The Federalist Debate

Papers on Federalism
in Europe and the World

- EDITORIAL
- COMMENTS
- BORDERLESS DEBATE
- FEDERALIST ACTION
- BOOK REVIEWS

Contents

Editorial

Oil and International Currency *Alfonso Iozzo and Antonio Mosconi*
4

Comments

Between Authoritarianism and Identity-stressing Sovereignism: "Illiberal Democracy" as a Model
Giampiero Bordino
8

Carbon Tax: Worthy of a Nobel Prize *Alberto Majocchi*
11

How can Commonwealth Nations Prevent Radicalisation? *Keith Best*
13

Monetary Aspects of the African Free Continental Trade Area *Elena Flor*
16

The State of the Nation: Conceptual Challenges to the Republican Nation State *Alon Helled*
20

Gaza Crisis: a Cooperative Way Forward *Rene Wadlow*
24

COP24 on Climate Change: Delay after Delay, Time Is Running out Dangerously *Roberto Palea*
26

UN Reform without Amending the Charter: the Case of the "UN Development System"
Andrea Cofelice
29

The Global Compact for Migration Signed in Marrakech *Grazia Borgna*
31

Antonio Megalizzi and the Silicon Valley of Politics *Michele Ballerin*
33

In Memory of Joseph Schwartzberg
34

Borderless Debate
Democracy and Federalism in Europe and the World

For a Stronger, More United Europe *Josep Borrell*
35
Wake up, Europe! *Sandro Gozi*
38
The Global Dimension of Europe *Fernando Iglesias*
42

Federalist Action

The Battle Plan for a Federal Europe. The 'I Choose Europe' Campaign *Ophélie Omnes*
46
The Creation of the Latin American Criminal Court Receives Broad Regional Support
Camila López Badra
49
Parliamentary Speakers Summit in the Context of the G-20 *Fernando Iglesias*
51
A World Citizens Initiative. The Case for a Global Participatory Democracy *Michele Fiorillo*
53
Three Important Advancements in the Campaign for a UNPA *Andreas Bummel*
56

Book Reviews

The European Project in Stefan Zweig's Thought *Paolo Ponzano*
59
The Destiny of Europe – A Sensation of *Déjà Vu* *Roger Vancampenhout*
61
Eighty Years of Federalist Commitment in Europe *Michel Theys*
63

Contributors

64

Oil and International Currency

Alfonso Iozzo and Antonio Mosconi

1. The End of Bretton Woods and Initial De-Dollarisation. Gold, the Euro and SDRs.
The end of the Bretton Woods international monetary system has been the subject of a vast amount of economic literature, yet the progressive unfolding of the consequences of such an occurrence does not cease to surprise and offer new interpretations.
The declaration of the dollar's inconvertibility into gold (Nixon 1971), the creation of OPEC, the two major oil crises (1973 and 1979) and the rapid succession of these events were the initial diagnosis, which is still valid, but that can now be completed. The international monetary system – as was said at the time – had lost its true anchor, i.e. gold, which is indispensable as long as relations among states are governed by power and not by law. Protection against the arbitrary nature of paper dollar needed to be created. Three possible proposals were being compared: 1) returning to gold (Charles De Gaulle, Jacques Rueff); 2) adopting a global flat money whose issuance did not depend on the US (Robert Triffin's IMF special drawing rights–SDRs); 3) creating a regional currency, the reliability of which was supported by the expected level of constitutionalisation of relations among the member states (Mario Albertini's euro).
Triffin was convinced that to create a world currency first the currency of an area on the path to political integration like Europe needed to be created, which triggered the long march towards the EMS, the ECU and finally the euro. Two significant traces of support for the French proposal to return to gold, indicative of a lack of trust at the global level, are the gold reserves still held by the Banque de France and the Bank of Italy and the pricing policy of OPEC at the height of its monopoly. The former mainly reflects the mood of the moment, but central banks still avoid selling gold, which has since skyrocketed. The latter deserves attention in the transition from the gold-exchange standard to the dollar standard. The oil-exporting countries tried to peg the oil price, denominated in dollars, to that of gold and succeeded for a few years; then, when the increase in the gold price made it impossible, the euro became available. Since then the oil price has been more stable in euros than in dollars.

2. Paper-Dollar or Oil-Dollar?
The decisions following the dollar crisis (1971-73) were generally interpreted as a transition from the gold-dollar to the paper-dollar. Giving up exchange rate stability freed the US from any remaining commitment to the rest of the world (and creditors in particular); the liberalisation of capital movements disarmed nation-states *vis-à-vis* international finance (i.e. Wall Street) and the dollar-denominated oil price encouraged producer countries to accumulate revenues at the London branches of the American banks. These are the pillars of the subsequent distortions, the exorbitant privilege (Giscard d'Estaing) and the paper pyramid (Guido Carli). However, if it were really only paper, why would the "free world" countries, as they were called at the time, accept it? Perhaps they were not as free as they were claimed to be. Certainly, during the Cold War the confrontation with Communism forced states to strongly endorse American politics. European integration itself was undertaken under the US umbrella. However, the end of the Bretton Woods system was such a radical unilateral change in the post-war economic

architecture that it seems unlikely that it was accepted without anything in return. It could be thought *ex post* that this exchange involved not only the defence of the allies against the Soviet Union (which probably had neither the will nor the strength to attack anyone), but above all the guarantee of energy supplies through the combination of the Pentagon and Wall Street. Therefore, one could say that the paper-dollar was actually an oil-dollar. However, the military and financial conditions on which trust in this "guarantee" was based have progressively weakened with the decline of American hegemony, the many wars lost or "not won" and the 2008 financial catastrophe.

3. The Acceleration of De-Dollarisation.

After 1820, China, isolated from the hubs from which the industrial revolution spread, was deeply impoverished compared to Western countries. It was only the new paradigm of the scientific revolution (transport, information technology and communications) that made it possible to establish an international labour organization combining the technologies of developed countries with the low labour costs of emerging countries. After the great divergence there was a new convergence, which however costs the suffering of those "dissatisfied with globalisation". Here it is interesting to note how this turning point has put China and Asia in general, with India on the launch pad, back at the heart of the world economy, therefore ranked first in energy consumption. Why should oil supplies from Saudi Arabia to China, at this point, be listed and paid in a currency subject to third power policies? Albeit still in its infancy, there are clear signs of the internationalisation of the renminbi, confirmed by its inclusion in the SDR basket: the creation of institutions similar to the IMF and the WB, the network of agreements for mutual payments in national currencies and no longer in dollars among the BRICS countries, an SDR-denominated loan issued by the WB and reserved for the Chinese market and, in 2018, the launch of the oil futures market in renminbi. As has already happened for the US, the renminbi holdings by the oil-exporting countries can be reinvested in Chinese assets and contribute to internationalising the renminbi and progressively de-dollarising the oil market. Finally, in early 2019, Russia, which had already reduced its dollar reserves in favour of gold, sold another 100 billion dollars to buy euros, renminbi and yen, thus continuing a march to close the gap between the composition of its own currency reserves and that of the SDR basket.

The 1973 and 1979 oil shocks led consumer countries to adopt energy-saving policies. Alarms on "resource limits" and climate change resulted in policies for the search for renewable energy. Europe was at the forefront. However, the US was focused on searching for technologies to extract oil from deep rocks and horizontal drilling. In the short term, shale-oil and shale-gas, despite the negative impact on the environment, particularly on deep waters, have allowed the US to return to self-sufficiency. It will be able to become net exporter, thus, inverting its relationship with producing countries compared to the past: no longer customer, but competitor. Therefore, the rift within OPEC and the rapprochement of Saudi Arabia to the Russian Federation is not surprising. The recent withdrawal of US troops from Syria and Afghanistan may be read as a realistic transfer of power from Trump to Putin and Erdogan in the Middle East.

So then why are sanctions against Russia and Iran continuing to be tightened? They actually make the dollar inconvertible in these areas. The US's demand that the whole world be subjected to its own law makes trade and financial transactions in dollars with these countries too risky (just remember the ten billion dollar fine imposed on the BNP, which it paid not to be expelled from the SWIFT clearing system, i.e. from the US financial market). The

contradictions in US politics speed up the de-dollarisation process. Indeed, the safest way to avoid penalties is not to use the dollar in transactions with sanctioned countries.

4. Multi-Currency System and the SDR

The de-dollarisation process has generated an international multi-currency monetary system, based on the five component currencies of the SDR basket: USD 41.73%, EUR 30.93%, CNY 10.92%, JPY 8.33% and GBP 8.09%. Each of these currencies is mainly used intra-regionally, despite being widely accepted – especially the first two – also in payments, bonds and inter-regional currency reserves, alongside gold (corresponding to "primitive law") and SDRs themselves (a creation of the "developed law"). The dollar's weight in the SDR basket is out of proportion compared to the current importance of its issuing country in the world economy. During the last IMF reform, the US obtained recognition of the financial weight of the currencies alongside the commercial one, thus increasing the weight of the dollar and the pound sterling. Without this innovation, the latter would have almost been reduced to zero due to the entry of the renminbi. During the next review of the basket, the weight of the City may have moved elsewhere, given that London is still the main euro market today. Did the Brexiters think about this? As mentioned above, the dollar's convertibility in some areas can be restricted through a US political decision alone, thus making the regulation of trade and investment uncertain. Last but not least, the dollar is the currency of the most indebted country in the world, which continues to increase its debt year after year to finance appalling deficits in the current balance of payments. The mechanism is the same one we have seen with the pound sterling: a fallen empire finances the maintenance of its previous standard of living and military force by getting into debt, in other words, by selling assets, which are often toxic. Every time a bubble is deflated (real estate, dot.com, Enron, the stock market, bonds with cleverly constructed underlyings, etc.) savers from the rest of the world get fleeced to the benefit of US consumers. The whole world knows that "it's not good" and tries to get out of this trap.

The euro is the only currency with broad commercial and financial distribution that is fully convertible throughout the world and not subject to sovereign whims. In addition, the euro area has an active current account balance and can invest in the young world to create the income necessary to support its ageing. However, the creators of the euro – technicians and politicians – have always thought and declared that it would not replace the dollar, like the latter did with the pound sterling, as the international currency because its ambition is to contribute to world monetary stability, a common asset, and not just to snatch up a slice of American seigniorage. It has always been clear that the Robert Triffin "dilemma" not only applies to the dollar, but to any national currency claiming to be the world's currency. If Europe lost this aspiration, it would remain without a soul, just when the US has divested itself of its residual values.

The internationalisation of the renminbi is in its infant stages, despite the economy's outstanding performance, its entry into the SDR basket and the great vision of the "Silk Road" through which Xi Jin Ping intends to shift the Chinese economy from exports to investment in the medium-term and from the United States to Europe and Africa in the long-term. Although the financial weight of the renminbi outside its borders is still limited, as well as its presence in global currency reserves, the tumultuous development of the Asian financial markets, Shanghai in particular, suggest other developments. Japan and the ASEAN countries, which Trump has unexpectedly freed from the free trade agreement wanted by Obama, certainly do not want to jump out of the American frying pan into the Chinese fire.

Yet, if the US does not remedy its mistake, this just might happen. The renminbi would still be present at a regional level, albeit immense, while at the world level the Triffin "dilemma", which former governor of the PBoC Zhou Xiao-Chuang indeed mentioned in 2009, would also apply to the renminbi.

Lastly, the yen and the pound sterling are currencies that are geographically limited (the former) and residual (the latter).

Here a summary opinion on the primary players in the international monetary system has been offered; however the conclusion is clear: none of the five component currencies of the SDR basket alone can perform the functions of an international currency. We are left with only two options: gold for war and special drawing rights for cooperation.

The values of Europe as a "gentle power" and its interests as the world's leading trading power converge in one direction: strengthening the euro in its sphere (which is not only limited to the Eurozone) and working to peg potential monetary areas (Russia, Africa, the Gulf and Iran) to the SDR. The first steps to facilitate an orderly de-dollarisation concern Africa and Western Asia. The formation of the African common market and the launch of the European plan with Africa would be facilitated by the adoption of an African unit of account pegged to the SDR (corresponding to the European unit of account–EUA phase of European monetary integration). Sanctions, in compliance with the agreements signed by the European Union, could then be bypassed through a primitive form of bartering, which is necessarily bilateral, or through a developed form of multilateral clearing, thus developing an SDR market in a neutral financial centre like the one already created by Kazakhstan in Astana.

More generally, we need to work on strengthening the supra-national institutions created by the Americans after World War II – when they alone dominated them – and that today they are boycotting so as not to share their sovereignty. We need to have the courage to face a period of isolation of the US and to implement every initiative Europe can so that it can again be an important pillar in the international order, according to Obama's plan, and no longer a rogue power.

[1] Elena Flor, *SDR: from Bretton Woods to a World Currency*, Peter Lang, 2019.
[2] Elena Flor, "Oil, Wheat and Currencies", *The Federalist Debate*, XXX, 2017. no. 3, pp. 10-12. Valentina Tosolini, *Analysing Commodity Prices: Trend for Crude Oil and Wheat in US Dollars, Euro and SDR*, Robert Triffin International - Centro Studi sul Federalismo, January 2017.
[3] Miriam L. Campanella, *The Changing Geography of Finance. Shifting Financial Flows and New Hubs: Shanghai and Paris?*, Robert Triffin International - Centro Studi sul Federalismo, March 2018.
[4] Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, *Europe, a Civil Power*, Federal Trust, London, 2004.

Between Authoritarianism and Identity-stressing Sovereignism: "Illiberal Democracy" as a Model

Giampiero Bordino

In Western history, democracy as a political system arises from the root of the liberal revolutions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the English, American and French ones, through the overcoming of the wealth-based and oligarchic limits of political rights, above all the electoral ones, and through a growing popular participation in political life. Between the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in a context of struggles and conflicts, the model of liberal democracy was born, which unites the masses' political participation, mediated by political parties, trade unions and all other possible forms of association and universal suffrage, to civil rights and to the system of guarantees provided by the rule of law, as inherited from those liberal revolutions. The division of the legislative, executive and judicial powers, gained in the liberal era, is a cornerstone of this political model, aimed at ensuring limits to political power and the respect for the rights of minorities; in short, it aims at preventing a new form of tyranny, that of the majority. It should also be remembered that federalism, conceived and experimented for the first time in the American liberal revolution, falls essentially within this perspective of division of powers, in this case not an institutional but a territorial division.

This model of liberal democracy, as well known, was weakened and threatened by the authoritarian nationalisms of the late nineteenth century, and entered a crisis and collapsed in many Western countries during the first half of the twentieth century after the First World War, with the rise of the totalitarian fascist and Nazi political systems and, albeit in another context, also with the failure of the Bolshevik revolution in Russia and the birth of the Stalinist totalitarianism.

Liberal democracy was restored in the West, and not everywhere, only after the Second World War in the new context of the bipolar world dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union. In the European West, the rebirth of democracy is also a result of the process of European integration which took off in the early Fifties, confirming the link between the federal and the liberal-democratic perspective.

This brief historical reconstruction may enable us to better understand what is at stake today, in the new context of the globalized and multipolar world in which we live. For the first time explicitly, the opposite model of an "illiberal democracy" is proposed today by the Hungarian leader Orbàn, and more recently also by the adviser to the American President Trump, Steve Bannon, a supporter of a nationalist and anti-European perspective and now "adviser" also to the new European neo-nationalist politicians like Orbàn himself, the Austrian Sebastian Kurz, the Turkish Erdogan, the Polish Kaczynski and the emerging Italian leader Matteo Salvini. Illiberal democracy is understood as a political system in which the political leader, legitimized by the majority of voters, presents himself as a direct expression of "the people" (an undifferentiated entity without significant internal articulations) without the need of intermediating associations (political parties, etc.) or significant counter-powers to

guarantee individual and minority rights.

In this framework, division of powers, constitutional courts, judges, press organs, technical-consultancy bodies, etc. are essentially seen as obstacles to the decision-making processes, potential "enemies of the people" and their leaders, to be limited or removed as far as possible. There follows, to use an expression proposed by the Uruguayan writer Eduardo Galeano and also used by the Croatian essayist Predrag Matvejevic, a model of "*democratura*", democracy and autocratic rule at the same time. The idea of illiberal democracy or democratura is based on a narration of the world able, in the context of ungoverned globalization in which we live, to intercept, involve and "seduce" (in the etymological sense: to lead to oneself) the expectations and emotions of more and more vast popular masses. People are presented as victims of "the elites", understood not only in an economic or political-institutional sense, but also in a cultural one, as made apparent by the increasingly frequent criticism against "competences" and competent people. 'People against the elites' is the winning formula of this narration. From this point of view, the elites are also seen and "denounced" as global elites and, before that, European and pro-European, not only local and national. So, the elites are in some way "foreign", distant from the interests of the people, unable to interpret their identity and interests. In this vision, the polemic against the elites as global entities, and the polemic against migrants, refugees, foreigners and so on (one of the great themes of the supporters of illiberal democracy, from Trump to Salvini) tend to be looked as one, and merge together. The people, through their leaders, have found the "enemies" to single out and fight, those responsible for all the evils that afflict them, those at which they shall direct fears, resentments and rancor. These enemies, despite their diversity, have in common their "remoteness", that is, their distance from the people, from their identity, from their interests and their emotions. It matters little if the new leaders of the people, their new "lawyers", from Trump to Bannon to make only American examples, have long been authoritative members of the ruling classes, globalized businessmen and billionaires, or are anyway, in other cases, rising exponents of new power elites now endowed with all the resources and attributes of their role, and also very able to use them. The narration of the "chanters" of illiberal democracy and identity-stressing sovereignty (in short: America First, Russia First and so on, in a zero-sum game in which all are inevitably losers and lost) represents its "heroes", from Trump to Putin, from Orban to Erdogan, as incarnations of the people, an authentic voice of their needs and imagination. Demagogy, already present and recounted in ancient Greece, is reborn in new forms in the 21st century. And with all the tools and resources made available by the global-age technology revolution, primarily in the world of communication.

The present ungoverned globalization is, as already mentioned, the fundamental frame of this great transformation, and it is in this framework that the identity-based sovereignty that accompanies illiberal democracy is situated and can be interpreted. With the globalization of finance, economy and markets, and more generally of all the flows (of signs, images, values, etc.) made possible by the technological revolution and favored by the neo-liberal policies of the ruling classes in the last decades, the States have actually lost a large part of their governing capacity. The problems have become predominantly global, while political power has remained enclosed within the borders of states, however large they may be. The impotence of states to guarantee public goods (peace, security, social protection, fiscal justice, jobs, environmental quality, etc.), for which statehood was born and developed in the last centuries, has become ever more evident. States, in fact, do not have even the traditional "monopoly of the legitimate use of force", their decisive resource of last resort, given that new transnational private

actors such as mafias, criminal organizations and terrorist movements are able to strike everywhere and everyone, as do know by experience even the world superpowers, from the United States to Russia to China.

