strasbourg organs are willing to grant national authorities in fulfilling their obligations under the European Convention of Human Rights. In antithesis to this, evolutive (or dynamic) interpretation is a tool of interpretation that grants the Court a certain level of flexibility to ensure the effective realisation of human rights throughout time.

The exclusive use of a progressive approach threatens the cohesion and predictability of the Court's judgments, as it contributes to a lack of predictability in the Court's judgments and a lack of stability in the Contracting States' obligations under the ECHR. Yet, a system that always allows States to have a great degree of interpretation in sensitive areas renders the fight for minority rights ineffective. Based on this understanding, the adoption of European consensus for the application of the Convention's provisions appears to be the most reasonable way to strike a just balance between the two mentioned opposites.

Nevertheless, the deployment of European consensus as a tool of interpretation of the Convention cannot be considered the most progressive means to carry out renovations in legislation, as it simply restates what has already been settled by national measures or international treaties for the protection of transgender rights. This is because the Council of Europe operates as an intergovernmental organisation established to rule on sovereign independent states and therefore it cannot

arbitrarily decide upon a new interpretation of the Convention without first establishing the emergence of a consensus on a particular matter. The existence of this common approach is ultimately the result of already settled national legislation in the majority of the Contracting Parties that demonstrate a positive approach in Europe towards the evolution of the specific human rights issue.

This reasoning can further be explained in light of the ECHR jurisprudence on the legal recognition of the change of sex of postoperative transsexuals. The focus is on *Rees vs the United Kingdom* (1986) and *B vs France* (1992). The first case concerned a transsexual man who was denied the right to change the sex on his birth certificate. This caused him embarrassment and humiliation, and it limited his ability to get married, prevented him from claiming certain pension rights, and excluded him from certain jobs. The Court, which was asked to rule on whether the right to privacy enshrined in Article 8 ECHR had to be interpreted to include the right to have a new gender recognised in law, found no violation of the provision. The reasons for this were mainly two: first, the right for gender recognition would have been too burdensome on the UK legislative system; second, a change in law was not possible due to the transitional stage of trans rights within Europe.

Nevertheless, the situation was dealt with differently in *B v France*, despite the temporal proximity and similarity with the case *Rees v the United Kingdom*. In this case, the ECtHR stated that there was an obligation on the part of the State's authorities to recognise in law a change in gender identity, as this would not be as burdensome for France as the UK.

While in the first case the Court considered the "transitional stage of trans rights" not to be sufficient to trigger a violation of Article

8 ECHR, in the second case the judgment was different. This illustrates something: the decisive criteria that influenced the decision-making process of the Court was not whether or not European consensus could be established, but whether or not national legislation would allow the change.

However, this approach towards trans rights changed with the case *Christine Goodwin v. the United Kingdom* which represented a turning point in the legal recognition of post-operative transsexuals. The facts of the case were formally identical to previous cases presented before the Court, but the outcome was completely different. What was decisive in the Court's ruling was the existence of "clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing international trend in favour not only of increased social acceptance of transsexuals but of legal recognition of the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals", as well as the acknowledgment of the notion of personal autonomy as an added principle protected by Article 8 ECHR and which includes "the right to establish details of their identity as individual human beings". For the first time, the European Court of Human Rights adopted a broader and autonomous interpretation of the rights granted by the Convention, allowing for broader protections for transgender rights that otherwise would not have occurred.

Another important breakthrough in this process happened in 2015 when the ECtHR finally specified explicitly that all transgender people – and not only transsexuals – are entitled to the enjoyment of the ECHR rights without discrimination.

It is evident that there is still a long way to go to achieve full protection and recognition of transgender rights; however, the above-described developments illustrate that the legal landscape in Europe is evolving. Indeed, while the initial application of the ECHR was based on a static set of rules developed in the late 40's, this approach has increasingly changed to reflect the social and legal context in which it operates.

The deployment of European consensus as a tool of interpretation of the Convention advanced major changes in the Court's rulings, but it was not the only determinant. Indeed, in *Christine Goodwin vs the United Kingdom*, the ECtHR took a more supranational stance for the first time and based its decision on a more autonomous interpretation of the ECHR. The Court decided that it was the moment to rule on the widespread discrimination against the transgender community and to affirm an evolutive approach to the Convention which renders its rights "practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory".

The Union of Barbed Wire

Alex Zanotelli

For more than three years now we have been demonstrating every first Wednesday of the month in front of the Italian Parliament for the *Fasting of Justice in solidarity with migrants* campaign. But this time, as the Rome Police Department did not authorize our demonstration, we were present on November 3 in front of the Prefecture of Naples from 5pm to 6.30pm, on behalf of those who will fast in their houses and monasteries.

Our hunger strike is a protest against the European and Italian racist policies towards migrants. This very month, it is a cry against the letter in which twelve European countries asked the European Union to finance the construction of an anti-migrant wall; they are: Estonia, Austria, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. Notwithstanding the EU's refusal to grant their request, both Lithuania and Poland are building walls at their borders with Belarus. Greece, in addition to its maritime frontier alongside the Evros river, on the border with Turkey, announced the building of a new 2.7 km long maritime border between Turkey and Lesbos Island. Slovenia built a wall on the border with Croatia and Austria. Bulgaria

will build a 235km long wall to stop migrants' arrivals from Turkey. This is the Union of barbed wire, not the European Union!

How is it possible that more than 80% of the 82 million displaced people are given shelter in impoverished countries, while the rich West is building only walls?

But this month's fasting is also a solidarity gesture towards the thousands of refugees that have been protesting for about one month in Tripoli (Lybia), in front of the United Nations Office for refugees, asking for their evacuation from Libya to neighbouring countries. And we want to give voice to their cry of massive suffering. The tragedy of refugees in Libya is mostly the responsibility of Italy. This is due to the Italy-Libya Memorandum and to our financing of the Libyan Coast Guard that, in this very year, brought back in Libya more than 26.000 asylum seekers that attempted to flee by sea.

Our hunger strike, in addition, is also a sign of support for Mimmo Lucano, the victim of Locri's court unfair sentence. We are calling for Mimmo's acquittal since he only did good to both migrants and the Riace inhabitants, revitalizing that deserted Calabrian village.

The Civil Education of Europeans

Giampiero Bordino

The theme of cultural and human formation is central to any historical process of building new political communities. As historical experience teaches us, common institutions are not enough, a shared culture is also needed which, in addition to making their birth possible, nourishes them and promotes them over time.

This awareness, essential but not always adequately present in the public debate and in government policies themselves, is the basis of the European Parliament Resolution (April 2022) entitled *“Implementation of civic education measures”*. The Parliament places the Resolution in the context of some fundamental European and international documents: in particular the founding treaties of the European Union, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union, the documents of the Council of Europe, the sustainable development goals of the United Nations, and others.

In the text of the Parliament it is said that *“civic education must be understood as an education at several levels, which contemplates the local, regional, national, European and global dimension of citizenship ...”*. It is also noted that *“the ongoing process of globalization and European integration will require the new generation of Europeans to have greater political commitment at various levels, as well as the ability to live and work all over the world, and manage differences in daily life. ...”*.

In such a context, civic education, understood both in a formal sense (education at various levels, including adult education) and in an informal sense (learning that takes place in

the variety and complexity of all human and social relationships), assumes a decisive value.

The numerous *“recommendations”* of the European Parliament to the Community institutions and at the same time to the national ones aim at the active involvement of all European citizens, old and new (migrants, refugees, etc.), in the processes of political participation at different levels, from the local to the global one, in which they actually take place. In other words, the fundamental objective is to promote forms of *“active citizenship”* capable of guaranteeing, not only formally but substantially, political democracy. In this context, the European Parliament document also highlights the training needs related to the *“digital transition”* underway. Without adequate digital skills, as is increasingly evident, the exercise of citizenship rights becomes difficult or in some cases even impossible. It is not just a technological problem, but a great political and cultural problem, decisive for our future.

The Parliament Resolution highlights the need for a shared memory for the civil education of Europeans. Identity, and the feeling of belonging, as is well-known, are built at the intersection between memory and any undertaking. In other words, we are always, on the one hand, what we have been and, on the other hand, what we plan to become.

In particular, the Parliament Resolution cites the island of Ventotene and its *Manifesto* (see insert in this issue). Memory and the project of the construction of Europe. Since the distant 1941.

Soros Warned that War in Ukraine May Lead to World War III

Lionel Woodhouse

Financier and philanthropist, founder and chair of the Open Society Foundations, George Soros, speaking at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, has warned that the Russian invasion of Ukraine may be the beginning of the third world war and that our civilisation may not survive this war. He said that the war has changed the world irreversibly. He praised US and European support for Ukraine and remarked that the EU's dependence on fossil fuels remains excessive. In his view, former German Chancellor Angela Merkel bears the main responsibility for it. Moreover, he appreciated Ukraine's application for membership in the EU. It represents a response in the right direction to the invasion of the Russian army, and Europe reacted "with greater speed, unity and vigor than ever before" in its history. According to European leaders, the lesson to be learnt by the invasion of Ukraine is the need of a closer European Union. Soros mentioned favorably the plan proposed by Enrico Letta, leader of the Italian Democratic Party, for a European Confederation, the largest of several concentric circles, which the institutional organization of Europe would be made up of. This largest circle is fit for the inclusion of Ukraine in the European institutional architecture. This plan was endorsed by Emmanuel Macron in a speech delivered at the European Parliament.