In this frame of reference, the identity-based sovereignty was born or reborn, and the supporters of illiberal democracy, from Trump to Orbàn, are at the same time supporters of that sovereignty too. In a world that seems to elude any control and in a context in which the"people" are clamoring for getting back the guarantees of lost public goods (security, jobs, social protection, etc.), the new leaders propose, for reasons on the one hand opportunistic (it is better to do so in order to obtain consensus) and on the other cultural (they cannot or do not want to look for any other way), the recovery of their lost sovereignty, the closing-in in their own borders, and the reaffirmation of their identity against the others. "Us" against "them", and every man for himself. As if it were possible to see to it on one's own, in a world in which interdependence has been intertwining and mixing things and people for a long time now. In fact, as our daily experience teaches us, the world's ills, the insecurity factors such as wars, environmental and social disasters, or financial crises, do not stand still, they "walk" fast and pierce any frontier and any wall.

But is there really another way out, an alternative to the illusory and self-destructive illiberal democracy and identity-based sovereignty, to face the evils of the world and at the same time guarantee democracy as a political model? How is it possible to give back to politics, and therefore to the will of the people, the control of the economy and the ability to produce the fundamental public goods, from peace to jobs, which national, and to some extent now also continental statehood has lost a long time ago? It is evident that, in the context of planetary interdependence and globalization, the only realistic way to successfully tackle global problems and thus guarantee fundamental public goods is to build institutions and policies at all the levels at which such problems arise: from local to national to continental (the level of the United States, China, Russia or India, and in a still embryonic form also the European Union), to the global one (the level of the UN and other world institutions).

Basically, it is a matter of really recovering one's lost sovereignty by sharing it with others, at the various levels where problems arise and must be addressed. Sharing sovereignty in a multilevel democracy, from local to global: this is the formula that a new narrative of the world, alternative to the illusory and suicidal one of an identity-stressing sovereignism and an illiberal democracy, should propose and try to make seductive. It should also be noted that the national level, in this perspective, does not disappear at all, but in some ways legitimizes itself again, because it is exercised on the problems and challenges in which it is able to act effectively, and in a constitutionally regulated context of cooperation with all the other actors: "below", the local and regional ones, and "above", the continental, like the European Union, and the global ones, the international level. This also means, in a new narration of ourselves and of the world, to embrace the perspective of multiple identities and belongings, of plural citizenships, not conflicting with each other; in sum, a new shared and common feeling of humanity.

To do all this, and to concretely build this perspective, there is not much time left. The "mole"of ungoverned globalization is burrowing and eroding, since many years now, the very foundations of our coexistence and of civilization itself, and is daily nourishing the seductive capacity of illiberal democracy and identity-stressing sovereignty. If we want to safeguard our future, and especially that of the coming generations, it is no longer possible or legitimate to stand idle and just watch.

Translated by Lionello Casalegno

Carbon Tax: Worthy of a Nobel Prize

Alberto Majocchi

On 6 October, ahead of the Climate Change Conference to be held in Katowice in December, the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) approved a Special Report on Global Warming of 1.5°C which reiterates the negative effects already seen following the 1°C increase in the planet's temperature, with extreme weather events, rising sea levels and shrinking ice caps. What the report particularly emphasises is that"limiting global warming to 1.5°C would require rapid and far-reaching transitions in land, energy, industry, building, transport and cities. Global net human-caused emissions of carbon dioxide (CO_2) would need to fall by about 45 percent from 2010 levels by 2030, reaching net zero around 2050. This means that any remaining emissions would need to be balanced by removing CO_2 from air". This grim warning delivered by the world's scientists emphasises that the goal of the Paris Agreement to limit the world average temperature increase to less than 2°C must be strengthened, using more incisive means than those put in place up to now.

At almost the same time, on 8 October, the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences announced that the Nobel Prize in Economics 2018 would be awarded to Prof. William D. Nordhaus of Yale University "for integrating climate change into long-run macroeconomic analysis". In the motivations for the award it was stated that, "according to Nordhaus' research, the most efficient remedy for the problems caused by greenhouse gas emissions would be a global scheme of carbon taxes that are uniformly imposed on all countries. A global emission trading system can do the same job, provided that limits on emissions are set low enough to result in high enough price for carbon". Alongside the aim of radically reducing CO_2 emissions, Nordhaus' work also provides indications on the instruments to use to deal with the problem of global warming: a price instrument – carbon tax – or a quantity instrument – tradable pollution permits.

These two facts highlight the extraordinary choices to be made to safeguard the future of humanity and the need to use appropriate tools to achieve the goal of reducing emissions and limiting global warming. The question that remains, which will certainly not be answered in Katowice, is how to transform these suggestions into coherent political choices. The US position of refusing to accept a human role in climate change is well known, as is the opposition by many – especially industrially emerging – countries to measures restricting consumption of fossil energy. It therefore seems appropriate to refer to the choice of European Commission President Jacques Delors who, ahead of the UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio in June 1992, had developed a European, unilateral, strategy to cut CO_2 emissions. This depended on the approval of a Directive introducing a carbon/energy tax of 10 dollars per barrel of oil (when oil prices hovered around 20 dollars a barrel), using the resulting revenue to stimulate the economy by reducing social contributions for companies and workers, thus generating the double dividend of improving environmental quality and creating new employment. Moreover, Delors' idea was that if Europe paved the way, other countries would have followed,

thus seriously tackling the problem of global warming.

That proposal for a Directive was not approved; although today the European Union manages about 45% of emissions (11,000 companies engaged in the production of electricity and other strongly energy-intensive sectors) by means of a quantity instrument – the Emission Trading System (ETS) – and with reasonable results, a large share of emissions linked to transport, construction, agriculture and the production of small and medium-sized enterprises is excluded. If the objectives set by the IPCC are to be achieved, a carbon tax on the consumption of fossil fuels should be introduced to complement the ETS, accompanied by the adoption of a 'border tax adjustment' equal to the European production tax rate to be paid on goods coming from countries that do not impose a similar carbon price. This last element would prevent a loss of competitiveness of European industry, and above all, a migration of production for tax reasons – known as carbon leakages – which could even lead to a deterioration of environmental conditions as production would be delocalised from Europe to countries with less stringent environmental constraints.

After years of silence, the idea of imposing carbon pricing was taken up by President Macron in his famous speech at La Sorbonne in Paris. The idea is beginning to take root in both the cultural debate and at a political level. In a recent article (in the Italian magazine Formiche) the President of Compagnia di San Paolo, Francesco Profumo, opportunely links the need to introduce a carbon tax to the creation of adequate resources to finance the EU's budget. The creation of an autonomous fiscal capacity in Brussels to launch investment policies to help demand growth was formally reaffirmed by President Macron and Chancellor Merkel in the Meseberg Declaration of 19 June. The theme of the European budget will be at the centre of the debate prior to the European elections of May 2019 and will represent the focal point of the clash between nationalist political forces and genuinely pro-European political forces. The former hope for a return to unrealistic national policies, even violating European rules, as proposed by the Italian government, while the latter not only demand compliance with those rules but are committed to strengthening – with a view to the approval of the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027 – the size of the European budget. This is needed to meet the multiple needs to which Europe must respond in new terms regarding internal and external security, environmental recovery, innovation and new technologies, employment for the labour force excluded from the production process because of the globalization process and new forms of multilevel welfare that guarantee to all citizens a decent standard of living.

The decisive choice to be placed at the centre of the political debate remains the carbon tax, not least because of the substantial revenue it can deliver. With an initial rate of between €25 and €30 per tonne CO_2, the revenue would range between €75 and €90 billion; if the rate were to reach €50 per tonne CO_2 in the medium term, as estimated by the most authoritative climate change researchers, the revenue would rise to €150 billion. Part of these resources should be redistributed at the national level to promote employment and reduce poverty, lowering taxes on labour, particularly on lower incomes, while the duties on imports should be allocated to the European budget since they are part of the Union's traditional own resources. Another part of such resources should be directed towards a European Energy and Environment Agency, to promote renewable energy and fight global warming. In this way, Europe could, once again, take on a pioneering role, as suggested by Delors in 1992, and effectively counter nationalistic positions by having an active policy for sustainable growth and employment.

How can Commonwealth Nations Prevent Radicalisation?

Keith Best

Some of you may have seen a documentary about a young man with a father who was a first generation Pakistani who worked so hard in Derby that he created a string of kebab restaurants and was well respected. His good fortune enabled his son to go to public school for a short term, and when he won a place from his school to go to university in London the family were immensely proud. The programme was called Cult of the Suicide Bomber and that young man was one of the four suicide bombers who killed 52 people and injured over 700 more on the streets of London in 2005. What turned a respectable young man into a suicide bomber? So many of those who commit atrocities in the name of Allah believe that they are doing God's will and that they will be rewarded in the after-life. They turn out to be British citizens who have taken an oath to this country, and who surprise their neighbours and often their closest families who have a very different memory of them.

They have been radicalised, some might say brainwashed, into undertaking these acts. Can that be stopped? Can they be identified at an early stage and prevented from going on to commit such acts? Can that degree of intrusion and possibly especial monitoring of certain types of personality, as a necessary part of that identification, be done in a relatively free society without risk of causing suffering, shame and ostracism to those who are innocent alongside the guilty? It is the same dilemma which confronts us when we place language deeply offensive to some parts of society against freedom of speech, held so dear in the USA that it is the subject of The First Amendment to the United States Constitution.

What is radicalisation? What can the Commonwealth do about it? Faced with violent extremism the Commonwealth Secretariat hosted a panel discussion of experts on 2 December 2015, which examined the role of formal and informal education and drew from the perspectives of health workers and other experts. The Commonwealth Secretariat Health & Education Unit seeks to stimulate a productive dialogue which can be built on to support member countries in countering violent extremism and radicalisation, through multi-sector approaches based on the Secretariat's Civil Paths to Peace model. This model played a central role in talks at CHOGM 2015, in which the Minister's Communiqué condemned violent extremism, acknowledging the serious threat this presents globally and encouraging the implementation of this report's recommendations. The role of education was also specifically highlighted as having the ability to address the conditions conducive to grievances and alienation which can contribute to radicalisation.

The dictionary definition of radicalisation is the action or process of causing someone to adopt radical positions on political or social issues. There is, of course, nothing inherently wrong with that. We have experienced radical thinkers and debaters in our politics and daily lives since the beginning of time. The extremism, however, which turns strongly held opinions into a deleterious

impact on parts or all of the population, is when the holder of those views sees fit to visit violence and killing on others. This is when the perpetrator has gone beyond the promulgation of views, however offensive (yet articulated in a society which tolerates a high level of freedom of speech), into a dark realm of killing those who do not share those views. It is perhaps one of the greatest sadnesses, and what, for many, makes such actions so incomprehensible is that when they are done in the name of a particular religion, however perverted an interpretation that may be, the perpetrators are careless that many adherents of the same religion are themselves indiscriminate victims.

The Commonwealth asserts that governments must go beyond traditional approaches to security, to cultivate 'respect and understanding' between people. The Secretariat adds value to this agenda by providing a comprehensive policy approach to address this complex and challenging issue. A multi-sector policy approach engages all different sectors to cooperate and work collaboratively towards a combined effort to counter radicalisation and violent extremism.

This approach engages the Commonwealth's ability to act as a forum for dialogue and consensus-building across borders, to foster and strengthen inclusive initiatives and cultivate mutual understanding. This is critically important to tackling the underlying mechanisms influencing violent extremism and moving away from the compartmentalising of individuals at risk and engaged in radicalisation.

In 2017 the Commonwealth produced a paper entitled Supporting Families in Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE). It makes the obvious point that when someone becomes radicalised and behaves in an 'extreme' way, this does not only affect the person, but also their family, friends, wider social circle and society. Families, youngsters and children are confronted with recruitment by terrorist/Violent Extremist groups. Today's reality is one in which radicalisation is not uncommon as a phenomenon. For vulnerable individuals and their social environment, current prevention challenges are detecting those who are at risk of radicalisation, being able to get into contact with them and support them and their families in a change of direction, and supporting both the individual and their family during the disengagement process. Why families? Families are at the core of any individual's resilience. Family members should be seen as partners. The objective should be to engage, build trust and form relationships over a longer period of time. There should be a systematic approach to the family (including understanding the family dynamics and wider social environment and community). Transparency towards the family is crucial to maintain a relationship. Although police involvement is necessary at times, the coordination and cooperation between them and family is important. The paper sets out eight practical steps: identifying a (potential) case of radicalisation within a family, discussing a course of action in a multi-agency setting, getting in contact with the family, making an assessment of risks and needs, lessons & approaches to working with children, keeping track of progress and communication, preparing to disengage from the family and building and developing family support capacity.

In 2015 CHOGM determined to set up a dedicated Commonwealth Countering Violent Extremism Unit requiring strong action and co-operation. The role of education in combating alienation and grievance was acknowledged. A multi-sector approach is required. Mutual respect and understanding is required. Whereas in the old order of nations each country learned of its history from its own proponents (and, of course, history is very much who writes it), in the new multi-

cultural, multi-ethnic world with so many now living outside their country of origin through extensive migration, those histories come together. They are now juxtaposed in the ethnic diversity of modern Britain. We should remember that the history of the East India Company, written from a British perspective for children in the UK in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, is portrayed very differently from that of those who were directly affected – the Bengalis and others in their own land, which had been invaded. Yet the children of both traditions now sit next to each other in our schools. Their own story must now be told alongside that of the colonialism of Britain. Those histories must somehow be reconciled in a non-confrontational way, seeking the disinterested truth wherever possible.

With so many sharing values, institutions, language and other attributes, the Commonwealth is in an ideal position to take forward the struggle against violent extremism. I am delighted that they have taken such a lead over the last few years.

At a session organised by UPF on Local Government and the Prevention of Radicalisation, on 28 June last year in the House of Lords, I developed a theme that we need to bring localism to bear rather than top-down Government schemes, which seem to indicate that one size fits all. It is local people, starting with families, but also in clubs and gyms and other social venues, who can notice a change in personality, who can see someone becoming introverted or obsessed with a particular narrative or dogma and, hopefully, investigate that within the context of the individual's life. It is then that there needs to be a proper dialogue about what may be causing alienation. Islam clearly has a major role to play in local imams accentuating the peaceful nature of the religion and the abhorrence of violence, as well as the haram nature of taking a life, including one's own. To kill one is tantamount to killing all.

The road to the eradication of violent extremism is long and tortuous. It requires perseverance and experimentation of what works and what does not. Ultimately, however, perhaps while acknowledging that there will always be deeply disturbed people who, for a variety of reasons, wish harm to their fellow travellers, it is building a greater sense of community and taking care for others that will help to extinguish it.

We need a co-ordinated approach on YouTube, video and transnational digital media such as Facebook, Instagram and Twitter. National governments, as well as international governance, has a role to play but, ultimately, it is our own local society, school, community and our families which will play the greater part.

[1] http://thecommonwealth.org/sites/default/files/news-items/documents/CHOGM%202015%20Communique.pdf

Monetary Aspects of the African Free Continental Trade Area

Elena Flor

Preface

The 2006 financial crisis forced international financial institutions to become stronger, first and foremost, the International Monetary Fund, which doubled quotas from 238 to 477 billion SDRs and redistributed them to emerging countries: the first ten IMF quota holders, in addition to China, also include India, Russia and Brazil.

Robert Triffin International contributed to the debate on the future of the international monetary system with its Report "Using the SDR as a Lever to Reform the International Monetary System" published in 2014 and – along with its Joint Report with the Shanghai Development Research Foundation, published in 2015 on occasion of the G20 held in China – to the debate on including the Chinese renminbi in the SDR basket, then decided in the following year.

The way was opened to set up a multicurrency reserve system and create monetary areas. In this perspective, Robert Triffin International participated in the initiative held in Moscow in November 2017 with the Eurasian Economic Cooperation Organisation with its study "The Triffin Dilemma on a Russian Perspective. The Fixing of Oil Price: Dollar, Euro, Ruble or SDR". The recent launch of the African Continental Free Trade Area makes reflections on the continent's participation in the evolution of the international monetary system particularly relevant.

This article aims to define a research and debate programme to identify the possible evolution of Africa's full participation in international financial institutions.

Monetary Aspects of the African Continental Free Trade Area

The long road to African unity has perhaps taken a major step forward with the recent decision – under ratification – by 49 countries to create the AfCFTA, African Continental Free Trade Area, along with the Free Movement Protocol, signed by 32 countries. The AfCFTA is one of the flagship projects of the African Union's Agenda 2063 that also provides for the introduction of a common passport and a single currency.

The African Union, which was established in 1963 as the Organisation of African Unity and thus renamed in 2002, includes all the countries on the continent and is headquartered in Addis Ababa. So far, the security sector has been its main scope of action with the creation of its "blue helmets", which have intervened on a number of occasions to help stabilise several countries troubled by inextricable tribal crises.

The new AfCFTA agreement can provide the same impetus to Africa as the creation of the Common Market did in 1957 to the European unification process.

Reflecting on the African unity issue, the most significant experience to look at is probably India. China has been able to count on a unification that took place over two thousand years ago, in particular with the concentration of the Seven Kingdoms, and on the creation, under the emperor, of a high-level administrative structure (the mandarins), of which the Chinese Communist Party is, in a way, a continuation. In the last thirty years, the fact that China has again begun to play a key role in the world economy has been facilitated

precisely by its historic unification.
The Indian Union was instead the result of the British imperial rule that left local power to the existing dynasties (the Maharajas) and only through Gandhi's action has the current configuration taken shape, by giving an important role to local entities: the Union is divided into 27 states and 16 territories. There are 14 official languages (including English) and only the currency (the rupee) and the army actually are federal competences, while there is still broad autonomy in the field of trade, without even taking into consideration the political structure, wherein, in many states, alongside the two big federal parties, local political forces prevail.
Based on the Indian experience, strengthening the role of the African Union in the security and monetary sectors is an essential step in the African integration process.

1. The Free Trade Agreement

This agreement, to the extent that it will be implemented, may bring about a decisive turning point in the economy of the African continent.
The economic system of many African states is built on the export of energy resources and raw materials, as well as on the import of consumer goods.
Dependence on the prices of raw materials – subject to sharp fluctuations in relation to the evolution of the world economy – and on indebtedness in "hard currencies" explain the recurrent financial crises which have plagued many African countries, forcing them to request IMF support (with the application of the related monetary and financial policies) and, in the most dramatic cases, debt restructuring and even cancellation.
The free trade agreement should lead the economy of African states to facilitate import/export with neighbouring countries, thus directing imports from developed countries to investment goods, using investments and aid to build infrastructures capable of breaking down the geographical and technological isolation of individual states.
The first steps in the European integration process after World War II moved along these lines, as it was facilitated by the implementation of the Marshall Plan, whose official name was the ERP (European Recovery Program). The first objective was to restore the production capacity destroyed by the war and, not surprisingly, the ERP required a single European plan that avoided duplication and relaunched trade between European states after the autarky phase.
The implementation of the European Payments Union was at the heart of the ERP, which allowed European countries to balance the settlement of trade between them, without using "hard currency": it was the "dollar shortage" phase. Only the net balance of the European Payments Union had to be settled in dollars and the Marshall Plan provided that ERP funds could be used for this purpose. The aim was, in fact, to cover European countries' deficit vis-à-vis the United States due mainly to the purchase of the capital goods needed for reconstruction.

2. The Monetary Problem in Africa

The need for monetary unification is particularly debated in Africa, which is, in fact, currently organised according to the old colonial areas, with the former French area pegged to the euro, the former British colonies looking for a currency peg and the Mediterranean countries shifting between pegging to the dollar and to the euro.
The African Union, under the 1991 Treaty of Abuja and then the Constitutive Act adopted at Lomé in 2000, decided to create an African Monetary Union, through the integration of the regional monetary zones and based on the "afro", and the establishment of the African Central Bank (ACB) headquartered in Abuja (Nigeria), the African Investment Bank

(AIB) based in Tripoli (Libya) and the African Monetary Fund based in Cameroon.
The process, despite being the subject of continuous political meetings and academic debates, will be long, but at least it is necessary to identify its direction.
Some steps are essential, especially in the initiation stage of the AfCFTA:
-The implementation, at least between groups of countries with stronger economic and proximity ties that are not part of regional monetary unions, of "payments union" agreements similar to those implemented in Europe after World War II;
-The choice of a "unit of account" as it was for the European Payments Union, when Robert Triffin obtained the first "European unit of account" that, albeit equal to the gold content of one dollar (the famous 35 dollars per ounce), after a long journey, was to become the euro;
-The choice of a borrowing currency to finance the necessary infrastructure endowment that does not undermine African countries' monetary stability due to the monetary policies of the issuing countries.

3. The SDR as a Standard for Africa

African countries' choice of the SDR as a "unit of account" may help them meet their needs since:

- it is a more stable "unit of account", especially with reference to the price of raw materials and energy sources;
- it includes the euro and the renminbi, which represent the areas more interested in the development of Africa and its natural resources;
- it may bring the different areas of the continent closer together in relation to their past experiences.

Pegging the potential "afro" to the SDR "basket" would make the unit of account project more robust, as happened in Europe when the ECU "basket" was indicated to peg the future euro.
The launch, at least between groups of states, of forms of "common agricultural policy" will be necessary to fill the deficit in food product output. Europe thus managed to cover demand and today is facing the opposite problem: surplus. Agricultural pricing in a "common unit of account" was an essential step and a powerful boost to the next transition to the common currency: the most rational choice would be to use the SDR as the "African agricultural unit of account".
The African Central Bank (ACB) can indeed perform the significant task – for the countries wishing to participate – of organising the African Payments Union (APU). The ACB could, as was the case in Europe, conclude a technical assistance agreement for the functioning of the APU with the Bank for International Settlements in Basel. The ACB could also participate in the BIS – as is already the case at present for European countries with the European Central Bank – thus strengthening Africa's role in international monetary cooperation.
African central banks could use the "official" SDRs held – given the lack of international currencies such as the dollar, euro and renminbi – both as capital contributions to the African Central Bank and as capital endowments of the African Investment Bank. In this case, the two institutions could be included in the SDR "Third Party Holders", as provided for in the IMF's Articles of Agreement.

4. The Role of the Mediterranean Countries

It is no coincidence that the SDR or similar formulas characterise the North African countries bordering the Mediterranean, namely Libya, Egypt and Morocco:

- Libya has formally continued to peg its currency to the SDR, originally wanted by Gaddafi, also in relation to his "African currency" plan;
- Egypt has continued to determine the Suez Canal tolls in SDRs, which was set at the time of nationalisation;

- Morocco has pegged its currency to a basket of euros and dollars (in fact, almost similar to the SDR).

Therefore, an area pegged to the SDR in the Mediterranean area could be developed and, over time, extended to other African countries, with whom economic relations will strengthen.

5. The Banking System's Contribution

The European experience shows how the participation of commercial banks can provide a significant contribution to realising the monetary unification project, anticipating the creation of a common capital market in the area and encouraging the extended use of the "unit of account" in financial transactions.

In Europe commercial banks, starting with the Kredietbank in Brussels, have played a significant role in the use of the ECU unit of account that has culminated in the creation of the ECU Banking Association by more than thirty banks, including the European Investment Bank, with numerous ECU-denominated bond issues.

The State of the Nation: Conceptual Challenges to the Republican Nation State

Alon Helled

The 19th century was characterized by the desire of geopolitical expansion of commerce and the race towards modernization, in terms of both technological and bureaucratic efficiency, as well as by the aim to crown the modern state as the sole holder of political influence. All these endeavours were engaged in the so-called empowerment of nations and in its Westphalian order. It was exactly this arsenal of ideas which typified the spirit of European society in that glorious *fin-de-siècle*. Intellectuals envisioned two types of social realms, according to the nascent social sciences, initiated by Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Karl Marx (1818–1883), Émile Durkheim (1858–1917) and Max Weber (1864–1920) (the founders of sociology): *Gemeinschaft* ('community') and *Gesellschaft* ('society'). Both served as conceptual tools to decipher historical, economic and social changes, while noting that the politics of men was undoubtedly a key-element in modern civilisation. They distinguished past traditionalism and religion, embodied by the *Gemeinschaft*, from the ongoing rationalisation, a synonym for modernity, incarnated by the *Gesellschaft*. The inner variations of these two social realms, one local, the other global in its social implications, positioned the nation-state as the main actor on the stage of world capitalism. In other words, the gradual transition from a community-centred polity to a society-centred one was to a large extent the core of nation-state building. However, that is not to say that prior forms of social structures ceased to exist. Micro-social experiences became individual experiences (e.g. religious participation, barter of goods, arranged marriages, etc.), but still enjoyed formal recognition. Hence, it is easy to understand that nations, as well as the ideology behind them, i.e. nationalism, are not monolithic in their historical development. They have always consisted of both the local and the global, of autochthonous consuetudes and identities *vis-à-vis* commercial enterprises navigating distant seas; and importing not only merchandises but also cultural cosmopolitanism.

The bidirectional process, maybe the archetype of nowadays "glocal", led to the rather slow secularisation and democratisation of government, while formalizing ethnic and linguistic membership in collectivist norms which were rationally legitimated by the practice of ruling. The political sub-unity of the nation-state acknowledged all nation-states as equal parts of a progressive universal History, secular in its essence, according to the ideals of European Enlightenment, but did little to foster a class-free society (in Marxist terms) or nurture a wider and deeper sense of (international) solidarity, regardless of mechanical reliance (kinship-based in less advanced societies) and organic interdependencies (diversification-led in industrial societies); both were conceptualized by Durkheim. Nor was the

nation-state able to make free-trade and capitalist liberalism endure, since nationhood and universalism clashed into the end of the golden age of modernity. The two tendencies collapsed and broke the relatively peaceful international balance of power. Moreover, they dismantled prior achievements in democracy-building and militarized their industries. The two World Wars shattered into pieces all possibilities to harmonize the nation-state, historically conceived as a universal actor among equals, with the values of inter-societal order, which were based on liberal ideals, on the containment of plurality within citizenry and on the comprehension of the other. The nation-state-centric approach rapidly fell into a loop of *realpolitik* during the Cold War years.

It is noteworthy to say that the nation-state is just one of the organisational containers of politics and thus of society in its wholeness. It is not the sole entity to identify peoplehood, nor does it better guarantee socio-political and cultural rights with respect to other forms of government (one may think of the multicultural Austro-Hungarian Empire, the multilingual Swiss federation, etc.). Many, if not all, political freedoms are distinguished from national sovereignty, following the insightful critiques by Hannah Arendt on violence and nationalism (where the nation-state tends only to homologize all religious and cultural identities). Furthermore, Arendt believed, while reflecting on the situation in Mandatory Palestine, that multi-ethnic territories should adopt federative political structures in order to avoid national conflicts, as the former "hold out good chances for the future […]"[1]. In other words, in a context where two or more nationally-built identities might shift towards animosity, federalism preserves the distinct existing identities, but works against attempts of separation, which are often violent and politically precarious in the long-term.

History teaches us that nation-states have nothing to do with peace, but that the latter is mainly determined by the type of regime that the states adopt (democratic or totalitarian), much more than the ethnical belonging. It is citizenship that matters, not kinship. As long as there is a political community which is able to seek shared solutions for common problems, a mutual-benefit system maintains peace (following the liberal model, as offered by conventional political theories). This perspective entails a political preference, i.e. a formation which is based upon socialisation. This learning process is extremely important because it shapes the corpus of values and norms that citizens follow. Furthermore, this interiorization of a legal-binding identity grows deeper, by allowing policies functional to develop not only rational political institutions, but also to transcend that same rationality. It fosters mutual solidarity which may codify ever-evolving praxes and anchor them into further norms. This approach highlights pluralism and calls for civil responsibility based on inclusion of different sectors of society into a peaceful system of rules. The latter is the core idea of modern republicanism. Whereas the authority of absolute monarchs was invested by divine decree or by supposed charisma (often both), handed down throughout the entire blood lineage, the republic is the idea that all members of society are equal in rights and in integrity as active participants in the process of holding a mandate to govern together through the practice of power by the few (the idea that lies under any elected representative democracy). Nonetheless, republicanism postulates that state institutions, citizenship, democracy and the law are not only functional to governability, but also shapes a shared common sense, a set of civil perceptions, a 'state-consciousness'. Yet, the latter is not acquired once and for all. It depends on the types of resources and

means which politics put at disposal. In this process the role played by socialization is, of course, as essential as substantial. After all, the societal 'habitus', i.e. the system of dispositions, practices and eventually sense[2] interiorized by different individuals taking part in the same ("imagined") community of reference (citizenry in this case), cannot be other than what political and intellectual elites profess and preach. The issue would be almost automatically resolved on the assumption that the republican creed changes only in rare cases. Notwithstanding, the ideology presents internal tensions between two variants. On the one hand, there is the social-economic dichotomy of left vs. right. On the other, there is the conflictual *modus operandi* of the political field: the consociational (power-sharing) discourse vs. the majoritarian one. In other words, beyond political content there is also the dispute regarding the rules of the game shifting between political accommodation (e.g. compromise, coalition-formation, multilateralism and cooperation) and decision, which often degenerates into unilateral decisionism and even into the authoritarian "one man in charge" leadership. The prevalence of one of these two political "states of mind" depends on the robustness or erosion of political parties, as well as on the de-politicization of collectivized interests (either in the form of an over-technocratic ruling class or in the banalization of ideologies spreading scepticism and apathy at the grass-root level). Nonetheless, no law-abiding democratic state could have its genesis without aggregating individual demands. As long as the single citizen remains sovereign and free in his/her choices and the state maintains its 'contractual' promise to transform the collective social construct into a democratic-republican civil society, the political public field enjoys a high degree of participation. Once the duality citizen-state becomes weaker, hence civil society and political participation lose their common ground, any democratic state finds itself passively dragged into the globalized (and de-territorialized) world with no sufficient means or resources. It simply loses power (i.e. the ability to govern social phenomena)[3], while its legitimacy soon evaporates following citizens' disappointment, anger and disillusion, as the state is not able to tackle the issues at hand (the so-called 'democratic discontent' leading to populism and demagoguery). This crisis of trust does not necessarily mean that the nation-state is destined to disappear. Nor does it condemn modern democracies to oblivion after becoming empty bureaucratic vessels. Such a gruesome outcome depends on the capacity of the modern democratic state to dialogue and push forward its republican *raison d'être*. By constructing a dynamic structure for the local level and the global level to cross each other, the *res publica* could provide both effective and efficient government as well as a multilateral governance. In order to foster the latter, republicanism ought to restore its bicentennial solemnity, that is to say its tradition of symbols and praxes which secure as much as possible effectiveness and solidarity, based not only on the vague idea of a 'community of fate', but on a rational collegiality, i.e. a 'community of choice', originated by the common project of facing globalization and the ever-shifting political order (today multipolar with some remainders of the collapsed bipolar international system). Though nationalism is highly suspicious and antagonistic to the openness of the global multitude, modern (mostly national) statehood may still serve as an intermediate 'survival unit'[4]: a sociopolitical structure containing and fostering the civil republican 'habitus', namely, an arena of interactions which neither excludes change nor obstructs continuity.

Therefore, a concrete system of rules that does not lead citizenry astray *vis-à-vis* the uncertainties of our world; a political entity which seeks to combine both the micro and the macro levels of government: the local national one and the transnational one.

Following the evolution of the city-state and that of the nation-state, it seems that federal republicanism may be the right form of government to embody the diverse levels of (inter)action. In this sense, a globalized republican federation could contain different individuals who face the same kind of society (the global transnational one), but differ in their communities of reference. In other words, the form of republican federalism might appease ethnocultural identities and make room for multi-level political identities, actively anchored to a common law-abiding polity (one must always remember that any form of statehood is as "natural" as any other social construction: city, province, region, canton etc.). Although quite idyllic, at least for the time being, it is important to consider the weight of republican values and those of active citizenship, which should accompany federal and national states alike. Only by fostering solidarity, civil consciousness and the rule of law, will global society be able to face the current geopolitical challenges on the horizon.

[1] H. Arendt: "*The Jewish Writings*" (2007), edited by J. Kohn and R. Feldman, New-York, Schoken Books, p.195.

[2] Two sociologists contributed to the elaboration of the 'habitus' as a center of their intellectual endeavors: Pierre Bourdieu and Norbert Elias. We cite two publications which result particularly useful: P. Bourdieu: *Practical Reason; On the Theory of Action* (1998), Stanford (California, USA): Stanford University Press; N. Elias: *The Society of Individuals* (2001), New York: London, Continuum.

[3] Z. Bauman: "*Politics, the Good Society and 'Westphalian Sovereignty'*" in *Social Europe* (25 May 2012).

[4] The concept of 'survival unit' is analyzed on the geopolitical level in N. Elias: "*Über den Prozeß der Zivilisation*" (1939); here used the English edition: "The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations" (revised and translated by Edmund Jephcott with notes and corrections by the author and edited by E. Dunning, J.Goudsbfom and S. Mennell, Malden: Oxford: Carlton, Blackwell Publishing (2000).

Gaza Crisis: a Cooperative Way Forward

Rene Wadlow

"Men take great decisions
only when crisis stares them in the face."
Jean Monnet, one of the fathers
of the European Communities

The shooting of Palestinian protesters by the Israeli military on 14 May 2018 on the frontier between the Gaza Strip and Israel has increased persistent tensions to a crisis level. The veto by the United States of a resolution within the United Nations Security Council to create an independent investigation of the situation prevents a clearer presentation of the situation.

The protests had a double theme: a short-term and a longer-term focus. The short term focus was on the need for an immediate improvement of social and economic life, by lifting the blockage of goods imposed on the Gaza Strip by Israel and Egypt. The long-lasting embargo has crippled, and in some cases destroyed, the manufacturing and agricultural sectors in the Gaza Strip. The economic and social situation in Gaza distorts the lives of many with high unemployment, poor health facilities, and a lack of basic supplies.

The longer-range issue is the right of return which gave the protest its name: The Great Return March. The issue concerns the claim of Palestinians to land and homes that they left at the time of the creation of the State of Israel, due to the armed conflict which followed quickly after the proclamation of the State of Israel. The possibilities of financial compensation, of the return of a number of Palestinians, of financial compensation to Jews who left Arab countries at the same time are all issues that will be raised when there are serious negotiations between the Israeli government and the Palestinian Authority. Negotiations on a broad range of issues and the creation of new, more just government structures are certainly needed. However, the strength of tensions and conflicts in the wider Middle East make it difficult to see when such over-all negotiations might start. Therefore, it may be useful to look at partial ways forward, perhaps starting with Gaza where current tensions are great

The Association of World Citizens believes that there must be a sharp break in this pattern of violence, by creating institutions of security, development, and cooperation. The Association believes that longer-lasting measures must be undertaken that will allow new patterns of understanding and cooperation to be established.

In an earlier UN discussion of Gaza tensions, the Association of World Citizens had proposed in a written statement to the Human Rights Council "Human Rights in Gaza: Need for a Special Focus and Specific Policy Recommendations" (A/HCR/S-12/NGO-1, 14 October 2009) that a Gaza Development Authority be created, a trans-national economic effort that would bring together the skills, knowledge and finance from Gaza, Israel, the Palestinian Authority on the West Bank and Egypt to create conditions which would facilitate the entry of other partners.

Our proposal is obviously inspired by the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) of the US "New Deal". The TVA was a path-making measure to overcome the deep economic depression of the 1930s in the USA and the difficulties of cooperative action across state frontiers in the federal structure of the USA. In May 1933, in a message to Congress, President Roosevelt suggested that an Authority should

be a "corporation clothed with the power of Government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of a private enterprise. It should be charged with the broadest duty of planning for the proper use, conservation and development of the natural resources of the Tennessee River drainage basin and its adjoining territory, for the general social and economic welfare of the Nation... If we are successful here, we can march on, step by step in the development of other great natural territorial units." Some quickly saw the international use of the TVA. A study by the economist Herman Finer in a 1944 International Labour Office study TVA: Lessons for International Applications is an example.

Today, the deep divisions in the Israel-Palestine area require more than economic measures – although economy and raising the standards of living remain important elements. Today, there should be a structure which provides security as well as economic advancement.

Therefore, the Association of World Citizens proposes the creation of an International Temporary Transition Administration for Gaza, that would promote security, stabilization, economic development, and institution building. Such a Transitional Administration would be limited in time from the start, perhaps five years.

Unlike the earlier UN Trusteeship agreements which followed upon the League of Nations mandate pattern, the Gaza Transitional Authority would welcome civil society cooperation from outside the area. Such a Transitional Administration cannot be imposed. We request a UN Secretariat study on what such a Transitional Administration would require, and encourage discussion among those most directly involved.