Contrary to Putin's expectations, who hoped to be welcomed in Ukraine as a liberator, the Russian army is meeting a resolute resistance. According to Soros, Putin seems to have recognized that the invasion of Ukraine was "a terrible mistake". As a matter of fact, "the weaker Putin gets, the more unpredictable he becomes", Soros said. This sentence overshadows the specter of the use of

nuclear weapons.

He asserted that the international community has been increasingly engaged in a battle between two systems of governance that are diametrically opposed to each other: "open society" and "closed society." He defined open society as one in which a government works to protect individual freedoms, and closed society as one where the individual's role is to serve the state. The attack against open societies started after the 9/11 terrorist assault on the New York Twin Towers in 2001. While the autocratic regimes are on the rise, democracies are retreating.

Soros also recollected that Putin and Xi, who met on February 4 at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympic Games, issued a long statement announcing that the cooperation between them has "no limits". The meaning of this statement, according to Soros, is that Putin might have gained Xi's agreement to Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Soros addressed the problem of EU's dependence on Russian fossil fuels, which makes the transition to renewable energy even more urgent. Gas and oil prices have soared and world energy markets have been severely destabilized. He defined "particularly frightening" the prospect of irreversible climate change. We all know that we must eventually die, he said, but we take it for granted that life on our planet will continue. This is not true any longer. And yet, the war has obliged us to relegate climate change and ecological transition to second place. Soros said the world must mobilise all resources to bring the war to an early end, and "the best and perhaps only way to preserve our civilisation is to defeat Putin" as soon as possible. (*l.w.*)

In Ukraine, It Is Time for the EU to Make Its Voice Heard in the Peace Talks*

Antonio Padoa Schioppa

The ongoing war in Ukraine is proving to be ever more frightening. Not solely because of atrocities perpetrated by the invader (now disclosed by the media in real time, except in Russia), but also due to the growing risk of escalation which could result in a nuclear world war. Both Vladimir Putin's Russia and Volodymyr Zelensky's Ukraine seem to be eager to continue the warfare, each hoping for a final victory on the battlefield. Western States have intervened with the heaviest economic and financial sanctions in history and a strong provision of weapons to the heroic Ukrainian counteroffensive, avoiding direct intervention to reduce the risk of a fatal escalation. However, everyone understands that it will be necessary to end the conflict by negotiation. Indeed, on the one hand, Putin's original plan to conquer (or forcibly control) Ukraine has failed; on the other hand, Ukraine's claim of recovering Crimea and the two provinces of the Donbas appears to be unrealistic, if not impossible.

In this context, two potential strategies come into sight. The first one would aim at fully defeating Russia to prevent the threat of future annexation attempts by force in Europe. This seems to be the plan of most of the US administration's officials, apparently currently shared by President Biden himself (even though, as in the past, there is no unanimous position regarding Russia in the US).

The second one aims, conversely, at launching, as soon as possible, a negotiation concerning the possible contents of a Peace Agreement.

In the first place, the latter would define new territorial borders between Russia and Ukraine, and also would ensure international guarantees to Ukraine's independence, stronger than the ones contained in the 1994 Treaty that Russia violently breached. These guarantees should not be signed exclusively by Russia and Ukraine, but also by the United States of America, the European Union (or, at least, a group of EU member states), China, India, and Turkey, within the UN framework. Once the Agreement is signed, sanctions against Russia could be removed.

Clearly, not only is the first option probably unrealistic without a direct intervention of the US, but it would also dramatically prolong the war, its sufferance, and the related extremely serious military and economic threats. For this reason, it would be desirable for Europe to urgently promote a concrete peace initiative. The European countries are much more united than how could be imagined only two months ago, and are proving an extraordinary humanitarian solidarity towards the Ukraine under attack. Obviously, if the European Union had built a common army in the last decades instead of its 27 uncoordinated national armies, which mobilize twice the economic resources spent by Russia for its military, the European peace-keeping operation would have had more credit. To that regard, maybe this crisis has at last brought up a change, and it is hoped that the additional military expenditures just decided in France, Italy and Germany will be mainly dedicated to a single common

European defense, and as such will be included within the EU institutional framework. Nevertheless, Europe can immediately play a crucial diplomatic role concerning its relations with Russia, and also with China and India, based on a multilateral and shared conception of international relations, that is necessary and urgent despite the different nature and political and ideological structure of their regimes.

A peace-seeking European intervention is possible, but under one condition: the EU must act with one voice. We must remember that this war is occurring in Europe, and that especially the European countries have to bear the risks, both military, and financial and economical, because of their energy, gas and fertilizer imports from Ukraine and Russia.

Emmanuel Macron's victory is crucial for the EU, since its very existence would have

been challenged by Marine Le Pen's election. Now it is time for at least the French, Italian and German governments, and also for the EU Parliament and Commission, to support together a peace initiative. This is possible. And it is also proper that, even within the NATO framework (currently necessary to our safety), the EU partners gain at last a strategic autonomy and are entitled to have an influence even on the US choices.

The peace design should include the strengthening of multilateral policies and institutions within the UN framework, as well as the resumption of shared and manageable initiatives on disarmament, that Biden has relaunched after Donald Trump's defeat, but that could be challenged again in the US itself. In a similar way, a global multilateral approach should be adopted to tackle climate change, that threatens mankind's survival.

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A Political Treaty for a Greater Europe. For a Political Response to Ukraine's Request

Mario Telò

False promises. Ukrainian President Zelensky's request for immediate EU membership. Respect for a fighter who defends our values with his heroic people and their resistance. He must be able to receive a political response. Certainly, immediate choices for help, including (for the first time) military. But we also owe him an effort to clarify the distinction between "a European perspective" and "immediate membership of EU institutions."

Art. 49 TEU legitimates the "application" of Ukraine to become a European State that respects our values. Nevertheless it raises four institutional issues (the institutions represent our common life, and cannot be neglected without weakening European democracy): the advisory role of the Commission (which can speed up its work, but its experts will be confronted with the impact of the statistical data (45 million inhabitants, with a per capita income of a quarter of the poorest country in the EU, Bulgaria) on the distribution of structural funds); the unanimous vote of the Council; the majority vote of the members of the European Parliament; the unanimous ratification by the parliaments (or by popular referendum) of the 27 States. It is a complex process and it can take years.

This is why Croatia negotiated for 10 years, Turkey has been a candidate state since 2004, Spain had to negotiate for 10 years, and the countries of the eastward enlargement had to wait, while approving the preliminary reforms,

from 1989 to 2004, or even (in the case of Romania and Bulgaria) up to 2007.

Emotion is important in politics and one could choose to force the procedure. But not all member states agree, and ratifications would be problematic (as the 2016 Dutch referendum reminds us: 34% in favour!). Second problem: visiting Brussels on March 1, Salomé Zurabishvili, President of Georgia, reminded Ursula von der Leyen that "the former Soviet states Georgia and Moldova have all declared their intention to become members of the EU, are members of the bloc's Eastern Partnership initiative, and have association agreements with it, covering trade ties and integration issues". Also the Georgian people fought against the Russian invasion and the continuing occupation of Abkhazia and Ossetia on 20% of their national territory. And let's not forget the positive opinion of the Commission (2021) on the opening of accession negotiations with the 6 Western Balkans states: Albania, Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia, Serbia and Macedonia. It is obvious that the "fast track" asked for Ukraine will hardly be able to ignore these nine countries, in the waiting list for years (and each candidate has its protectors in the Council). So, what the promoters of miracles are selling to Zelenski would imply for the EU to go from 27 to 36 Member States, including a faithful friend of Putin's Russia, Serbia (a political contradiction): we risk the dilution and weakening of EU institutions, a sort of second Council of Europe.

In relation to the history of European construction, proceeding in this manner would be a historic turning point.

The balance between enlargement and deepening has always been the EU's Guiding Star. No reform of the treaty is announced. Unfortunately, the Conference on the Future of Europe is a failure, there will be no massive recommendation for a more federal Europe. Macron will not be able to announce an Inter-Governmental Conference for a new treaty in May so easily (the mandate must be unanimous). So the consequences of an enlargement to 9 Member States without prior deepening and institutional reform would not be difficult to predict: the institutions would objectively risk paralysis; think of the Council of International Affairs, where unanimous voting is required and some members States are used to play the "veto-game", blocking the action of Josep Borrell for reasons of internal politics. Or in the Commission, with 36 members! The federal (or at least the Qualified Majority Voting) perspective of the EU would be severely affected.