The current crisis in the Gaza area requires bold, new approaches. The wider Middle East has many conflicts which could expand. Thus creative advances in the Gaza situation could create a change in attitudes and a willingness to create new forms of cooperative action.

COP24 on Climate Change: Delay after Delay, Time Is Running out Dangerously

Roberto Palea

The 24th Conference on Climate Change (COP 24[1]) was convened in Katowice, Poland, with the objective of establishing how to implement the commitments made in Paris in 2015 by the 195 signatory countries; and how to align the various National Plans on climate (the Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, INDCs) by 2020 with the objective of maintaining the average increase in earth's temperature well below + 2°C, above pre-industrial levels; and how to divide among the industrialized Countries the funding of the Green Climate Fund, established in Cancun in 2010 but remained on paper ever since.

The importance of the mission of the 200 countries' representatives gathered in Katowice was dramatically emphasized by the UN Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres[2], who affirmed that we urgently need to move from declarations to facts, as "the world is still totally on the wrong path".

"Even if we witness devastating climatic events causing havoc across the world, we are still not doing enough, nor moving fast enough […]. It is a matter of life or death".

As a matter of fact, since the Paris Agreement of 2015 the political circumstances and the environmental state of the Planet have dramatically worsened.
The President of the United States – the Country responsible for 15% of global greenhouse gas emissions[3] –, Donald Trump, has confirmed his intention to withdraw from the Paris Agreement as soon as it becomes legally possible (three years after its entry into force, and therefore after 2019). The effects of this defection will be partly mitigated by the declared intentions, in sharp disagreement with President Trump's, of some important member States of the American Federation (such as California and the State of New York), namely to unilaterally respect and possibly even speed-up the emission reduction targets set by the Paris Agreement. Moreover, the democratic majority of the US Congress, emerged from the recent mid-term elections, is strongly oriented towards an ecologically progressive direction.

The opposition of the United States has stimulated an emulation effect, thus reinforcing the disengagement of those nations that consider their primary task to defend short-term national interests. As a consequence, the new President of Brazil, Jair Bolsonaro, as well as the States rich in coal mines and gas fields (such as Poland, led by Andrzej Duda) and Australia, have expressed their opposition.

In a special report[4] published on October 8, 2018, leading scientists of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) affirm that, given the climate evolution over the last decade and its assessed impacts, it is imperative to limit global warming to 1.5°C, rather than 2.0° or more, to avoid irreparable

consequences; and that we have only 12 more years left to reach climate stabilization within the limit of 1.5°C, otherwise the situation will become irreversible and out of control. The IPCC report concludes that in order to limit warming to 1.5°C above pre-industrial level, it is necessary to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions by 45% within 2030.

Furthermore, after a 3-year decrease phase, from 2014 to 2016, greenhouse gas emissions are now rising again. As a consequence, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has estimated a 1.4% increase of global emissions in 2017[5] and an additional, higher growth in 2018, as a result of the growth in oil and, mainly, gas consumption in the World, especially in China. Whilst, according to the IEA, emissions should be reduced by at least 1% per year until 2025, to stay on the pathway set by the Paris Agreement.

In this critical scenario, between pressures towards more ambitious targets and threats to cancel the undersigned Agreements, the conclusions of Katowice COP24 have favoured the selfishness of individual Countries, showing disregard for the environmental climate change disasters registered all over the world, and indifference to scientists' warnings. Once more, the need to face climate emergency together, through properly funded supranational institutions, has been set aside.

In order to avoid a monumental diplomatic failure, the well-tried and tested postponement technique was again used.

Since the Paris Agreement should enter into force in 2020, the Parties to the Katowice Conference have agreed upon a common measuring and reporting system for greenhouse gas emissions and the INDCs, approving a Rulebook to be applied to both developed and developing countries without distinction. On the other hand, the attempt to make clear which nations – considering the historical responsibilities of the industrialised countries for the concentration of CO_2 in the atmosphere – will have to contribute, and the amount of each contribution to the funding of the Green Climate Fund (decided in Paris in 2015), amounting to at least 100 billion dollars a year, was in the end unsuccessful.
Positive points that are worth noting are:

- the growing mobilization of citizens, especially young people, all over the world, with public demonstrations and marches, asking for a strong global action to contrast the climate crisis we are facing;
- the constitution, in Katowice, of a High Ambition Coalition, – gathering, among others, the majority of European Countries, the City of London and Canada – which is committed to increase, by 2020, the emissions reduction objectives signed in Paris. To this regard, the above mentioned European Countries and the European Parliament (at its plenary session of October 25, 2018)[6], in line with the critical threshold of 1.5°C, proposed to review the objective set for 2030, and go beyond 55% in emissions reduction. This will constitute a strong driving force for other Countries, able to turn into concrete actions the commitments of the Paris Agreements.

Considering the repeated, even if vague, declarations of readiness by the European Commission[7], we can still hope that the European Union will maintain its leadership role in the fight against climate change, involving the European Council in this struggle.

In our opinion, the EU should create an Environment and Energy Agency, following the model of the European Coal and Steel Community of 1951, endowed with supranational powers and adequate financial resources.

With a high degree of autonomy and under a unitary direction, it would be possible to implement effective policies to reduce polluting emissions and develop renewable energies, in order to achieve the Union's energy self-sufficiency. At the same time, it would be possible to promote partnerships with African Countries and companies, aimed at developing energy infrastructures in those solar-rich countries, in order to generate clean energy in Africa, a prerequisite to promote an endogenous economic development and solve the problem of the lack of drinking water (wells, desalination of sea water) in that continent.

As a consequence, by rooting African population in their own territory and defeating malnutrition, disease and underdevelopment, migratory flows would slow down as well.

The proposed Environment and Energy Agency could finance its activities through the imposition of a carbon tax at the European level (collected at the border of the EU on imports of goods and products) and at the national level. The national carbon tax, applied with the same criteria by all EU member states, could contribute to reduce the taxation on business and work income (reducing the tax wedge), while substantial contributions for funding the common activity could be given by the national States to the Agency (in any case entitled to finance itself on the market).

This initiative would be an example and a model for the whole world.

One variable is still to be considered: how much time do we effectively have in order to avoid a global climate-change catastrophe, a time that is rapidly running out?

Will Humanity succeed in realizing that we are seriously behind time and that we must act immediately, and escape the shortsighted and perverse logic of the national states?

[1] http://cop24.katowice.eu
[2] https://theeagleonline.com.ng/cop24-climate-change-conference-must-succeed-un-chief-tells-g20/
[3] https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissons/global-greenhouse-gas-emissions-data
[4] http://www.ipcc.ch/report/sr 15/
[5] https://www.iea.org/geco/emissions
[6] http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+MOTION+B8-2018-0477+0+DOC+XML+V0//EN
[7] https://ec.europa.eu/clima/index

UN Reform without Amending the Charter: the Case of the "UN Development System"

Andrea Cofelice

Since his election in 2017, the UN Secretary General Antonio Guterres has published a series of detailed reports to present his proposals to strengthen the UN development system (*Repositioning the United Nations development system to deliver on the 2030 Agenda: ensuring a better future for all*, doc. A/72/124–E/2018/3); reform the peace and security pillar, by creating, within the UN Secretariat, a Department for Political and Peace-Building Affairs and a Department for Peace Operations (*Restructuring of the United Nations peace and security pillar*, doc A/72/525); and simplify the Organisation management (*Shifting the management paradigm in the United Nations: ensuring a better future for all*, doc. A/72/492).

According to a terminology normally used in the EU context, the approach adopted by Guterres could be defined as an attempt to reform the Organization "without treaty reforms". Admitting, for the time being, the impracticability of launching a grand bargain on the reform of UN intergovernmental institutions – due to the lack of political consensus among member states, particularly in relation to the reform of the Security Council –, the Secretary General has opted for a more pragmatic approach, aimed at reorganizing and making the UN bureaucracy more effective.

However, it would be a mistake to superficially dismiss this approach as a "makeup" operation. The three reform projects in the area of development, peace and security, and management of the Organization are all based, in a coherent manner, on a single strategic vision pursuing two complementary objectives. First of all: increasing the operational and "governance" capacity of the Secretariat, by promoting the rationalization and centralization of important executive and control functions, which are currently fragmented and dispersed among various UN departments and agencies. At the same time: increasing the effectiveness of the UN field presence, by restructuring and strengthening the network of UN national and regional missions, teams and offices. In other words, the strategic aim of the reform consists in setting up a reinforced Secretariat, which should be endowed with additional executive and control powers, as well as with an increased ability to act on the ground in a more rapid, transparent and effective way through a new generation of UN national and regional offices.

The reform of the UN development system, which was unanimously adopted by the General Assembly in May 2018 (resolution A/72/279), represents the first example of how this vision can be translated into operational terms. The reform was introduced by two Secretary General's reports, published respectively in June and December 2017, and is the result of a consultation process among member states carried out in the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).

The urgency to reform the UN development system also stems from the need to accelerate the process towards the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. According to the latest report (June 2018), for the first time in over a decade the number of people in the world suffering from hunger has returned to increase, from 777 million in 2015 to 815 million in 2016. Climate changes, conflicts, increasing inequalities and rapid urbanization are among the main

factors that determined this result.

Three main aspects can be highlighted among the six chapters of the reform.

A new generation of UN "national teams".

The reform alters the institutional and operational model of the UN national teams, made up of representatives of the various UN entities operating at local level, with a view to enhancing a prompt response to the specific needs of each country in the implementation of the Sustainable Development Goals. The response of the UN system to national development priorities will be settled by the "United Nations Development Assistance Framework": unlike today, a variety of actors (local and national authorities, parliaments, civil society organizations, regional and international institutions, universities and business actors) will be involved in the design, implementation and evaluation of this strategic framework. Furthermore, the host government will work together with UN representatives to define the composition of national teams at the beginning of each programming cycle.

An independent and reinvigorated "resident coordinators" system.

The UN national teams will continue to be guided by resident coordinators, i.e. the highest-ranking UN development officials working at the country level, but their functions will be enhanced. First of all, there will be no more overlapping between resident coordinators' and UNDP representatives' functions. Furthermore, resident coordinators will have greater decision-making powers vis-à-vis national teams, especially in emergency situations or humanitarian crises. Lastly, they will respond directly to the Office of the Secretary General, and no longer to intermediate regional structures: this will considerably simplify the UN long bureaucratic chain, which often represents a source of delay and dysfunctionality.

The issue of how to finance this reform package has been vigorously debated by member states In order to secure adequate and regular funding, the Secretary General had initially proposed using the UN ordinary budget; member states, however, have opted for a hybrid solution, consisting of a voluntary trust fund, cost sharing agreements between UN development agencies, and a "coordination tax" on third-party donors' non-strategic contributions dealing with UN development activities.

A "funding compact" for development.

The UN development system will be financed through a funding compact, involving mutual commitments for states and UN institutions. Member states will guarantee more regular, sustainable and responsible financial support, ideally through multi-year commitments. For their part, UN institutions undertake to: present annual reports on the obtained results; adhere to the *International aid transparency initiative*, in order to certify full compliance with international transparency standards; facilitate access to funding data and provide greater visibility to member states' contributions; turn to independent evaluations to assess the quality of the results obtained; allocate at least 15% of non-strategic resources from each development agency to joint activities.

The analysis of these three dimensions reveals that the development system reform pursues win-win solutions. Indeed, the Office of the Secretary General is expected to acquire more executive and oversight functions; donor states (especially the US and EU) managed to impose a more result-oriented approach, as well as guarantees in terms of transparency and rationalization of resources; recipient and/or "sovereigntist" states (including China, Russia and some African states), gains broader ownership and responsibility for the definition of national development strategies and the composition of national teams.

Obviously, the overall success of the reform will be assessed against its capacity to stimulate the UN development system to achieve effective results on the ground, in terms of reducing inequality, combating poverty and promoting the Sustainable Development Goals. After all, as the Secretary General stated, "reform is about putting in place the mechanisms to make a real difference in the lives of people".

The Global Compact for Migration Signed in Marrakech

Grazia Borgna

On December 13, 2018, overcoming the opposition of nationalist governments, the agreement for the global compact for migration was reached[1]. This project represents an important global step forward for cooperation and coordination in the management of migratory phenomena. It wants to fight illegal immigration that, left in the hands of organized crime, endangers the lives of migrants, and strengthens the legal avenues.

The idea of tackling this emergency globally was launched at the UN in 2016 by President Obama: a Protocol "for safe, orderly and regular migration". Faced with 258 million migrants in the world living outside their country of birth who, for various reasons, have left their country of origin, the protocol, signed by 193 countries, proposed to "introduce elements of governance and rationalization of the phenomenon". No one, it was claimed, just for having chosen to emigrate, must lose his fundamental rights ... to security, dignity, physical integrity, international protection, and a fairly paid job.

Countries favoring this protocol committed themselves ... to cooperate to save lives and prevent the death or wounding of migrants, through joint or individual search-and-rescue operations ... They committed to strengthen global cooperation between States and International Organizations to manage migratory phenomena and help the countries most exposed to the phenomenon in both directions, inward- and outward-bound. With regard to the former, it was proposed to set up support programs aimed at ... minimizing the detention measures of irregular migrants ... and ensuring that they have access to basic services; and also at fostering their full social integration ... and at eliminating ... any form of discrimination, and fighting any expression of racism, intolerance and xenophobia". With regard to the latter, it proposed to facilitate, in collaboration with the countries from which the migrations come, the readmission agreements, and at the same time promote programs of economic and social development.

After 18 months of consultations and negotiations between governments, experts, civil society, refugees, on 10-13 December 2018, in Marrakech, an international conference was convened by the UN. The aim of the summit was not only to confirm the consensus on the agreements reached in New York in September 2016, but above all to take decisions on the operational level.

The Global Compact for Migration has substantially confirmed the objectives mentioned in the 2016 protocol. 164 countries have signed the "*Global pact for safe, orderly and regular migration*". The document is based on 23 objectives aimed at improving migration management at local, national, regional and global levels. With all the limits deriving from the intergovernmental nature of the agreement, the Global Compact opens an important road to the cooperative management of immigration, reception and asylum, which will also contribute to make the behavior of the actors involved more transparent. Although the agreement does not limit state sovereignty, about fifteen sovereignist governments have denied their adhesion. They accuse it of "destroying borders and national states, and of

encouraging uncontrolled immigration". They rely on the citizens' fear of the stranger to close their borders, erect walls, and pass special laws. The document approved in Marrakech, therefore, assumes a high political and moral value. The agreement was challenged by the United States, Australia, the Dominican Republic. The decision was postponed by Italy, Switzerland, Bulgaria, Estonia, Israel, Slovenia, Austria, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Latvia. In Belgium, the adhesion has led to the fall of the government.

The countries of the European Union have not found a common agreement. By not signing the agreement they severely damaged the unitary image of Europe. Furthermore, choosing isolation, they risk being more exposed and weaker in the face of the phenomenon. Only cooperation, as the global compact for migration indicates, can open and strengthen the legal avenues for migration.

Similarly to what is emerging worldwide, in Europe the theme of the increase in migrations is at the center of the political debate.

Among the many studies and proposals that have come to light in recent years, the Delors Foundation, chaired by Enrico Letta, in view of the upcoming elections to the European Parliament (24-26 May 2019) has launched the project "*For a policy of asylum, migration and mobility in Europe*". Starting from the observation that the theme of immigration has upset the equilibrium of the old continent, it makes a series of proposals on the European measures necessary to tackle this problem. It is addressed to both the candidates in the next European elections and the citizens. It emphasizes the need for the phenomenon to be tackled from a continental and non-national point of view. On the operational level it proposes: 1) European harmonization of the conditions for access to asylum; 2) the protection of the European external borders, with a federal plan integrating national capacities; 3) the strengthening of the legal immigration of workers coming mainly from Africa; 4) the creation of a Europe-Africa partnership for the development and management of immigration. To achieve these objectives, the Delors Foundation indicates the establishment of a "European solidarity pool", a pact between a group of EU countries which decide to share the measures and procedures to be adopted with respect to immigration. The instrument of *enhanced cooperation* (as stipulated in the Treaties) allows the member countries in favor to act without being blocked by the dissenting countries.

Europe, says the Delors Foundation, must prepare itself to rationally face the next foreseeable emergencies linked to immigration and cannot do so without adopting common regulatory measures. The moment is favorable, because migratory flows have diminished. Jérome Vignon, author of the report, is optimistic about the possibility that the proposed measures can overcome the obstacles at European level and be quickly adopted, as they do not require to amend the current European Treaties, with the ensuing long procedures.

Translated by Lionello Casalegno

[1] https://www.un.org/pga/72/wp-content/uploads/sites/51/2018/07/180713_Agreed-Outcome_Global-Compact-for-Migration.pdf

Antonio Megalizzi and the Silicon Valley of Politics

Michele Ballerin

The death of Antonio Megalizzi and four other people in the terrorist attack in Strasbourg last December 11 is a sad fate on which there is no need to spread rhetoric: enough has already been written about it. But beyond personal cases – whose substance today is the pain of those who knew and loved the victims, a private matter –, a general reflection can certainly be attempted. And it could start from considering the reason why the twenty-nine year old journalist was then visiting Strasbourg.

I'm not talking about the contingent reason. We know this: Antonio Megalizzi was in Strasbourg to work as an editor of the *Europhonica* project, a transnational student-radio born a few years ago as a European projection of the Italian RadUni, a university-radio network. I refer instead to the deeper reason, the one that unites him to the thousands of young people like him, and has made him in recent weeks indeed the mirror of a generation: he was in Strasbourg because he wanted to be there, in the democratic heart of Europe, to gravitate around the first and only supranational parliament in history.

To use an expression that Megalizzi was referring to himself, there exists a generation of young Europeans "in love with Europe", on which the Union's institutional centers exert an almost irresistible attraction. At the heart of this attraction there is an intuition that is anything but fanciful: the idea that in those places, in that political and cultural space, people are working for the future. This is so very sensible that it does not seem exaggerated to establish a similarity with the magnetism that the Silicon Valley has been exerting on technology enthusiasts for decades. If, in this part of California, a future of digital technologies is invented day by day that will have an almost incalculable impact on the daily life of billions of people, Brussels and Strasbourg represent the world's epicenter of political innovation, the laboratory in which people are working on an unprecedented experiment: the overcoming of national sovereignties.