So, the interrogations of the experts are part of our duty: they do not have a "legalistic" origin, but twice political. On the one hand, the internal democratic legitimacy of the decisions; on the other hand, the possibility for the EU to take advantage of this favorable moment to take steps forward towards our priorities: a strategic autonomy, a defense union, a world-power role. Without this progress the EU would be weakened in an increasingly dangerous world. Who is interested in a more fragile EU? It is the opposite of the EU becoming a geopolitical power.

The alternative: an innovation in the European institutional architecture. It is absolutely necessary to give a positive and innovative answer to the demand for a European perspective of the Ukrainians in their fight

against a dictator who, according to some information, is behaving like a criminal against humanity. A third approach is needed between the membership policy and the neighborhood policy. The "European perspective" must have a more visible and identity-based concretization, allowing Ukrainians to feel from now on part of the renewed European perspective and live up to the change-of-era that is in the making. This institutional strategy must have a predominantly political character, clearly distinct from the European Economic Area or the Council of Europe. We propose to revive the idea of a European architecture organized in concentric circles: the EU, in turn already organized in several circles; the federal core of the euro zone (19 members); the EU of 27; and the wider circle, i.e. the confederal "Greater Europe" of the 35, open to new members, in particular to those who choose freedom over Putin's autocracy (note: without any implication in terms of the obligation to guarantee security, as NATO's Art. 5). This architecture would be tolerated by Russia as part of a compromise which would not contemplate any NATO enlargement and would revive the OSCE.

This is a historic moment: new institutions are built in times like this.

It is necessary to relaunch, by an initiative of the High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/VicePresident of the Commission (HR/VP) at the European Council, what Mitterrand in 1989-91 opposed to Mrs. Thatcher's proposal for an immediate and generalized entry of the countries of Eastern Europe into the EU (the use of widening versus deepening: the Maastricht Treaty was at stake).

The "Greater Europe" would have at its head a Council composed of 35 States (with majority voting in the event of human rights violations), but also a common parliamentary Assembly, which would invite the HR/VP in

its programmatic debates for matters of CFSP. This new confederal treaty, drawn up with the necessary caution, should be able to strengthen all the association agreements that already exist with these countries, multiplying cooperation programs at the level of the internal market, in economic, cultural, educational, energy, transport fields, etc. Everything except touching the EU institutions.

Is it a multi-speed Europe? No; rather, it is a

dynamic and not fixed political architecture, to be proposed to the continent, in which the second treaty of a confederal nature (the Greater Europe) would have a political objective: peace and the prevention of conflicts through economic integration and multidimensional cooperation, while ensuring a strong sense of European belonging to the Member States. And it only depends on the political will of the European Council.

Us Against Them? We Need to Think about Freedom in Order to Face Putin's Russia

Roberta de Monticelli

There we are. Sergey Lavrov, the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs, said it clearly: there is a global nuclear threat, and that's because of a United States' proxy war against the Russian Federation. From Kiev, the U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken and the Head of the Pentagon Lloyd Austin do not deny it at all: Austin explains that the ever-increasing involvement of western military power in the Ukrainian war aims to outplay the Russian one. No one could have thought that this could be the Ukrainian goal, before the country was properly armed -for many years now- to be capable of doing just that.

The events in Italy on April 25th [the day celebrating the liberation from the fascist regime, *Transl. Note*] did not silence the arguments between those who uphold this escalation and those who think it is crazy. The thing is that this topic has shadowy contours, in which it is easy to lose one's head. The point of the debate is the freedom that the Russian autocrat is threatening in Ukraine, or even elsewhere after that; the question is what should we do to help Ukraine.

The shadow regards the question: we who? We need to think with a fresh approach about freedom in order to shed light on that question and to argue with reason, and not in the throes of blind passion.

The new thought we need is new just because the western conscience has removed from memory two of its biggest civilization builders.

Altiero Spinelli and Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, both defeated now, apparently, are united in a symbolic passing of the baton, that Spinelli gave, just before his death, to the President of the Soviet Union, who took office the year before.

BELLA CIAO'S FREEDOM

On the 25th of April, the song *Bella Ciao* resonated in the streets of all Italy, expressing what must be saved from the idea of freedom that we have today. It starts with the words "*the invader*". It ends with the flower of freedom sprouting from a partisan's grave.

In its own way, the song reaffirms the core connection that Plato established between the soul and the City, between the person and the ideal civilization, which we the citizens can identify ourselves with. The song puts it in the simplest terms: there is no freedom for the people (i.e. civil, political, social and cultural rights) if there is no freedom from the invader, that is, the political independence of the State.

But what is the connection between the freedom of the people and the independence of a nation state? Only one, which the song, that is now sung all over the world, does not say but preserves in its melody: democracy.

Because repelling the invader and regaining one's own independence is certainly not a sufficient condition for the freedom of the citizens of a State if it still lacks democracy, the only regime that allows them to say (in principle) "the State is us".

Altiero Spinelli is not just the author of the *Ventotene Manifesto*, along with Ernesto Rossi and, ideally, Eugenio Colomi and Ursula Hirschmann. Starting from the Italian “Euro-communist” political turn that allowed him to work in the European Commission and then in the European Parliament – which were still phantasmagorical until the 1970’s –, Spinelli is also the solitary theorist and tireless builder of the institutional design of the European Union, today still hanging from the national sovereignties of the member States. That design which, if fully realized, would lead to the federation of the United States of Europe, with its political sovereignty, its fiscal unity, and, obviously, its common defense.

SOVEREIGNTY DISSOCIATED FROM THE NATION

The simple and grandiose idea that underpins this design is that, in a globalized world defined by economic interdependencies and the multinational dimension of corporations, even the idea of democratic sovereignty (Art.1 of the Italian Constitution) must be dissociated from that of nationhood.

Indeed, the Italian Constitution incorporates this idea in its 2nd Article, where it recognizes and guarantees “the inviolable rights of the human being” (not restricting them just to its own citizens). Thus, the Italian Republic put in its own Constitution the respect of human rights, which will be soon after articulated in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and which the Charter of Rights of the European Union will deepen to an astonishing degree.

This idea allows for the first time a precise distinction to be made between nationalism and love for one’s country. Nationalism today is a disvalue for democracy. It is called sovereignty.

Looking back thirty years after his defeat, Gorbachev’s thought is surprising for his

lucidity and its breadth of vision. His lucidity allows him to see that in the century of nuclear weapons “humanity has ceased to be immortal”. His breadth of vision gives him a perspective that embraces not just the end of the Cold War and the defeat of one of its two poles, but even the future construction of a new world order that must truly replace the imperialism of the great powers with the rule of law, and thus give strength to the United Nations Organization.

In his vision, the point of origin and then dissemination of this new true order of lasting peace is Europe, of which Russia is not only a geographical part, not only a great and profound soul, but can and must also become a constitutive part, through the bridge of all the republics (Ukraine, Belarus and the Baltic Republics in the first place!) of the renewed Federation of Independent States into which the Soviet Union should have and could have peacefully transformed itself.

So articulate and concrete was this immense chance in the dramatic years prior to the defeat in 1991, and then prior to the chaotic dissolution of the enormous Soviet body, under the violent thrusts of many nationalisms, first and foremost the one of Boris Yeltsin’s Russia, that we will have to return later to reconsider that idea, limpidly expounded in Gorbachev’s *Memoirs*. But for now, it is urgent to dwell on its most crucial aspect, which is the new thought of freedom.

THE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION OF MINDS

Everyone may remember Reykjavik, 1986. Just arrived at the summit, Gorbachev persuaded Reagan to resume the negotiations launched the year before, in Geneva, for a bilateral nuclear disarmament. A year later, in fact, the US-USSR agreement on the elimination of short- and medium-range missiles was signed. At the time, however, few understood that this was for the new Russian leader the “external”

or global aspect of *perestrojka*. That is, of that “democratic revolution of minds” – and institutions – that produced, together with a flowering of cultural and civic life never seen in Russia since the 1920s, the first truly democratic election: the one that brought Yeltsin to the presidency of the Russian Republic in 1990.

The first and last democratic election: because Yeltsin was careful not to ever allow another one, especially after he had his parliament cannon-bombed in 1993, causing a massacre whose true numerical size was never disclosed, speaking of *glasnost* or transparency... What followed was the coup d'état with which Yeltsin carried out the sheer dissolution of the Soviet Union, initiating what Gorbachev called ‘a parade of sovereignties’ and which prompted Yeltsin shortly afterwards to wage the ill-fated Chechen war. But the so-called West did not understand.

It supported Yeltsin, but above all it did not understand why it was wrong. It was wrong because of the essential link between internal democratization and the true realization of a new democratic international order, starting with the “Common European House”.

“An agreement had been reached on a possible entry of the USSR into the European Union with the status of associate member, and shortly afterwards into the International Monetary Fund as a full member”.

THE THOUGHT OF FREEDOM

The new idea of freedom was on the verge

of becoming the steel core of the institutions of the so-called West. A fully supranational democratic order for regulating the coexistence of nations. Yet, even before the Soviet empire, the Yugoslav system had already dissolved: in the blood that nationalisms have always carried with them since the First World War.

What an immense chance was lost - and how brutally it is trampled upon today in Lavrov’s statements and in Blinken’s and Austin’s responses.

And to close the circle on the other great builder defeated today, here is what Spinelli wrote in 1986 in his diary shortly before his death, mocking an Italian communist of the time who had not yet realised who the new Secretary of the CCP was. He wrote: “In vain I suggest that if 8 May is to be commemorated, it is not as the victory of anti-fascism, but as the end of 30 years of disastrous European civil war, and the beginning of a new chapter in European history”.

Gorby said in 1991, on the occasion of the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize: “If *perestroika* fails, the prospect of entering a new period of peace in history will vanish”.

We have seen how this is playing out. “We” is becoming again the awful word that opposes “them”, as Blinken and Austin oppose Lavrov. Russian pride versus American pride.

No, we were not that “we”. Maybe, can we still not be forced to become it?

The Curse of a Country with an Inadequate Economy for Its Own Imperialist Ambitions*

Adriana Castagnoli

History teaches that nations and their leaders rarely learn the lessons they should. In the recent weeks there has been a debate over the alleged “prophecy” of the former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger on Ukraine. But few remember that, in 1994, addressing the nostalgic restorers of the Russian empire, Kissinger stated that they could repeat the fatal mistakes of their Tsarist and Soviet predecessors because “the extension of territory was an extension of weakness”. Even the former U.S. ambassador to Moscow, Jack F. Matlock, observed that the Russian empire could not be reconstituted because only a “healthy economy” could bear the cost.

The gap between imperial ambitions and economic power is the hallmark of Russian history over the last half-century, beginning with the failure of the Soviet-American détente policy inaugurated by the Nixon-Brezhnev summit in Moscow in 1972. Despite a series of long-term economic cooperation agreements (e.g., on nuclear energy, space, environment, nuclear armaments), in the second half of the 1970s the USSR continued the broadening and involvement of its foreign policy with ever more extensive commitments in the Middle East and Africa.

In Washington they became convinced that the East-West economic cooperation, far from fostering the convergence of the two systems, had favoured the Soviet military build-up through the transfer of Western technology.

In December 1979, the Soviets invaded Afghanistan with the purpose of backing the communist government threatened by the Mujahideen. They will stay there for ten years. First the democratic President Jimmy Carter, then his republican successor Ronald Reagan, intensified covert operations and economic sanctions with the goal of making Afghanistan the Vietnam of Moscow. But the USSR, beyond the show of strength, was already on the ropes after years of stagnation.

Western Europe, despite the embargo imposed by Washington, continued its trade with Moscow with some uneasiness, particularly in the energy sector, deepening economic solidarities that would be increasingly difficult to get rid of. In January 1992, one month after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, President George H.W. Bush claimed that the United States had won the Cold War. In Russia the mood was different, although there were those who thought that the new world order could be realized the way Mikhail Gorbachev and the Soviet reformers had imagined: Moscow would contribute to a “common European house”, designing the new international order together with Americans and Europeans.

The economic asymmetry between Washington and Moscow became evident during the global financial crisis of 1998, when Russian politicians complained that the United States had been unable to steer the International Monetary Fund into granting Moscow a

financial stabilization package similar to that offered to less politically relevant countries. Substantial differences eventually eroded trust and cooperation between the two powers, as the Kremlin sought higher power status on the international stage. Russia and the United States remained at odds over the NATO enlargement strategy, although they found points of agreement on some aspects, to the extent that they launched the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, and the Partnership for Peace with the aim of establishing joint forces to be deployed in the rapid management of regional conflicts. But Moscow's intent was to take back, for better or worse, its rightful role as a former great power.

With the rise of Vladimir Putin, who became prime minister in 1999, these asymmetries crystallized Russian and American positions. Moscow's opposition to NATO's eastward enlargement stemmed from the perception that the expansion of the Alliance offered the U.S. the possibility of acting unilaterally regardless of Russian objections. Even the EU's willingness to embrace former Soviet bloc countries was perceived as an attempt to prevaricate Moscow's prerogatives. President Putin expressed this position clearly in the spring of 2000, by asserting that Russia might revise the idea of applying for NATO membership, but only if NATO had undergone a major transformation and had assumed the character of a political organization, the cornerstone of which would have to be the granting of veto powers to Russia.

The NATO intervention "for humanitarian reasons" in Kosovo in 1999 changed the Russian perception of the international scenario. Underneath the ashes of the former Soviet military apparatus brooded many ill-feelings that generated resentment, and Russian generals continued to think in terms of East-West confrontation. Many events

burst onto the international scene: after the intervention in Kosovo, followed Islamic terrorism and the 9/11 attack, Western military operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya; until the great financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent recession. The collapse of oil and commodity prices turned the Kremlin's bet on commodities into a risk for the Russian economic system, despite the fact that Washington had supported Russia's entry into the WTO in August 2012.

Moscow's response to domestic problems remained its increase in military interventionism abroad: from the war in Georgia, to the one in Ukraine and the one in Syria. Meanwhile, the economic rise of China also constituted a challenge for Moscow in the construction of the wider "Eurasia", reducing its influence in Central Asia. Russia thus found itself in a sort of identity crisis, to which it responded by resorting to the Soviet model of the fight with the West.

With the intervention in Syria, Moscow had regained a great-power status, also by working side by side with the United States for a diplomatic solution to the crisis and the success of the later truce agreement. But President Putin's ambitious programme was to transform the Russian army into a light force, equipped with state-of-the-art technology by 2020. Ever since the war with Georgia in 2008, Vladimir Putin had put the introduction of now-insurmountable structural reforms in the Russian economic system on the back burner, focusing instead on re-establishing the prerogatives of the former Soviet regime. He had tried to compensate for the weakness of the Russian economy, on which the effects of the sanctions imposed by the EU for the annexation of Crimea in 2014 also weighed heavily, by resorting to neo-nationalist and revanchist sentiments that stemmed from a widespread discontent with Washington's

global leadership. While investments in digital technology and infrastructure were scarce, the effects of Western sanctions and Russian counter-sanctions on the import of agricultural products had finally oriented the Russian economic system in an autarchic direction.

Against this backdrop, in July 2021 and for

the first time since 2015, Putin updated the National Security Strategy: a manifesto for an era defined by an intensifying confrontation with the United States and its allies, accompanied by a return to the traditional Russian values. The gap between imperialist ambitions and economic power has remained dangerously relevant.

*This article was published in *Il Sole 24 Ore* on April 1, 2022

Ventotene and Santo Stefano Historical Capitals of Moral and Intellectual Construction of European Values.

Nicola Vallinoto

The European Parliament (EP) adopted a resolution on 6th April, 2022 concerning the implementation of citizenship education actions. The text proposed by Salvatore De Meo (PPE) and Domenec Ruiz Devesa (S&D) “considers that the island of Ventotene and its Manifesto have played a decisive role in the history of European integration; stresses its role as an emblematic place of memory for European integration and for the protection of European common values; highlights its contribution to fostering European citizenship education, in particular through the active involvement of young people in its annual seminar on European integration, initiated by Altiero Spinelli in 1982; stresses also the symbolic importance of the works to reclaim the Prison of Santo Stefano and its potential to become a center of reference for permanent cultural exchange, public events, exhibitions and debate; therefore considers it a historical capital of the moral and intellectual construction of European values”.

The EP resolution “highlights the role of the *House of European History* in furthering the development of specific programmes, instruments and activities that build up a cogent narrative of European integration and its basic values, in particular for students and teachers at all levels of education; asks the Commission to cooperate with Parliament in assessing means to decentralise the *House of European History* in order to broaden accessibility, including from the Member States and, in particular, the educational community, through, among other initiatives, enhanced collaboration with Member States’ cultural institutions, roving exhibitions and a network of permanent delegations”.

On 28th April 2022, the European Commission awarded the *European Heritage Label* to 12 sites that have played a significant role in the history and culture of Europe and the building of the European Union. The *Ventotene Manifesto* has been awarded the Label with the following explanation: “An area of confinement since ancient times, Ventotene has always been a place where cultures meet, becoming a political laboratory for reflection on European values of democracy and freedom. The outcome of this encounter was the *Ventotene Manifesto*, which, by envisaging a federal government, laid the foundations for the modern idea of a united Europe. The *Ventotene Manifesto*, officially entitled “*For a free and United Europe*”, was signed in 1941 by Altiero Spinelli and Ernesto Rossi who both were kept in the prison camp in Ventotene that was built in 1939 to exile opponents of the fascist regime. The *Ventotene Manifesto* is a key document, encompassing values such as democracy, solidarity and freedom into a future foundation of a common and strong Europe. Nowadays, the city of Ventotene continues to develop initiatives that confirm this role so as to become a place of education on Europe and of reflection on how to develop the federalist perspective suggested in the Manifesto itself.”