I would like to draw the attention of the reader to this extraordinary event, which I believe is destined to open up an increasingly vast and central space in the political debate: for the first time in history a transnational generation has appeared in Europe, which has in supranationality its main anthropological characteristic. It is the young people who have been formed at the turn of the third millennium between the web, the social networks, low cost flights and international mobility programs promoted by the Union, and for whom neither the restoration of frontiers, nor the return to monetary sovereignty or any other national sovereignty could ever have the slightest appeal. What the federalists, the new Diogenes, have been seeking for decades with the lantern of their faith in European unity and in its historical necessity, has emerged all of a sudden from the subsoil of society, and offers itself today to our analysis as the most solid bulwark against the wave of neo-nationalisms, as the most certain foundation for our hopes in the future of the continent: the European people, the ripe, by now, fruit of a globalization which, apparently, does not produce only inconveniences.

European, mind you: not simply pro-European. There is a difference between owning an ideal and embodying it, and it is a crucial difference. A citizen who is dreaming about the political unity of Europeans is certainly useful to the federalist

cause, he is someone on whose vote, at the right time, one can count; but an anthropologically European citizen is something more: he is – whether he acknowledges it or not, whether he wants it or not – a soldier of European unity, an individual whose destiny is so intimately linked to that of the integration project that he is obliged to support it without reserve. The former aspires to the supranational dimension, the latter lives in it. And it does not matter if our young man is called Antonio, Jean, Hans or John, or if he will follow his path undisturbed between masters and internships, or if he instead will meet an absurd death among the stalls of a Christmas market. It will always be the same person, the same fragment of present heading towards the only conceivable destiny: that of belonging to a spiritual and political community whose boundaries range from the Mediterranean to the Baltic, and from Lisbon to Warsaw.

Translated by Lionello Casalegno

In Memory of Joseph Schwartzberg

Joseph E. Schwartzberg died on September 19, 2018. Joe grew up in Depression era Brooklyn, where his family owned a small clothing store. He attended Brooklyn College, graduating Cum Laude in 1949. Shortly thereafter, he accepted a position with the U.S. Army Map Service, while at the same time earning his M.A. from the University of Maryland. During this time Joe first became aware of the World Federalist movement, a concept that would run through the rest of his life. In 1950 Joe was drafted into the Army. He served in Germany in a topographic engineering battalion, and was discharged in 1952 as a 1st Lieutenant. He then began several years of foreign travel and residence, including time in Spain, Paris, Israel, North Africa, the Middle East, India, other countries of South and Southeast Asia, and Japan. Joe earned a PhD in geography from the University of Wisconsin in 1960 and then accepted a teaching position at the University of Pennsylvania. In 1962, he led the first group of Peace Corps volunteers to be sent to Sri Lanka. He then spent a year in India as a Fellow of the American Institute of Indian Studies. In 1964, Joe was invited to take a teaching position at the University of Minnesota's Geography Dept. and to lead a project to create a *Historical Atlas of South Asia* as chief editor. It was published by the University of Chicago Press in 1978. Oxford University Press issued an updated edition in 1992. This major work won the Watumull Prize of the American Historical Association, as the best work on Indian history in 1979; and an Outstanding Achievement Award from the Association. of American Geographers. Then Joe joined the History of Cartography project as the associate editor and principal author of two volumes: one on *South Asia and the Islamic World*; the other on *East Asia, Southeast Asia and Greater Tibet*. During the 1990s, he wrote extensively on Kashmir, focusing on promoting a peaceful resolution of the multi-partite disputes over that region. Along with writing, he taught thousands of students in a variety of courses in the field of geography. Joe was also active in the public arena, serving in various capacities in the Minnesota Chapter of the World Federalist Assn. (later Citizens for Global Solutions) including 14 years as President. Following his formal retirement in 2000, he focused more heavily on issues of global governance. His book *Transforming the United Nations System: Designs for a Workable World*, published by the United Nations University Press in 2013, is a summation of his lifelong study. In December 2014, Joe established *The Workable World Trust*, the principal purpose of which is to disseminate and promote the many global governance proposals in his book. In his last years, Joe put most of his efforts into this organization, working until only a few weeks prior to his death. In a non-academic vein, Joe gained a touch of notoriety for his remarkable doodles, hundreds of which were created during staff meetings and conferences. *(n. d.)*

For a Stronger, More United Europe*

Josep Borrell

Pro-European politicians in every country need to convince their citizens that no nation on its own can have an impact on the world's problems. More democratic control over decisions is vital.

The European Union, and the entire world, have changed substantially since the latest elections to the European Parliament in 2014. At that time, Europe was still reeling from the social consequences of the euro crisis, and there were fears that the currency would not survive. Today, after a lost decade, the EU's GDP is back to pre-crisis levels. However, there are wide disparities from one country to another. The burden of adjustment should have been better distributed between debtors and creditors. The outcome has not been good for European cohesion, with heightened inequality in many countries and a North-South divide that weakens the mutual trust required to advance on political union. A decade ago, we had yet to see the crisis of refugees from the Near East, or the huge increase in migratory flows from Africa. This is a problem that could become the most corrosive force weakening the union among Europeans, and which has sparked a confrontation between Eastern European countries – plus Italy – and those of the West.

Since 2014 the world has undergone many geopolitical changes. The United Kingdom has voted in a referendum to leave the EU. Trump's America is cutting its ties with Europe, abandoning multilateralism, breaking with the Paris climate change agreements and the Iranian nuclear agreement, and championing protectionism. China is setting itself up as a defender of free trade, and Russia is emerging as a military power. The threat of terrorism persists. The internal adversaries of a free, collaborative and united Europe now have powerful external allies.

What is the future of this EU, which – according to the latest Eurobarometer – 68% of the population believes has been positive for their country (75% in the case of Spain), even though 50% say that they are not happy with its current direction? Perhaps this EU was a 20th-century invention to resolve intra-European problems in a bipolar world that had yet to become globalised. An invention that made it possible to overcome the antagonisms that had wrought so much death and destruction. Nevertheless, the goal of maintaining peace is no longer enough, above all for the younger generation, whilst the memory of war is fading, even from the minds of those who lived through it.

This is why, faced with the rise of these external threats and internal problems, doubts are arising regarding the permanence of this great postwar project.

And yet, if the EU did not exist, we would still have to invent it. However, for it to survive we must re-invent it, making it more united and thus stronger. This compels the EU to speak with one voice, to act with the logic of a global power: with strong cooperative relations with its nearest neighbours, especially Africa; with more robust and inclusive growth; with converging national economies; and able to win the battle of technological innovation.

The upcoming European elections will be the acid test of the EU's future. Their outcome will show the inroads made by those who reject European integration – whether from the right or the left. This is the fault of *populisms*, we say, using this catch-all term to paper over the different expressions of public disaffection with an EU legitimised more by its achievements than by its decision-making processes.

What if, to combat populisms, we had to make Europe more popular? In other words, to promote an image of Europe as a powerful defence in the face of concerns over globalisation and the resurging ghosts of nationalism. This is why, in every country, pro-European political leaders must convince their citizens that a stronger future is dependent on stronger unity. That no nation on its own can have an impact on the world's problems. That Europe begins at home, because the decision-makers in Brussels are not extraterrestrials; rather, they were each elected and sent there by each country. And that we must combat fallacies such as the idea of freeing ourselves from the "yoke of Brussels" as a supposed miracle cure for all our ills.

But forming a more perfect union, which necessarily entails pooling risks and opportunities, also calls for greater participation in decision-making, and more democratic control. Historically, European integration has been achieved through agreements between the national political elites, with the "permissive consensus" of their citizens. But those days are over. Today, people are more aware – which is good news – of the importance of the decisions made in Brussels. However, many people feel (rightly or wrongly) that they have no influence over these decisions. They do not know who is responsible for what, nor what legitimises the actions taken by the EU institutions in which their governments exercise shared sovereignty. We must give them reasons to see the EU as an instrument for shared prosperity that favours an equitable distribution of wealth, and increases their influence in the world.

And we must acknowledge that, from this standpoint, the EU's performance over the past decade has not been very satisfactory. And this explains the disaffection of so many citizens. We must not take refuge in a euro-sanctimonious attitude, nor be unwilling to criticise certain EU policies. Still, we must explain that criticisms of EU policies are not always fair. There are restrictions on our sovereignty which we mistake for impositions from Brussels. However, these restrictions stem from the growing interdependence of a globalised world, and from the European Treaties which we have accepted in an exercise of our sovereignty.

We have also reached the end of a system in which the EU took care of macroeconomics and the Member States took care of distributing income. A system in which a liberalising EU promoted competitiveness and eradicated national economic barriers, while the Member States used redistributive policies to protect – for better or for worse – the losers in this process of European economic liberalisation and globalisation.

Aware of the inequalities that could not be fully alleviated by national redistributive policies, Jacques Delors launched the cohesion funds – a Spanish initiative – to favour economic convergence between EU countries. However, European economies have diverged in the past 10 years, losing ground with regard to their pre-crisis convergence.

The economic crisis, with its lasting scars of inequality and impoverishment of the middle class, as well as the fears provoked and fuelled by immigration, have generated a nationalist, populist, and extremist backlash. The losers of globalisation, feeling defenceless, have sought refuge in what they know best: the nation-state. And they have done this by embracing identity politics.

The union of all Europeans needs to have a social, protective dimension if we want citizens to get back on board with the European project. It is difficult to imagine the long-term sustainability of a monetary union without a budget that has redistributive, stabilising effects to mitigate asymmetric shocks. We need to strike a new balance between the monetary dimension of European economic policy, which cannot always do everything, and

its fiscal dimension. To this end, we must also abandon the rule of unanimity on tax issues and foreign policy.

We need a social Europe. However, we cannot proclaim grandiose social goals with a budget equivalent to 1% of European GDP. If we do not have the capacity to finance these goals, they will only lead to frustration and disaffection.

Not being able to rely on the American military umbrella could actually be an opportunity for us to develop European strategic capabilities. The response to "America First" must be "Europe United". The major cultural challenge of our time is to build societies that are both open and cohesive. The EU must show its citizens that it can protect them better and create more opportunities than reactionary nationalism and closed economies.

In order to do this, we must be strong. And strength, in a world dominated by political and economic giants, can only come from unity. Embracing a federal model, and accepting a differentiated process of integration among the Member States (because not all of them will be equally committed) is the only way to achieve this goal.

* Originally published in *El País*, 25 October 2018

Wake up, Europe!*

Sandro Gozi

Our Europe is, again, at a turning point. It has been so several times in the past. But the point in which we are now is a particularly important one. This time is different. Very different. And it is so because never before has the European project been under so much threat, so many attacks while, at the same time, it has never been more important for us all. And let me say without exaggeration, and without being Eurocentric, for the rest of the world. Because not since the 1930s has the world needed Europe and the European method of peaceful management of relations between peoples and countries more.

This is the political paradox we're facing. On the one hand, an unprecedented global need for Europe, while, on the other hand, existential attacks against Europe both from the inside and the outside. And this, dear friends, has me worried. For the first time, I fear for the future of our common project. For the first time, I fear Europe is at risk. For the first time, we must seriously act against European disintegration. It is absurd, one might think. And it is so, especially if you look at what our Union still represents to the rest of the world....!

I'm just back from a mission to Tokyo, where I had the chance to discuss how to rebuild trust in democracy. I debated with politicians and experts from Japan, Philippines, Indonesia, etc. I was with other Europeans, from Paris and from.....London. It was just after the failure of the APEC meeting, due to the strong disagreement between the US and China. And it always amazes me to see how they still look at us with respect and admiration, as the first successful project of free regional integration. And less amazing, but telling a lot about the Brexit mistake, how many values and interests in the global world we share across the Channel. This is why I am ever more convinced that the only way to "go global" for us Europeans is not to leave the Union, but to move towards a European Federation.

The only way to take back control is to work for a European sovereignty.

So, the federalist action today is as important as ever. Our commitment is the real way forward to have a future as Europeans in the global world. Yes, the first reason why I present my candidacy is purely and solely federalist, as I think it should be! The second reason is simply and openly a political one. Non-partisan, of course, but very political. Why? Because we are witnessing a major conflict between two visions for Europe: liberal democracy versus nationalism, rule of law versus intolerance, openness versus closure, multilateralism versus unilateralism.

And each day this cleavage emerges more and more in the debates in the press, in the talk shows, in the European and national parliaments. For the first time after the Iraq war in 2003, when so many European citizens were united against the war, we are seeing signs and movements of a European public opinion: on rule of law, on migration, on climate change, on the digital challenges. Europe is more and more at the centre of these societal debates.

There are more and more civil initiatives launched to defend and to reform Europe, free citizens initiative in cities as Warsaw, Budapest, London, Edinburgh, and Turin more recently. We must be in these squares, walk in these streets, at the heart of these initiatives!

What a historical chance for the federalist movement! Let's seize it. Let's fight for the Federalist cause! Spinelli's message has never been so strong and so current: that the new cleavage between federalism and nationalism is more and more at the

center of European and national debates. In this context we, European Federalists, must take on all our responsibilities and renew our commitment to the European cause. What drives people into the hands of our enemies is that they have lost trust in the current system to deliver solutions: therefore, without more delay, we must get out of this status quo and relaunch a strong process of European reform addressing ourselves to all the political forces sharing our values, our concerns, our goals.

And also trying to act as a catalyst of the several pro-European initiatives launched by the civil society: they are many today, from Pulse of Europe *to* Civico *or* Volt *to mention just a few. Let's connect the dots. Let's build up a civic and political critical mass!*

Wake up, Europe! This must be our motto, this must be our goal. Not because we're not aware of the important steps taken in the recent years. Of the relentless work of the EU institutions, starting from the European Parliament. And I want to commend all the MEPs present here today: I myself, as Italy's Europe Minister until June of this year, could witness the great quality of their work in this legislature. Not because we underestimate the difficulties, but because we appreciate the challenges.

Precisely because the scale of the challenges has dramatically changed we must redouble our efforts. We are entering a new phase in European integration. In recent weeks, important EU leaders have indicated a European Army as a possible and necessary goal. In the most recent days, the debate on how to reshape the eurozone has been relaunched.

Yes, we wish more and better. We must use all our means to persuade, encourage and put pressure on the key decision makers to do more and better, starting from these two initiatives. And we have to do much more to mobilize public opinion around these fundamental choices, using all possible means: from parliamentary debates to daily action on social networks, from dialogue with the key European leaders to open debates with all the interested political and civic organizations *with which we must aim to create a strong network for a stronger European mobilization.*

We have an immediate very important job to do, as also this Congress is showing. More generally, we, as UEF, have an important role to play in uniting all democratic political forces to defend the European idea from the illiberal challenges, and to provide ideas for European solutions and a European reform agenda. And for us, the next European elections will be a litmus test of our capacity to have a non-partisan but highly political influence on the European debate.

We will have to address ourselves, with our Federalist choices, to all the political parties running up to the elections: proposing our agenda to them, asking them to take a clear position on it, and laying down the basis of a possible federalist agenda for the next European legislature.

We will also have to act as a civic actor: we have to raise the awareness of our European citizens on the importance of exercising their voting rights, *especially the youngest who vote for the first time*, aiming to do our part to increase the turn out in May 2019, offering our cooperation in the different countries to promote initiatives together with the Commission and the Parliament to explain the importance of the next European elections. I do believe that this could also act as a boost for all our national sections.

The third reason for my candidacy is a personal one, an obvious continuation of my European and professional path. As I had the opportunity to explain in the letter which I sent to you all, I am a committed European, with academic and professional experiences in at least 7 European countries. Experience in practically all the EU institutions, as well as in organized civil society. I am pro-European and pro civil rights. I'll always be very grateful to the governments, universities and associations which wanted to recognize my commitment: from the French and Maltese Presidents to the Fribourg University or the Harvey Milk San Francisco Foundation to mention just a few.

In my last experience as a Europe minister, I have

always pushed for a stronger Europe. Let me mention just few initiatives which I took first, since 2014: dialogue and new conditionality on rule of law, increase Erasmus and Europe youth initiative funds, the focus of the Rome declaration on Europe of Defense, Social Europe and the possibility of going ahead for a more dynamic group of willing countries, the proposal of using the parliamentary seats left empty by Brexit to introduce the transnational lists in Bratislava, informal general affairs council of July 2016.

With these experiences, over the years I have basically lived Europe from many different perspectives, as an active citizen, as a professional and through my several political and institutional experiences. I thought therefore that I was now well placed to put my convictions, my commitment and my experience at the service of our common endeavor as UEF President.

If you ask me where my strong European convictions stem from, I say it was not when I went to Berlin just after the Fall of the Wall, although it was like a dream for me and I still have a piece of the wall at home. Neither was it when I did the Erasmus program in Paris and studied in other 4 countries. Nor was it as a student when I campaigned in France for the OUI to the Maastricht Treaty, or when I was in the "grand amphithéâtre" of La Sorbonne, following the debate between François Mitterrand and Philippe Séguin in September 1992.

No, the real moment was when as a diplomat I witnessed the siege of Sarajevo, under the shots of the snipers from Pale, and I worked for its reconstruction afterwards. It was in those moments, where I met so many young people of my age without a leg, on their wheel-chair, massacred by another bloody war between Europeans, victims of the madness of another ethnic cleansing in our continent. Young people just like me, only born on the wrong side of the Adriatic in that moment. That was the only difference between us. But it was our Union which made that difference.

That was the moment. Since then, in all my life I have always fought and will always fight for the European cause. No matter what happens. No matter what the immediate political advantages may be. No matter how unpopular it may be in certain moments. Yes, for us, the Europeans, "*le nationalisme c'est la guerre*", Mitterrand was right, as Adenauer, De Gasperi, Schuman, Spinelli, the many participants to The Hague Conference in 1948 were right before him. I don't say this because my grandfather or my father told me about their experiences during the First or the Second World War. And I don't say that this is the most effective way of promoting the European project today. I say it because I've lived it personally. I say it because it could happen again. But let's look at our future. Why a Federal Europe? A Federal Europe is a multiplier of opportunities, securities and protections for all. A multiplier of the future, especially for the young generation. And we must work a lot on the young generation. They are the generation who live the most as Europeans and who are more at risk because of the risks of the European project. They're the generation which in the last years have mostly lived Europe as a multiplier of deceptions and constraints. I don't want to say that this is necessarily the true story. But this is what they feel. This is what they perceive. And we need their support.

A Federal Europe because in this new global disorder there are more and more actors who want to divide us, to weaken us, to manipulate us. There is a golden thread, and probably even something more, between the neo-nationalist forces in some European countries, starting with my country, Italy, Putin's challenges and the links with the extreme anti-European movements, Bolsonaro's victory, Trump's stances, China's strategies.

We must defend and reform multilateralism: this is the real, serious way of celebrating 100 years from the end of the first world war, and have Europe as a legitimate global actor.

To this end, we must work to favour truly transnational politics. Yes, if we want to give Europe the power and the strength to take control on transnational issues, such as immigration, terrorism, climate change, finance or digital

innovations, if we want Europe to become a real security-ensuring and global actor, we must also work more on the democratic legitimacy of the Union. In my belief, a federal democracy must rely on transnational political and civic movements. Starting from the European elections.

Yes, we must relaunch the proposal of the transnational lists, which must become a reality in 2024. Without a truly democratic Europe, we will never get the Europe we need and we will put at risk the national democracies we have!

I am well aware of the very good job which has been done so far, on the one hand, and I honestly want to greet and commend the work and the leadership of Elmar Brok! Dear Elmar, you've done a great job, and be ready, because I'll need your support and your advice if the Congress decides that I will succeed to you. Thank you for all the work you've done!

And I am also fully cognizant of the organizational challenges that we face. For the Federalist movement to play a successful role, we need to redouble our efforts to deliver for our national sections, to encourage the smallest sections to grow, and to intensify our advocacy at the European level. UEF must become a real opportunity for all our national sections to expand our common European initiatives.

In the light of the previous discussions you held, and of my first analysis, we should be able to immediately develop some aspects of our strategy: to promote events and projects with a new added-value and able to meet the new funding priorities of our potential donors. I feel that this is a concern shared by many national sections and on which I am willing to commit through the collective action and a clear strategy of the new Executive Bureau. We must do all we can to secure our financial situation and to diversify our donors. To this end, Bureau members should identify clear advocacy priorities and take ownership of tasks and responsibilities to reach our common objectives.

Last but not least, I will be always open to ideas, concerns and proposals from all the national sections. Within this well-defined context, I am ready to use my experience and networks to strengthen the presence of the UEF, and represent the UEF positions in the political debate at the European level in this very delicate and decisive phase of European integration. We need to show determination, commitment, and team spirit. Above all, we need to show courage, in our ideas as well as in our actions.

You already know that music is one of my passions. And as a former DJ, I often draw inspiration from songs. A very good song by an American band which I strongly recommend to you all, the Rogue Wave, is "*What is left to solve?*". This should be our starting point. Not with the presumption of having all the solutions, but with the respect for the work which has already been done and with the determination to contribute to the success of our movement! Ah, for those who are interested, the album is of 2016 and *California Bride* is also another excellent piece.

"*What is left to solve*" is also a way of paying respect to those who worked and fought for our cause before us. Not only the famous founding mothers and fathers.

Among the mothers, I would like to specifically mention Simone Weil, whom I personally knew and to whom President Macron paid a special and well-deserved tribute last year at the Invalides *and then at the* Panthéon.

But also, I will always insist on this, the many unknown Federalists, active citizens, civil servants, politicians who have given so much to our European project away from the limelight. And let us recall what some of them used to say and write at the beginning of this incredible European adventure – yes, it was Walter Hallstein – and which still holds true even more for us today: "*... tut etwas Tapferes...*", it is time for an act of courage. It is time for the European Federation.

* Speech held in Vienna on 22 November 2018, on the occasion of the author's election to the Presidency of the UEF (Union of European Federalists).

The Global Dimension of Europe*

Fernando Iglesias

I read with special attention the important paper by Marco Piantini about the future of the European Union, and the different opinions that have rightly come up. Personally, I would have nothing to add that's not in line with the principles of European federalism, and there's no need to do so, considering that there are lots of European federalists who follow the European debate more carefully and knowledgeably than me. But maybe I could say something from the perspective of a European citizen who was born outside Europe, of a convinced "Spinellian" who lived in Europe only ten years of his life, and of a global federalist who just for these reasons might have an alternative vision with respect to those expressed so far.

The first thing I would like to say is that Europeans don't have the right appreciation of the extraordinary success that the European Union has been, and of the importance of the European political model at the global scale. It's sufficient to look at the 20th century and divide it into two halves centered on the year of the creation of the European Coal & Steel Community, to understand how the events unfolded.

Basically, Europe in the hands of nationalisms gave the world the worst fifty years of the history of humanity: plenty of wars, genocides, hunger, poverty and totalitarian dictatorships. On the other hand, the United Europe, from the ECSC and then the EEC and then the EU (and maybe thereafter a real federal republic), offered to humanity the deeper progress of its history. Even now, despite the crisis, four countries that form part of the European Union are within the top ten in the world for the best conditions of human development, according to the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and other three are also in Europe.

Better than celebrating the successes achieved by the Union, it would be to think about how to support them now, and reinvigorate them in the future. The consolidation of the federalist project and the creation of a truly democratic republic is certainly being debated now, as shown by the debate on that matter that already unfolded on these same pages. But despite the central importance of that aspect, I would like to add the global perspective: the project of a United Europe was born, of course, by an innovation concerning the historical dialectic between nation and continental region, of which the *Ventotene Manifesto* was the original and maybe the clearest expression.

If Europe was considered earlier as the sum of what was happening at the level of its countries, Spinelli's *Manifesto* made a Copernican Revolution on this concept, a revolution that led, in the course of time, to view the European successes in the broader scenario of the globalization of the social processes. I mean that Spinelli understood that there was no chance of having any European country democratic and progressive – a democratic and progressive Italy, if you wish – in a Europe dominated by nationalisms, totalitarianisms and wars. And if all that was happening, it was because the Nations, as Altiero understood, were no longer the ones determining what had to happen in Europe, but vice-versa: it was the overall situation in Europe to determine what was happening inside the European nations. In a Europe dominated by nationalisms, trade-

wars, armed wars and genocides there was no way for any European country to override the general entropy.

Well, today this statement by Spinelli about the supremacy of the whole over the single parts has become valid, at last, worldwide. The Copernican Revolution brought about by globalization makes it so that there is no hope to have a democratic and civil Europe if the world keeps moving towards trade wars, nationalisms and wars. In short, the world, in this newborn 21st century, overlooks the same abyss – and the same challenges – that Europe had to face at the beginning of the 20th century. We either go towards a more peaceful, democratic and civil world scene, following the federalist guidelines, or towards its contrary; and in such a case Europe will not have any way out.

Spinelli himself asserted that the European unity was only the first step towards a world federation; and in this sense Europe has failed, because she didn't give the contribution that was possible and proper to expect of her. In this perspective, the European Union must be re-thought as a big "internal" success but a big "external" defeat. It is true that not everything depended or depends on Europe, but it is nevertheless also true that the contribution given by the European Union to bring about a stronger and more democratic global governance has been limited and unsuccessful. As a paradoxical but inevitable result, nowadays there is no one of the so-called "European" problems that is not actually a global problem. Or rather we might say that Europe has almost no problems because none of the problems the European Union is facing today is strictly European. The European issues of today, the European crises still in place, are simply regional reflexes of bigger global crises that beset the world and arise from the inability of the national-international political system to act globally through a federal and democratic approach. Migration, financial instability with increasing poverty and inequality, fundamentalist terrorism, climate change… none of these is a European problem in itself: they are all just symptoms at the European level of huge global problems that are not rationally answered by the political system; a global political system in its dimension, but still national-international from an organizational point of view.
So, this is exactly the Copernican inconsistency that the ECSC, the EEC and the EU have succeeded in handling at the European level, thanks to the premises set by Monnet and Schuman on the one hand, and to the political struggle of federalists like Spinelli on the other. The need for a federal, democratic, integrated political system, able to leave to the nations the national problems but to take upon itself at the same time at the regional level the regional problems. Why then this concept that we accepted as valid for the dialectics European Union vs. Nations is not valid for the dialectics European Union vs. the World?

Nowadays the global issues that affect Europe find no actor capable of making decisions and intervening in a scarcely democratic national-international system, lacking a true capacity of enforcement. Of course, the G7, G20, the UN Security Council, the IMF, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization and so on are all the embryos of a possible global governance, but they still have at their disposal reduced powers, are subjected to the principle of unanimity and have no trace of democracy within. Europe has truly done little for this political architecture, whose deficiencies are pouring onto the European continent.

In order to solve its crises, the 21st-century world, that nowadays is facing the same problems that the EU solved in the second half of the 20th century, needs to take advantage

of the experience developed by that lab of supranational democracy that is the European Union. We need to strengthen the powers of the United Nations and of the international agencies, to get it to do the decisive step from confederacy to federalism, and finally democratize it. These are the principles and ideas for which Europe is known today globally: the rule of law, democracy, respect for human rights and welfare state.
However, what did Europe not do and what could it do in this direction? First of all, the European Union has been lacking a true policy aimed at helping the integration of other regions. As an Argentinean and citizen of Mercosur, I witnessed how after the initial efforts and in front of the first inevitable failures, the European Union retreated. Actually, today there is no European policy towards Mercosur, nothing about other regional initiatives, no policy brought forward by Europe with political, and not economic, criteria. Let's make an example: in Latin America, the European Union has generous programs that support human, women's and children's rights and sustainable development, and so on, but no one is targeted at sustaining concrete actions for its regional unity.

A similar argument applies to the trade agreements between Mercosur and Europe that, once established, would create the biggest trading space in the world. Those agreements, once blocked by Kirchner's Argentina, now can only find obstacles from European countries and officials who only cater to the interests of a little part of the European economy, the agri-food sector (in particular the French one), instead of seeing them with a more farsighted political perspective. In fact, in this world crossed by trade wars, should not escape to European officials the importance of creating a trade agreement that brings together two continents that share the political principles of European history, like democracy, human rights, republicanism, liberalism and the respect for individual rights.

What is the EU waiting for in order to get rid of its lowly interests and get involved in a commercial agreement that helps Mercosur to organize itself? It seems to me that this is a question to ask and that does not find today an answer that is up to the renown of the Union.

The European Union has also failed in promoting any democratic and federal reform of the United Nations. In particular of the Security Council, for which it continues to suggest nationalistic measures instead of a federal restructuring of the Council that follows the regional logic and includes:

- The removal of veto when circumstances of serious violations of human rights are present.
- The regionalization of the Council, adapting it to our times and committing all its member states to give rise to regional agreements and some kind of regional political unity, no matter how embryonic.

Finally, little has so far been achieved to support valid and forward-looking initiatives like the proposal to create a Parliamentary Assembly of the United Nations – an idea of an important group of NGOs. The idea of the creation of an embryo of global parliament through the development of an advisory agency of the United Nations General Assembly could now look as utopia, but utopia was also the European Union in the times of the *Ventotene Manifesto*, and even more so after thirty years of war, when France and Germany, bled dry in nationalist conflicts, made a deal to create the ECSC.

Utopia? So, if it's not Europe that proposes the application of federalism and democracy at a global level, then who will do it? If it's not the European Union and its success to

push through the proposal of a Parliamentary Assembly of the United Nations (similar to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe and the Parliamentary Assembly which later originated the European Parliament), who will do it? It's time to ask these questions. It's time to look at the future of the world with the same foresight that Spinelli and the founding fathers of the United Europe knew how to put into practice in much more challenging times. The fate of the European Union itself is at stake. If we do not move towards federalism and democracy on the decisive global scale, there's no hope for the world to avoid a tragedy similar to that which occurred in Europe at the beginning of the 20th century – or perhaps even a bigger one. If European leaders don't have this ability to look at the world and at the future, they will turn a blind eye to the urges of history, as did those who were against every type of democratic union of the European continent because they thought that it was necessary first to proceed to democratize all European countries, an impossible project.

If Europe doesn't go ahead in this direction, nobody will. And if nobody will do it we are going to increasingly be in the hands of nationalistic populisms or, to say it better, of the populist nationalisms that are now advancing *en bloc* all over the world, from the USA to Brexit, to the different nationalistic populisms getting ready to enter the European Parliament and destroy the European project from within. Stopping them is part of a decisive battle not only for Europe itself, but also for the world, because the collapse of the European integration process would mean a return to nationalism, xenophobia, conflict at the global scale. But that is why we must also look at the world and not only to Europe, and understand that now Europe is the only political power with global impact that has the opportunity to propose itself as a model of democracy and federalism to be looked at.

Those who believe that is necessary first to fix the European Union and then look at the world's situation, are making now the same mistake as those who believed that before the regional union there was to make all the European countries civil and democratic. They are not federalist but rather European nationalists. Luckily for Europe and for the world, this has not been the prevailing opinion at the end of the war, but it was that of Schuman and Monnet, strengthened by the contributions of the federalists and Spinelli.

In their name and following their vision, it is necessary now to find the resources and the ways to bring to the global level, gradually but resolutely, the two principles that we do accept at the national and European level: federalism and democracy. If not now, when the Union itself is at the mercy of the global processes, when? And if not Europe, who? The European Union cannot give up its battle because, in so doing, would lose itself, as we well understand from the consequences of having done so in the previous years.

* This article was published in the Italian review *Micromega*, on 6 September 2018

The Battle Plan for a Federal Europe.
The 'I choose Europe' Campaign

Ophélie Omnes

During their last Congress in Vienna in November 2018, the European federalists (UEF) adopted the format of their campaign for the next European elections in May 2019. Aware of the difficult task to advocate for a federal Europe in times in which the European ideal is more than ever criticised, they have carefully designed the 'I choose Europe' campaign to give concrete but ambitious answers to many of the challenges that lie ahead.

It is a sort of ritual: six months before every European electoral deadline comes the time for each and every pro-European organisation to start thinking – not to say to start implementing! – its strategy to try and influence the vote. And we, European federalists, as the main federalist umbrella organisation in Europe, make no exception here. Initiated at the last Federal Committee in Berlin in April 2018, the discussions about how the new campaign would look like crystallised in November, when the *'I choose Europe'* motto was designated as the banner of a concept that had been thought through. One may look at it and think federalists are once again serving people their usual ideas – and ideals – about a European federation we need to build to solve most of our problems.

But this time is different.

In the gloomy context of a disastrous Brexit, at times when the rule of law is endangered in Poland and Hungary, to name only them, while witnessing worrying developments in Italy and weak government decisions in Germany, the European project might have never been threatened by so many opponents – both internal and external, as the world does not seem to be in a better shape. Defending that project might have never been harder than these days… unless you have a plan.

Choosing the federal solution

With the adoption of a pragmatic approach, the European federalists can pursue their values through concrete proposals. The real issue here is, and will be, for the coming months, to campaign for a federation, when this is not a real option we have in the elections. The trick is then to send the right messages, to get as many people of goodwill as possible in the Parliament and hope that the general turmoil will lead them to sit down and discuss the required substantial changes of the exhausted European institutions, who keep on struggling. In this regard, the idea of *'This time I'm voting'* is quite a good example of the deadlock in which we currently stand when we know that more participation in the European elections, without a clear pedagogy on the stakes, might also lead to more populists in the next Parliament. And this is what the motto *'I choose Europe'* is all about. In these dark times, we, citizens, choose Europe and all the values it stands for, and we believe that our future can only get better through a European perspective. That is why the motto comes with a few more adjectives to define the kind of Europe we want to build: stronger, democratic, social, federal. The message sent is intentionally positive, but not naïve, and can adapt to the various realities encountered in the different Member States, especially towards the idea of federalism.

To implement such a programme, efficient tools are very much needed. In this regard, the

European federalists have understood where their strengths and weaknesses lie, and an honest evaluation of the situation is what led to setting a concrete agenda.

The objectives of the *'I choose Europe'* campaign are quite clear, which make them achievable:

- Support the national sections in their own campaigns;
- Advocate efficiently on the European level;
- Organise a final event in Strasbourg during the first session of the newly elected European Parliament;
- Increase the visibility of the organisation throughout the process.

Analysis of a well-thought-out plan

To understand the complete structure of the campaign and why it is a reliable system, it is worth taking a close look at each component individually.

- **Support to national sections: the main purpose of UEF as umbrella organisation**

We might regret it (and we do!) but the European elections are not as European as we would like them to be. It is not one big European battlefield that we need to prepare ourselves for, but a constellation of 27 (28?) lands, which answer to different rules, in different political environments, with different focus points. In this configuration, the European level of the organisation is not entitled to make plans to tackle issues in each Member State, and it should not even try. This role is the responsibility of the national sections, who know the field reality better than anyone outside of their borders. This is where the 2019 *'I choose Europe'* campaign is strong: it respects and embraces the diversity of actions the sections may want to come up with by giving them a framework in which they are free to express themselves, while still belonging to the same set. Moreover, it will give the sections' initiatives some echo by highlighting that it is not just nationals pushing the federalist ideas forward in their own countries, it is a wide collection of men and women throughout the continent who stand for the same values, using different weapons and adapting them to the threats they must face.

The ammunition provided by the European level is gathered in a toolbox, which contains, among other things, the manifesto of the organisation for the campaign, coordinated together with the Young European Federalists (JEF Europe), the call to European political parties, the pledge for candidates and the pledge for citizens. If most of the tools are traditionally used by UEF in election times, the pledge for citizens is a new concept which emerged from the observation that citizens need to be (re)engaged in the public debates on Europe. The populists do not have the monopoly of representativeness and the pledge for citizens was made to remind us of it.

The strength of the *'I choose Europe'* campaign lies in its flexibility. Regardless of whether the actions take place in a big and well-organised section or inside a young and small one which does not really know where to start, the diagnosis is the same: we are all in this together and we all make the network live in our own ways. The whole structure is based on a pooling and sharing system in which we can give and take ideas, concepts and tools to support our own initiatives and create synergies.

- **The advocacy actions on the European level, or the simple application of the principle of subsidiarity to the organisation**

As we have seen, very few things are left to be decided on the European level during the election period, when it seems that the European institutions can do nothing more than hold their breath, hope for the best and tell citizens to vote. The perk of being a political – and not only a citizen-based – organisation is that we can get in the political game to make our points and inspire new ideas. Of course, here again most of the battles will be played on the national level, but whatever is

left to the parties will be grounds on which UEF can try and get influential in the parties at European level. That is why there is a whole strategy to attend political parties' congresses, get visible and meet the parties leading candidates (the so-called *Spitzenkandidaten*). As the elections trigger the actions of the entire pro-European civil society, it is also a great time to create partnerships with other organisations to develop stronger positions and make ourselves heard.

- **Why organising a final event when it is already all over?**

One may find it odd to organise a final event of a campaign when the said campaign will have already come to an end. It is not. If we remember 2014 and how close we were to completely ignore the *Spitzenkandidat* process, whereas it had been said repeatedly that the future head of the European Commission should be the leading candidate of the winning party, it even makes all the sense in the world. Organising a major event in Strasbourg for the opening session of the European Parliament in July will mark the real end of the campaign and the opening of the dialogue with the newly elected members of the European Parliament who will have committed to the *'I choose Europe'* project. It will be our way of saying *'we are still there and now we are watching – behave'* and hold our MEPs accountable.