Mariya Gabriel, Commissioner for Innovation, Research, Culture, Education and Youth, affirmed that “Cultural heritage is Europe’s soul. These beautiful sites embody our rich history, they are geographical manifestations of who we are. The *European Heritage Label* sites are amongst the greatest gifts Europe has to offer and it is our duty to preserve them at all costs.”

UEF Statement on the War in Ukraine

The pandemic and Putin's aggression to Ukraine have ushered a new era for Europe. This calls for a more proactive European action in different policy fields, such as health, economic and social recovery, foreign policy, defence and security, energy, and migration, among others.

In this regard, the Conference on the Future of Europe becomes even more relevant after the pandemic and war shocks. New necessary unions in the health, defence, energy, migration, financial and fiscal domain, call for a stronger, federal political union as a necessary condition to fully underpin them.

Therefore, the Union faces two urgent and fundamental tasks. The first is to fully support Ukraine, by providing military, economic and humanitarian aid. The second is to complete the political unification of Europe through a process of federalisation.

Defending Ukraine and the implications of the war in Europe

Thus, the Union of European Federalists:

1. Deplores the Russian aggression of Ukraine; supports the strong and swift diplomatic, political, financial and security measures undertaken by the EU, particularly the UNGA resolutions, the punitive measures on the Russian economy and Central Bank reserves, and the delivery of military equipment to Ukraine.

2. Deplores the Lukashenko's regime support for Russian aggression against Ukraine, using Belarus territory and infrastructure, and calls

for the strengthening of the sanctions already imposed against Belarus.

3. Encourages Member States and the European Commission to scale up - where deemed necessary - multisectoral sanctions and to fix all possible implementation loopholes for those measures that are already into force.

4. Points out that the continuous reliance of Europe on Russian gas and energy indirectly contributes to finance the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Consequently, it is of the utmost importance to put an end to European energy dependency as soon as possible; calls for an immediate ban on imports of fossil fuels and raw materials from the Russian Federation, in order to undermine the Russian financing of its war efforts.

5. Urges the Member States to uphold the supply of military and intelligence capabilities to Ukraine, and in particular of fighter jets and anti-aircraft weapons.

6. Declares that the Union should not cease its efforts to bring the perpetrators of war crimes to international justice, including all responsible officers within the chain of command; urges international organisations to activate all the available justice mechanisms in this regard; expresses its support to the ICC and the Office of the Prosecutor's investigation and to the safe collection of evidence on the ground to independently assess whether war crimes and crimes against humanity were perpetrated, and calls to increase financial support, and voluntary secondment of experts; calls for the establishment of a Special Tribunal for the Punishment of the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine; urges the extension of the conflict monitoring mechanism in order

to support civilians in Ukraine, helping to prevent further escalation and better anticipate harm from military operations; supports the Ukrainian authorities to track disappearances during the war by raising awareness about international humanitarian law.

7. Stands in support of the millions of refugees of the Ukrainian war; praises the Commission and the Council for the expeditious activation of the Temporary Protection Directive; urges the Commission and the Member States to develop stronger coordination mechanisms to ensure that all human and social rights (such as access to work, health, schooling or housing) conferred by it to Ukrainian refugees are effectively ensured; affirms that without well-balanced relocation mechanisms, countries at the forefront of the reception of refugees will not be able to provide for the needs of Ukrainians in need of international protection; calls for solidarity and relocation to be made effective under the coordination of the Commission.

8. Affirms that there can be no possible trade-off between the compliance with the EU values of democracy, respect of human rights and rule of law, and the moral obligation of welcoming refugees; considers it necessary to widen the scope of application of the conditionality regulation and to ensure its proper enforcement.

9. Concludes that the costs arising from Russia's war of aggression on Ukraine for European citizens require additional and substantial investment and financial support to minimise surges in the cost of living, in energy prices, but also for continued financial, humanitarian, and military support to Ukraine; points out that the provision of decent shelter, of schooling and other essential services to more than 3.4 million refugees will also require the deployment of additional European funds.

10. Stands with Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova, which are currently confronted with continuous attacks and threats by Russia; considers that

the Commission should expedite its opinion on the granting of the candidate country status to Ukraine.

11. Stands in solidarity with the Russian opposition, Russian civil society and the courageous Russians citizens opposing the war; calls to provide further support to the Russian democratic opposition and Civil Society Organisations, including additional multi-entry visas for a long period of validity for civic and political activists opposing Putin's regime.

12. Calls on the EU Member States to facilitate the opening of humanitarian corridors inside Ukraine's territory, in particular through the United Nations mechanism, to allow civilians' safe passage out of the zones affected by military operations, and of the territories unlawfully occupied and controlled by the Russian Federation; supports as well the declaration of a no-fly zone in the skies over the corridors, over Ukraine's nuclear power plants and nuclear waste storage facilities.

Towards a new Europe

Therefore, the Union of European Federalists:

13. Urges to fully exploit the potential of the Lisbon Treaty, with the purpose of guaranteeing the proper implementation of Union's policies, thanks to the activation of *passerelle clauses* to overcome unanimity voting in the Council in the field of Foreign and Security Policy, Social Policy, and of taxation, and extending Qualified Majority decisions and ending national vetoes.

14. Calls for the relaunch of the Energy Union; reiterates its support to the rapid phase-out of the energy dependence on Russian natural gas, oil, and coal; welcomes the new Re-power EU Communication; underlines the need for a prompt diversification of energy supply sources, developing centralised gas purchases and strategic reserves at the EU level, promoting more efficient energy interconnections at

European and international level, particularly for natural, liquefied gas and hydrogen, and decoupling energy prices from final prices paid by consumers; believes that there is a need to redouble the efforts to develop renewable energies (in particular green hydrogen) as the best way forward to guarantee energy autonomy, and thereby accelerating the implementation of the European Green Deal.

15. Deplores that a two-tier system of refugees' protection is emerging in Europe between Ukrainian citizens and non-Ukrainian nationals; recognises that all refugees should be entitled to the same rights; rejects mandatory relocation as one-off measure, and calls for solidarity to underpin the proposed New Pact on Asylum and Migration; urges the Council to speed up the current negotiations on a mechanism based on the principle of solidarity and on relocations, towards the creation of a new sustainable European Asylum Union.

16. Calls upon the European Council to fast track the development of a first embryo of a Defence Union, to ensure the safety of European citizens and the longstanding commitment of the European Union to uphold peace, if possible by activating Article 42.2 TEU and constituting the Rapid Reaction Force proposed by the Strategic Compass.

17. Highlights that the current 2021-2027 long-term EU budget and the Next Generation EU will not provide sufficient resources to achieve the above-mentioned goals; notes that the mobilisation of already committed resources poses at risk the strategic objectives

of the Union, including the financing of new energy, migration, asylum and defence unions; calls therefore to make the European Recovery (and Resilience) Plan permanent, and to complement it with additional resources financed through new EU bonds to finance the new unions and the European Green Deal.

18. In this regard, reiterates the need to urgently progress towards a federal political union, where Parliament and Council will negotiate on an equal footing on the EU budget and its financing, including on EU debt, and on European taxation.

19. Believes that the magnitude of the challenges ahead will require all democratic institutions to conceive innovative and unprecedented solutions; reiterates thus the need to empower the European Parliament with the right to initiate legislation, and with increasing fiscal prerogatives; calls for the extension of the Ordinary Legislative Procedure to all the Union's policy areas.

20. Calls for the holding up of a Convention in the short-term to grant a proper follow-up to the deliberations of the Conference on the Future of Europe, to ensure a reform of the Treaties and to launch the creation of a sovereign and democratic European Federation; recognises the need to consolidate the new competences and policy instruments, and to confer stronger democratic legitimacy to the new European Union through the adoption of a Federal Constitution allowing for the full involvement of the European Parliament in all policy areas.

Biden's Call for War Trial and Acknowledgment of the ICC Role *

US President Joe Biden called for the collection of evidence of war crimes against Russian President Vladimir Putin on Monday 4th April, following gruesome reports of mass killings of civilians by Russian troops in Bucha, Ukraine. The Biden administration has openly declared its intention to bring this evidence to trial; and will look to intelligence reports, interviews from global, independent media, and observations from Ukrainian residents and international organizations to build a case through the International Criminal Court (ICC), or a similar mechanism.

The reports in reference indicate that civilian bodies lie strewn across the streets of Bucha, bound and bruised with gunshot wounds. Perhaps even more disheartening are the accounts which allege that Russian troops are blatantly opening fire on civilians, in what is a clear contravention of customary humanitarian law. Furthermore, the ICC's chief prosecutor reportedly stated that there is "reasonable basis to believe that war crimes and crimes against humanity have been committed in Ukraine". Even so, bringing President Putin before the court could prove difficult as Russia does not generally acknowledge the Court's jurisdiction, nor can the Court try an individual in absentia. Meanwhile, Russia is not a state party to the Rome Statute, which means that Putin cannot be tried for crimes of aggression for invading Ukraine, and that Russia can apply its privilege as a permanent Security Council member at the UN to veto any attempts to be brought before the ICC for this crime. This essentially gives rise

to a situation where Putin can operate with a level of impunity; ultimately underscoring the importance of the Rome Statute in ensuring a layer of accountability, especially where powerful States are concerned.

The US interest in exploring justice for Ukraine through the ICC is therefore a significant milestone, as the country has never been a state party to the Rome statute and has never formally acknowledged the court's jurisdiction. The hope is that President Biden's resolve to hold the Russian Government accountable will lead to a national and global acknowledgment of the Court's important role in maintaining order and promoting the rule of law.

In leveraging this momentum, Civil Society and international institutions, in partnership with the international community, need to ramp up calls for:

- All States to recognize the Rome Statute, and become State Parties to it, bearing in mind its importance in providing accountability to perpetrators and justice to victims.
- The ICC to actively investigate the atrocities in Bucha and across Ukraine, with a view to bringing some justice to war victims, and making a strong statement about accountability for grave international crimes.
- Ukraine to complete its application to formalize ratification of the Rome Statute, and aid in the investigation of international crimes undertaken within its territory.

* World Federalist Movement (WFM) Press Release

Petition for the Deployment of International Intervention Forces in Ukraine *

The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Antonio Guterres, has finally called for an immediate and temporary “ceasefire” in Ukraine after sixty days of armed violence. The General Assembly of the United Nations already approved Resolution 377a (Uniting for peace) in 1950, which authorizes the General Assembly to adopt – by qualified majority – the measures of peace keeping. Therefore, both the member countries of the European Union and the States that abstained on the resolutions condemning Russia, could request the convening of a new Extraordinary General Assembly. Said Assembly could support the urgency of an immediate truce and authorize sending International Peace Forces to Ukraine to guarantee it.

The signatories of this petition urge the activation of the United Nations Statute, in particular its Chapter 7, which authorizes the General Assembly to decide on peace keeping measures through the “International Peace Forces” (the so-called Blue Helmets) established since the document “United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines” was issued to ensure compliance with the “ceasefire”.

Among the essential rights, or as the basis of essential rights, the Charter of the United Nations of 1945, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and the United Nations Covenants on Civil, Political, Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of 1966 have established the principle of human dignity, mentioned in their respective preambles. The contempt for human dignity regarding women, minors, men, and the whole civilian population, is just one of the heinous crimes committed by the Russian army. Contempt could reach its peak if the

Moscow autocrat decided to parade the Ukrainian prisoners, humiliating them as the Soviets did on the Red Square in 1945 with the prisoners of the Third Reich. The international community, mainly the OSCE and the European Union – while having the awareness and the means – have not been able to foresee the war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine without any justification and to bring military operations to a halt.

The only way forward at this point appears to be the dispatch to Ukraine of international interposition forces (the blue helmets) to guarantee the peace keeping operations. Their mission – it should be reminded – is not offensive, but it is necessary to ensure compliance with the ceasefire. The decision should be taken by a qualified majority of the General Assembly of the United Nations, going beyond the stalemate taking place within the Security Council.

This intervention was also explicitly requested by the Ukrainian Parliament, which called for the deployment of a peace-keeping mission on the Ukrainian territory, launching an appeal to the United Nations for international mediation. The exceptional gravity of what has been happening since February 24 in Ukraine and Vladimir Putin’s refusal to accept the start of a genuine peace negotiation now requires the adoption of exceptional measures.

This is obviously a difficult road to undertake, but the immense humanitarian tragedy must push the international community to try to take even the most difficult roads and, on this occasion, to show the world that the UN is an institution created to guarantee justice, peace, and the freedom of peoples.

* Proposed by the Italian Council of the European Movement

Appeal to the European Union for a Peace Pact *

The force of reason against the force of arms

Russia's military invasion of Ukraine is provoking growing political rivalry between opposing world powers that could have catastrophic outcomes. The use of nuclear weapons is no longer excluded. In any case, if the war still lasted months or years, a rift would be created in Europe and in the world similar to that of the darkest years of the Cold War as well as causing enormous costs for the whole Planet. We need only mention the wheat blocked in the port of Odessa.

The European Union can and must stop this dangerous escalation with the tools available and with a forward-looking political initiative. Diplomacy, the supply of defensive armaments to Ukraine, economic sanctions and the partial halting of fossil fuel imports from Russia are not enough. The embargo on the import of oil and gas, in line with the request of the European Parliament, would deprive Russia of the resources necessary to finance the war and could facilitate a ceasefire overcoming the present stalemate. The time has come to act with forward-looking policy proposals which take into consideration the post war situation.

We European citizens and citizens of the world call for the EU to ask all the forces deployed in the field to accept a Peace Plan that includes:

1. The renewal of the Atlantic Pact (1949) involving all current NATO member countries plus Russia and other countries that want to be part of it. The Pact, among the peoples

of the new Atlantic area, from Vancouver to Vladivostok, must guarantee security and economic cooperation among its members. What was possible in 1975, with the Helsinki Accords, during the Cold War, must again be possible in 2022. Who is preventing the current perpetrators of the ongoing conflict from returning to the spirit of Helsinki? The OSCE and the Council of Europe must be reactivated.

2. An initiative for peace and cooperation from Vancouver to Vladivostok would have a positive effect on international relations in Asia. Peace between Russia, Ukraine and other countries will show the way to a reduction in political tensions also between China, Taiwan, Japan and all other Asian peoples.

3. All UN countries must be called upon to ensure respect for the new Peace Pact in Europe. The UN, in the years of the Cold War, played the crucial role of easing tensions between the superpowers. Today its role becomes even more important not only to ensure peace among peoples, but also to face the existential challenge of climate change. The mad race for the increase of military spending must be stopped: governments must devote more resources to the ecologically sustainable development of the planet until the launch of a Global Green Deal.

4. The signing of the Peace Pact will immediately put an end to military hostilities and economic sanctions.

War is not an inevitable fate.

The 100 Assemblies for a Federal Europe Campaign Comes to an End

On Thursday, 5 May, the final event of the 100 Citizens' Assemblies for a Federal Europe Campaign, promoted by the European Federalist Movement - Italy as part of the mobilisation for the Conference on the Future of Europe, took place online (here: <https://fb.watch/cW9Txirn72/>). As of the date of this writing, as **many as 84 citizens' assemblies have been organised and planned**, held in various ways, as Citizens' Assemblies with civil society and political and social forces (usually also involving representatives of the municipal administration) or as Municipal Councils, often open to citizens, or even as University and inter-institutional assemblies. Almost all of them were included **on the website of the Conference on the Future of Europe**

The event on 5 May featured speeches by a number of assembly representatives from each region. Each one brought his or her own testimony regarding also the involvement of citizens and young people in the debate on the future of Europe, also **in view of the new process for the reform of the Treaties that we ask to start after the conclusion of the Conference**. Speakers included **Stefano Passarini**, Mayor of Costermano (VR), **Monica Marini**, Mayor of Pontassieve (FI), **Sonia Cambursano**, Mayor of Strambino (TO) and Deputy Councillor of the Metropolitan City of Turin, **Marco Cogno**, Mayor of Torre Pellice (TO), **Lia Montalti**, Regional Councillor of

Emilia Romagna, **Ennio Triggiani**, University of Bari (Coordinator of the Forum on CoFoE of the Association of European Union Law Scholars), **Filippo Barberis**, Member of the Milan City Council, **Antonella Melito**, Member of the Capitoline Assembly, **Massimo Bello**, President of the Senigallia City Council, **Vito Piruzza**, President of the Piazza Futura Cultural Association, Ragusa

Government and parliamentary representatives also took part to bring greetings and to confirm the synergy of the various institutional levels in this process: among them, the **Undersecretary Benedetto Della Vedova**, **Senator Alessandro Alfieri** and the **Hon. Matteo Bianchi** - national representatives respectively for the Senate and the Chamber in the Conference Plenary - the MEPs members of the Conference **Brando Benifei** (Head of the Italian Delegation of the S&D in the European Parliament and President of the Spinelli Group) and **Sandro Gozi** (President of the Union of European Federalists - UEF).

Among the 84 assemblies can be numbered several municipal councils, the assemblies produced an Agenda or Motion committing the municipality and its administration to promote the conference and its results, while in the Open Citizens' Assemblies, in the majority of cases an Assembly Appeal was approved at its conclusion.