- **The essential need to increase the visibility of the organisation**

In the end, visibility is what this is all about. In a political context where the stability and growth of an entire continent are at stake and the battle of ideas is strongly influenced by how visible and noisy an organisation can get, increasing our presence wherever possible is an essential part of this campaign, if not the most important. As mentioned hereinbefore, this vote is not about whether we agree with the creation of a European federation or not. It is about electing people whom we hope will be brave enough to demand substantive reforms heading towards a federal structure. Therefore, we federalists will have to consider other parameters to cast our vote, since we will not be able to tick the 'federation' box when going to the ballot boxes. Our goal is to be heard and understood as much as possible in the media, in the civil society circles and in the public debates and street demonstrations which will take place throughout Europe until 26th May.

Conclusion

If there is one thing we know for sure about the next European elections, it is that it is not going to be easy. Tough are the times if you are a pro-European activist, let alone a federalist one! But if that is the price to pay for being ambitious and still believing that the only way forward is to overcome national egoisms and work together in a common project, where what unites us is stronger than what divides us, then so be it.

The *'I choose Europe'* campaign not only does it have a fair distribution of roles between national sections' actions and European level duties, but it is also balanced regarding the public to involve, targeting both citizens and politicians. It aims at implementing the principle of subsidiarity we care so much about at every level of the organisation, in order to make our voices heard everywhere possible.

If anything, it is not a perfect campaign. However, it is worth giving it a try, at least to get some hope in a fight that might last longer than the few months left before the vote. And if things go bad, we can always say that we chose Europe when there was still time to do so.

For the moment, it is all but a closed deal. Let's be the political actors we want to see. Let's take our responsibilities, as citizens, as activists, and let's join the fight, altogether. There is a European federation to build, waiting for us to be brave. *En avant!*

The Creation of the Latin American Criminal Court Receives Broad Regional Support

Camila López Badra

On 1st November 2018, at the Honorable Cámara de Diputados de la Nación – the low chamber of the Argentine Congreso Nacional –, within the framework of the Parliamentary Speaker's Summit and Forum at the G20, the conference "Towards the Creation of a Latin American and Caribbean Criminal Court Against Transnational Organized Crime" took place. This event brought together various parliamentarians and ambassadors from the region, as well as important Argentine officials, including the Vice President of Argentina, Gabriela Michetti; the Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Germán Garavano; the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Faurie; and the Secretary of Public Ethics, Transparency and Fight against Corruption, Laura Alonso.

During the opening session, Camila López Badra, Executive Director of the NGO Democracia Global and Coordinator of the COPLA campaign, emphasized first the important role of her organization: it is responsible for promoting the project and committed to "develop a legal instrument to ensure the arrest and prosecution of key members of criminal groups". She added that the COPLA would be "a complementary Court that cooperates with national jurisdictions, an independent and flexible Court that is not subordinated to any regional organism". Furthermore, López Badra argued that this regional Court "will have jurisdiction to prosecute any organized criminal group that commits illicit drugs, arms, human, child and cultural property trafficking, and money laundering". After presenting the key points of the COPLA campaign, the Executive Director stated that "Latin America is home to only 9% of the world population, yet 33% of all homicides are committed in our region". Therefore, "today, the fight for human rights is the fight against organized crime".

The preliminary project of the COPLA Statute was drafted by a group of legal experts on international law, criminal law and regional integration coordinated by Christian Cao. He noted that "nowadays, organized crime groups are in search of large amounts of money to broaden and keep committing transnational crimes" and further stressed, for that reason, that "the creation of a complementary court to prosecute key members of criminal groups is a twenty-first century requirement".

Nicolás Cordini defined the concept of "organized crime group" as an "association or gang of three or more people with some level of internal organization and whose purpose is to commit any of the crimes covered by the Statute". Sabina Romero emphasized that the Court is intended "to judge any person who directs, organizes or manages a criminal organization" and "to cooperate with national courts as the enabling clause enshrined in the preliminary project is applicable whenever a state is unable or unwilling to judge these crimes".

Octavio Silitti reviewed the mechanisms that trigger the jurisdiction of the Court. On the one hand, he noted that a regional institution of this nature "requires a strong and independent

Office of the Prosecutor and an accusatory system where the power of investigation falls fully and exclusively on the Public Prosecutor". On the other hand, he pointed that the Court would intervene "when a Member State refers the case to the Office of the Prosecutor, which shall initiate an investigation".

The closing remarks of the first round of speakers were made by the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs and Worship, who emphasized the need to achieve consensus within societies: "without consensus, widespread issues cannot be tackled. Therefore, we adhere to this initiative because we understand it is a way to build consensus".

The second round of speakers featured the intervention of the Argentine Minister of Justice and Human Rights, who declared that COPLA is a "very valuable" initiative, stressing that "Latin America is one of the most violent regions of the world, with the highest number of intentional homicides, mostly related to organized crime". In addition, Alonso stated that "crime has become transnational" and that COPLA could be "an excellent instrument" to fight corruption at the regional level.

Vice President Gabriela Michetti, one of the first supporters of the initiative, closed the event stating that "COPLA could be a very effective instrument to make progress in the path of fighting against organized crime." Fernando Iglesias, Argentine MP and Director of the COPLA campaign, acknowledged the support for the campaign and invited the parliamentarians to adhere to the "Declaration of Buenos Aires", which was signed by 19 of them from Argentina, Ecuador, Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela, as well as by ambassadors from the Dominican Republic, Honduras and Nicaragua at Buenos Aires.

Parliamentary Speakers Summit in the Context of the G-20

Fernando Iglesias

Between 2010 and 2013, four parliamentary speakers' summits have taken place within the framework of G-20 under the name of "Consultations". The first meeting has been held in Ottawa, Canada, in September 2010; the second in Seoul, Republic of Korea, in May 2011; the third in Riad, Saudi Arabia, in February 2012; the fourth in Mexico City, in April 2013. By 2018, Argentina took up again the parliamentary speaker's summit and, for the first time, the P20 was organized by a National Congress (Argentina), the Inter-parliamentary Union (IPU) and the OECD.

Unlike the 7 engagement groups of the G-20, namely: Business 20 (B20), Labour 20 (L20), Science (S20), Youth (Y20), Women 20 (W20), Civil 20 (C20) and Think 20 (T20), which are adopted by the member states of the G-20, the parliamentary speakers of the G-20 agreed that, being the P20 the expression of an independent parliamentary power, the formal establishment of the P20 does not need any government's authorization.

In 2018, the addressed debate in Argentina was: Building consensus for a sustainable and fair development. Its final joint agreement stated: "We made a commitment to work together to find and implement lasting solutions to the key challenges of our ever-changing world. These include the future of work, financing for development, the fight against corruption, the empowerment of women and youth, education for the new era of technology and innovation, and the renewed commitment to multilateralism".

Another meaningful statement was: "We are convinced that, in view of the increasing interdependence of our societies and the growing threats to democracy, the current system of global governance needs to be strengthened so that it better reflects the perspectives and interests of all people everywhere, including those of vulnerable groups. We are strongly committed to promoting a rules-based global order with multilateralism as its key principle", and "Our Parliamentary Speakers' Summit of G20 member and guest countries is founded on the paradigm of 'global challenges, global solutions' and, to this aim, we reiterate the need to increase dialogue and cooperation among our States, governments, and parliaments".

In the context of this P20 Summit, the side-event "Towards the creation of a Latin American and Caribbean Criminal Court against Transnational Organized Crime (COPLA)" has taken place. Many parliamentarians and ambassadors of the region discussed the feasible institutional solutions to the rise of transnational crime. The outcome document was the Buenos Aires Declaration, which proposed a mechanism for institutionalizing the COPLA and was signed by more than 20 officers among parliamentarians and ambassadors from Argentina, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Paraguay and Venezuela.

After the end of the P20, by following a recommendation of MP Fernando Iglesias, the speaker of the Argentine Chamber, Dr Monzó, sent an official letter to his Japanese counterpart. He insisted on the value of the

experience, recommended to repeat it at the coming Osaka P20 Summit, suggested that it might work around global core topics (climate change, international terrorism, migrations flows, disruptive technologies, financial market regulation and transnational organized crime), proposed that the discussion of these topics should be developed within committees and that either resolutions or recommendations were voted, hence should be added to the G20 agenda.

Recently, the Japanese Chamber's speaker communicated to Mr Monzó that, indeed, a new edition of the P20 will be organized during the next G-20 Osaka summit and accepted most of the recommendations he received. Hopefully, this will be a first step towards a parliamentary global discussion as a permanent part of the political debate previous to the P20.

A World Citizens Initiative. The Case for a Global Participatory Democracy*

Michele Fiorillo

Time is high for a reform of the United Nations, and many proposals are under discussion in the run-up to its 75th anniversary, which will be celebrated on October 2020.

This honorable institution – born in the wake of the Second World War, with the aim to preserve peace on earth – is nowadays generally perceived like a weak old elephant attacked by many arrows, almost on the point of falling down. An urgent renovation is needed – everyone sees that. But towards which direction?

Raison d'état and inter-governmental methods are increasingly prevailing in the UN system, blocking de facto the necessary development of a stronger global governance in front of the new challenges of the new Millenium. Therefore, what we need is to build up a 'counter-power' by the citizens who are aware of the common destiny of humanity and the necessity of cooperation, instead of antagonism. But how could the emergence of such civic activism on the planetary stage become possible?

As acute observers noticed, the huge mobilizations against the Iraq war (2003) have produced not only the birth of a transnational *European public sphere*[1], but also the affirmation of a new *world public opinion*[2] – something similar to what already happened in the 1960s with the mobilization of young students all over the world against the Vietnam war and the last spasms of Western colonization.

Since then, day by day, more and more citizens became more and more connected on a global level thanks to social networks, increased opportunities of traveling, and growing economic, educational, scientific and artistic cooperation, despite the limitations that nationalisms and authoritarian regimes are trying to impose to the free movement of people.

On this progressive development of a global civil society is based on the 'cosmopolitan' hope for the democratization of globalization. But it's likely that this will not happen without a strong help by an institutional approach.

Therefore, one question seems to be central: how to put the citizens at the center of the UN project?

Once more, as always, we need to exercise political imagination.

The World Federalist Movement started a quarter of a century ago a fundamental campaign towards the introduction of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly (UNPA), as a first step towards a World Parliament, finally representing the citizens of the world[3].

However, this approach does not seem to be enough in an age where 'parliamentarism' is under attack almost everywhere, and the distance between institutions and people is growing, at least in the eyes of public opinion. As many democratic theories have shown, representative institutions alone are not sufficient to bring about a high-quality democracy: representative democracy, to survive, has to be integrated by modern forms of direct and deliberative democracy. If that is true at a national level, it should be even more true at the international one: therefore, if our aim is to reach progressively a *global democracy*, we need to imagine innovative tools for a *transnational participatory democracy*.

Such kind of institutional instruments would

enable to raise awareness among the people about the complexity of global governance, and would help to mobilize the growing global public opinion towards their direct influence on the destiny of the world community.

One of these tools could be the introduction of a *World Citizens' Initiative* (WCI) on the model of the ECI (European Citizens' Initiative). The ECI, introduced in the European Union with the Treaty of Lisbon (2007), is the first example of transnational participatory democracy. The experiment has demonstrated that it can work, despite some difficulties that are now being addressed thanks to the pressure of NGO activists, willing to improve and make easier its functioning.

Now, the idea is very simple: why not imagine that also within the United Nations framework something similar could work? If our aim is to give a voice to world citizens, we will find the technical solutions and the relative institutional mechanisms to be addressed in the appropriate manner, with the help of legal experts. However, we can already start to figure out concretely how a UN WCI could work.

In practice, making due proportions, if, for the ECI, signatures from a minimum of 7 countries out of 28 EU Member States are necessary, for a hypothetical WCI signature from, for instance, a minimum of 48 countries out of 193 UN Member States would be necessary. With regard to the total number of signatures: if for the ECI a minimum of 1 million collected signatures is required – within an EU population of 511 millions, as of 1 January 2017 –, for a WCI 15 millions signatures, for instance, would be necessary, being the world population about 7.5 billions, as of 1 July 2017. That would be a hypothetical threshold for an initiative to be addressed to the Secretary General, who would have then the role to propose the issue to the UN General Assembly for discussion, on behalf of the citizens of the World.

We can imagine that in particular cases also the Security Council could be addressed by a special WCI, with a higher threshold, say for instance 100 million signatures. Moreover, the debate on the proposal issued by a specific WCI could be established as mandatory within the sessions of the General Assembly or of the Security Council – under condition of a twofold threshold of signatures – say 30 millions for the issues addressed to the GA, and 200 millions for the ones addressed to the SC. A very high threshold – say for instance 500 million signatures – could be required for the citizens to urge the Security Council to (re) consider peace-keeping interventions and stop the war in every point of the planet.

By an organizational point of view, we could imagine online registrations and signatures to be collected on a specific web platform set-up by the UN Secretariat. But also offline registrations and signatures through the UN offices (and peacekeeping missions) all over the world, and – when an agreement is possible – through national and local authorities of the Member States. NGOs would be allowed to collect signatures too, under special authorization. This integrated online/offline approach could enable even citizens of countries governed by authoritarian regimes to participate in WCI campaigns and be part of a growing democratic global community.

In this respect, the WCI could be seen as a powerful instrument for the long-term objective of global democracy. A cosmopolitan tool in the hands of the many – not the few wealthy global elites – to counter big corporate interests, which are at the moment governing the world together with the will of hegemony of the great powers and the natural egoisms of the nation States.

Movements like the one represented in the World Social Forum could use the WCI as a counter-power to global capitalism. Ecological activists could have one more instrument to use when campaigning against climate change

and environmental crimes, moving from square and street mobilizations like the "People's Climate March" to international institutions. Civil rights battles could try to achieve their goals in a specific country through the active solidarity of many people from all the corners of the world.

Civic platforms like *avaaz.org*, experienced for years in public opinion campaigning, could transform their big potential in terms of data collection and civic mobilization into a decisive support to citizens and organizations willing to engage in a WCI.

Influential intellectuals, famous artists and other global personalities would be easily involved as sponsors of the different campaigns, catalyzing the media attention and spreading ideas about a different shaping of global governance among national and global public opinion.

By a legal point of view, the main road to introduce a WCI in the UN system could be found – precisely as for the UNPA – in invoking Article 22 of the UN Charter: *"The General Assembly may establish such subsidiary organs as it deems necessary for the performance of its function"*.

Giving direct voice to the citizens of the world would help the General Assembly to improve its "performance" and credibility in its commitment to keep peace in the world, showing itself as the place where global issues raised by the people are heard and taken into great consideration.

All that could be seen as'fantapolitics'. But what today appears just as a fruit of imagination could become a tangible institution in the future. It has been so for the International Criminal Court: from a powerful idea to a reality, thanks to a broad coalition of NGOs campaigning for its establishment and ratification. Nothing less has to be made now: build up a broad coalition of civil society organizations and create a growing civic mobilization, pushing politics to do a step forward towards a brave renovation of the UN system, in the pursuit of participation.

The strength of the democratic ruling idea will do the rest, as always in history, in the short or long term.

** The idea of a World Citizens Initiative, modeled on the example of the European Citizens Initiative, was first proposed by Michele Fiorillo at the European Parliament during the session of the UNPA campaign meeting in Brussels (16 October 2013 - see www.mfe.it/site/fileMfe/archivio/UE/UE_2013_05.pdf (in Italian)). More recently, the proposal was adopted by the last WFM Congress held in The Hague on July 2018, and a campaign has been promoted by Democracy Without Border together with Democracy International and CIVICUS (worldcitizensinitiative.org).*

[1] Juergen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, '*February 15, or What Binds Europeans Together: A Plea for a Common Foreign Policy, Beginning in the Core of Europe*', Constellations, 10 : 3, p. 294 – issued originally in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine* on 31st May, 2003. 15th of February is the day of the simultaneous demonstrations against the imminent start of the Iraq War in many cities, that for the authors were"a sign of the birth of a European public sphere" (p. 291).

[2] "The fracturing of the Western alliance over Iraq and the huge antiwar demonstrations around the world this weekend are reminders that there may still be two superpowers on the planet: the United States and world public opinion." (Patrick Tyler, '*A New Power in the Streets*', New York Times, February 17, 2003)

[3] www.unpacampaign.org

Three Important Advancements in the Campaign for a UNPA

Andreas Bummel

On 7 November 2018, a group of elected representatives was established through an international online meeting with the goal to promote the establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly. The new Parliamentary Group for a UNPA adopted a call-to-action warning that "the United Nations, the multilateral order and democracy are under attack".

The declaration urges the UN and its member governments to take steps towards the creation of a UNPA in order to address the UN's democratic deficit. It refers to a statement by former UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali who said that "we need to promote the democratization of globalization, before globalization destroys the foundations of national and international democracy."

The meeting elected five co-presidents: Fernando Iglesias, Member of the Chamber of Deputies of Argentina; Daniel Jositsch, Senator from Switzerland; Jo Leinen, Member of the European Parliament from Germany; Naveed Qamar, Member of the National Assembly of Pakistan; and Ivone Soares, Member of the National Assembly of Mozambique and the Pan-African Parliament.

"Democracy currently stops at national borders"

"Democracy currently stops at national borders. At the global level, the United Nations brings together diplomats appointed by member state governments. There is no UN body composed of democratically elected representatives. As a consequence, the UN reaches serious limits when it comes to finding solutions for global problems. Take climate change as an example. There has been little progress for decades" said Senator Daniel Jositsch who chaired the meeting.

Other initial members of the group include, among others, Ireland's Thomas Broughan, Jens Holm from Sweden, Smári McCarthy from Iceland, Florence Mutua from Kenya, Achyuta Samanta from India, Lilia Puig de Stubrin from Argentina and Nomsa Tarabella-Marchesi from South Africa.

Group members already in action

Responding to a question posed by Thomas Broughan in the Irish Parliament this week, Irish foreign minister Simon Coveney responded again that Ireland was "open-minded" on the UNPA proposal. Together with four other parliamentarians, Smári McCarthy these days re-introduced a resolution in the Icelandic Parliament calling for support of a UNPA.

Previously, with the involvement of group members Fernando Iglesias, Jo Leinen and Ivone Soares, respectively the Latin-American Parliament, the Parliament of Mercosur, both chambers of the Argentine Parliament, the European Parliament[1] and the Pan-African Parliament[2] endorsed the proposal.

In addition, the international campaign for a UNPA so far was endorsed by over 1,500 current and former individual members of parliament. The new parliamentary group aims at building "the political momentum and pressure that is needed to achieve our goal".