A Biography of Robert Triffin

Pierre-Hernan Rojas

Ivo Maes, with Ilaria Pasotti

Robert Triffin: a Life

Oxford University Press, New York, 2021,
262 pp., £48

Robert Triffin's intellectual heritage rests on one major tenet: namely, that an international monetary and financial system (IMS) based on a single national currency is inherently unstable. Dealing with the primacy of the dollar in the Bretton Woods system, Triffin (1960) forecasted worldwide deflation because the USA could not fuel world economic growth by means of the main source of international liquidity – the dollar – without undermining other countries' confidence in the convertibility of dollar balances into gold. This diagnosis – the Triffin dilemma – conferred on Triffin a prominent role in international monetary debates as a policy-oriented economist. A biography of one of the twentieth century's most outstanding economists, who left his mark on many policy proposals, was very much lacking. Who better than Ivo Maes, a reputed historian of economic thought, and Ilaria Pasotti, his former PhD student who wrote her dissertation on Triffin? The book covers Triffin's life in seven chapters. In each chapter, the authors build a coherent narrative of his intellectual and professional life based on his published works and on archival material. Chapter 1 deals with Triffin's intellectual background as a student at Louvain (1929–1935) and Harvard (1935–1938). Chapter 2 is about Triffin's years at the Federal Reserve Board (FRB) in Washington (1942–

1946), when he led money-doctor missions in Latin America. Chapter 3 covers the period between his departure from the FRB for the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1946, and his involvement as the US representative of the Economic Cooperation Administration in the implementation of the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1950. Chapter 4 covers the period when Triffin, a professor at Yale University since 1951, put great effort into alerting the international community that the Bretton Woods system was inadequate for the growing needs of international liquidity. Chapter 5 surveys Triffin's involvement in a closer European monetary integration, first at the EPU and then as the monetary expert on Jean Monnet's Action Committee for the United States of Europe. Chapter 6 deals with Triffin's retirement from Yale University and his appointment at the Université Catholique de Louvain in 1977, during which Triffin remained involved in European monetary debates. Chapter 7 concludes.

Maes and Pasotti begin by casting light on how Triffin's mind was shaped by the interwar years. As a left-wing Catholic, Triffin was fascinated by Henri de Man's New Socialism and by Albert Einstein's anti-militarism. Triffin's pacifism and his quest to foster understanding and peace among people was forged at the same time as the rise of Nazism. At Louvain, with Paul Van Zeeland, Albert-Edouard Janssen and Leon-Hugo Dupriez, Triffin learnt monetary and banking economics and an empirical approach to test business-cycle theory in Europe. The 1929 crisis and the deflationary spiral of the 1930s made a lasting impression on Triffin, who remained obsessed with the monetary problem of the interwar period, especially because of the decision-makers' incapacity to achieve unanimity in devising a new order after the 1931 sterling devaluation. At Harvard, Triffin turned to pure theory. Under the influence of

Joseph Schumpeter, Edward Chamberlin and Wassily Leontief, he wrote a thesis on general equilibrium and monopolistic competition. This graduate work made Triffin an expert on imperfect competition theory, shaping his perception of international monetary phenomena.

Needless to say, the book raises the problem of international liquidity, the life-long concern of Triffin. He clearly understood the extent to which the USA could exploit its “exorbitant privilege” of issuing the dollar to finance its national economic policies (Vietnam War, over-consumption), forcing other countries that unconditionally demanded its assets to adjust. During his money-doctor missions in the 1940s, Triffin pointed to asymmetries of the IMS (in terms of specialization and commodities exported by peripheral countries, and in terms of key currencies), causing inequalities among countries. The balance-of-payments in Latin American countries was governed by international capital flows and fluctuations of imports and exports, not by cost maladjustments. To maintain their domestic stability, Latin American countries needed to draw on international reserves to finance compensatory policies. Again, in the second half of the 1940s, Western European countries were unable to restore current account convertibility because of the scarcity of dollars. Together with European officials, busy implementing the Marshall Plan, Triffin recommended a clearing union in Europe as a remedy for bilateralism and trade and exchange controls. His proposal gave rise to the EPU (1950–1958), which was seen as going against the Bretton Woods system and substituting regional (supranational) for global monetary integration.

Maes and Pasotti systematically assess Triffin’s contribution to political decision-making. Triffin never seems to have missed an

opportunity to harp on his analysis to political and economic institutions (central banks, governments, the European Commission, etc.) and individuals (Monnet, President Kennedy, etc.). The EPU’s success in the 1950s convinced him to advocate closer monetary integration in Europe coupled with a reform of the IMF to enable it to issue supranational liquidities. The (supranational) region was the level at which monetary reforms should be implemented to bring about a multipolar international monetary system. Maes and Pasotti explain in detail Triffin’s plan for the creation of a European Central Bank that could lend and rediscount to national central banks with a unit of account that could also serve as a means of payment between countries, and a way of centralising participating countries’ international reserves. Until his death, Triffin unfailingly supported Europe’s monetary and financial integration with a specific regional form of liquidity and the centralisation of reserves in a supranational regional fund.

This book is very timely. The Bretton Woods system ended in 1971, but the dollar remains the world’s principal currency. Emerging market economies largely demand US-dollar-denominated assets to invest their surpluses, rather than to finance domestic economic development policies. The creation of the Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) in 1969 did not solve the fundamental flaw, namely the continuing use of the dollar as an international currency. Moreover, SDRs are obtained on a quota basis with rich member countries securing most SDRs. Triffin’s work is therefore still relevant today. As the authors argue, Triffin was “both [an] imaginative and creative mind, thinking outside the box, coming up with new ideas that could be put into practice in the policy process” (154).

One shortcoming of the book might be pointed out. On regional monetary integration,

the book only deals with Western Europe, while Triffin also had experience with regional monetary schemes in Latin America (1952), Africa (1963) and Asia (1967). Indeed, Maes and Pasotti remind us that Triffin thought of European monetary integration as a first step towards a decentralised reform of the IMS. One of Triffin's arguments, in the face of the IMF's reluctance to participate in the EPU machinery, was that a global approach to monetary issues was extremely difficult to coordinate. Triffin, as a pragmatist, pointed out the practicability of closer supranational regional integration with a limited number of countries to deal with immediate issues such as monetary or commercial policy. From the 1950s, Triffin advocated clearing and reserve schemes in other parts of the world.

This kind of analysis is not explored in detail in the literature. Maes and Pasotti might have taken the opportunity to contribute to a better understanding of Triffin's view of a polycentric monetary system grounded on the use of supranational currencies issued by regional central banks. In spite of this minor lacuna, Maes and Pasotti wrote an outstanding book on Triffin that is a must-read for economists.

(For more information on Robert Triffin please see: www.triffininternational.eu)

Opening to Omnilateralism

Catherine Vieilledent

Wolfgang Pape

Opening to Omnilateralism Democratic governance for all, from local to global with stakeholders

AuthorHouse, 2021, ISBN 1665583150, 652 p.

"We do not unite states, we unite people." (Jean Monnet)

Its title is clear, this book is an invitation to broaden our system of governance to go beyond nation-state dominated multilateralism and include the voices of stakeholders (non-state actors or civil society, including corporations). The book calls for an "omnilateral" global system (from omnibus in Latin, "for and by all," quoting Immanuel Kant in "*The Science of Rights*" in 1790).

The multi-level governance that the book invokes strives to include the Eurasian perspective, non-Western cultures and the experience of other regional integrations in the world such as ASEAN, the AU and Mercosur. It is about opening up to "holistic" cultures, capable of understanding the global commons of the environment, the oceans or space, not to mention animal life, and of assuming mutual responsibility. This is reminiscent of Jeremy Rifkin's "*The European Dream*", which evokes a European model based on respect for the

individual and solidarity between individuals and with the environment.

However, the nation-state model, Wolfgang Pape explains (Chapter 1), has been exported to other parts of the world, including Asia, without there generating more advanced cooperation than international structures essentially for purposes of trade. This is a model of sovereignty that has been exhausted by the concurrence of several forces: the integration of economies and above all finance, the penetration of multinational corporations especially of the Internet, the citizens' loss of confidence and their increased demands at the local level, the progress of international justice, the action of non-governmental organisations, and the emergence of challenges that we can only solve collectively based on interdependence (e.g. climate change).

The second chapter focuses on globalisation and analyses the causes of the gradual but irresistible decline of national sovereignty. In particular, the author identifies as a factor of renewal the emergence of international non-governmental organisations ("INGOs") and the association of non-state actors such as corporations (in the name of social responsibility). These, of course, give rise to questions of legitimacy and possible conflicts of interest for European countries: can we speak of official NGOs ("ONGOs") and how can we avoid an accreditation system that is perceived as preferential treatment? The author gives as an advanced example the International Labour Organization with its tripartite structure (workers, employers and governments), a legacy of workers' struggles in the 19th century Europe. But it lacks binding powers, which disqualifies it as a truly "omnilateral" organisation.

Western-style globalisation is accompanied by a void linked to the "Anglo-Saxon

disorientation". Bilateralism is making a comeback but remains an often unequal form of cooperation, breeding chaos and legal uncertainty. Multilateralism is now outdated, according to the author, because it lacks binding instruments and grants the Member States a formal equality, whatever their demographic or economic weight. This makes it unfit to manage worldwide commons such as the environment, climate change, pandemics, etc. The author, we are to understand, calls for the sharing of sovereignties and supports the construction of regional integrations, of which the European Union is the prototype.

Renewing modes of global governance (or collective organisations, the term is debated), implies a differentiated approach from the most local to the global level. The "multi-level governance" (chapter 3) that the author invokes does not rely on general mechanisms of direct democracy. At higher stages, it is indeed risky to resort to decision-making mechanisms based on the volatility of mass opinion, which can easily be manipulated by populists or algorithms (see the Brexit votes and the election of Donald Trump, or the market of opinions on social networks).

What proximity makes possible at grassroot level, is no longer possible as the level of decision-making moves away from the local and the sphere of everyday life (chapter 5): indirect, representative filtrations must be used, informed by expertise and information that vary from country to country. Parliamentary democracy has long made it possible to filter individual opinions, but it is under pressure from the very fact of forms of governance, particularly federal ones, such as exist in Europe. Solidarity does not come naturally, even in federal or quasi-federal structures: we note the regional splintering of parties in Belgium, opposition to budgetary transfer or equalisation mechanisms between regions in

Germany, and the reduction of the legislative powers of national parliaments in the EU, even though it is the latter that stands accused of suffering from a democratic deficit.

However, compared with other regional organisations, the EU has powerful and effective mechanisms for formulating and arbitrating the common European interest: it is the community method, since the origin of the Communities, with the Commission as a lever and counterweight to the national interests that dominate the intergovernmental method. The supranational element of the EU is without equivalent in international organisations.

The author thus calls for a reform of the United Nations, which he believes can only result from external pressure: such a reform would be based on the association, in addition to states, of sub-national organizations and "regional" governance bodies and on a mode of financing that is independent of States. Global governance, he argues, is increasingly the responsibility of Civil Society and groups active in environmental or Internet issues, for example, which are able to deliberate on issues that transcend national borders.

The book concludes, as one of its key arguments, with the concept of non-state "stakeholders" (which it opposes to shareholders, whose interest is narrow and short-term, or to states dedicated to formal and territorial representation). As coalitions of interest groups, or participatory partnerships working towards agreed objectives, stakeholders are viewed as a "qualitative" contribution to the democratic process, based on expertise and the ability to convince. Together with a weighting of the votes of states according to their importance, but also according to the impact the issue has for them (cities, islands, etc.), this could be a solution to the need to reform the functioning of the UN General Assembly.

One of the charms of the book is the personal testimony of the author, both during his formative years as a student in Europe, America and Asia, and as a EU representative in Japan for a dozen years. And the analyses he provides of the history of Asia and Europe, as well as its anchoring in recent and older current events. The book introduces a number of original concepts ("concentric identity", "Enlightening 2.0", "Westlessness", "crowd decisions", etc. drawn from numerous readings) and the critical apparatus is very rich (index, bibliography, notes).

Beyond the Eurozone Crises: An Inside Journey

Flavio Brugnoli

Marco Buti

The Man Inside: A European Journey through Two Crises

Bocconi University Press, Milan, 2021

There are many books on the Eurozone and its crises, but one that discusses “economic policy formation and thinking in real time” presents a unique opportunity for an in-depth review of a decade of turbulent and at times dramatic events in Europe. This is the case with the excellent *The Man Inside*, by Marco Buti, who, between 2008 and 2019, was Director-General for Economic and Financial Affairs at the European Commission (which he joined in 1987) and is currently the Head of Cabinet of the Commissioner for Economy, Paolo Gentiloni.

The book covers two crises that hit the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and shook the architecture of the Eurozone: the global financial crisis and the pandemic. It consists of six parts, covering the most relevant issues with a well-balanced mix of economic, political and institutional analytical tools, and includes 42 chapters, most of which previously published in CEPR’s VoxEU and co-authored with other economists and/or Buti’s colleagues at the Commission. Therefore, the book is a fascinating mix of “mainstream” views, which fuel public debate and add transparency

to the decision-making process, and of fruitful opportunities for “thinking out of the institutional box”.

The long journey leading to the EMU has already seen several generations of EU civil servants shape the European integration project. As Marco Buti highlights, after the “Pioneers”, who had peace as their beacon and goal, it was the turn of the “Architects”, who set the institutional architecture of the Single Market and the launch of the euro. After the creation of the EMU, the torch has now passed on to the “Builders” (to whom Buti belongs) who, learning from past weaknesses and mistakes, are moving forward to deepen European integration.

After the successful first decade of the euro, which resulted in a widespread but (with hindsight) fragile stability, the explosion of the first crisis, in 2007-2008, showed that the European institutions had a weak and short-sighted toolbox to tackle it. Moreover, as Buti emphasizes, the fact that the epicenter of the crisis was Greece’s public finances severely affected the whole EU approach to the crisis, and led to the relevance and systemic impact of the banking and financial sectors’ crises being underestimated.

Confronted with what soon became an existential threat to the Eurozone, the primary need was to preserve the integrity of the euro. At the time, the focus was on structural reforms and rule-based fiscal prudence – what Buti calls the “Brussels-Frankfurt consensus”. The need to restore credibility to the markets whilst trust amongst countries was severely lacking, prompted a reliance on asymmetric adjustments, which have then been labeled as “austerity”. Indeed, Buti explains well that the rules were neither so inflexible nor so inappropriate, but what was mainly wrong was the sequencing of policies.

At that time, what had become a “government by-crisis” saw intergovernmentalism prevail, with (strong) Member States in the driving seat, on supranationalism, with EU institutions in charge. The intergovernmental approach was an emergency option, but it seriously affected the quality and timing of the actions taken. The narrative became one of North vs South, (good) creditors vs (bad) debtors, risk reduction vs risk sharing, responsibility vs solidarity. This scenario probably propelled populism and sovranism, which in 2016 was aggravated by the Brexit referendum and the election of Donald Trump.

Sometimes European public opinion undervalues the difficulties and conundrums in designing timely and viable tools for tackling crises. Marco Buti offers us (in a paper written jointly with George Papaconstantinou) a useful compass to find a way through the labyrinths of European decision-making. It is what he calls the “Monnet Compatibility Test”, which relies on three pillars: economic coherence, as policy tools and mechanisms should be effective; institutional coherence, as the right level(s) of government should be involved, based on subsidiarity; political coherence, as public support is of the utmost importance in implementing policies.

The European Commission’s role can hardly be overestimated in the crises we have experienced. As Buti points out, we have seen a significant evolution in the Commission’s political role and economic stance. It has gradually played many roles, notably as referee, consensus builder, integration promoter, enforcer of rescue programmes, and enabler of policy plans. After the emergency phase of the financial crisis, there was a (sometimes painful) learning process, in which the personality and leadership of the Commission’s Presidents played an important role. Since President Juncker, the

Commission has played a more active role and supported a growth-oriented strategy. Thanks also to this evolution, the reaction to the Covid-19 crisis has been much more coherent and forward-looking.

But even before the disruptive impact of Covid-19, the milestones for strengthening the Eurozone were clear. As Buti’s papers almost obsessively (and rightly so) stress, building an EU fiscal capacity, performing a centralized stabilisation function complementary to national public finances, is a key element in moving towards a Fiscal Union and fostering European integration. This process would also require, at least, a completion of the Banking Union and the Capital Union. Covid-19 presents an (unwelcome) opportunity, due to the different nature of the two crises discussed in this book: the financial crisis seen as endogenous, the pandemic as exogenous; the former burdened by “bad” debt, the latter rescued by “good” debt.

National governments have struggled to understand that interdependence and shared sovereignty is at the heart of how the Eurozone functions. Next Generation EU, and the steps that have made it possible (notably, the issuance of EU public debt) may represent, according to Buti, a “quantum leap in EU integration”. We have moved from restrictive emergency measures, at the beginning of the financial crisis, to a package of measures for sustainable growth, focused on investments and reforms, to counter the crisis caused by the pandemic. The main political challenges and priorities ahead of us are how to make the NGEU a permanent instrument and the Commission a *de facto* Eurozone Treasury, with the EU playing a proactive role in global economic governance. Or that is what we thought until the nightmare of war returned to Europe.

Buti's "European journey through two crises" could not have imagined that a new terrible crisis would undermine Europe's future. After the criminal invasion of Ukraine by Vladimir Putin, we are faced with uncertain and frightening scenarios. We understand that the European project has reached another critical

turning point. Although, as Buti reminds us, "going from A to B is not a straight line in Europe", let us hope that the lessons learned in the last decade will inspire us to show lasting solidarity and determination and to take decisive steps towards a federal European Union.

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