"The creation of a Parliamentary Group for a UNPA is another step forward in the way

towards a world parliament, global democracy, a stronger UN and a fairer and more peaceful world", commented Fernando Iglesias.

A declaration adopted unanimously at the 42nd Plenary Assembly of the World Federation of United Nations Associations (WFUNA) held in Punta Cana, Dominican Republic, on 21 October 2018 supports "steps towards the creation of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly". The declaration explains further that the new UN body should be attached to the UN General Assembly and allow for "formal participation of parliamentarians in the work of the UN."

The resolution that was jointly proposed by the UN Associations of Germany, Denmark, South Africa and the United Kingdom states that the UN "must address the democratic deficit within global decision-making processes", if it is to be successful "in the pursuit of creating a better world for all and ensuring that no one is left behind."

"We hope that a UNPA will strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the UN," commented UNA-Germany's board member Hannah Birkenkötter in Punta Cana. Ben Donaldson, the Head of Campaigns at UNA-UK said that "we need a world organisation that truly represents the world. A UNPA would be a major step towards this goal."

The resolution adopted at the world congress says further that there should be "an open and inclusive intergovernmental preparatory process under the auspices of the UN General Assembly for a UN 2020 Summit that considers comprehensive reform measures, including the creation of a UN Parliamentary Assembly."

The document acknowledges the ongoing international Campaign for a UNPA that has received the support of more than 1,500 members of parliament across party lines, among others. It also refers to endorsements of a UNPA by the European Parliament, the Latin-American Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament.

"The World Federation of United Nations Associations not only brings together the world's strongest supporters of the UN, but also those who perhaps have the best understanding of how the world organization operates. Their call for a UN Parliamentary Assembly has great significance," said Andreas Bummel, the UNPA Campaign's Secretary-General. "The pressure on the UN and its member states to finally consider this proposal is growing," he stated.

Moreover, a postulate submitted on the end of November by Daniel Jositsch, a member of the Swiss Senate from Zurich, instructs the federal government of Switzerland to report on whether it perceives a democratic deficit to exist at the United Nations and whether "the creation of a parliamentary assembly within the UN" may be an appropriate step to address such a deficit. The document explains that the suggested new body may be understood "in the sense of a second chamber that represents the population, analogous to the Swiss system."

The explanatory statement of the initiative, supported by all 46 members of the upper chamber of Switzerland's parliament, stresses that the structure of the UN still reflects the situation after the Second World War. The document points out, however, that the situation has changed and that the structures of the UN established at the time "cannot last forever." It goes on to say that it is necessary to democratize the world organization. According to Jositsch and the other Senators, Switzerland could play "an important role" in this process "as a neutral small state with its two-chamber system, which attaches special importance to the cantons in the structure of the state." In particular, the question arises "whether a parliamentary assembly could be considered as a supplement to today's United Nations General Assembly".

The initiative refers to a resolution of the European Parliament of July, calling on the

governments of the European Union to pursue the establishment of a parliamentary assembly at the UN (UNPA).

"The worsening crisis in international cooperation shows that new ways must be found to combat global problems", Jositsch welcomed the resolution at the time. The Senator is Co-President of an international parliamentary group for a UNPA that was created last month. Worldwide the international campaign for a UNPA was supported so far by more than 1,500 parliamentarians.

It is not the first time that Swiss parliamentarians draw international attention with an initiative concerning a UNPA. In February 2005, a majority of the National Council and the Senate called on the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan to include the proposal into the official reform agenda of the United Nations.

In his reaction to the decision of the European Parliament, Jositsch stressed that now "concrete implementation measures" are needed.

[1] https://en.unpacampaign.org/10619/european-lawmakers-call-for-a-un-parliamentary-assembly-and-a-2020-un-reform-summit/
[2] https://en.unpacampaign.org/7629/pan-african-parliament-calls-on-african-union-to-support-the-creation-of-a-un-parliamentary-assembly/

The European Project in Stefan Zweig's Thought

Paolo Ponzano

Stefan Zweig
Appello agli Europei [Appeal to Europeans] (in Italian)
Skira, Milano, 2015
English edition including eleven Zweig's essays: *Messages from a Lost World: Europe on the Brink*, Pushkin Press, London, 2017

In 2015, the volume *"Appello agli Europei [Appeal to Europeans]"* was published in Italy; it collects the unpublished texts of four conferences held in the 1930s by Stefan Zweig, the Austrian cosmopolitan writer and intellectual, a great proponent of European unity, who was deprived of his Austrian citizenship after the annexation of Austria to Hitler's Germany and forced to take refuge first in England and then in Brazil. There he decided to put an end to his days in 1942, when Europe seemed to be succumbing to the advance of Nazi troops. His autobiography was published in the book "The World of Yesterday" (with the significant subtitle "Memories of a European"), an illuminating account of the European civilization.

The first short text of the volume is entitled "The Tower of Babel", in which Zweig describes the myth of the tower of the same name as a metaphor for the great monument of the spiritual unity of the European continent, which fell to pieces due to the discord of the European peoples, who lost the notion of the common effort necessary to complete the work; a project, on the contrary, that it is essential to resume. The second text traces an evolution of European thought throughout the centuries, which Zweig sees as a continuous alternation between national and supranational tendencies (from the Roman Empire to the religious unity broken up by the Reformation, from Renaissance humanism to the affirmation of the national States, etc.); it contains an enlightening sentence by Goethe ("At the moment when the commitment is to create new countries everywhere, for the one who rises above his time homeland is everywhere and in no place") and concludes with an act of trust in the future United States of Europe. In his third conference, Zweig asserts the need for a moral detoxification of Europe, in order to put an end to the national propaganda that wants to instigate every nation to hate its neighboring nation, instead of highlighting what each nation has in common in the history of human civilization. To this end, Zweig proposes a sort of Erasmus program long before it was set up, in which each student would spend one year studying at the University of another European country - recognized in his country of origin -, with a view to contribute to a mutual knowledge and understanding among European peoples.

Finally, in his last text dedicated to the unification of Europe, Zweig starts from the observation that "the European idea is not a primary feeling, as the patriotic sentiment is (...); it is not innate and instinctive, but arises from reflection; it is not the product of a spontaneous passion, but the slowly matured fruit of an elevated thought. It lacks the enthusiastic instinct that animates the patriotic sentiment". ... If the European idea has to have real effects, we have to pull it out of the esoteric sphere of intellectual discussions and devote all our energy to making it visible and convincing for an enlarged circle". According to Zweig, although a European

spirit has not yet manifested itself, we have the mathematical certainty of its existence, the same certainty of the astronomer who sees in his telescope a star appear whose existence his mathematical calculations have revealed.
Zweig draws the conclusion that books, documents, congresses and debates reach a small part of all Europeans, and precisely those who are already convinced of the European idea. It is therefore necessary to move from mere praiseworthy gestures by an elite to concrete action in civil society, through an organization capable of militating for the European idea and giving it a visible character. To this end, Zweig proposes concrete actions for mobilizing public opinion for the European project: creating a European university; recognizing a year of study at a foreign university; creating a common press organ for all Europeans, to be published in all European languages; concentrating all international conferences for one year in a single European city; establishing a supranational body that has the power to disprove all the "fake news" or accusations published in a European country regarding another country, etc. ... Stefan Zweig's lesson is striking for its topical relevance: reason is nothing without passion, and passion is powerless without organized action. For this reason Zweig's book concludes with the words borrowed from Goethe's Faust: instead of saying "in the beginning was the Word", let us rather say "in the beginning was the Action".
Zweig's book should be read in particular by the defenders of national patriotism, who have forgotten the harmful effects of nationalism and pretend to legitimize the superiority of their own nation over others ("America first", or "Deutschland über alles", or "D'abord les Français", or "Prima gli italiani"). The physicist Carlo Rovelli states, in his article "Let's stop the nationalists: there is only one homeland, humanity" in response to an article by Galli della Loggia in defense of national identity, that the latter is "good if it helps to overcome local interests for the common good", but it is "short-sighted and counterproductive when it promotes the interest of an artificial social group, namely "our nation", instead of a wider common good". Not because we do not have national identities - continues Rovelli - but because each of us is a crossroads of multiple and stratified identities. Putting the nation first means betraying all the others. In his book "28 centuries of Europe", the Swiss philosopher Denis de Rougemont mentions a hundred statesmen, philosophers and intellectuals who have devised or defended projects of European unity over the centuries. This has allowed Altiero Spinelli to assert the validity of the European project, because it has not been buried by history like other projects, but did always spring back to life after its defeats. As the most famous constitutionalist of the modern age, Montesquieu, said, "if someone would propose to me something that would prove useful to my homeland but detrimental to Europe, I would consider it a crime". But perhaps Galli della Loggia did not read this passage in Montesquieu's works.

Translated by Lionello Casalegno

The Destiny of Europe. A Sensation of *Déjà Vu*

Roger Vancampenhout

Ivan Krastev
After Europe
The University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia, 2017

Ivan Krastev, a Bulgarian political scientist, specializing in the post-Soviet world and European issues, has the voice of a convinced European from Central Europe. He founded and runs the Center for Liberal Strategies in Sofia. He is, among others, a permanent member of the Vienna Institute of Human Sciences. *After Europe* is not an optimistic book. It poses a shocking question: is the European Union, now facing several crises – financial crisis, migration crisis, crisis of its own security, re-emergence of ethnic and religious nationalisms, challenging populisms, etc. – bound to disintegrate in the manner the Habsburg Empire did?

"In recent years, the Europeans have come to understand that the Union's political model, although admirable, is unlikely to become universal, and even to be adopted by its closest neighbours."

Of the many crises that Europe is facing, the migration crisis is the most important; more than the economic crisis or the worsening of social inequalities, it is the failure of liberalism in dealing with the migratory problem that explains why its public opinion has turned around against it: the inequality between classes has given way to inequality between peoples. The migration crisis has precipitated the decline of the human rights discourse that had until then been the dominant discourse in European politics. Is the spread of the democratic system a decisive factor of de-stabilization? But the causes of Ivan Kristev's pessimism, I would say of his black ideas, do not stop there. According to him, all the crises that Europe is facing today split up the Union in one way or another. The crisis which affects the Eurozone divides the Union along a north-south axis. Brexit illustrates the division separating Europe from its periphery. The Ukrainian crisis divides Europe into hawks and doves on the question of whether to negotiate with Russia. But it is the east-west dividing line, which emerged as a result of the refugee crisis, that threatens the survival of the Union itself: the migration crisis has clearly shown that Eastern Europe is considering the cosmopolitan values that are at the foundation of the European Union as a threat, whereas, for many Western citizens, it is precisely these cosmopolitan values that constitute the heart of the new European identity; the deep-rooted defiance of Central Europe with regard to a cosmopolitan worldview would also be a source of division between East and West. Another factor of cleavage between East and West: the author puts his finger on a reality which characterizes Eastern Europe as a result of the opening of borders and freedom of movement. At the risk of giving the impression of sometimes mixing all the problems, the author cites the example of Bulgaria: its demographic decline, resulting from the mass emigration that people on average 25 to 50 year old chose, would have dealt a severe blow to the Bulgarian economy and politics, as well as to those of other Central European countries. That said, one should not want, I believe, to

have one thing and its opposite: freedom of movement, on the one hand; preservation of one's identity at any price, on the other hand. In this respect, the European trade unions have repeatedly advocated wage increases in those countries, precisely to contain emigration and brain drain. Moreover, the factors of social and societal division that we observe in the European Union are not caused by the European policies, but have everything to do with the globalization and the interpenetration of the markets, which do not spare Europe more than other regions of the world. In the conclusion of the book, entitled with some malice "Perhapsburg" – a play of words with a wink to the Habsburgs –, Ivan Krastev, inspired by Antonio Gramsci's pessimism of the intelligence and optimism of the will, wants to see the positive aspects of the current developments:

"In reality, the various crises that the European Union has undergone have contributed, much more than any of the cohesion policies implemented by Brussels, to consolidate the feeling that Europeans are all part of the same political community. By providing answers to the crisis of the euro, the migration issue and the growing terrorist threat, Europe is pursuing its integration process more than ever (...). There is a risk, however, that some Western leaders, in their legitimate attempt to respond to the social demand for concrete results, are tempted to neglect the legitimate concerns of Eastern Europeans, and to blame the problems arising between the East and the West on the illiberal governments of this part of the continent. That would be a mistake" (a reference to the current Hungarian and Polish governments, accused by some of drifting towards "democratures").

Post Scriptum In an interview to the Belgian newspaper *Le Soir*, Ivan Krastev commented reprovingly on the attitude of the "Brussels elites" *vis-à-vis* some democratic European countries: *"In times of crisis, you have the choice between rigidity and flexibility. If you choose to impose rules, you do it being well aware you are disciplining the reality. This was Germany's choice in the financial crisis. For my part, I say that we must choose flexibility: give others some leeway. Because, paradoxically, democracy cannot work if you do not give room to bad choices. Democracy is precisely to allow self-correction. If you do not allow others to make mistakes, you will not allow them to be responsible. (...) People should be allowed to make choices that we do not like. And I think it's the hardest thing to accept by the European elites in Brussels".*

Will the elites meditate on these strong words by Ivan Krastev? Is really the alternative, the European democracy, the world of the bullies (populists, sovereignists), sometimes so close to the borders of the Union, of whom speaks the book by Enrico Letta? And let the editor of this column greet Bulgaria, who took the rotating Presidency of the European Union on 1st January. And wish the best to the Bulgarian Commissioner Marya Gabriel, become the youngest member of the Juncker Commission, who was given the Digital Economy and Society portfolio.

Translated by Vittorio Quartetti

Eighty Years of Federalist Commitment in Europe

Michel Theys

Jean-Francis Billion, Wilfried Loth, Jean-Pierre Gouzy, Daniela Preda, Angelica Radicchi, Fabio Zucca (eds.)
Les fédéralistes en Europe des années 1930 à la fondation de l'Union européenne des fédéralistes (Paris – décembre 1946), Annexe: soixante-dix ans de campagnes fédéralistes pour une Europe unie et fédérale (1946-2016)
Presse Fédéraliste and UEF France, Maison des Européens de Lyon, 242 rue Duguesclin, 69003 Lyon, www.pressefederaliste.eu, coll. Textes fédéralistes, n° 16, 2018, p. 216, € 20, ISBN 978-2-9558710-5-8.

Dedicated to four French Federalists who died recently, this book has been conceived as an Introduction to the history of the modern federalist movements in Europe, and it ends with the foundation in Paris of the Union of European Federalists (UEF) on December 15, 1946, a moment of history which became the object of a Symposium that this work represents. In its first part, the historian Daniela Preda (University of Genoa) defines how the British federalist school influenced the birth of this organization, and she goes back to its genesis in Italy. Then other contributions shed light on how the European idea, and the Federalists, evolved in France from the thirties to the Liberation and the end of World War Two (Jean-Francis Billion). Professors Wilfried Loth (University of Duisburg-Essen) and Fabio Zucca (University of Insubria) did the same work concerning Germany and Switzerland. This part is completed by a testimony of the journalist Jean-Pierre Gouzy, who, being present at the inaugural meeting, reminds us that «it would probably never have taken place without the repercussions of the *Ventotene Manifesto* of 1941, without the European Resistance and personalities such as Henri Brugmans, Henri Frenay and Altiero Spinelli» and also the action of intellectuals such as «Jaspers, Spendler, de Rougemont, Lukács». For her part, Angelica Radicchi (University of Pavia) brings to light what was «the supranational vision» in the UEF publications between 1948 and 1953. In the second part of the book are painted the portraits of three of the founders of the UEF and the French Union of Federalists: Jean-Francis Billion and Jean-Luc Prevel remind us the work of Henri Frenay, the founder of the Resistance movement *Combat*; Professor Danièle Lochack (University Paris X) usefully remembers the memory of her father Pierre Lochak, born in Bessarabia, who illustrated the fact underlined by Spinelli that the future European Federalists were in a fairly important number longtime or former Communists; finally Jean-Pierre Gouzy comes back on the emblematic figure of integral federalism, Alexandre Marc.

MICHELE BALLERIN
Former Vice-Secretary of UEF Italy

KEITH BEST
Secretary of WFM, Chair & Chief Executive of the Wyndham Place Charlemagne Trust and Former Chair Executive Committee WFM-IGP

GIAMPIERO BORDINO
Professor in Contemporary History and Political Analyst. President of the Einstein Center for International Studies

GRAZIA BORGNA
Former Director of the Einstein Center for International Studies, Torino, Italy

JOSEP BORRELL
Spain's Minister of Foreign Affairs, the European Union and Cooperation, and Member of the Union of European Federalists of Spain (UEF-Spain)

ANDREAS BUMMEL
Founder of Democracy without Borders and Coordinator of the Campaign for a UN Parliamentary Assembly (CUNPA)

ANDREA COFELICE
Research Fellow at the Centre for Studies on Federalism, Torino, Italy

MICHELE FIORILLO
Co-founder of the campaign We Europeans. He has conceived the idea of a UN World Citizens Initiative. Former member of WFM Council and UEF-Italy Central Committee

ELENA FLOR
Secretary General Robert Triffin International

SANDRO GOZI
President of the UEF

ALON HELLED
PhD candidate, Universities of Turin and Florence. École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales

FERNANDO IGLESIAS
President of the WFM, Director of the Spinelli Chair in Buenos Aires, member of the Argentinian Parliament.

ALFONSO IOZZO
President of the Centre for Studies on Federalism and Vice President of Robert Triffin International

LUCIO LEVI
Member of UEF Federal Committee, Former President of UEF Italy

CAMILA LOPEZ BADRA
Executive Director of Democracia Global and Coordinator of the COPLA Campaign

ALBERTO MAJOCCHI
Professor Emeritus of Public Finance at the University of Pavia, Vice President of the Centre for Studies on Federalism, Torino, Italy

ANTONIO MOSCONI
Former President of the Einstein Center for International Studies. Research Department, Robert Triffin International

OPHELIE OMNES
Directly elected member of the Federal Committee of the UEF and President of UEF-France.

ROBERTO PALEA
Member and former President of the Centre for Studies on Federalism

PAOLO PONZANO
Professor of European Governance at the European College of Parma, Italy.Senior Fellow of the Schuman Centre of EUI

MICHEL THEYS
Editorialist of the daily bulletin Agence Europe

ROGER VANCAMPENHOUT
Member of the UEF Group Europe

RENE WADLOW
President, Association of World Citizens

FERGUS WATT
Executive Director of WFM – Canada and Chairperson of the WFM-IGP Executive Committee. He is also a member of the UN2020 Initiative's Coordination Group.